Balkanalysis.com

By Gergely Nagy*

Balkanalysis.com Editor’s note: in this new interview with noted Turkish policy expert Dr Doga Ulas Eralp, Hungarian researcher Gergely Nagy gets insight on a fascinatingly complex range of issues in which Turkey has a stake today- from investment in the Balkans, political and economic outreach in Africa, managing crises in Syria and Iraq, as well as the expected freeze on relations with the Cypriot Republic in June 2012.

Doga Ulas Eralp is non-resident Research Fellow at the SETA Foundation in Washington, D.C. He is currently also working as a Public-Private Dialogue Expert for Fragile and Conflict Affected States at the World Bank Group. Before his assignment to Washington, Dr Eralp was working as an assistant professor of conflict resolution at Sabanci University, Istanbul. He has also taught at George Mason University and the Brussels School of International Studies (BSIS).

Dr Eralp is also the author of a number of articles and book chapters on the Western Balkans, Cyprus and Turkey. His forthcoming book, The European Union in Bosnia Herzegovina: An Actor of Peace? (Lexington Books) will be out in winter 2012.  Dr Eralp received his Ph.D. from the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. He also holds a BA in Business Administration from Koc University, and a MA degree in Political Science from Sabanci University. His areas of expertise include governance, democratization processes, conflict resolution mechanisms, accountability, sustainable development partnerships, election monitoring, consociational systems, anti-corruption measures, inclusive dialogue platforms, human rights regime in Turkey, third party intervention roles in the ECA and MENA regions.

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Gergely Nagy: Turkey in recent years has experienced rapid economic growth, both exports and imports have also increased at a great pace and, according to these developments Turkish foreign policy has also become more active in the political, economic and cultural fields too. Do you see any major events or issues that could put hurdles in front of this rapid growth and have considerable, negative effect on development during the next few years? How would you evaluate the domestic and foreign factors in this question, which part could be of greater risk, if there is any?

Doga Ulas Eralp: There are two major developments in the Middle East that would affect Turkey’s policies in the coming year. The first such challenge is the withdrawal of the US troops from Iraq; following the departure of the US troops it is likely that the fragile political stability in Iraq will be altered at the expense of the autonomous Kurdish region in the north.

Turkey is the biggest trading partner of Iraqi Kurdistan and there is considerable Turkish investment in that region. Turkey would not like to see its investments and soaring trade relations with Iraqi Kurdistan put in jeopardy. Similarly Turkey started enjoying better cooperation with the Barzani leadership in the fight against the PKK. In the case of a renewal of hostilities between the Iraqi central government and the Kurds, Turkey might find itself in a position where it would need to act as an intermediary between the Arab parties and Iraqi Kurds.

Secondly, the political uncertainty in Syria is bound to worsen in the coming year as the Assad government struggles to find a solution and plunges into an all-out civil war. Turkey would be forced to establish a buffer zone [across] its border with Syria to thwart the flow of refugees before they reach the Turkish border.

One major development will be the freezing of relations with the Republic of Cyprus, when it takes over the rotating presidency in June 2012 for six months. Relations between South Cyprus and Turkey are already tense due to a crisis over the sharing of the oil resources on exclusive economic zones. Turkey’s progress toward EU membership has not been progressing due to the veto of the RoC and it seems that Turkey is in no hurry to push for reforms.

GN: Do you consider these events and risks – like Iraq, Syria or Cyprus – as long-lasting ones, or can some improvement could be expected in the upcoming year? Can these issues have a major impact on the economy of the affected Turkish regions?

DUE: 2012 will be the decision year for Cyprus. It is highly possible that Turkey actively might start pushing for the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus among its partners. Turkey will remain the biggest donor and trade partner keeping the Northern Cypriot economy afloat; this is especially crucial in a period where the South Cypriot economy is going through a tough financial crisis and had to concede to Russian and Israeli influence over the island. It will not be surprising to see the South Cyprus government eventually reaching out to Turkey to share the oil resources.

Similarly, for Iraq, 2012 will be an important year that would test the maturity of the Iraqi security structures. The first six months could prove to be politically volatile, and this might indeed affect Turkey’s trade with Iraqi Kurdistan substantially, but once the authorities in Baghdad and the Kurdish leaders agree on the control and distribution of oil revenues, Turkish-Iraqi relations will continue to grow at an even faster pace.

[The year] 2012 will definitely be a difficult one for Syria. As Syria’s former partners in the Arab world have begun to turn their backs on the Assad regime and started supporting economic and political measures, Syrian economy will stagnate and more segments of the once burgeoning Syrian middle class will pull their support from Bashar Assad. Turkey is expected to play a controversial role, to coordinate economic support for the insurgent groups in Syria. Many Turkish cities near the Syrian border have been benefiting from the good relations with Syria like Urfa, Gaziantep, Mardin and Hatay. The local businesses in those cities will definitely be negatively affected, but considering the bigger economic gains in place for Turkey following a possible regime change in Syria, these losses will be tolerated.

GN: In connection to this issue, do you think that the developing relations with several Balkan countries could offset the problems and possible partial political negativities on the Eastern and Southern borders of Turkey? To what extent could these steps affect Turkish domestic politics?

DUE: Turkey’s economic relations with the Balkan countries will continue to grow steadily, regardless of the developments in the Middle East. Turkey already has well developed relations with Bulgaria and Romania with billions of US dollars worth of investment. In the Western Balkans, Turkey will benefit even further from the political stability in Serbia, especially at a time when Serbia is bound to be recognized as a candidate to the EU. As Turkey-Serbia relations will continue to evolve into a partnership, there would definitely be more opportunities for Turkish investors in the region, in terms of infrastructure projects such as the construction of highways and energy transit lines.

GN: Turkey is also diversifying its foreign policy, widening and deepening relationships that had previously not been well-maintained. Do you consider this as an opportunity for maintaining, or even speeding up the current growth? Which countries could fuel Turkish growth, in terms of increasing exports, trade, investments etc.? Are these countries complementary to the existing export, investment countries or can they substitute for the existing ones?

DUE: Turkey’s primary focus in the coming decade will be diversifying its trade portfolio with the Middle Eastern and North African countries and the Sub-Saharan African countries that are projected to sustain a high growth rate, on the condition that they achieve political stability. Turkey is not considering substituting the European Union market with the MENA region and Sub-Saharan African countries, but diversifying the trade volume as a way of offsetting its over-dependency on the European markets and leveraging its influence in the Islamic world.
GN: Turkish foreign policy highlights the country’s economic achievements. However, considering the current negative trends in the European economy for example, what do you think about the possibilities in Turkish growth regarding the close future?

DUE: A significant portion of Turkey’s trade is still with the European Union. The crisis in the Eurozone has already started affecting Turkey’s projections for growth in the coming two years.  The sound state of the Turkish banking system is Turkey’s biggest asset in sailing through the crisis, but conservative fiscal policies of the Eurozone countries in the short-term might affect Turkey’s efforts to mitigate its current account deficit.

GN: What do you think would happen if Turkey does not prove able to sustain the current pace of growth? To what extent is this expansionist foreign policy – e.g. many new consulates around the world – built on the need for new markets? Is this growth only fueled by foreign trade and exports, and how could this trend develop in the years ahead?

DUE: Turkey’s growth will continue regardless of the developments in the Eurozone, albeit at a reduced rate. Building more sustainable relations with the rising economies of the world like the BRIC, via following a more active role in G-20 and leveraging its partnership with the US, Turkey’s economic growth will continue. The key element is political stability in Turkey. The AKP government is currently going through a difficult time in balancing its desire to maintain political stability in the country and the need to liberalize the political regime. If Turkish politics completes its liberal transformation, Turkey has the potential to become the primary peacemaker in the Eastern Mediterranean.

GN: How do you see this political stabilisation process developing? What are the main issues that AKP needs to address in order to achieve the liberal transformation of Turkish politics? Is this move of the AKP compatible with the current atmosphere in the Turkish politics, public?

DUE: The AKP government is in a political dilemma; on one side, the government acknowledges that the liberalization efforts of the Turkish political culture need to keep on track, especially in the fields of the judiciary and military-civilian relations; on the other hand, the government wants to maintain its grip on the regime without losing ground on the issue of the Kurdish problem and on the issue of freedom of expression. This is not an easy task and there are many challenges in place, such as the long periods of detention in place for the journalists in prison for different cases of the Ergenekon trials and KCK (the so-called political arm of the terrorist organization, PKK).

GN: Summing up the previous points, to what extent is Turkish economic growth facilitated by this active foreign policy, and how do the new export and investment markets contribute to Turkey’s more and more robust voice and stance in the regional and global field?

DUE: Turkey’s export-led growth has so far been the engine for Turkey’s assertive foreign policy in its near abroad and global foreign policies.  One significant development will be a more assertive Turkey in African politics.

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About the Interviewer

*Gergely Nagy is a Hungarian researcher who has written for various news outlets, research institutes and think tanks in Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Balkans, such as TransConflict and Transitions Online. He holds an MA in International Economic and Political Studies from from Charles University in Prague, with a thesis on recent Turkish foreign policy developments towards Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.

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Balkanalysis.com editor’s note: more than 50 years ago, Turkey started its EU accession project, with its first application to join the European Economic Community made in July 1959. Negotiations were delayed, however, because of several domestic political developments.

In 1999, the Helsinki Council concluded that Turkey would be accepted as a candidate country. Accession negotiations started in October 2005 but were subsequently suspended. Turkey showed more commitment to achieving the demanded reforms and the negotiations were resumed in January 2007. Even though some argue regarding the legitimacy of Turkey’s accession, some advantages of a strong EU partnership with Turkey could not be ignored. They refer mainly to its geo-strategic position, its economic prosperity and trade balance.

With key parliamentary elections coming up in just one week, Balkanalysis.com is providing insight into the foreign policy goals and strategies of the Turkish government with the following interview. Speaking with with Brussels-based Balkanalysis.com correspondent Maria-Antoaneta Neag, Mr. Egemen Bağış, Turkish Minister for European Union Affairs and Chief Negotiator with the EU, shares his experience and opinions regarding Turkey’s dialogue with the European bloc, as well as his country’s new foreign affairs policy and economic growth targets.

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Turkey’s Dialogue with the EU

Maria Neag: What would be the assets deriving from Turkish membership in the European Union?

Egemen Bağış: It is a fact that Turkey is key to Europe’s future, through its dynamic economy, young population and wide role in global affairs. Today, Turkey is not a meek candidate waiting at the European Union’s door. On the contrary, it is a country which plays a key role in global affairs, in energy security and in the global economy.

The European Union’s main problem today is economic stagnation. Europeans need economic dynamism. Imagine the power of the European Union when the continent’s fastest growing economy and youngest working population joins it. Imagine the impact of the strong Turkish market and dynamic Turkish industries.

Turkey’s membership is not only related to economy. Turkey will be an important player in Europe’s security and defense policy. It will be an indispensable partner in its quest for energy and a major contribution to its cultural diversity.

MN: Ria Oomen-Ruijtenm a MEP a d the EPP rapporteur for Turkey, adopted by the European Parliament, expressed concerns regarding the transparent functioning of Turkish institutions. The rapporteur argues that the pre-trial detention periods are excessively long and there is a need for effective judicial guarantees for all suspects. Do these reports and criticism have any influence on the government’s decisions in this sense? Is Turkey working to achieve an independent and democratic judiciary system?

EB: Turkey is determined to carry out its reform process in order to achieve full compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria. We consider the judicial reforms as one of the key components of this process.

This is indeed reflected in the 2010 Constitutional amendments, which aimed to bolster the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. This reform package amended the independence of the judiciary, ensured Turkish citizens’ access to justice through introducing the right of individual application to the Constitutional Court and limited the jurisdiction of the military courts.

As a result, the Law on the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors went into force on 18 December 2010. Civil Procedure Law was enacted on 2 February 2011. The Law on the Establishment of Constitutional Court and Trial Procedures followed on 3 April 2011, taking the Venice Commission’s recommendations into account.

Constitutional amendments also paved the way for the establishment of the Ombudsman institution which will increase the transparency and the accountability of the administration. Currently the Draft Law is on the agenda of the Parliament.

One of the significant developments is the enactment of new provisions of the Criminal Procedural Code (CPC) on 1 January 2011, which decrease maximum terms of arrest and give suspects in the criminal proceedings the constitutional and legal rights to object and appeal against decisions during every phase of the judgment process. Besides, decisions on arrest are subject to regular examination of a court in every month at the latest.

Further amendments, passed on 9 February 2011, also serve to speed up the appeals process and shorten trial periods.

The increase in the number of chambers of the Court of Cassation as well as its members ensures fast access to justice. These measures will ease the workload of the higher courts that will eventually decrease the pre-trial detention periods.

MN: What is Turkey going to do regarding the freedom of the press? The definition of terrorism in Turkey makes it hard for journalists to express their views without being held accountable in front of a court. Are there reforms under way as to clarify this legislative “trap”?

EB: Freedom of expression and press are safeguarded by the Constitution and other relevant legislation in Turkey. We are determined to continue reforms on freedom of expression and press, which are not only crucial for our path towards European Union accession, but also for deepening democracy.

We are determined to enhance the scope of freedom of expression through the means of participatory democracy. To ensure this, we have to reform not only legislation, but the mindset of all professionals working to safeguard these freedoms. This, naturally, takes time and political determination.

One of the first priorities of our Government when it came to power was to have a new and more liberal Press Law. Corresponding changes were made in the Constitution and relevant laws that enhanced freedom of expression and press freedom. In seven of the EU Harmonization Packages out of eight adopted between the years of 2002 and 2004, major legal improvements had been made concerning freedom of expression.

The Turkish Penal Code has been amended in July 2005, with a more liberal approach regarding freedom of expression and media. In order to enhance the awareness of judges and prosecutors, the Ministry of Justice issued a Circular reminding that investigations pertaining to the misuse of freedom of thought and expression shall be made in accordance with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and other international human rights standards.

The “infamous” Article 301, which was used against many Turkish intellectuals has been revised. Ambiguous terms in the article have become clear and the Minister of Justice’s permission is brought as a condition to open an investigation. After the introduction of this amendment, there was a substantial decrease in the number of cases opened. In 2010, only 10 cases citing Article 301 were carried out, out of 403 applications.

MN: What is your opinion concerning the ongoing trials against Turkish writers (the most famous being Orhan Pamuk)? They exiled themselves in various European countries or the US for fear of imprisonment. How can Turkey regain its credibility regarding the freedom of expression?

EB: It would be very unfair to refer to one of Turkey’s greatest and best-selling writers, currently at the prestigious Colombia University, as in exile. Just because Milan Kundera has chosen to live in Paris does not mean that he is on exile either.

In the case of Mr. Pamuk, he is sufficiently anchored in Istanbul where he wants to create a museum.

The law that was invoked to bring a case against Mr. Pamuk no longer exists. He was prosecuted for insulting “Turkishness” under Article 301 of the Penal Code in its old version. The charges against Orhan Pamuk have been dropped when it was amended.

Although painful, the trial of Mr. Pamuk, Turkey’s best-selling author, taught us an important lesson on laws on freedom of expression, a lesson that we have taken to heart.

As I have mentioned, the Turkish Penal Code was further amended on 8 May 2008, which made it even more difficult to evoke Article 301.

MN: Women’s rights represent a sensitive subject in the Turkey-EU discussions. Even though Turkey has passed legislation protecting women against domestic violence and honor killings, it is said that the implementation of these laws is deficient. Do you agree with this criticism? What efforts are made in order to enhance women’s rights in Turkey? Do you think that we will soon be able to see more women active in politics?

EB: Following the footsteps of Kemal Atatürk, founder of the Turkish Republic, we are determined to strengthen and protect women’s rights. There have been remarkable legal developments in recent years to eliminate discrimination against women.

The most recent development is the constitutional amendment on Article 10, bringing positive discrimination for women.

Last year, the Women-Men Equality of Opportunities Commission in the Parliament was established to review the applications regarding the claims on breach of gender equality.

In order to ensure efficient combating of violence against women, a national action plan has been put in place. This National Action Plan identifies six main fields: legal arrangements, social awareness and mental transformation, advancement of women’s socio-economic status, protective services, curative and rehabilitation services and inter-sectoral cooperation. Furthermore, a protocol has been signed between the Ministry of Justice and the State Ministry responsible of Women and Family in order to raise awareness on fight against domestic violence and promote gender equality.

MN: Turkey is aiming to reach a visa liberalisation agreement with the EU. Some of the technical conditions regarding the visa waiver have already been fulfilled by Turkey (i.e. biometric passports). Certain efforts are ongoing within the framework of integrated borders management system. However, a problem remains regarding the readmission agreement, one of the conditions for lifting up the visas. Would signing such an agreement be so costly for Turkey? How could Turkey get the same facilitations as the Western Balkan countries did?

EB: Turks have difficulty to understand why, despite their long-standing relations with the European Union and their status as a negotiating candidate, they have to get visas to enter into EU countries, unlike other candidates and a good number of third countries.

Our demarches to the EU Member States and institutions for visa liberalization to Turkey were met by a request to fulfil the obligation of signing a Readmission Agreement. We were ready to do that, provided that the conclusion and initialling of the Readmission Agreement was in parallel to the initiation of the visa dialogue process between Turkey and the EU Commission towards a visa-free regime.

Negotiations that were carried out in the most constructive manner to conclude the Readmission Agreement with the EU resulted with a balanced and applicable text in May 2010, where Turkey displayed an attitude of good will despite the difficulties raised by some member states.

Yet, all this work was undermined by the Justice and Home Affairs Council, which failed to give a mandate to the Commission to start negotiations on a detailed action plan with Turkey and present the associated road map with the ultimate goal of visa-free travel for Turkish citizens. Turkey will only sign the Readmission Agreement if this is done.

Although disappointed, we will continue to work with the EU on the common challenge of irregular migration. In this framework, Turkey will implement effective regulations on integrated border management.

Turkey as a Global Player

MN: The forthcoming Polish Presidency declared that it will support Turkey in the visa question, hoping that the partnership with the EU will be thus strengthened. Can we translate this as being an EU concern that Turkey will slowly abandon its commitment towards the EU in favour of an axis shift?

EB: Turkey certainly welcomes the Polish Presidency’s inclusion of its intention to continue the accession process of Turkey in its programme. Poland is a country which has one of the highest levels of support to enlargement and we are confident that we will work closely with Warsaw on the visa question and other priority issues of the Presidency, from energy to defense, from agriculture to border security.

I do not think that any European Union member state needs to be concerned that Turkey is shifting its attention away from the European Union. In view of our multilateral policy, we have certainly many areas of focus, from the Middle East to Balkans, from Caucasus to North Africa. This, I believe, is actually one of our assets in our accession talks with the European Union and one of the benefits we will bring to the EU as a member state.

MN: What role will Turkey play when the revolutionary wave from the Middle East and Africa will come to an end?

EB: As the wave of uprisings sweep over Middle East and Northern Africa, Turkey’s democratization process coupled with its socio-economic transformation particularly in the last one decade, has been attracting extensive attention. Turkey emerged as a “source of inspiration” to the pro-change groups of the region.

Historical ties with the countries of the region dating back to the Ottoman era contribute to Turkey’s popularity. Yet, the source of inspiration is rather about what Turkey symbolizes today – that is, a strong regional actor with major socioeconomic transformation backed up with democratic development.

The firm anchoring of Turkey within international structures has definitely strengthened the internal dynamics of the country. The orientation of Turkey in such organizations acted as a strong stimulus of the consolidation of democracy. Particularly in the last decade, Turkey has taken bold steps on freedom of expression, freedom of the press, privacy of individual life, freedom of religion, freedom of association. The death penalty has been abolished. Civil-military relations have been normalized. The Turkey of today has become a “beacon of democracy” for those people who are trying to overthrow authoritarian regimes in their own homelands.

The uprisings have brought Turkey to the forefront of Arab minds – and, in the process, have underlined how important is the integration between Turkey and the EU. When a Moroccan taxi-driver in New York or an Egyptian waiter in London asks whether Turkey will someday be a member of the EU, there is now no surprise at the question. The people, media, and governments of the Middle East closely follow Turkey’s EU vocation.

The Arabs who are trying to overthrow authoritarian regimes are seeking freedom and change today, and democracy and prosperity tomorrow. Turkey’s accession to the EU would send a positive signal to them.

It would also be a good sign for the millions who for centuries have felt marginalised by Western structures. In the Muslim world, the double standards that Turkey faces in its accession bid feed these old sentiments, and they keep alive questions about whether the EU truly represents a set of values or merely defines itself narrowly as a ‘Christian Europe.’

Turkey’s Democratic Tests: Constitutional Reform and General Elections

MN: How will the new Turkish constitution be designed? What outcome is to be expected from this reform?

EB: It is too early to speculate on the new constitution before the elections but there are three certainties in that regard.

First, the fact that the overwhelming majority of Turkish citizens have voted in favor of the 2010 Constitutional Amendment Package demonstrated that not only the government but the people of Turkey support a new, more liberal and non-military constitution.

Secondly, the new constitution will be a “constitution of consensus” – unlike the 1982 Constitution which was the remnant of a military regime.

Thirdly, it will be a constitution befitting an EU member state. It will consolidate Turkey’s democratic reforms. It will ensure Turkish citizens to benefit fully from fundamental rights in a more democratic system by lifting the restrictions of the military regime. Thus, it will further strengthen the institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law in Turkey.

MN: There will be general elections on June 12. What rhetoric should we expect from the parties involved?

EB: Politics, particularly in electoral periods, are volatile. Especially in a great country like Turkey, you have big issues, big promises and sometimes big divergences of view between competing parties.

I am happy to say that Turkey’s accession to the European Union is not one of those points of divergence. I am glad that the EU issue is not being used as a propaganda tool in the elections. It is a positive sign that issues about the EU are not being brought into the election discourses of opposition parties. This is a sharp contrast to some European Union member states where Turkey is used as some sort of scapegoat or “tete de Turc” in their election campaigns.

The priority of the parties running for the elections is to serve the citizens and the social good. A sound rhetoric shares the vision for the future of Turkey by responding to these social and economic needs in the context of international economic circumstances.

My own party envisions the year 2023 as the target date for a prosperous, developed and powerful Turkey. We believe that all of our citizens, every single one of them, deserves the best and we have written our programme accordingly.

Assessing Turkey’s Economic Growth

MN: The 2010 figures revealed an unexpected 8.9% growth rate of the Turkish economy. Moreover, the trend is expected to continue in 2011 and 2012, with rates between 4.5% and 5.5%. What are “the engines” laying behind this evolution?

EB: When you look at it from a pure economic point of view, strong domestic demand, strong investment growth, rising industrial output, improved foreign trade and foreign direct investments all contribute to Turkey’s growth, which is higher than the EU expectations.

We think that Turkey’s position as the fastest growing economy in Europe is sustainable in the coming years.

From a wider perspective, I think our macroeconomic stability and predictability is, ironically, the result of the bitter lessons of a decade ago, when Turkey had its worst financial and economic crisis in its modern history. The Turkish economy has been involved in a structural transformation process afterwards. From then on, stability became the main focus of our macroeconomic policies with the support of significant structural reforms.

The role of the EU accession period is also significant. EU membership perspective have played an anchor role for stability and sustained economic growth during this transformation process. Our government has preserved price stability with the help of sound economic policies as well as fiscal discipline. As a result of this, any negative effects of the global financial and economic crisis on our economy have been limited in terms of both duration and scale and we have been able to recover rapidly with a remarkable growth rate in 2010.

In the light of impressive growth performance of Turkish economy over the last decade with the exception of 2009, we take the economic success in 2010 as a continuation of this trend rather than as a surprise.

MN: You mentioned in a speech held in the European Parliament on the occasion of the event “The Turkish children’s perception on the EU and the Turkish accession perspective”, organised by the Friends of Turkey (on 4th of May), that Turkey’s economic goal is to become the 20th economic world power by 2023, which will be the date celebrating 100 years since the formation of the Turkish modern state. What are the policies Turkey will employ in order to achieve such an ambitious target?

EB: Turkey, as a dynamic emerging economy, is determined to catch up with the bigger actors of the global playground. In order to reach our target, Turkey will continue to follow sound macroeconomic policies, fiscal discipline and structural reforms in order to further improve stability and growth.

To this end, we have already launched our development strategies for the improvement of the physical infrastructure and research & development to boost the economic activities. These strategies refer also to the priorities like environment, energy, transport, innovation, education, health and SMEs.

With the help of these extensive structural reforms and strategies, Turkey will be able to unlock its untapped capacity and improve its potential. By 2023, Turkey will reach its targets like income per capita worth 25,000 USD, exports volume amounting 500 billion USD, and being one of the top 5 agricultural powers of the world. And this will bring Turkey up to the league of the world’s top 10 economies.

Last but Not Least…

MN: Turkey is a Eurasian country whose territory spreads across different regions, with different historical and cultural backgrounds. One might stress that people from Anatolia, for example, don’t have the same EU aspirations as do Istanbul inhabitants. Is there a general support for Turkey’s accession to the EU? What do people expect from the EU?

EB: Turkey is a country where continents and cultures meet – and whose own heritage is deeply entwined with that of the European Union. The “Sick Man of Europe” of the 19^th century is now the “Robust Man” of Europe.

Turkish people from multicultural metropolises to Anatolian cities want to be a part of the European Union if that means better living standards, more democratic rights, and prosperity.

However, this desire is dimmed by what they perceive as the unfair attitude of the European Union. From the perspective of the Turkish public, the question is a “trust” issue – “Can we trust the European Union to treat our candidacy fairly and make a fair decision when we have met the criteria?” The European Union has to work with us, Turkey’s government and its people, to readdress its somewhat battered image and credibility in the eyes of Turks.

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In the following interview, Balkanalysis.com Director Chris Deliso gets the views of Mehmet Ozkan and Birol Akgun, two leading academic experts on Turkey’s burgeoning diplomatic and economic engagement with Africa.

The work of Mr Ozkan, a PhD scholar at Spain’s Sevilla University, focuses on how cultural and religious elements shape foreign policy mentality in South Africa, Turkey and India. Prior to that, he studied at Istanbul University in Turkey, the University of Johannesburg in South Africa and Linkoping University in Sweden. For his part, Birol Akgun is a professor of international relations at Selcuk University in Konya, and has affiliations with the Institute of Strategic Thinking (SDE), an Ankara based think-tank. Professor Akgun concentrates on Turkish domestic and foreign policy and global security issues in general.

Readers interested in learning more about the topic should read an important article co-authored by Ozkan and Akgun, entitled “Turkey’s Opening to Africa” and published in Cambridge University Press’s 2010 Journal of Modern African Studies. References in the following interview are to comments made in that specific article.

Background and Ideologies

Chris Deliso: When did Turkey start to really perceive the value of expanding its diplomatic and economic reach in Africa? In your article, you point to 1998 – four years before the current AKP government took power – as a key date, a year after the EU failed to give Turkey candidate status at its summit. You point to this rejection as one part of the reason why the then-foreign minister, Ismail Cem, created the ‘Opening up to Africa’ policy document. Historically speaking, do we know what were the other motivations or influencing parties behind the creation of this doctrine?

Birol Akgun: As a matter of fact, there were some political initiatives made by Turkey in the 1960s to reach out to the third-world countries, in order to develop political relations with the non-Western world, and for a couple of reasons. To start with, after American President Lyndon Johnson wrote a letter explaining that the US might not be willing to defend Turkey against the Soviet Union in case of Turkey’s use of force in Cyprus, Turkey’s political elite began questioning the value of NATO’s security umbrella for Turkey.

Therefore, the Turkish government sent some ambassadors to different African countries and tried to reach out to the Non-aligned movement as well. Again, when the US Congress imposed an arms-sale embargo against Turkey (a NATO ally) because of Turkey’s involvement in Cypriot affairs, a large majority of people in the country lost their belief in the US, and some political parties including leftists, Islamists and nationalists advocated that Turkey must follow a more diversified foreign policy, one that should look at both the west and east at the same time.

In the 1980s, Turgut Özal somehow found a way to develop good relations with many Middle Eastern countries for economic reasons. When the Cold War ended, then, again it was Özal who successfully explored ways of further deepening ties with the countries of the ex-Soviet bloc, including the Central Asian Turkic states. The expansion of the three-party Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) into Central Asia, and the creation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) were part of Özal’s new opening strategy to the neighboring regions.

Thus, when Ismail Cem took over the MFA post in the coalition government of 1997, Turkey had already developed economic ties and political frameworks within Turkey’s immediate geo-political environment. Now it was time for Turkey to further its vision for the African continent across the Mediterranean Sea.

Therefore, it would be a simplistic view to explain Turkey’s rapprochement with Africa merely in the context of its rejection by the EU in 1997, if we do not take into consideration Turkey’s growing interest in various parts of the world in the last three decades. In sum, Turkey’s opening to Africa is not a reactionary move but rather a visionary approach.

CD: In the article, you also note that it was only after 2005 that a “massive effort” began to increase Turkish presence in Africa. So, to what extent should the credit be shared between Cem and Davutoğlu, the latter with his expansive foreign policy vision of “strategic depth” for Turkey? Was this simply a continuation of the late 1990s-era policy, being implemented finally at a time when the opportunity arose?

Mehmet Ozkan: Ismail Cem had some thoughts about reshaping Turkey’s foreign policy in the new era. But he was serving as foreign minister in a three-party coalition government that made his efforts difficult to organize in a coherent way. Also, the economic crisis in 2000-2001 in Turkey was so severe that Turkey could not look beyond or commit itself to Africa by undertaking coherent and coordinated diplomatic work.

It would be unjust, however, to say that now Ahmet Davutoğlu is just simply following what Cem already started. It certainly helped and was important; however, what Davutoğlu has brought is the sophistication and connection of Turkey’s relations with different regions. Davutoğlu believes that every [Turkish] move in Africa or in Latin America has implications for Turkey’s relations with other regions as well. So Turkey now acts considering all in a single approach. Of course, it was [necessarily] Turkey’s political stability and high level of economic growth under the current AK Party government that have provided the opportunity for Davutoğlu’s vision to be fully implemented in the 2000s.

CD: The current realization of this policy is now becoming tangible. You cite that Turkey is opening 15 new embassies in various African countries, while in the 1990s some of the few that were there had to be closed due to lack of budget. Where is all the money coming from to do so? What other regions of the world have suffered in terms of foreign ministry budget being taken from one priority to the new one in Africa?

BA: You open an embassy if your country gains in economic and political terms. Before Turkey’s trade with Africa was very limited, and mostly with a few countries. Now, as Turkey opens to the world and develops economic relations, new embassies are a necessity. As far as we know, there is no other region that has suffered from a lack of budget [as a result]. Beside, Turkey’s growing export sector is also demanding political support, to expand their business in Africa as well.

CD: On the same theme, have the foreign ministry budget and the Africa expansion plans in specific had to be defended against any criticisms from the Turkish opposition parties? Or is there a feeling that the new diplomatic opportunities that will arise will help the new embassies to “pay for themselves.”

MO: When Turkey announced 2005 as the ‘year of Africa,’ many people were so critical and many journalist and former diplomats saw this as a waste of time and energy and resources. However, when Turkey’s opening to Africa started to pay off, those critics went silent. In that sense, the Erdoğan government has changed the conception of Africa in Turkey. The image of Africa in Turkey is now much more positive than it had been before.

CD: Historically, has the security sector played any role in the ‘opening to Africa’ for Turkey? After all, Turkey’s most famous moment in Africa in modern history is probably the abduction of Kurdish PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, by Turkish secret agents in Kenya in February 1999. Did that operation transpire successfully because of renewed Turkish activities in Africa? If so, in what respects?

BA: Neither the security sector nor the capture of Ocalan in Kenya have contributed to this opening, nor been influential for this opening in a meaningful way. It is a civil society-driven opening, and the state has to follow it most of the time [to keep up].

Institutions, Organizations and Economics

CD: You note that in 2005, Turkey was granted ‘observer status’ at the African Union. Practically speaking, what does this mean for a country such as Turkey? What new capacities can the observer build, what new sources of information are opened, etc?

MO: This ‘observer status’, if nothing else, will help in one thing: to overcome the lack of knowledge on both sides. In Africa, even little kingdoms require a visa for Turkish citizens- not because they see Turkey or Turks in a different way, but just because they don’t even know where Turkey is, and if such a country exists at all.

Both sides thus need time to understand each other and to see the potential. We think that permanent contacts will facilitate this and lay the foundation for future relations. Briefly, observer status and political communication help both sides in changing mutual perceptions.

CD: This new institutional cooperation also involves military training for various African forces in Turkey. That said, have there been any concerns from NATO or NATO states about the potential for exfiltration of sensitive information or other potential compromising of classified NATO material? If so, what was the reaction?

BA: Turkey’s military relations with Africa are still very basic. Mostly, it involves police training. There is no need for NATO to have concerns.

CD: Your research cites that Turkey’s volume of trade with African countries shot up from $5.4 billion in 2003 to over $16 billion in 2008- with the government hoping to clear $30 billion per annum soon. What industries and companies in particular have benefited most from this rapid trade increase?

MO: Construction companies and those who produce mechanical parts benefited most.

CD: What are the major Turkish investors in Africa? Do you expect these to increase their role in coming years? Are there others, yet to emerge, who have shown interest in African markets?

BA: Mostly they are medium-sized companies. Their economic activities will increase in coming years, as many new companies are entering into African market.

CD: A major new trade organization in Turkey, the Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON), is discussed in your treatment of Turkish-African relations. Founded in 2005, it apparently represents 11,500 businessmen and has organized (among its other trade conferences) three sessions with Africa, in which thousands of Turkish businessmen have been informed of opportunities in Africa.

Considering the implication that the TUSKON is also in some respects an ally of the AKP government, along with your observation that Turkish society still has many ingrained negative stereotypes about Africa, what can we make of this concerted action? Is it a case of politics driving economics, or vice versa? That is, does the government want more Turkish investors in Africa to bolster its political and ideological agenda, or are the  businessmen pushing the politicians to develop new economic opportunities in Africa for purely financial reasons?

BA: Both the government and business community are helping each other. It is a perfect example of a convergence of interest between civil society and the state.

CD: You note that the inaugural Turkey-Africa summit was held in 2008 in Istanbul, and will be held next in 2013, somewhere in Africa. Considering that South Africa and Nigeria are Turkey’s biggest trade partners on the continent, can we expect one of these to host the event? Or are there any other likely hosts in the running?

MO: So far, there is no information about the next Turkey-Africa summit. Our guess is that it will take place in a central or east African country (e.g. Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia) rather than in Nigeria or South Africa.

Development, Religion and Politics

CD: In your article, you mention the important role that the TIKA, Turkey’s international development agency, has played in humanitarian work in Africa. Can we compare the TIKA’s role to those of similar development agencies from the US or EU states, of course accounting for the relative wealth and capacities of each respective to one another?

BA: Yes, it is very much comparable with development agencies in European countries. In the end, it is the official aid agency of Turkey, and acts in accordance with Turkey’s priorities and planning.

CD: Has the TIKA presence been able to help Turkish diplomacy and intelligence in any tangible ways? Do the Turkish aid authorities choose their destinations of work in Africa based solely on perceived humanitarian need, or for political and strategic goals as well? If so, are there any examples you can point out?

MO: TIKA has tried to cover all of Africa, and it acts with a balance between strategic planning and humanitarian needs in Africa. TIKA is not an intelligence agency, and Turkey’s approach to Africa is more driven by economic and trade interest than political concerns at this stage.

CD: In your article, you cite a very interesting detail involving Turkey’s little-known Directorate for Religious Affairs. In November 2006 in Istanbul, you note, the government organized a historic “Religious Leaders Meeting of African Continent Muslim Countries and Societies,” Apparently, the African leaders present emphasized that they wished to restore the Ottoman legacy which they saw as positive. To what extent do you believe this was a genuine feeling of enthusiasm? After all, it was obviously the response that the Turkish hosts wanted to hear…

MO: Interest in the Ottoman legacy is very much alive among Muslims in Africa, especially in Eastern and Western Africa. We think it is an expression of genuine feeling. We think in the future that we will see this playing a greater role in relations, as both Turkey and Africa are reshaping their historical narratives.

CD: Again, regarding the Directorate, your research reveals that in 2009 the government invited through its embassies 300 African Islamic students to study theology in Turkey. The implication, as far as I understand, was that Turkey was and is selling this as a positive alternative to radical Islamic teachings being conducted elsewhere in Africa. To the best of your knowledge, is this new development sort of a policy point that Turkish leaders have sought to emphasize when meeting with Western diplomats concerned with radicalism in Africa?

BA: There is no official discourse on it, nor any information regarding such a conversation with Western diplomats. Inviting African students to study in Turkey, in theology and other fields, is part of Turkey’s soft power effort in Africa. Turkey has long experience with providing support to students of developing countries as well.

CD: According to your research, the Turkish charity Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) is now present in 41 African countries, and has spent many millions of dollars on humanitarian operations. Since in many cases it has been the first Turkish contact with locals, you have dubbed it a sort of “pioneering” organization. Yet considering its orientation as an Islamist proselytizing organization, to what extent does the group and its members represent the general mainstream of Turkish society? Is there a risk that Africans might get a limited sense of Turkey and its people from exposure to only one such group?

MO: The secularist elite in Turkey has no Africa vision, nor have they an interest to develop one. The IHH goes to Africa with the intention of [providing] humanitarian aid. Today, the IHH is considered one of most credible aid organization in Turkey. It enjoys a huge legitimacy among the vast majority in Turkey.

Besides, there are many other organizations that have projects in Africa as well. Many businessmen have connections with Africa. Africa has already been exposed to all layers of Turkish society through different channels. In addition, so far the IHH has not played a missionary role; rather its activities are mostly focused on tangible developmental and humanitarian projects in Africa.

CD: Again on the IHH, this group is dealing with famine relief, other natural disasters, and infrastructure issues. Another example was the large-scale, free cataract-removal operations for poor Africans, accompanied by a marketing slogan- that Turkey would ‘open the eyes of 100,000 Africans’ by these operations. However, considering the group’s religious goals, can we understand this slogan in another sense? If so, are there records being kept of Turkey’s ‘successes’ in bolstering Muslim faith and expanding Islam in Africa?

BA: No. We don’t think any organization in Turkey, be it IHH or others, hold such a record.

CD: You note that Turkish influence has also been stepped up in the form of schools. I understand there are now large areas in African countries where the Turkish language is being spoken or understood for the first time by the local peoples. Has language knowledge transfer helped Turkish political and economic aspirations in any specific ways?

BA: It only helps Africans to know Turkey and Turkish culture first-hand. It may help Africa to aspire to develop political and economic relations. Some graduate of these schools also continue their higher-education studies in Turkey. They can thus naturally serve as a bridge between Turkey and African nations.

Future Likelihoods

CD: Whether or not the AKP government’s contentious relationship with the Turkish military causes damage for Turkey’s military-industrial sector, will we see Turkish military industry begin to sell more weaponry to African states?

MO: I doubt it. Actually, the Turkish military is interested in buying, rather than selling. For example, Turkey has had a long-time interest in buying the Rooivalk attack helicopters for the Turkish army from South Africa.

CD: Commentators sometimes portray Africa as the ground for a global economic exploitation war between China and the United States. How has Turkey’s new positioning on the continent benefited it there in relations to these two superpowers?

MO: Turkey’s move is more modest comparing to that of India, China, US and others. Therefore, such a rivalry has almost no influence on Turkey’s opening at this stage.

CD: You say that Turkey needs Africa for ‘diversifying energy resources’- can you clarify more about what this means?

MO: As is well-known, Turkey’s energy resources very much depend on various countries, such as Russia. Turkey is desperately looking to diversify it energy resources for its high-speed development. Africa has a share in that planning too. That is why we look at trade statistics between Turkey and Africa; energy resources play an important role in Turkey’s import from Africa along with other things.

CD: Turkish leaders have recently stated their support, as you indicate, for Africa in terms of being a ‘voice’ for the continent on the international stage. Western states are usually quite skittish about getting involved in interventions in Africa, and dealing with widespread instability such as the recent killings in Ivory Coast are not high on the Western agenda. That said, do you feel that there could be possible cases in which Turkey would push for military intervention in African disputes?

BA: Turkey’s willingness to act as the voice of Africa is true when it comes to humanitarian and developmental issues, not so much in security matters. For instance, Turkey in the UN Security Council and in other platforms, such as the G-20 and UNDP, always consulted with African nations and defended their priorities in the official meetings- as was the case in the UN Millennium Development Goals meeting in September 2010. The fact that Turkey in May 2011 will also hold a large LDCs meeting in Istanbul is also an indication of its commitment to African issues.

However, when it comes to political and security matters, Turkey has always been cautious about involvement in foreign countries’ domestic conflicts; rather, it has always acted with the international community, paying utmost attention to international law and legitimacy. It may take part in peace-building missions in Africa, such was the case in Somalia in the early 1990s, but it never unilaterally considers sending troops to any country. But diplomatically speaking, we expect, Turkey will always be willing to help friendly countries in Africa.

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In the following exclusive interview, Balkanalysis.com Director Christopher Deliso speaks with Philip Giraldi, a former CIA deputy chief of base in Turkey. Through the interview, readers get a first-hand introduction to the cloak-and-dagger reality of undercover work in one of the world’s most important strategic areas. Iranian assassinations, Turkish eavesdropping and other eye-opening stories allow the reader an intimate inside look into the shadowy, high-stakes game of international espionage.

Mr. Giraldi’s biography and career information are provided after the interview.

Christopher Deliso: First of all, please share some background information about your mission. What exactly was your position in Turkey? For how long were you stationed there?

Philip Giraldi: I served as deputy chief of base of Istanbul from 1986 to 1989. In the CIA, a station is in the capital city, Ankara, in this case, and is subordinate to the Embassy. All other field elements in any given country are called bases.

CD: Right. But I would imagine that as “bases’ go, Istanbul was a fairly important one, no? What were you tasked with doing, primarily?

PG: Istanbul was the largest CIA base in Europe when I was there. Since the Cold War was still going on, most officers were involved in monitoring the Soviet Navy, which had to pass through the Bosporus to get into the Mediterranean.

Intelligence Gathering in Turkey: a “Highly Sensitive’ Operation

PG: We thus paid a lot of attention to the other intelligence agencies operating in Istanbul, most notably the Russians and the Egyptians, both of whom had managed to penetrate the Turkish intelligence services, something that we had been unable to do.

CD:: Really! A Muslim state like Egypt is understandable, but how did the Soviets manage to get inside? And on that note, were there any dramatic Cold War showdowns that you saw?

PG: Re. the Russians in Turkey, there were no dramatic incidents because the Turks were all over their diplomats through surveillance and monitoring. How they managed to penetrate Turkish intelligence I never quite understood, though I assume it was an ideological “fellow traveler” who had volunteered his services. It is my understanding that the Turks never discovered who the miscreant was.

As for the CIA, we did not do much on Turkish internal affairs, leaving that to the US Embassy’s political officers.

CD: Why? Was spying on the Turks out of the question, or too difficult or what?

PG: The CIA did not make much of an effort to develop good sources among Turks because it was extremely perilous to do so, both in terms of US broader equities and because the Turks were very aggressive in a counter-intelligence sense.

CD: That’s interesting- and a little surprising, since Turkey is a very important country for the US. By “broader US equities,’ do you mean diplomatic relations?

PG: Turkey was a key player in NATO and it was therefore considered to be highly sensitive from an intelligence viewpoint. To run an operation to recruit a Turkish official would require coordination at the highest level, because of the potential for serious blowback were it to be discovered.

CD: So are you saying that the CIA did not even try to recruit any Turkish officials?

PG: I knew of only one senior Turkish official who was on the payroll and he was not actually recruited — he volunteered in exchange for lots of money. He was met carefully outside of Turkey by an officer whose identity was not known to the Turks.

CD: I don’t suppose you are at liberty to identify that official?

PG: Honestly, I never knew his name or his job. It was very strictly “need to know’ information, solely for higher-ups.

CD: So there was no formal or tacit agreement between the two governments to not spy on one another, being NATO allies and so on?

PG: There was no agreement between the US and Turkey that we would not spy on each other- I believe that only Britain enjoys that status. Indeed, the Turks did spy very actively on our diplomatic missions, mostly through co-opting the local employees who worked there.

Life under Surveillance

CD: So combining this with your statement that “the Turks were very aggressive in a counter-intelligence sense”- how did this affect you and your colleagues?

PG: Embassy officers who were known or suspected to be CIA were surveilled whenever they went out, had their phones tapped, and their apartments were bugged.

My apartment had microphones in the table lamps, for example, and everything I said on the phone was taped and analyzed. I was routinely surveilled when I went out to lunch, sometimes by teams of as many as one dozen survellants using cars and radios.

CD: That sounds stressful. How did you handle yourself, under the circumstances?

PG: When your apartment is bugged as mine was, you just talk normally and never ever talk about work.

CD: Would it have been foolhardy to remove those devices?

PG: If you remove the microphones, they would just put more in- in the end, it’s better to know where they are than to have to guess.

CD: Did you ever try to deceive them by speaking nonsense, or code, or things that would send them on a wild goose chase?

PG: No- you don’t play games with them, because then they really get mad and come after you with everything. And you don’t want that.

Persian Assassins and a Foiled Plot

CD: So if you did not work on recruiting Turkish officials, what were some of your other focuses?

PG: Well, what we did do was a great deal of work on international terrorism, often working closely with the Turks. In fact, I worked almost exclusively against terrorism-mostly Iranian.

The Iranians and Libyans were the big terrorism players in those days. The attacks were all state-sponsored. For example, the Iranian regime would send hit teams of Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) to Turkey and Western Europe when they wanted to kill critics and political opponents.

CD: How did the CIA do against this threat? Were you able to stop them?

PG: We were reasonably successful, but the Iranians in particular were very good and often were able to identify and assassinate our agents.

CD: Wow! Are you saying that roving teams of Iranians were able to go around eliminating CIA officers?

PG: Not exactly- when I say “agents’ I mean in the broad sense of the definition- these were sources of information who were Iranians, not Americans.

CD: Do you have any specific names or examples?

PG: I don’t recall their names, but if you were to go back to the late 1980s and search in papers like the IHT, as well as the European press, you would find some names of Iranian dissidents who were assassinated in Turkey. These were people who were providing information to the US Embassy and CIA station in Ankara.

Later, after my time in Turkey, the Iranians also rolled up at least two large groups of CIA-recruited agents who were reporting with invisible writing from inside Iran, one in around 1991, and one about ten years later.

This was also reported in the international press. The arrested agents were tortured to death. The first group was exposed when a CIA clerk sent letters to all of the agents all at the same time, from the same mailbox, and all in the same handwriting- the Iranians picked up on it immediately and arrested the whole group or nineteen.

CD: What a disaster? Was there any agency political fallout because of this fiasco?

PG: No- nobody in CIA was punished for the egregious “error in judgment,” and the chief of the field element responsible was, in fact, promoted.

CD: If we speak about underlying causes, how do you explain the Iranian government’s ability to identify and eliminate CIA-associated Iranians?

PG: They were very successful, first of all because Turkey was the door into Europe; it was the only country bordering Iran that did not require Iranians to have visas to enter. It also harbored a very large Iranian expatriate community.

CD: Was the Turkish government unable to stop their assassins? Or were they allowing them to take out your agents for some reason?

PG: No, they weren’t “allowing’ them, but in a sense they had to tolerate them. The Turkish police and intelligence service were very active against the Iranians, but the problem was beyond their capabilities. Hit teams would cross the border, travel to Ankara or Istanbul, kill someone, and be back across the border by the next day. The Turkish government did not make waves about it, because Turkey was very dependent on Iranian oil at that time.

CD: Can you point out any specific successes on the anti-terror front during your time in Istanbul?

PG: While I was in Turkey, we did manage to thwart one terrorist operation, in which two Libyan agents were preparing to bomb a wedding at the US airbase in Ankara. We stopped the attack before it happened, fortunately.

Another successful operation that I recall, dramatic in a different way, again involved a Libyan agent. He produced the doctor who had appeared on television with Moammar Gadhafi, after President Reagan bombed Tripoli. The doctor was holding what appeared to be the body of a young girl, claimed to be Gadafi’s daughter who was reportedly killed in the attack.

According to the doctor, Gadhafi had no daughter and the whole thing was staged. It was one of those rare instances where the report had immediate impact, going to Reagan and to Margaret Thatcher directly.

CD: Were you aware of any connections between Iranian terrorist groups in the Balkans, and/or Turkish intelligence and Balkan Muslim groups, Bosniaks, Albanians, etc? For example, some reports have claimed that the nascent Kosovo Albanian militant movement was nurtured in Turkey, with the assistance of MIT in the 1980′s.

PG: We were aware that MIT was meddling in the Balkans in support of local Muslims. This was somewhat of a legacy of the Ottoman Empire. However, as far as I know, we never had any more precise details regarding the MIT activities in the Balkans.

CD: Now, with the Cold War long gone and a totally different power dynamic in effect, do you think that the CIA preoccupations of your time have now changed- and that they now do do more on Turkish internal affairs?

PG: I assume CIA is now doing more reporting on Turkey, but I don’t know that for a fact. It would be a very tough target and considered very sensitive if it were to be exposed, so I don’t think there is much likelihood that much is going on.

Thoughts on the Sibel Edmonds Case

CD: Let’s speak for a moment regarding the case of former FBI translator and whistleblower Sibel Edmonds. Your summary of the case in the American Conservative was rated the best such one so far by Sibel herself. How much of what she has disclosed can be verified independently?

PG: I have not attempted to corroborate Sibel’s story as I have no resources to do so. And it would appear that the government gag order she is under precludes the type of confirmation that would be desirable.

CD: Can you elaborate at all on the role of neocon and other actors mentioned in your article, who were allegedly involved with illegal arms sales and more, such as Doug Feith, Richard Perle, Eric Edelman, Steven Solarz and Marc Grossman?

PG: As my article stated, the preoccupation with Turkey of the key neocons named is curious indeed. It is plausibly explained by their interest in Israel and their connections to the weapons industry in the US, Turkey, and in Israel.

I can recall Solarz showing up in Turkey in 1986 after he left Congress, and the connection with Perle and Feith in particular is well documented. I don’t know if the illicit arms sales are still going on, but I would suspect they are. Weapons dealing is big business and there are many players in it.

CD: You also mention Turkey and false end user certificates in association with illegal proliferation to dangerous states. Was this something you were involved with monitoring when in the CIA? What about special teams like the Brewster Jennings outfit? Did they operate or have a predecessor working with you at the time?

PG: I have no inside information on CIA or US government monitoring of arms sales to third parties a la the work of Brewster Jennings. When I was in Turkey, I was not aware of any US government interest in such matters and there was no non-proliferation staff at headquarters.

CD: The exact period in which you were in Turkey, 1986-1989, was important for the Pakistani nuclear program. Did you have any awareness of the oft-attested Turkish-Pakistani cooperation in this regard?

PG: I don’t know anything about Turkey-Pakistan re. proliferation – I suspect the [CIA] station did not have any interest in it at that time.

The Future of US-Turkey Covert Relations

CD: Many observers, and most pointedly the neocons, have declared that there has been a breakdown in relations with Turkey since the invasion of Iraq and the Turkish refusal of a northern attack route for the US. How bad are things really?

PG: I certainly know that the relationship is regarded as cool and that the Turks are extremely mistrustful of the United States, primarily due to our failure to suppress PKK activity in northern Iraq. The neocons, of course, would like to see Turkey join in a new crusade against Syria and Iran, but that is not about to happen.

CD: So has the CIA’s intelligence-sharing cooperation with Turkey also suffered because of this chill?

Intelligence cooperation with Turkey has always been so-so. They share information only when it is completely in their interest to do so, not otherwise.

CD: So is Turkey now being categorized at the policy-making level as more of a hostile power than a friend? If so, Will the US be able to win back Turkish trust?

PG: Turks really dislike the US because of the mess in Iraq and the impending mess that our unquestioning support of Israel means for the region. And the Turkish government has reflected that antipathy. If you want to change the perception, you have to change the policy. Not likely to happen, is it?

CD: Indeed. But, speaking pragmatically, do you think the CIA has sought to reach out more to allies such as Greece, Cyprus, Georgia or Bulgaria, for example, to make up for any information deficit that may have occurred since 2003?

PG: I don’t know, but anyway it wouldn’t matter substantially. The Greek, Bulgarian, Cypriot, and Georgian intelligence services are no substitute for Turkey, which is both geographically and culturally pivotal to our ability to monitor developments in Iran and elsewhere.

CD: What can you say about how the current Israeli war in Lebanon will affect the traditional Israeli-Turkish alliance?

PG: Well, concerning the impact of [what is happening now in] Lebanon, you must be aware of the fact that the so-called “friendly” relationship between the two countries is very narrowly focused. It is largely the Turkish Army’s General Staff that keeps the relationship going, because it provides access to US military assistance and weapons that would otherwise be embargoed.

The Turkish public and the government, on the other hand, are rather ambivalent, if not hostile, to the relationship. And they are now very angry about the attacks on fellow Muslims in Lebanon.

CD: After you left the CIA base in Turkey in 1989, have you continued to keep in touch and to visit the country?

PG: Yes- since 1989, I have visited Turkey frequently and have good friends there. My most recent trip was a year ago. I follow Turkish political and security developments closely.

CD: Mr. Giraldi, thanks very much for your time and insights. Much appreciated!

PG: Thank you- my pleasure.

………………………………..

Philip Giraldi served as a staff officer in the Central Intelligence Agency for sixteen years, culminating in his selection as Chief of Base in Barcelona from 1989 to 1992. He was designated the Agency’s senior officer for Olympic Games support, and was named official liaison to the Spanish Security and Intelligence services. During the lead-up to the Games, he also expanded his liaison activities through contacts with the Security Services of a number of European, Asian, and Latin American countries. Working closely with the Barcelona Olympics Security Committee, Phil helped develop the overall Olympics security plan and became the principal briefing officer on security preparations for the United States Government.

Prior to Barcelona, Phil specialized in intelligence collection and counter-terrorism operations throughout the Middle East and Europe, often working in coordination with the local government security services. In Istanbul, he successfully worked against a number of Middle Eastern terrorist targets. In Hamburg, he developed information on illegal technology sales in Western Europe. In Rome, he ran operations focused on economic espionage and counter-terrorism.

Since 1992, Phil has been engaged in security consulting for a number of Fortune 500 corporate clients. He is the founder and President of San Marco International, an international security consultancy, and is also a partner in Cannistraro Associates of McLean, Virginia.

Over the past four years, he has specialized in post-September 11th issues for his clients and has also done contract work for the United States government. Phil has been designated by the General Accounting Office as an expert on the impact of illegal immigration on terrorism. As a counter-terrorism expert, he has been brought in to assist the Port Authority of the City of New York in its planning, has assisted the United Nations security organization, and has helped develop a security training program for the United States Merchant Marine. He has conducted security surveys at a number of international airports and ports in Latin America and Asia.

Phil was one of the first American civilians to travel to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban, and he has assisted multinational corporations in the upgrade of their security at overseas sites to help them comply with the Patriot Act. Prior to September 11th, he specialized in international risk assessments and “due diligence” investigations. In many cases, his investigations have developed information that led to corporate decisions not to go ahead with planned overseas joint ventures. To meet the needs of clients, he has traveled extensively, most particularly in Latin America, south Asia, and Europe, and has built up a world-wide network of working-level contacts in the security, political, and economic sectors.

Phil is a recognized authority on international security and counterterrorism issues. He appears frequently on National Public Radio and is a Contributing Editor who writes a regular column called “Deep Background” on terrorism, intelligence, and security issues for The American Conservative magazine. He has written op-ed pieces for the Hearst Newspaper chain, has appeared on “Good Morning America,” MSNBC, and local affiliates of ABC television. Phil has been a keynote speaker at the Petroleum Industry Security Council annual meeting. He has been interviewed by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the British Broadcasting Corporation, FOX News, 60 Minutes, and Court TV. He also prepares and edits a nationally syndicated subscription service newsletter on September 11th issues for corporate clients.

Phil was awarded an MA and PhD from the University of London in European History, and also holds a Bachelor of Arts with Honors from the University of Chicago. He speaks Spanish, Italian, German, and Turkish.