Balkanalysis.com

By Valeria Giannotta*

Turkey’s diversification of its foreign policy goals since the AKP’s first electoral triumph in 2002 has delivered a number of notable results. The AKP continues to consolidate the currents in Ankara’s foreign policy, launching Turkey towards a more assertive and independent role in its neighborhood. Remaining institutionally anchored in the West, the new government, equipped with a huge democratic mandate and the prospect of EU accession, realized that it would also be convenient to forge new relations with the South and the East, taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the post-Cold War scenario.

An Independent Foreign Policy in a Multipolar World

In light of this increasing interest and activism in surrounding regions, some commentators have concluded that Turkey is turning away from the West and moving towards the East, pursuing a sort of a ‘Neo-Ottoman’ foreign policy designed to restore Turkey’s regional predominance and to turn it into an independent player in a multipolar world.

In making this case, they have often referred to the ‘strategy of depth’ crafted by current Foreign Minister Davutoğlu. This exemplifies Ankara’s newfound appetite for engaging in all neighboring areas, as a means of gaining recognition for Turkey as simultaneously a European, Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf and Black Sea power.

In fact, these multiple regional identities, as well as Turkey’s historical and cultural legacy, “mandate us (Turkey) a foreign policy that is multifaceted” with the main goal being “to promote good neighborly relations with all, to replace disagreement with cooperation, to seek innovative mechanism and channels to resolve regional conflicts, to encourage positive change in our region, and to build cross-cultural bridges of dialogues and understanding.”[1]

In his 2002 book, Davutoğlu (then an advisor to new Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) articulated these efforts for improving relations with neighboring countries, in line with the AKP’s desire to harmonize Turkey’s European and Islamic identities. Since Turkey is located at the center of important ‘geo-cultural basins’ in which the West has interests (the Middle East, Balkans and Central Asia), the author argued, it should pursue an activist policy, taking advantage of all opportunities existing in these areas.

According to his point of view – as was the case during the Ottoman Empire – Turkey must serve as the epicenter for regional events, “rediscovering its historic and geographic identity” while “balancing the approach towards all global and regional actors” and building “strong economic linkages with all regional states.”[2]

Under the AKP umbrella, not only has Turkish trade with neighbors increased, but also critical historic relations with countries like Russia, Syria, Iran and Greece have improved. A number of ambitious mediation efforts showed that Ankara would like to become a key regional player. All of these negotiations demonstrate that the AKP is pursuing its ‘zero problems’ policy with neighbors, improving its relations with explicitly Islamic regimes, but also reaching out to non-Islamic governments.[3]

Making clear that its policy is not driven by an Islamic sentiment, Davutoğlu wrote of his aims to balance Turkey’s strategic relationships, rather than to prioritize relations within Turkey’s historical framework of relations with international organizations and a Western orientation. In this trend must be recognized a deep degree of pragmatism which underlines significant continuity, with respect to AKP’S foreign policy activism.[4]

AKP Phases of International Relations

In analyzing Turkey’s international relations during the AKP era, it is possible to identify two different phases. During the first period (2002-2005), continuing the policy of previous governments, the AKP government pushed for Turkey’s full membership in the EU, and sought to improve its economic and democratic performance. After 2005, however, a certain loss of enthusiasm on the focal point of joining the EU, and a deviation towards a ‘soft eastern’ strategy can be discerned.

The AKP has not been homogenous in terms of foreign policy behavior, however, and while in its first wave the foreign policy activism put strong emphasis on Europeanization, more recent developments have increased tensions between Europeanization and Eurasianism. In this context, the shift does not mean a reorientation of foreign policy, but shows a new activism with respect to all neighboring areas, without gravitating firmly around the EU axis, as was the case in the past. What distinguishes this strategy is that the Western orientation is still a strong element of Turkish foreign policy, but will likely continue in a more flexible form.[5]

A number of factors have played a central role in this important change. First, significant internal tensions have emerged over the past several years, as the country has faced the challenge of balancing different components of its identity and cultural, historical and strategic values. Turkey, in fact, is struggling to consolidate democracy while preserving secularism; it will be the interaction of these domestic factors that will determine the critical equilibrium, and the path of this new activism in Turkish foreign policy.[6]

In the past few years of AKP governance, Turkey’s foreign policy was transformed from that of a “hard power” to a ‘soft power,’ and recent internal and external developments have contributed to Ankara’s soft power potential.[7] In other words, there is a close relationship between the degree of secularization of Turkey’s foreign policy – which is traditionally related with the Kemalist legacy, the foundation of the Republic and the role of the military – and the current orientation of the AKP abroad.[8]

In this framework, a deterrence of possible internal and external challengers through the adoption of coercive strategies marked the path of past security practices. Following the collapse of communism and the emerging of regional instabilities in the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East, the Western credentials of Turkey’s identity were questioned. Given that the EU considers liberal democratic transformation the main criteria of membership, Turkey thus accelerated the process of de-securitization and worked to increase its soft power identity, a sine qua non condition to gain credibility in Western eyes.[9]

Looking at the domestic causes of this transformation, the main element to be considered is the changing character of the civil-military relationship, following the de-securitization process promoted by the government in which previously securitized issues were gradually redefined as political issues. More politicization, in fact, has increased civilian primacy in the process and helped to prioritize negotiations and consensus building as the most important point of conflict resolution.[10]

Without any doubt, this internal dynamics were affected by the patterns of Turkey’s internal politics, based on the important lesson of the ‘February 28 Process’ following a military-led ‘post modern coup’ in 1997, against the pro-Islamist government that was essentially a forerunner of the AKP.[11] And it was under these conditions that the AKP emerged, with the aim of staying in power by trying to take as much civilian control as possible over internal and external politics.[12] Consequently, the party sought to adopt a multilateral and cooperative approach on foreign policies that would minimize the role and relevance of the military.

The AKP government has in fact shown that it believes Turkey to be the legitimate successor to the Ottoman Empire. In this context, the party’s policies indicate that it believes Turkey should play a responsible and proactive role in the maintenance of regional peace and stability. This course of action is perceived as the only way to demonstrate its relevance to the West, by helping Western efforts to deal with emerging security threats.

As has been noted, Turkey’s new soft power identity has been positively affected by recent developments in the Middle East and by the EU accession process.[13] Once the EU decided to formally start accession talks in 2005, people in the Middle East seriously considered the idea that Turkey’s potential accession could help to develop and modernize their own countries and the region. Just as the EU contributed to peace and stability in Central and Eastern Europe through its enlargement process, it was suggested. Turkey could contribute to regional stability in the Middle East and in other critical areas by conveying European and international standards to the area.

Turkey’s soft power identity is nowadays visible in its relations with neighbors: from the economic diplomacy of the current government to its repeated calls to further enhance democracy and freedom in the region. (Not to mention the popularity, and profitability of Turkish soap operas across the Balkans and Central Asia).

The Evolution of AKP Policy and EU, US Relationship Trends

To a significant extent, the evolution of Turkish foreign policy in the AKP era has been conditioned not only by domestic trends but also by US policies in the Middle East, and by the EU approach towards Turkey.

Since the end of the Soviet threat the interests that bound Turkey and the US have grown significantly weaker, and this became clear in March 2003 when the Turkish parliament refused to help Washington by voting against the opening of a northern front for the intervention in Iraq. With this decision, the AKP government intended to show that its concerns about domestic politics, public opinion, good neighborly relations and regional stability took precedence over the strategic relationship with the American partner.

As far as the EU is concerned, the picture is more interesting because the logic of integration has led Turkey to improve its soft power policy for dissolving regional conflicts and consolidating regional alliances through the pursuit of economic interdependence. At the same time, however, the growing anxiety about the exact nature of Turkey’s future relationship with the EU has added additional currency to the idea of pursuing a multifaceted foreign policy.[14]

Indeed, there is a consistent consensus that Turkey is a regional actor that can pursue its own rights and interests in defining its own hegemonic position within the international community. This new orientation suggests that rather than looking outside through the prisms of the West, Turkey should make use of its links with the West to pursue its interests abroad through a rather instrumental approach.

From the AKP government’s point of view, in fact, the EU accession process is seen from this perspective: its value depends on the realization of Turkish economic interests abroad, and on the democratic dynamics domestically.[15] This underlines that the EU accession process has contributed to the improvement of Turkey’s domestic stability, while attracting foreign investment and supporting the interest-based logic of the AKP.

It must be considered, moreover, that unlike the previous, more outspoken Islamic parties AKP does not display euroskepticism; it considers Turkey as belonging to both the European and Islamic civilizations. This is the case even though they do not recognize themselves as European and their aim is to integrate Islamic culture into the European sphere.[16]

At the same time, the intense debate about Turkey’s economic interests and the frustration linked to the slowing accession process in recent years generated a serious nationalistic backlash in Turkey, and strengthened some anti-EU and anti-reform feelings. Without any doubt, these negative signals originated from the accusations made to Europe to be willing to end Turkey’s accession process and push Ankara away from the Europeanization process. Still, even if some important domestic factors have weakened the commitment to membership, the AKP has declared that its attachment to the EU has not changed.[17]

Perceptions of an EU Future amidst a Foreign Policy of Complexity

Arguably, the fact that the AKP represents a broad coalition of interests, encompassing liberals and nationalistic elements within a conservative framework, has reshaped the attitudes of the party to EU membership. Indeed, since 2007 the AKP government has not pushed for key reforms requested by the EU. Together with the strong polarization of Turkish society, this evidences a loss of enthusiasm that has had quite negative effects on the whole process.[18]

What seems to be a shifting point in Turkish relations towards Europe and the West during a time of disappointment and a weakening of EU relations, in reality stresses the co-existence of both Europeanization and Eurasianism in Turkish foreign policy. The main horizon of Turkish foreign policy since the 1990s had been the West, with the EU as its main reference point. Nevertheless, in parallel with this alignment Turkey has taken the role of regional power based on its soft power and a multilateral approach.[19]

In this, the AKP political leadership is attempting to exploit linkages between different dimensions of foreign policy, mediating in various conflict situations and becoming important in enhancing its status as a pivotal power in surrounding regions. AKP foreign policy in recent years has particularly emphasized this mediator, for example opening some channels of dialogue and facilitating some diplomatic contacts role in the Middle East.[20]

Economic Aspects

In addition to and in connection with these diplomatic initiatives, the Turkish economy has become stronger during the AKP government’s rule. The significant trade and investment linkages which characterize Turkey’s foreign economic relations with all neighboring countries enable Turkey to deploy its soft power resources much more effectively. The importance of these growing economic interactions is particularly reflected in foreign policy initiatives involving new actors related with the democratization process.

Therefore, in this new era Turkey’s proactive foreign policy comes off as much more convincing, as it does not automatically mean the rejection of the Europeanization project. What it indicates, however, is that the EU in not the center of Turkey’s external relations anymore- at least not the only one.[21]

Turkey today is taking every chance available to pursue its own national interests. Rather than turning away from the West, Ankara is thus realizing that its neighborhood consists not only of Europe but also the Middle East, the Balkan and the wider Black Sea regions. This new trend indicates a breaking away from the old Kemalist notion of Turkey as a country surrounded by enemies and strategically located in the West; it instead emphasizes the cooperation between Ankara and the neighbors, to provide stability in the region.[22]

However, there are some limits to the effectiveness of this rhythmic diplomacy causing counterproductive impacts, especially if it is managed unilaterally without considering policy alignment with Europe and the US. The 2010 diplomatic crisis between Israel and Turkey, bilateral relations with Iran and diplomatic contacts with Hamas, all conducted unilaterally, reduced the legitimacy and the effectiveness to these initiatives, led to the interpretation that Ankara is turning away from the EU.

Today, many issues are on Turkey’s agenda, and its success in its chosen new role will depend on how it reacts to conflicts and changes in the regions surrounding it. The Europe-inspired modernization process, in fact, would accelerate Turkey’s transformation into a developed and democratic nation state. But in doing this, Turkey needs to be seen from many perspectives and not only as a deeply religious Muslim state, different from the West and with a Hobbesian approach to security issues.[23]

Without any doubt, relations between the Turkish AKP government and some of the other Middle Eastern countries are helped by that emotional feeling based on shared values and religious beliefs. In general, however, what is motivating all this in the background is Turkish interest to define its own regional political and economic leverage, regardless of previous institutional linkages with the international community.[24]

The European Perspective on Turkey

In the European perspective, therefore, Turkey has to be considered as a strategic crossroad and as a fundamental political, economic and military actor- it should not be forgotten that it has the second-largest military force in NATO. In a rapidly changing domestic and international context in which Turkey represents a large country with a huge population, a growing economy and diverse market, it is obvious that its foreign policy must have goals in line with its welfare.

In fact, there is no rational reason why Turkey should be restricted to only one sphere of influence. Demonstrating a broad and autonomous foreign policy based on a number of relations with different states is a normal goal for all developed countries seeking to strengthen their positions in the international arena.32

EU members are divided as to what conclusions should be drawn from the evolution of Turkey’s new foreign policy. All of them recognize that what Turkey is doing beyond its borders, including in the Middle East, is as important as domestic developments, and can be highly valuable from the point of view of the EU’s own interests.33 None of them would honestly deny that Turkey could contribute to enhancing stability and peace- a main goal of the EU as an international actor.

From the EU accession perspective this new multilateral and multifaceted trend could help provide regional stability and a more peaceful environment. In pragmatic terms, however, some doubts arise- it is a quite difficult task to play peacekeeper and mediator when there are several historically unresolved issues (such as Cyprus), and therefore, difficulties in having a clear and transparent dialogue with all interested parts. Unfortunately, as the Israeli crisis showed, the AKP government still has to improve its negotiation ability based on effective diplomatic skill, and avoid emotional approaches.

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*Valeria Giannotta is an Italian scholar specializing in Turkey’s domestic affairs and international relations. She is currently a lecturer at Yildirim Beyazit Univeristesi in Istanbul, and a visiting scholar at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara. She holds a PhD in International Relations from Catholic University in Milan, with a thesis entitled ‘The AKP and its Program of Conservative Democracy.’

(Balkanalysis.com Press Release)  Palgrave Macmillan has published an important new monograph on energy security in Europe, with particular reference to Turkey’s role, written by Balkanalysis.com Turkey editor Mehmet Efe Biresselioğlu, also a vice-dean at the Izmir University of Economics.

According to a publisher’s description the new book, European Energy Security: Turkey’s Future Role and Impact, “identifies the EU’s main energy security challenges and looks at Turkey’s possible role in this policy area. By investigating the role of Turkey as a westward transit hub for hydrocarbons from the Greater Caspian region, Middle East and North Africa, Biresselioglu explores European and Turkish energy profiles.

In doing so he looks at the connection between geopolitics and energy security; the relationship between oil and natural gas resources and geography; the importance of the concept of energy security and the role of energy in foreign policy and international relations. Accordingly, the aim of the book is to determine what the challenges are to the future of Europe’s energy security.”

About the author

Based at the Izmir University of Economics in Turkey, Dr Biresselioğlu holds the positions of Vice Dean in the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences and Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations and the EU. He is also a board member at the Turkish Energy and Climate Change Foundation (ENIVA).

Dr Biresselioğlu’s research interests include geopolitics, energy security and sustainable energy, geo-strategic issues with a geographic focus on Turkey, Russia, the Greater Caspian area, the Middle East and also with Turkey’s relations with the EU and US. His articles for Balkanalysis.com in the past months include Turkey’s Transforming Relations with the Arab World: the Impact of Recent High-Level Turkish Visits to the Gulf Region and Changing Dynamics in the Turkey-Iran Relationship.

Chapter structure: European Energy Security: Turkey’s Future Role and Impact

Introduction
Geopolitics and Energy Security: The Inevitable Connection
Energy Security in the European Union: Challenges and Perspectives
Greater Caspian Sea Area: A Major Alternative for European Energy Security?
Turkish Foreign and Energy Policy after the Cold War
Turkey’s Role in European Energy Security
Conclusion

………………………………

Click here to buy European Energy Security: Turkey’s Future Role and Impact on Amazon.com.

By Maja Šoštarić in Sarajevo

“Sarajevo is a miracle (…). If you understand Sarajevo, you can understand all the Ottoman history. Because it is, according to the saying, [true that] if you understand a person you can understand that century.”

Is this a new slogan of the Bosnian chamber of commerce? Or was it perhaps taken out of some Sarajevo guidebook? Not quite. The author is Ahmet Davutoğlu, Foreign Minister of Turkey, and the paragraph stems from his speech at the opening ceremony of a conference entitled “The Ottoman Legacy and Balkan Muslim Communities Today,” held in Sarajevo in October 2009. After that conference, Mr Davutoğlu was harshly criticized by detractors for his alleged neo-Ottomanism in relation to the Balkans.

Turkey has been effectively present in the Balkans for centuries. The Ottoman Empire lasted until the early 20^th century, and Balkan countries were an important part of it. Some of them, such as Bosnia, Albania, Macedonia or Kosovo, were strongly influenced by Turkish culture, religion and language, and this legacy is still evident today.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has a large Muslim community – in fact, one of its three constituent peoples are Bosniaks, or the Bosnian Muslim ethnic group. Conversely, Turkey hosts large numbers of diaspora from all the abovementioned countries; in fact, there are more Bosniaks in Turkey than in BiH (2 million opposed to 1.9 million, according to the most recent approximate estimates).

Explaining Friends to Neighbors, and Neighbors to Friends

Turkey’s foreign policy is a continual balancing, even juggling act. Maintaining friendly relations with Iran but also shaking hands with the United States; trying to calm down Syria while negotiating with Israel; seeking “to explain friends to neighbors and neighbors to friends” (as former Turkish Ambassador Umut Arık once noted) – these are all elements of the famous Turkish ‘Zero Problems with Neighbors’ foreign policy imperative of the current AK Party government Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, widely considered the most influential man behind this policy, has received both praise and criticism for it.

The MFA website also notes that since its establishment, Turkey has been pursuing “a peaceful, realistic and consistent foreign policy guided by the principle ‘Peace at Home and Peace Abroad’ set out by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.” Other objectives of Turkish foreign policy stated include “security and stability in its region and beyond,” with the caveat that the policy is “based on [Turkey’s] democratic and secular political system, vibrant economy and its tradition of reconciling modernity with its cultural identity.”

After the 12 June parliamentary elections, the victorious incumbent AKP (Justice and Development Party) government has many challenges ahead, according to the International Crisis Group: resolving the Cyprus issue, carrying out a comprehensive constitutional reform, solving the Kurdish problem, determining its stance on the Middle East or bringing some fresh breeze to the country’s eternal EU accession process. So when will Turkey find time for engaging in the Balkans, after all? And what is its motivation?

A Turkish diplomat in BiH recently stated for Balkanalysis.com that Turkey’s ‘zero problems’ foreign policy in the Balkans consists of four main pillars: 1) high-level political dialogue between countries of the region; 2) regional economic integration; 3) respect for multiculturalism, and 4) principle of security for all.

As far as political dialogue in the Balkans is concerned, Turkey has recently established top -level consultation mechanisms with BiH, Serbia and Croatia. Also, Turkey is active in supporting trade creation in the region. When it comes to cultural diversity, the foreign minister is far from the only Turk to view Sarajevo as a unique example of a multi-religious and multi-cultural city. Finally, Turkey holds that security in the Balkans should not be a zero-sum game, but that a balance between security and freedom needs to be established. In BiH in particular, this is a difficult task.

State, Entities and Cantons: Common Denominator- Crisis

Where should one start, when trying to describe the bedlam of Bosnia & Hercegovina? The newest Crisis Group Bosnia report considers the country to be in the “worst crisis since the war.” The same report addresses the parallel crisis in both Bosnia’s entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS).

The elections of October 3, 2010 resulted in a victory for multiethnic parties, such as the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Still, to date, nine months after the election, BiH has no government due to lack of consensus between the winning parties. According to an unwritten rule of rotation, the prime minister in this mandate should be a Croat (following the Serb and Bosniak PMs in the previous two mandates). However, the candidature of Slavo Kukić, a university professor nominated by the SDP, has just been blocked by the representatives of RS, which minimizes the chances for BiH to have a state government before September.

The situation at the entity level does not look much brighter. In May, all eyes were on the president of RS, Milorad Dodik, who threatened to hold a controversial referendum, something that would call into question the legitimacy of the decisions made by the High Representative, in particular the laws relating to the Court of BiH and the Office of the Chief Prosecutor.

However, following the urgent visit of Brussels envoy Miroslav Lajčak and the EU High Representative, Lady Catherine Ashton, Dodik decided to drop the referendum. This is how one crisis was at least temporarily averted.

However, at the same time another crisis was taking place in the FBiH. In March 2011, after an initiative of the SDP, the new federal government was appointed. This, however, was done to the detriment of the two largest Croatian parties, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and its splinter party, the Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ 1990). These two parties claimed that they could not be ignored in forming the government since they represented the genuine interest of Croatian people, with whose majority they were elected.

After the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) responded to what they saw as an unlawful government formation by annulling the election of the federal president and vice president, High Representative Valentin Inzko intervened and immediately reversed the decision of the CEC. In other words, the new federal government, led by the SDP and its partners, was given the green light. The HDZ and HDZ 1990 considered this a major injustice and reacted by forming a parallel government, the Croatian National Parliament in Mostar. Therefore, even with a government in place, there is still major discord in FBiH over whether that government is even legitimate.

As for the RS, the withdrawal of the referendum decision did not imply an end of the RS-policy of blocking BiH state institutions. Actually, Dodik probably never even really planned to hold a referendum in the first place, because he would not want to be the president of a new Abkhazia or South Ossetia: an internationally unrecognized and isolated enclave. In fact, the referendum hysteria indicates that the international community was possibly misguided. There seems to be a lack of a comprehensive international strategy for BiH; what we can see are only some sporadic firefights.

OHR and ‘Five Plus Two’ –Adieu, Protectorate?

When the previous Head of the EU Delegation in BiH departed in summer 2010, his successor (Danish diplomat Peter Sørensen) was not appointed until May 2011. In other words, the EU needed almost a full year to appoint its representative in a country without a government.

What is often heard in Sarajevo is that BiH, divided and impoverished, does not seem to figure very high on the list of EU priorities. On the other hand, as several foreign NGO representatives in BiH noted for Balkanalysis.com, the problem with BiH politicians and the general public is overly high expectations from the international community, and thus an avoidance of any kind of national responsibility.

Yet another problem of the international engagement in BiH is the very uncertain future of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which for several years has not been fully using its given Bonn powers. While his predecessors sacked a number of BiH officials from office, often without any substantial explanation, the current High Representative, Valentin Inzko (set to depart from office on 31 August 2011) has lifted all the remaining suspensions from public office for officials previously banned by his predecessors, demonstrating that the Office is preparing for closure. However, the rapid intervention of the High Representative in the case of the FBiH crisis, and the lack thereof in the case of Dodik’s threats in Republika Srpska, has yet again contributed to the overall division within BiH.

Since there are five objectives and two conditions in place (the famous ‘five plus two’) put forward by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) for the OHR to close, it is uncertain for how much longer the Office is going to exist. For now, BiH has fulfilled three objectives (ensuring fiscal sustainability, entrenching the rule of law, and completing the District of Brčko final award), as well as one condition (signature of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, SAA, with the EU on 16 June 2008).

The remaining two objectives – division of state property and defense property – have been subject to debate for years now and a viable solution does not seem to be in sight. Furthermore, one remaining condition, “positive assessment of the situation” by PIC, is clearly an utterly subjective one.

That said, does the solution lie in burying ‘five plus two’ and closing down the OHR once and for all? Bosniaks would object, as they see their interests (strengthening the state) protected by the OHR. On the other hand, Croats and Serbs would welcome the OHR’s closure, because they want a more decentralized BiH.

How Soft is ‘Soft Power?’

With the appointment of a new EU Special Representative (EUSR)/ Head of Delegation, there is an obvious shift towards the EU soft-power approach, which the current High Representative has recently welcomed. Further bans and impositions are not expected – rather, the benefits of the EU accession process should serve as a single carrot, and the slowdown thereof as a single stick for BiH.

The SAA with BiH was signed and ratified by all EU members, but needs to be endorsed by the Council. Endorsing the SAA will serve as a positive message of support for BiH, an official from the European Commission Office in Sarajevo notes for Balkanalysis.com. BiH has still not applied for EU membership. Nevertheless, according to the abovementioned official, the EU sees three priorities for the upcoming period: 1) forming a government; 2) implementing the Sejdić-Finci ruling of the European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg, that found the BiH Constitution non-compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights; and 3) adopting, as urgently as possible, the Law on State Aid.

Also, following Lady Ashton’s visit to Banja Luka, a comprehensive EU structural dialogue on judicial reform was launched. However, the question as to remains whether all these single efforts can result in an elaborated strategy.

BiH has probably the most complex administrative and political system in Europe, if not beyond, which is a result of an equally tricky political and administrative structure determined by the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995. The international community was present during the war (1991-1995) and has remained in BiH continuously since. Yet the major powers, such as Brussels and Washington, have a tendency to neglect the significance of Turkey, a country that has for several years been working its way into BiH and the Balkans in general, in a very intelligent, elaborated and strategic manner – as an economic partner, mediator and powerbroker.

Fix Bosnia? No Problem!

Turkey and BiH have shared a long, and often common history. BiH served as an Ottoman fortress against the Austrian-Hungarian Empire for several hundred years. In 1992, Turkey was among the first countries to recognize the independence of BiH. Moreover, it called for NATO intervention against the Serbs in Bosnia in order to end the bloodshed of 1992-1995, and in 1994 it helped to broker the alliance between Croatia and Bosnia against Serbia by investing in the highway Zagreb-Rijeka (a joint investment of the Turkish ENKA and the American Bechtel). Finally, Turkey is one of the members of PIC, the institution that still figures as part of the Dayton heritage in Bosnia.

In a similar vein, Turkey has for years been lobbying for the full NATO and EU membership of BiH. Unlike many other global players, Turkey takes the view that the EU and NATO membership are not ends in themselves, but rather means in order to achieve the necessary ends.

As discussed above, the EU and the OHR have lost some credibility over the last few years, which is where Turkey sees itself stepping in. The EU, for instance, requires a much stronger state for the reforms it demands from BiH. This, in turn, brings about internal clashes between Bosnia’s three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats), diminishing the leverage of the EU as significant player in the region.

On the initiative of Turkey, BiH was offered the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in April 2010. The contested state property law, one of the objectives required by the PIC in order to close down the OHR, is also crucial for Bosnian NATO membership. The law assumes a transfer of property previously belonging to the former Yugoslavia from entities back to the central state. This is unacceptable for Republika Srpska. If, through the mediation power of Turkey, Serbia can convince RS of the benefits of MAP and NATO membership, then following that logic also the issue of state property may be successfully resolved.

Increasingly active in the Balkans, Turkey has been striving to broker friendlier relations between the Balkan neighbors. As its foreign minister likes to emphasize, Turkey’s diplomacy consists of three main objectives: 1) strengthening Turkey’s good relations with traditional Balkan partners; 2) establishing relations with countries with which Turkey has had a problematic past; and 3) improving regional stability by playing a mediator role wherever possible.

Being a member of the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP), an initiative dating back to 1996, Turkey held the chairmanship of SEECP from 2009 to 2010. In the framework of SEECP, Turkey successfully managed to institutionalize two tripartite consultation mechanisms: BiH-Serbia-Turkey and BiH-Croatia-Turkey. As a result of these, the Serbian parliament adopted a declaration apologizing for the genocide of Srebrenica.

In turn, Turkish companies are pouring in significant investment by deciding to build a new highway linking Belgrade with southern Serbia. In this manner, Turkey hopes, the reconciliation process between BiH and Serbia can be somewhat accelerated. By the same token, although the relations between BiH and Croatia have been quite warm since the end of the war, the city of Mostar remains the scene of intermittent ethnic clashes between Bosniaks and Croats.

Again, Turkey is hoping to counteract this by investing in and around Mostar. Finally, on April 24, 2010, Turkey achieved a major diplomatic success when the Istanbul Declaration on Peace and Stability in the Balkans was signed by Serbia, Croatia and BiH. That declaration calls for peace in the region as well as its European integration and future common prosperity. The then Bosniak member of the Bosnian tripartite Presidency, Haris Silajdžić, represented his country in Istanbul and signed the declaration. This consequently engendered rage in RS, where Silajdžić was accused of violating the country’s constitution and Bosniaks in general were depicted as Turkey’s protegés.

“Rolls Royce Ambitions, but Rover Resources”

As a January 2010 US diplomatic cable released by Wikileaks metaphorically put it, Turkish diplomacy has “Rolls Royce ambitions but Rover resources.” Many observers from abroad do not consider Turkish foreign policy aspirations as something more than genuine, Eugène de Rastignac-like ambitions. In their opinion there is no financial backing for Turkey to become a serious global power, despite its noteworthy efforts to increase its official development assistance (ODA).

Turkey’s Growing Business Presence

According to the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA)’s latest available Turkish Development Assistance Report (2008), Turkish bilateral official development assistance in 2008 was the highest in the Caucasus and Central Asia, followed by the Middle East and then the Balkans.

As far as BiH is concerned, in 2008 Turkey was its eighth-highest donor. Official aid to BiH amounted to additional $15.92 million, making BiH the second-biggest Turkish aid-recipient in the Balkans (after Kosovo). However, a glance at the trade volume of Turkey with BiH shows the sum of $600 million (2009), but in 2007 Turkish foreign direct investment (FDI) amounted to only 1.4% of total FDI in BiH. BiH was the Balkan country with the third-largest direct investment in the region (after Serbia and Ukraine), amounting to $10.32 million.

Some of the most important Turkish investors in BiH are Turkish Ziraat Bank, the Sisecam (glass producer) and the Hayat Kimya (chemical products). Turkish Ziraat Bank Bosnia (TZBB) was the first foreign capitalized bank to open in Bosnia-Herzegovina (operational since 1997). Recently, another major Turkish export-import lender, Eximbank, announced it would extend credit lines for projects in BiH.

Further, Turkish Airlines acquired 49 percent of BH Airlines in 2009. Moreover, a Turkish-Bosnian Business Council (TBBC) was established as early as 1995, three years after a Free Trade Agreement was signed, which reduced all custom duties on imported Turkish products. Turkey has also invested in a number of infrastructure projects across BiH.

A Turkish Language, University and Cultural Presence

Culturally, Turkey’s role in BiH is large and growing.  Besides the Turkish Language Center in Sarajevo, two Turkish universities have been established in the country: the International Burch University located in the Sarajevo suburb of Ilidža and the International University of Sarajevo, hosting approximately 1500 students.

In addition, Turkey has organized a number of film festivals, exhibitions, poetry nights and children festivals in BiH. Recently, Ankara has obtained one more powerful ally in BiH: Salmir Kaplan, the FBiH’s new minister for culture and sports. This Istanbul University graduate is also an AKP political academy alumnus, and, it goes without saying, wants to promote the language and culture of his alma mater. In that light, Kaplan pledged to strengthen Turkish-Bosnian cooperation in culture, preservation of patrimony and sports.

Turkey: Back for Good?

The EU and US have been observing Turkey’s emergence with a pinch of skepticism. Several Sarajevo-based EU diplomats and foreign think-tank representatives noted for Balkanalysis.com that in reality, Turkey’s allure applies only to Bosniaks. Croats, and in particular Serbs in BiH are still rather reluctant to see Turkey as a Bosnian, not to mention a Balkan, superhero, officials and analysts add.

An influential Washington-based think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, provides some estimates of the Turkish economic significance in the Balkans. According to their blog, Turkey is in fact much more interested in bigger regional markets such as Bulgaria and Romania, and the European Union, its largest trade partner. On the other hand, the CSIS contends, Greece keeps on playing a key economic role in the region despite its catastrophic financial turmoil.

Moreover, regionally Ankara is lagging behind Russia in the energy industry, as well as Greece and Germany in the area of telecommunications. In BiH in particular, as already discussed, there are inflows of Turkish development assistance, but little investment, whereby only the latter is a real income-generator. Some BiH analysts even fear that in its attempts to earn the crown of the regional political mediator, Turkey may eventually choose Serbia over BiH to do business with (and the current investment trends point in that direction). So, where is the Turkish policy for BiH heading? Is it back? Are we talking ‘much ado about nothing’?

A Different Path

As the above analysis tried to show, there are several facts that must not be overlooked. BiH’s situation is delicate, to put it mildly. EU membership seems unattainable. Visa liberalization, having served as the only palpable benefit of it, was achieved last December, leaving many Bosnians with that weird mix of sentiments of accomplishment and anxiety, which can be summarized as, “now what?”

NATO membership, on the other hand, seems closer, and progressing towards it could drag along some useful reforms, such as finally resolving the issue of state and defense property ownership.

Rather than looking at what everyone else has been focusing on- i.e., when the OHR will close and be fully substituted by the EUSR, whether RS will secede and whether there is going to be a state-level government in the near future, Turkey has opted for a different path. It chose a combination of advocacy and economic support, which is much more tangible and attractive for average citizens.

Still, for the magic recipe to work, Ankara needs to flesh out its investment policy in BiH, and should find partners and interlocutors in two constituent peoples other than Bosniaks alone. Of course, centrist and moderate parties are always the best option, in particular should Turkey wish to give its contribution in the heated debate over the BiH constitutional change.

In a similar vein, Turkish agenda of regional reconciliation in shape of tripartite consultations may bear some fruit soon. Including Serbia, as the biggest country of the Western Balkans and a significant economic partner, as well as Croatia, as the 28th EU member state (as of 1 July 2013), in the mechanism, was diplomatically very wise.  In the framework of SEECP and the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) in Sarajevo, the consultation meetings should become regular.

One danger for Turkish foreign policy is precisely Ankara’s omnipresence. For instance, its policy in the Middle East at times conflicts with its policy for the Balkans. When BiH was a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, it supported sanctions against Iran proposed by the UNSCR 1929, though Turkey voted against. Another example: while it was chairing SEECP, Turkey condemned Israeli attack on international aid flotilla in May 2010. However, other SEECP countries never followed the Turkish lead.

All that said, it still holds that GDP-wise, Turkey is currently number 16 in the world. During his abovementioned speech in Sarajevo in 2009, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu exclaimed: “Turkey is back!” He was not shy to add: “the Ottoman centuries of the Balkans were a success story. Now we have to reinvent this.” This provoked many different reactions, but to be quite honest, it was also supposed to. Certainly, evoking Ottoman times does have a symbolic meaning. Still, in practical terms Turkey will be judged by what it is doing in BiH and the Balkans now, and not by what it did 400 years ago.

Responding to criticism, it remains to be said that maybe it is not Turkey’s ambition to become a Rolls-Royce for now, anyway. After all, the Rover is not a bad car, mainly because it is apparently quite affordable and accessible to all.

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By Balkanalysis.com Director Chris Deliso

Israel’s temporarily closure of four diplomatic missions abroad – including two in Turkey – due to fears over Hezbollah terrorist attacks indicates a deepening sense of unease, and could mark further deterioration in the once strong security cooperation and political rapport between the two countries.

Citing the Israeli Foreign Ministry, the Jerusalem Post reported on February 17 that “a number of ‘irregular incidents’ had been noticed recently around a number of Israeli diplomatic missions abroad.” The Israeli embassy in neighboring Azerbaijan was also affected, while Jews in Istanbul also cited personal fears for their safety, YNet News has reported.

What lies behind these worrying developments? The prime factors that define Israel’s concerns about Turkey were explained by numerous Israeli (and other) experts from the academic, diplomatic, military and intelligence communities during a major conference held from February 6-9 in Tel Aviv. Organized by the Inter-Disciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, the event brought together a high-level assortment of international political, military, economic and economic leaders contributing their input before hundreds of international guests at the annual security conference, now in its 11^th year.

While the broad sweep of topics over multiple speeches and panels involved Israeli national security and issues affecting it, such as the Iranian nuclear program, the Middle East peace process, unrest in Egypt and neighboring countries and the dynamics of the Israel-US relationship, Turkish affairs also proved an important topic of focus, both in public discourse and in numerous conversations conducted on the sidelines. Turkey’s interests converge and diverge on various points in its relations with Europe, the US and Israel itself, but are vital to all; therefore, representatives of all sides understand how much is at stake.

The Israeli perception that Turkey has some part to play in almost all of its key areas of concern was particularly interesting, and illustrative. Indeed, while there was only one panel devoted to Israeli-Turkish relations, the issue came up in passing or explicitly in comments from numerous speakers over the full course of the event. It become clear from the presentations and from interviews conducted for Balkanalysis.com on the sidelines that the Israeli foreign policy and security communities are growing more and more concerned about Turkey’s reliability as an ally, its regional aspirations, and its potential as a security liability- as the events of this week have forcefully indicated.

Turkey: Where Is It Heading?

In a speech dedicated mostly to the Iranian threat and the current civil unrest in Arab states, Maj. Gen. Amir Eshel, Head of the IDF Plans and Policy Directorate, also mentioned Turkey as a point of concern. “We do not see it as radical,” stated Maj. Gen. Eshel, “but where it is heading is a big question.”

This question is becoming increasingly acute now, at a moment when Israel could use all the allies it can get in an increasingly turbulent region. Aside from the open threats from Hezbollah, violent revolutionary unrest has spread from Arab states in North Africa through the Middle East and Persian Gulf, with the future unclear and previously ostracized groups such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood hoping to gain from instability. Not incidentally, Tehran is making bellicose moves, such as requesting Egypt to allow passage of Iranian warships through the Suez Canal to dock in Syria. At this critical moment, instead of being able to turn to a reliable ally in Ankara, Israeli officials are instead seeing a pro-Islamist Turkish government that has taken steps to significantly warm relations with Tehran, announced plans to train Syrian troops, and been involved in several provocative activities against Israel- most notably, the Gaza flotilla operation of last May.

Probably alluding to the role of the flotilla organizer (the Turkey-based IHH charity) during his presentation at Herzliya, Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Rafi Barak noted that the rise of NGOs and “civil society” in general has also been accompanied by a new “blurring of the differences between combatants and non-combatants” in localized conflicts.

Noting that Turkey seems to have ambitions towards becoming a regional superpower, Barak added that “we are looking at this closely.”

The Israeli raid on the allegedly “humanitarian” activist flotilla was widely condemned at the time, further fuelling latent Israeli concerns that the country is all too often unfairly demonized in the international press. But other things, from overt political rhetoric to popular culture, have also alarmed Israelis and Jews worldwide. Most recently was the Turkish action film Valley of the Wolves- Palestine, in which a Turkish commando team goes on the warpath in Israel in search of soldiers involved with the Mavi Marmara raid. Released on 28 January 2011, it entered the Turkish box office at number one, garnering over $3.8 million in its first weekend.

Israel’s ambassador to Ankara, Gabby Levy, denounced the film at the time, stating that it “has anti-Israeli and has anti-Semitic reflections,” while the Jewish Community in Vienna pressed charges for these reasons. (Turkish commentators, meanwhile, claim that the film has aroused relatively little interest as the Valley of the Wolves franchise has in general lost a good deal of its initial excitement over successive installations).

Nevertheless, it is clear that the filmmakers’ claims to be merely bringing the plight of the Palestinian cause to world attention are highly revealing about the sort of gestures that are seen as useful and politically palatable in Turkey today. The film has also opened in Western Europe and now the Balkans. It will be interesting to see how Muslims there with a pre-existing prejudice against Jews and Israel react to watching it.

An Ally Lost?

In light of the vast changes in political and cultural relations in Turkey over the past few years, it is not surprising that some Israeli experts are already writing the epitaph for their old ally. “Everyone knows that the Turkey we knew is not going to come back,” is how Dr. Shmuel Bar, Director of Studies at IDC Herzliya’s Institute for Policy and Strategy put it for Balkanalysis.com.

This sentiment about this critical Western ally is shared by many Israeli experts, who often allude to the orientation of the current government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his AK Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/ Justice and Development Party). Comprised partially of remnants of overtly Islamist parties that were banned in the late 1990s, and with a strong base in the more pious and provincial Anatolian region, the party came to power in 2002 and has since then undertaken a foreign policy unprecedented in its degree of independence and activism, attempting to involve itself in mediating differences and projecting power in the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East and wider Muslim world, while also sparking a power struggle with the Turkish military- the ostensible upholders of Ataturk’s secular republic.

“The AKP adopted the Muslim Brotherhood model that had been previously rejected in Egypt, but gave it a certain respectability,” noted Dr. Bar. At the same time, “the Turkish military has become less able to retain its model as the bastion of secularism.” He also blames the “sins of omission” of the secularist parties, who “didn’t realize that they needed to keep their constituency” when they ended up losing dynamism and relevancy in a changing Turkish society.

But were there indications of this shift? “In the academic and security community, it has been known for some time,” stated Dr. Bar, adding that it has become much more notable over the past 2-3 years.

For his part, Maj. Gen. Yaakov Amidror, Vice-President of the Jerusalem Academic Center at the Lander Institute, and a former head of the research division of IDF military intelligence, was more precise. When asked whether Israel had been taken by surprise by Turkey’s Islamic re-orientation, Maj. Gen. Amidror stated for Balkanalysis.com that “the IDF’s military intelligence had done a study on this in 1995,” which concluded that Turkey was indeed headed in that direction. “However, as was the case with [the surprise uprising in] Egypt recently, it was too hard to establish a specific number of years in which it would appear.”

Since the major focus of concern is the orientation of Turkey’s government, it is not surprising that Israeli and other observers are assessing the political conditions that fostered its arrival, and that may play a role in the future.

Some analysts have been pointing out for years that one of the main opposition parties to the AKP, the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi/ Republican People’s Party), is relatively weak- even amusingly so. This perception was given somewhat of an endorsement, from a European point of view, when Constanze Stelzenmüller of the German Marshall Fund stated during her Herzliya presentation that secularism in Turkish politics is “in ossification,” and opined that the opposition is “hardly an attractive choice” for most voters. Considering that this perception is, in various forms, fairly widespread in European capitals, it is not surprising that the EU has tended to suffer the AKP’s occasional over-indulgences on the domestic and international stage. There is simply nowhere else to turn.

Another key difference in Europe’s relationship to Turkey, of course, is the latter’s status as a candidate country for the EU. It is also viewed as a strategic partner, chiefly in economic terms, but also as a bridging partner in areas of the continent where the EU has provided anemic results thus far.

It was thus no surprise to hear Michael Leigh, the European Commission’s enlargement chief, disclose in his Herzliya speech that the EU sees a key role for Turkey in Bosnia and Kosovo. Of course, the burden of resolving the EU’s failed nation-building experiments there is hardly an unwelcome one for a Turkish administration that sees the Balkans as an integral part of its larger historical, religious and cultural territory.

At the same time, EU encouragement of a ‘Turkish model’ of ‘European Islam’ – as an apparent antidote to the radicalization of Muslim immigrants in their own midst – has meant that EU governments, universities and other institutions continue to fund programs and projects that abet Turkey’s political and religious issues there as well. The Turkish government has played its cards masterfully indeed.

Israel and Turkish Internal Political Consumption

Interestingly, the heightened focus on Islam in Turkey’s internal politics of late has also brought Israel, however involuntarily, into the discourse- most notably with the controversial events of last May. Yet outside viewers often overlook the internal political aspects of such international events, and the strategic use of timing to redirect attention from the opposition’s public discourse.

For example, “the flotilla [to Gaza] left Turkey on the day when the new CHP leader was beginning his first tour of the country making speeches,” stated Professor Barry Rubin, head of the IDC Herzliya’s GLORIA Center, for Balkanalysis.com. “The government used the provocation to stir up both patriotism and religious fervor, trying to mobilize political support- I worry that we might see similar stunts before the next Turkish election.”

In this context, it might be interesting to note that according to media reports Turkish police and intelligence services just a few days ago issued specific predictions regarding where pre-electoral violence or terrorism is likely to occur, whom it would likely target, and who would be the likely perpetrators.

In any case, there are clear indications that Israel (as well as the European Union and other key players) are paying close attention to upcoming campaigning in Turkey, and what may come after it.

Some fear that the Erdoğan government – which is generally expected to win a majority of parliamentary seats – will try to interpret a renewed mandate as a referendum on its religious-oriented views. “Let’s see what the future of this region holds after the June elections in Turkey,” said Israeli Maj. Gen. Amos Gilead in a presentation, echoing the concerns of many others at the Herzliya Conference.

However, despite the AKP’s confidence about another victory some, like Professor Rubin, are not completely pessimistic about the opposition’s chances. “In the polls, I’ve seen the parties are closer than people seem to claim,” he noted. “Of course, the AKP would come in first- but the question is whether a CHP-MHP coalition could get a majority.”

While the implications for Turkey’s relations with Israel, in whatever post-election scenario, are not yet clear, there is no doubt that the Israeli government is keenly monitoring the situation. It is also, of course, monitoring the security implications.

Israeli-Turkish Security Cooperation: The Great Unknown

The final, and probably most serious question, thus becomes to what extent Turkey’s re-orientation of priorities and politics in the Erdoğan era has affected intelligence cooperation between the Mossad and its Turkish counterpart, the MIT (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı/ National Intelligence Organization).

Ironically, here one might recall that when cooperation between Israel and Turkey had reached an all-time high back in the late 1990’s, there was widespread speculation that Israeli intelligence provided vital assistance in the MIT’s kidnapping of Kurdish PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan from his Greek minders in Kenya in February 1999. “Ocalan’s capture certainly carried some of the hallmarks of a Mossad operation,” said one expert for Time. “There’s been strong security cooperation between Israel and Turkey, and the Mossad certainly has a well-established capacity to undertake such complex missions in faraway countries.”

Similarly, on August 9, 1999, the Associated Press discussed the Ocalan kidnapping in the context of a sudden spike in Turkish abductions of other Kurdish leaders, noting that military ties “have grown sharply during the past few years between Israel and Turkey [and] also had a positive impact on ties between their secret services.”

Whatever the truth may have been, it is hard to imagine Israel taking part in any such adventures on Turkey’s behalf today. Instead, over the past few years, it has had to be concerned about terrorist attacks against Jewish sites and Israelis in Turkey, such as the Istanbul synagogue bombings of 15 November 2003, and rumored plots on Turkish soil, such as the February 2009 warning over possible attacks against Israeli citizens that led to the temporary cessation of Israeli flights to Antalya.

Although a deterioration in security cooperation cannot definitively be discerned in the case of this past week’s Israeli embassy closures, mutual lack of trust or cooperation could well explain Israel’s precautionary measures during this past week.

According to Dr. Bar, who previously served for over 30 years in areas of research, diplomacy and planning in Israel’s intelligence community, “the MIT has already been taken over at the top leadership positions.”

Dr. Bar also underscored that it is not only Israel that the Turkish intelligence agency is at odds with. “You can see it in the whole cooperation. If you ask US or EU officials, they will tell you that they are very frustrated with the relationship,” he stated. “The MIT has become very dogmatic. It is no longer reliable.”

Further Developments

The Turkish leadership, for their part, does not seem particularly concerned about what anyone thinks of it. In a sign of how greatly United States influence has declined in the eyes of Turkish leaders, Prime Minister Erdoğan blasted US Ambassador Francis Joseph Ricciardone on Friday for criticizing press freedom in Turkey, calling him “a rookie” who had “walked into a trap” in a country beyond his understanding.

Nevertheless, US officials chose to steer clear of offending the prime minister after this insult. Turkey’s very unique geographical placement, cultural diversity and regional and economic connections means it is courted far more often than it is criticized by allies like the US. These factors also mean that Turkey can – unlike other nations – operate on several fronts simultaneously, while often displaying a knack for managing to turn international crises and other people’s headaches into diplomatic and developmental opportunities.

Indeed, even as Turkish diplomats were assiduously writing down what Israel and the EU think of them from their seats in the Herzliya audience, the head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization, Hakan Fidan, was visiting Baku to meet with Azerbaijan’s National Security Minister, Gen. Eldar Mahmudov and President Ilham Aliyev. While their meetings were ostensibly concerned with countering terrorism and organized crime in the region, it is not implausible that the security chiefs may have also sought to assess what would happen if the current rebellious streak gripping other Muslim states spreads to Azerbaijan- as the other states affected, relatively autocratic in nature.

Their discussions may well have also included Azerbaijan’s steady military build-up for a possible second showdown with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh- something which few outside parties would be prepared to contain at present. In any case, relations between Turkey and its closest ally are excellent as always- while Israel’s embassy in Baku remains closed over security fears.

The intelligence front offers further ironies. In September 2010, Hürriyet reported that a wave of reforms begun by Emre Taner, the predecessor to MIT chief Fidan, is expanding in new ways. For example, the agency “has started to send young women spies to all corners of Turkey and the rest of the world… Turkish female James Bonds are coming.”

One of the reasons cited for why females had previously been mostly relegated to desk jobs, instead of field positions, was “family reasons.”

According to the report, “although MİT is one of the strongest intelligence agencies in the Middle East, it does not have an international network comparable to that of MOSSAD, CIA or MI6.” Yet even contemplating such a reform would not have been possible without the secular state basis originally conceived by Ataturk- something which critics fear is now in danger of being eroded by the present regime, in pursuit of an Islamist agenda. Over the long haul, the balancing act between liberal reform and an illiberal agenda will become increasingly hard to manage. Until then, the government seems keen to take from the best of both worlds.

Peripheral Opportunities

Do foreign governments, does the US in particular, share Israel’s concerns over the Islamic orientation of the current Turkish government? While “a lot of European governments do see this, the Obama Administration doesn’t want to see it,” stated Professor Rubin. “If they don’t want to see it, then no amount of evidence will suffice. The Turkish government’s vote against sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program should have been enough.”

The question of the Turkish government’s “arbitration” role towards Iran’s nuclear program was one of the most hotly-debated topics at the Herzliya Conference’s Turkey panel. In a separate speech given there, British Defense Minister Liam Fox proclaimed that “Iran needs to engage seriously and constructively. It did not do so at Istanbul” This reference to the recent 21 January P5+1 negotiations in Istanbul was met with much approval.

Back in August 2010, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak expressed concerns that “the nomination in recent weeks of a new chief of the Turkish secret services who is a supporter of Iran worries us.” Barak added that Fidan’s appointment could result in “the Iranians having access to secret information.” (Fidan had represented Turkey at the International Atomic Energy Agency before his appointment on 27 May 2010).

In May, when the Turkish government was taking some heat in the press for its Iran-Turkey-Brazil “fuel swap” solution to the nuclear issue, things changed (four days after Fidan’s appointment), when the Gaza flotilla raid occurred. Negative media coverage of Israel increased exponentially, and the public discourse was immediately changed from the Iranian nuclear threat to human rights and the Palestinian issue. Meanwhile, in Turkey, the public was being fed a story sustained by both the government and opposition that Israel had secretly led contemporaneous Kurdish guerrilla attacks on the Turkish army, something that the more responsible domestic media rubbished.

Most important in the end, though, is the inscrutable behavior of Iran, which Israel presents as the number-one threat to peace in the Middle East. In an attempt to raise national morale at Herzliya, former Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy delivered a rousing speech on February 7 in which he sought to reassure his countrymen (and the outside world) that Iran was in fact “not ten foot tall” and that it was high time for the Israeli public to regain their confidence, and realize that their formidable security apparatus makes Israel – and not Iran – the regional superpower. Israel and Iran have been at war for over 20 years, in a “mostly clandestine” capacity, stated Mr Halevy, who concluded that Israel and the US will prevail in the end. And numerous lesser-informed experts, Turkish and non-Turkish alike, have argued that it is not in Turkey’s interests for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons- something that may indeed never occur.

Yet at the same time, it is also clear that continued Iranian saber-rattling at very least is conducive to Turkey’s aspirations to be a key player in the region; the more Iran acts up, the more Turkey can portray itself internationally as a willing arbiter of security disputes.

Further, other things that Israel considers “provocations,” like Iran’s current demands to sail through the Suez, also inevitably distract international attention and resources from other areas where Turkey is expanding its influence on all fronts- and where Islamist groups hostile to Israel also operate relatively undisturbed. In this light, it is obvious that Israel’s wariness about a once close ally is becoming a new factor of concern as it estimates its national security strategy and allocation of resources in the years ahead.

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By Mehmet Efe Biresselioglu in Izmir, Turkey

Turkey is becoming increasingly active in its foreign policy-making. There are new principles and approaches in the new Turkish foreign policy rhetoric, including the importance of soft-power, universalism and a new vision for security (including the “zero problems with neighbors” dictum).

New Principles Put into Practice

These principles have clearly been visible in recent international events involving Turkey. Turkey’s Lebanon policy, its role as a mediator between Syria and Israel and its position between Israel and Palestine confirms the new influence of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. Moreover, Turkey’s constructive approach to Iran’s nuclear issue, in cooperation with Brazil in the UN, and its wider role as go-between for Iran and the Western world have all enhanced and extended the new approach of Turkish foreign policy.

With the beginning of the Davutoğlu era, as well as in the Middle East, Turkey is also becoming more active in Africa (as was noted recently in a Balkanalysis.com interview with Turkish experts Mehmet Ozkan and Birol Akgun), and Asia. All these regions have traditionally been relatively insignificant for Turkish foreign policy-making. However, Turkey is starting to become more active by establishing new embassies, economic visits and new agreements with the countries of these regions.

Turkey is also demonstrating its foreign minister’s “zero problems with neighbors” approach in practice. The recent diplomatic progress with Armenia, the new Turkish approach to the disagreements between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Turkey’s aim of expanding its economic influence throughout its region, while abolishing visa requirements for neighboring countries, exemplify these recent changes in Turkey’s policy within its own neighborhood.

Likewise, Turkey’s regional policy has shifted. The policy is now based on security for all, high-level political dialogue, economic integration and interdependence, in addition to multicultural coexistence. Since the beginning of this period of change, Turkey has reached considerable achievements in its regional power role.

Turkey’s Relations with the Arab World

In order to achieve its ambitions of an increased regional power role, Turkey has also turned its face towards its immediate Arab neighborhood, the Middle East. Under the AKP government, Turkey has taken positive and constructive steps with its relations towards the Arab countries and has been developing its relations on both bilateral and multilateral platforms. Since most of today’s Arab countries were included within the geographical extent of the former Ottoman Empire over long periods, Turkey has always enjoyed deeply-rooted historical, cultural, social and religious ties with the Arab world; now, the new priorities in foreign policy-making make are making Turkey much more proactive here as well.

According to obvious current geopolitical trends, the Middle East in particular has an important place; therefore Turkey attaches great importance to close dialogue and co-operation with the Arab states. Turkey has recently established consultative mechanisms with a number of Arab countries, including Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain.  Moreover, Turkish President Abdullah Gül, Prime-minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his cabinet frequently visit Arab countries both to promote trade and strengthen relationships. However, beyond the Middle East specifically, Turkey has also made great efforts of late to increase its stature within the Arab states of the Persian Gulf.

Turkey and the Gulf Region

In parallel with its developing relationship with the Arab world in general, Turkey is deepening ties with Gulf states, a process which includes developing better economic relations with energy-rich Gulf countries like Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain- a factor hardly surprising for energy import-dependent Turkey.

Beyond energy, however, Turkish investors in other sectors see opportunities here in states such as Kuwait, where the government has an ambitious urban expansion plans. Clearly there are some gulf region countries that are not energy-rich, such as Yemen, but energy is not the only factor here either. Turkey has historical ties with the region dating back to the Ottoman era and World War I, and the region is critical in Middle Eastern geopolitics.

Also, as Prime Minister Erdoğan has stated in his speeches, Turkey is not only looking to develop its economic relations, but to increase and lead the stability and prosperity in the region. To this end, one of his main goals is to establish a free trade area and a visa agreement similar to Europe’s Schengen Visa, which would include the Middle East, the Persian Gulf region and Turkey. Today, Turkey is paying particular importance in the Gulf to Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar in order to increase its influence and to support its role as an emerging regional leader.

Turkey’s Relations with Bahrain

Since diplomatic relations began in 1973, Turkey has maintained a stable relationship with Bahrain. However, in recent years, with Turkey’s changing foreign policy rhetoric, the Turkish government has started to pay high-level visits to Bahrain, such as with those of President Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan in 2009.

Here, it is important to note that while not as rich as its neighbors in the Gulf, with its long-term development program, free trade opportunities, investment and foreign currency regulations, Bahrain is one of the region’s most developed economies. In addition, Bahrain leads the petrochemical and aluminum sectors in the region, while it has also acquired a reputation for being a financial capital within the region due to its advanced banking and financial sector.

Turkey is increasing the level of its diplomatic and economic relations with Bahrain, as a leading Gulf state, by signing agreements concerning security, economic and political issues. Furthermore, in the last five years Turkey-Bahrain bilateral trade has increased five-fold to more than $400 million per annum, despite having fallen to under $150 million in 2009 due to the global financial crisis.

Currently, Turkey is actively supporting exports to Bahrain and especially its construction sector. In addition, funds having their origin in Bahrain are prominent in Turkey.  It is also worth noting that President Abdullah Gül was the first foreign president permitted to give a speech in the parliament of Bahrain.

Turkey’s Relations with Kuwait

On January 10, Prime Minister Erdoğan and a number of his cabinet members, including the energy and trade ministers, visited Kuwait. Kuwait was the first stop on the premier’s Gulf region visit, coming before Qatar. During his visits to both countries, Erdoğan also brought a delegation of 500 high-level Turkish officials and businessmen.

One of the main aims of Erdoğan’s visit to Kuwait was to secure a substantial share in Kuwait’s $120 billion worth of investment plans over the next 10 years. Turkish companies are already very active in the Middle East, and are constantly bidding for major projects, especially in the construction sector.

In the Persian Gulf region as well, it seems as though the power of the Turkish economy has become an important tool in Turkish foreign policy-making. However, in his speech, Prime Minister Erdoğan noted the present relatively low level of bilateral trade – approximately only $600 million in total – and stressed the need to increase the degree of business cooperation.

With this goal in mind, both sides ensured during the visit that over 2,000 business meetings were held between Kuwaiti and Turkish businessmen. Moreover, the Kuwait Investment Authority plans to raise its investment in Turkey to $1.7 billion. It is known that Kuwait’s private sector has made key acquisitions in the Turkish banking sector. As Amberin Zaman of Haberturk stated in her column, Erdoğan sees fresh opportunities with the new generations in both Turkey and the larger Muslim world to cooperate more in business than they had in the past.

Apart from pure business, Prime Minister Erdoğan also found an opportunity for political gain while in Kuwait, stressing that Turks and Arabs were brethren in their shared Islamic faith and values. Erdoğan had meetings with Kuwait’s Crown Prince, Prime Minister al-Sabah and Parliament speaker al-Khorafi. Erdoğan discussed bilateral relations as well as international issues such as Cyprus, Iran and Iraq. Both officials reckoned the importance of the territorial integrity of Iraq, Kuwaiti officials support Turkey’s stance on Iran’s Nuclear Program and are also positive on establishing diplomatic relations with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Moreover, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on industrial cooperation. The Turkish premier was also given the “Outstanding Personality in the Islamic World Award” by Kuwaiti Sheikh Fahad al-Ahmad.  At the award ceremony, he used his speech to strongly criticize what he called the “inhumane Israeli Aggression,” referring to incidents in Palestine and the death of nine Turkish citizens in the Mavi Marmara flotilla confrontation last May.

Judging from his condemnation of the world for its perceived lack of response to these incidents, it seems clear once again that Erdoğan is seeking a stronger leadership role for Turkey, especially within the Muslim world. Adding that Turkey and the Turkish people have heart and conscience, he stated that he desired a world where justice was more powerful than power. He used this opportunity to try and increase the Turkish role in global affairs and in the region.

Turkey’s Relations with Qatar

After Kuwait, the Turkish delegation’s next stop was Qatar. The aim of this visit was, once again, to increase Turkish influence in the region, and also to increase the cooperation between Turkey and Middle East/Gulf countries, due to the fact that the Islamic world’s share in the global economy is almost 30 percent presently.

In Qatar, Erdoğan stated that cooperation between members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference would bring prosperity and peace to the Islamic world. As in Kuwait, Turkey hopes to secure a substantial proportion of Qatar’s $150 billion worth of investment plans- especially significant as Qatar has been chosen as the venue for FIFA World Cup 2022. Therefore, Turkish businessmen had a number of meetings with Qatari officials and companies.

In addition, Qatar is expected by Turkish authorities to become a leading LNG exporter in the near future. Therefore, as an energy import-dependent country, Turkey is also seeking to develop LNG projects and a natural gas pipeline with Qatar. Currently, Turkish-Qatari bilateral trade is at the $400-million level, having decreased from $1.2 billion in 2008 due to global financial crises. Consequently, as with other countries, Erdoğan also stressed the need to focus on increasing the volume of trade exchange between the two countries.

Turkey’s Goals in the Gulf Region

Clearly, Turkey is seeking to take on the role of a regional power, and therefore, the Gulf region occupies an important place in its calculations. In order to reach this goal, Turkish entrepreneurs are being used as a tool to spread influence, and to exploit the huge opportunities available in Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain in regards to exports, joint investments ad contract services. The aim of Turkey is to further diversify the opportunities for mutual commercial and economic cooperation, thus expanding the market shares of Turkish companies.

Turkey is also aiming to boost its economic and political ties with the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG), having already signed a memorandum of understanding with CCASG states in order to forge a strategic partnership in all fields.  The volume of trade between Turkey and CCASG states has increased from $1.5 billion in 1999 to an impressive $17.5 billion in 2008. In 2008, GCC exports to Turkey had already increased to five times 2007 levels, while the group’s corresponding import levels increased by almost 15 times.

Turkey’s deepening relationship with the Gulf countries and the Arab world in general has been criticized by the West, as an apparent sign that Turkey is turning its face to the east. However, this ignores the fact that Turkey conducts almost 50% of its trade with the EU and US. Nevertheless, Turkey is diversifying its trade, and the integration of its economy into both Eastern and Western markets confirms Turkey’s globally strong economy and the globalization of its economy. Indeed, considering that this is an era in which countries everywhere in the world are more and more frequently negotiating and cooperating with other countries regardless of nation-state borders, it should not be considered strange that Turkey is casting its nets more widely, as the recent diplomatic and business excursion to the Persian Gulf shows.

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By Çağrı Yıldırım*

The role of the military in Turkish politics is the central question in the country’s European Union membership process, since one of the crucial political factors stipulated by Brussels for obtaining full membership has been the democratic control of the military.

In order to achieve this ambitious aim, a dramatic reform process for democratic control has been launched. Under the AKP government, the power of the army in Turkish politics has dramatically diminished since 2002. Over the past two years, a number of officers and retired generals have been arrested in connection with the so-called “Ergenekon” case. Prosecutors accuse the network of planning to create chaos through a serious of bloody provocations, thus justifying a coup against the AKP government.

On the other hand, the Turkish general staff denied these accusations. As a result, there is an ongoing power struggle between Erdoğan’s government and the Turkish military. So, in spite of this move by the government, there are serious difficulties in terms of establishing full civilian control over the military due to the strong position of the Turkish military in politics.

The Military and the State: the Ottoman Legacy

The legacy of military involvement in Turkish politics goes back to Ottoman times. The military played a key role in the history of the Ottoman Empire, since it could extend its territory by having a strong army. Toward the end of the empire, the state’s modernization process was driven by military concerns.

The evolution of the army commenced through the establishment of institutions developed according to Western models, in which a new generation of reformist officers appeared. These officers began to see themselves as the vanguard of enlightenment. They pioneered the political modernization by leading the 1876 revolution and the Young Turk revolution of 1908. The legacy of military intervention appeared through these revolutions in which the armed forces played a leading role. These interventions brought about new reforms, which changed significant aspects of the political and social system.

The Role of the Military after the Creation of the Kemalist Republic

After the First World War, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) emerged as the country’s political and military leader. He and other generals transformed the Ottoman Empire into a modern nation-state. In other words, Turkey’s modernization process was again led by the military.

In the first year of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal sought to exclude the army from open involvement in party politics. In order to achieve this, a law was passed in 1923 which obliged serving officers who were elected to parliament to resign from the army. The aim of Mustafa Kemal was not only to prevent the military from exercising direct political influence, but also to protect the military from the everyday struggles of the political arena. However, Ataturk’s removal of the army from politics was never quite complete, because he also saw the role of army as the guardian of the secular republic.

As a result, the army has since then felt a responsibility for the protection of the principles of the Kemalist republic. When it has felt that the republic and its principles to be threatened, the army has in the past taken responsibility for its protection. This principle was written into the Turkish Armed Services Internal Service Code. It states that “the duty of the armed forces is to protect and safeguard Turkish territory and the Turkish Republic as stipulated by the Constitution.” Three interventions have been justified on this legal basis.

Thus, the current position of the military in Turkish politics is the product of a long-term process. The army sees itself as a “guardian” of the Republic and its principles. These characteristics of the military, however, have also caused a dilemma for Turkey-EU relations, as the EU’s principles are completely opposed to military involvement in politics. The reasons why the European Union has been pushing Turkey to reform its civil-military relations are specified in the Copenhagen criteria, which comprise of three distinct criteria: political, economic, and those related to the obligations of the EU membership.

The Changing Role of the Military following EU Reforms

The political criteria require the implementation of institutional stability, complete freedom of expression, the entrenchment of human rights, and respect and protection of minorities. Although the democratizing of civil-military relations are not directly mentioned in the Copenhagen criteria, the military as an institution should be subordinate to the political criteria. Following the acceptance of Turkey as a candidate country in 1999, Turkey agreed to the fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria in order to start accession negotiations. As a result, the democratizing of civil-military relations has become one of the most important issues in the overall reform process, since one of the most important conditions of the political criteria for Turkey’s full membership is the democratic control of the military.

After the acceptance of Turkey as a candidate country, the main criticism of the accession partnership document, annual reports and progress reports on Turkey concerned the perceived lack of democratic control over the country’s military. The main criticisms of these documents were generally in regards to the institutional aspect of democratic control. In this respect, the status of the Chief of the General Staff under the prime minister, the role of the National Security Council in Turkish political life and the lack of an effective civilian control over the military budget constitute main reform areas.

All of these required reforms have been outlined in official EU documents, namely the Accession Partnership Documents and Regular Reports. According to these reports, Turkey’s reform process in civil-military relations can be divided into four parts: the transformation of the role and composition of the National Security Council; the transparency of the defense budget; the removal of the military representatives from the civilian boards; and an amendment concerning military courts.

Reforms Undertaken: From the National Security Council to Military Courts

Firstly, the position of the National Security Council in politics was one of the main impediments in relations with the EU. The NSC was established after the 1960 Military Intervention in order to legitimize the place of the army in politics. Its power was then enlarged after the 1980 Military Intervention. The new council of the NSC is composed of the president of the republic, the prime minister, the chief of the general staff, the ministers of foreign affairs, internal affairs, and defense, as well as the top military commanders. Thus, the military was able to make itself politically more active and effective.

However, in the process of moving towards EU membership, the power of the NSC has been restricted. With the modification of Article 118 of the constitution, the role of the NSC was diminished. According to the 1982 Constitution, the NSC was responsible for the drafting of national security and foreign policy. With this amendment, it became solely an advisory body. Furthermore, the composition of the NSC has been altered, with an increase in the number of its civilian members. Moreover, the post of The Court of Auditors has been authorized to audit accounts and transactions of all types of organizations, including state properties owned by the armed forces. With the introduction of these reforms, Turkey’s elective representatives became more effective in making the armed forces more accountable.

The removal of military representatives from the civilian boards is the third area of the reform process. As part of the 6th Harmonization Package of 19 July 2003, the NSC representative on the supervisory Board of Cinema, Video and Music was removed; similarly, military representatives on the Higher Education Board and the Higher Broadcasting Board were also withdrawn. As a result, progress on EU reforms have prepared the way for a diminished military influence on the policies of educational, arts and broadcasting institutions.

The final area of the reform process concerns the amendments of military courts. According to the Accession Partnership Documents, the European Commission’s main criticism was of the excessive power of State Security Courts that deal with political crime. The Commission also had doubts about the impartiality of judges, since one in three State Security Court judges were military judges. This was the only example in Europe in which civilians can be tried, at least in part, by military judges. For these reasons, the legal basis for the existence of State Security Courts has been removed. Moreover, the trial of civilians in military courts was abolished as part of the 7th Harmonization Package. Eventually, State Security Courts were totally abolished in 2004.

Therefore, in regards to EU demands, Turkey has made reforms in all the area mentioned. The important question, then, becomes the extent to which these reforms have been successful in restoring full civilian control over the military. Through the EU membership process, civil-military relations have become more democratized. In other words, the autonomy of the military in Turkey has been diminished by means of EU reforms. As a result, the NSC is no more an executive body, and has only an advisory function; the transparency of the defense expenditures has been enhanced; and the function of the military court has been limited.

However, there are still perceived problems regarding the position of the military. Firstly, military representatives continue to make their views known on a variety of topics, through speeches, their influence on the media, and through formal declarations. Most of the time, statements by the military are perceived as warnings to the civilian government. During the presidential election in 2007, the army was able to influence politics. As the generals objected to Abdullah Gül, the AKP candidate, they placed a message on the defense ministry’s website, threatening intervention. This “e-coup” caused political chaos in Turkey, which resulted in a new general election.

The second problem is that the chief of the Turkish general staff is still directly responsible to the prime minister, contrary to EU practices. These unchanged positions of the military indicate that the political influence of the military remains, and that civil power in Turkey is still far from exercising full control over the military.

There is no doubt that EU candidacy has contributed to the democratization of civil-military relations in Turkey. According to the last EU Progress Report on Turkey’s accession, progress has been made regarding civilian control of the army. The military court’s competencies have now been limited through the constitutional package. Moreover, the decisions of the Supreme Military Council are now open to judicial review.

However, there are certain limits to its impact because of the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and the Kemalist Republic, and this will probably remain the case in the near future. Full civilian control over the military can only be maintained with the full implementation of recent reforms, which, as the Regular Reports on Turkey consistently indicate, are crucial to the democratization process.

……………………

*Çağrı Yıldırım is a Research Assistant at the Department of International Relations at Izmir University of Economics, and a master’s student in its Sustainable Energy program. He holds a B.A. in International Relations and the EU from Izmir University of Economics. His research interests include energy politics, energy security and international politics, and EU-Turkey relations.

By Mehmet Efe Biresselioglu in Izmir, Turkey

The relationship between Turkey and Iran has undergone considerable change during the rule of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP). Starting with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Tehran on 28 and 29 July of 2004, there has been a thawing of relations between the two neighbors. This visit was a key sign of the winds of change affecting Turkey’s world view. From that time, both Turkey and Iran began to adopt the view that they should put aside deep-rooted and enduring ideological differences, and instead to increase trade, while also addressing the continuing problem of terrorism.

Changes in Turkey’s World View

The pace of change in Turkish foreign policy rhetoric has progressively escalated during the rule of the AKP government. The architect of this change is Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was appointed chief advisor to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2002, and thereafter nominated as Turkish Foreign Minister in 2009.

Turkey has been able to formulate a systematic and unified methodological approach to its foreign policy in the 21^st century. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey now adheres to three main principles in its foreign policy making. These three main principles are:

• a ‘visionary’ rather than ‘crisis-oriented’ approach;
• a universal applied foreign policy based on a consistent and systematic framework;
• the adoption of a new discourse and diplomatic style, which has resulted in the spread of Turkish soft power in the region.

Moreover, Davutoğlu has proposed five operational principles that help to enforce these main principles of Turkish foreign policy. These are:

• striking a balance between security and democracy;
• zero problems with neighboring states;
• a proactive and pre-emptive approach to ‘peace diplomacy;’
• a multi-dimensional foreign policy;
• a ‘rhythmic’ diplomacy.

These principles are clearly visible in recent international events involving Turkey. Turkey’s policy towards Lebanon, Turkey’s role as a mediator between Syria and Israel, and the new Turkish position on the Israel/Palestine conflict have all demonstrated Turkey’s renewed Middle East foreign policy. Moreover, Turkey’s constructive approach to Iran’s nuclear issue with Brazil in the UN, and its wider role as go-between for Iran and the Western world, has enhanced and extended the new approach of Turkish foreign policy.

The Historical Relationship between Turkey and Iran

Bilateral relations between Turkey and Iran have been subject to the influence of various political factors, especially on the Turkish side. These tendencies derive from the realities of having a common border, and common cultural and other factors that are many centuries old. In addition, there is a 500-year history of peaceful relations, extending back to the time of the Ottoman and Persian Empires.

Following the military coup d’état in 1980 in Turkey and the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran, anti-Iranian propaganda increased in Turkey because of the threat to Turkey’s secular ideology, and of the export of the revolution to Turkey. However, the threat was completely unreal; as Turkey’s secular tradition would not allow this outcome.

Until recently, bilateral relations had been negatively affected over several decades by various issues. These included the suspicion from both sides that the other country was supporting Kurdish terrorist groups in its country, i.e. PKK in Turkey and the MKO in Iran, interaction between Turkey and the United States and Israel, rivalries in the Caucasus regarding energy transit. These and other forms of negative propaganda against Iran have had adverse effects on bilateral relations until recent years.

Economic Issues

Today, the volume of trade between Iran and Turkey stands at about $13 billion. Economic officials from both countries expect this figure to rise to $20 billion per year over the following five years.

Moreover, the Turkish government has agreed that Turkish businessmen should be allowed to export up to $100 million worth of goods to Iran on a zero tariff basis. In addition to that, Iran’s Mellat Bank announced its readiness to financially support necessary measures to encourage cross-border import/export. Ankara and Tehran have already initiated talks about cooperation in different sectors, and to solve the customs tariff problems.

Oil and natural gas are the major goods in the trade relations between Turkey and Iran. Turkey hopes to enhance its energy security by reducing its dependency on Russian oil and natural gas, by including Iranian oil and natural gas in its energy composition. The already completed Tabriz-Erzurum pipeline has a capacity of 14 bcm of gas per year, though currently only one quarter of its capacity is being used; however, in general this development allows for considerably increasing of natural gas imports from Iran to Turkey. The two countries have signed an agreement for Turkish and Iranian companies to cooperate on exporting gas to Turkey, with the option for subsequent resale. Also, Turkey has been granted the right to explore and extract natural gas from Iran’s significant South Pars field.

Current Dynamics in Turkish-Iranian Relations and Israel’s Role

Turkey has strengthened its ties with Iran since the AKP took power in 2002. As a result of Turkey’s policy goals of becoming a regional power and achieving a ‘zero problems with neighbors’ foreign policy, Turkey has offered to become a mediator in disputes between Iran and the Western world, and also between Iran and Israel. The main concern in this respect has been Iran’s nuclear program.

However, the recent ‘Mavi Marmara’ incident has jeopardized not only Turkish-Israel relations, but relations between Turkey and the West. Eight Turks and one US citizen of Turkish decent were killed by Israeli forces as the ship, in spite of discouragement from Ankara, tried to reach Gaza. This incident has had serious repercussions in the Middle East, and Turkey has started to be seen as the leading voice of the Muslims, including Arabs.

On the other hand, Turkey has been criticized by the West and domestic opposition as ‘turning east,’ ‘joining an Islamist bloc’ or ‘turning its back on the West.’ However, Turkey’s aim is to be an active regional power actor not only through hard power, but to use its soft-power capacity by increasing economic engagements, supporting this with trade and investment, but also increasing its social and popular connections in the region.

Still, Turkey is also increasing its level of relationship with Iran by supporting its nuclear program, but only for peaceful purposes. There are two views on Iran’s nuclear program, first that Iran has plans to threaten Israel and the US with nuclear weapons, and second that Iran genuinely needs nuclear energy, as it is unable to refine enough of its petroleum products, and therefore needs alternative sources to exchange in order to supply its energy needs. This is a result of US sanctions, leaving Iran’s energy sector needing more than $100 billion dollars of investment in the coming decade.

Turkey is supporting Iran’s second, peaceful aim and for that reason is trying to mediate between Iran and the West, accepting Iran’s guarantee that it will not build nuclear weapons.

Hence as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, Turkey voted ‘no’ against additional sanctions on 9 June. It should not be considered that Turkey’s “no” was in support of any Iranian nuclear military ambitions. Rather, it argued that Turkey, along with Brazil, was convinced that it has US support to negotiate the exchange of a substantial amount of Iran’s low-enriched uranium stockpile, as set out in the 17 May Tehran Agreement. The Turkish aim was thus to protect its bargaining power, and moreover to adhere to the Tehran Agreement.

The Real Concern

A real concern, however, remains that even with 1.2 tons of low-enriched uranium exported to Turkey for storage, Iran will still retain enough to build a nuclear warhead. Therefore, Iran needs to demonstrate to the world its good will and also to explain why it needs nuclear power instead of confronting the West. Turkey and the West want to eliminate any possibility of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, and Iran’s nuclear program is the most urgent nuclear proliferation test facing the world at the present time.

Turkey’s aim is to promote an advanced diplomatic solution instead of a disagreement between the West and Iran, and Turkey’s changing foreign policy would allow this, with its increasingly active role in the Middle East, compared to its past approaches. Despite Turkey’s deepening relations with Iran, the AKP government still does not support Iran’s potential nuclear military aims. Rather, these efforts are perceived by Turkey as solely to promote regional stability.

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By Chris Deliso

On August 17, Turks held a solemn commemoration to mark the 11th anniversary of the massive 1999 earthquake that killed 18,000 people, while destroying over 110,000 buildings. The occasion has also sparked much public discussion over the structural soundness of construction in the densely populated areas in and around Istanbul, where other risk factors potentially affecting prized ancient monuments are also coming to the fore.

Earthquakes are not infrequent in Turkey, though the magnitude of the 1999 quake, centered in the northwestern province of Kocaeli, was extraordinary at 7.4 on the Richter scale. Five days previous to the commemoration, an earthquake registering 4.8 shook Balya, in Balikesir province. There were no reported damages or injuries.

Today, Turks are asking themselves to what extent they are prepared to deal with future large earthquakes, from the point of view of both construction improvements and disaster response planning. Like other densely populated cities at high seismic risk built along the water, such as San Francisco, a major earthquake in Istanbul could unleash not only building destruction and loss of life, but also things more difficult to prepare for, such as tidal waves.

According to Orhan Turan, chairman of the Association of Turkish Building-Material Producers (İMSAD), “…we keep talking but so far there is no master plan.”

Speaking for the Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review, Turan attested that while more stringent building standards enacted by the government after 1999 mean that most new constructions “are strong enough to resist earthquakes,” a clear plan and budget for dealing with a potential major earthquake have yet to be made.

Speaking for the country as a whole, Turan estimated that of approximately 18 million total buildings, some 14 million are still at risk: “…even though we have the needed materials, and produce them and build the greatest buildings in the world, we have not been able to find a solution to the houses built before 1999,” he said.

The businessman added that the use of cheap and unregulated black-market construction supplies, and the lack of registration for low-quality new dwellings, mean that the government is still not doing enough to protect Turkey’s biggest city and its inhabitants from future earthquakes.

Further, a sobering new joint study carried out by the İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality and Japan’s International Cooperation Agency has revealed that some 30 percent of Istanbul buildings “…are in danger of collapsing if a strong earthquake were to occur,” reported Today’s Zaman on August 17.

The joint study also predicted that “…tsunami waves could reach as high as 5.5 meters along a 10-kilometer area of the shoreline in İstanbul. The waves could reach the city’s shores in eight minutes and are expected to be able to go as far inland as 150 meters.”

Istanbul sits a mere 20km north of the major North Anatolian Fault. Since 1939, when a deadly earthquake further east along this fault line struck the eastern town of Erzincan, registering 8.2 on the Richter scale, a succession of earthquakes has been moving steadily westward- leaving many to suspect that Istanbul may eventually suffer a major tremor as well.

At the same time, experts are sounding the alarm about structural risks to constructions that have so far proven much tougher and more long-lasting.  While Istanbul is enjoying its present role as European Capital of Culture for 2010, in July resurfaced the possibility that the city could lose its place as a protected UNESCO World Heritage Site if the government does not do more for conservation.

According to another Hurriyet report, threats to heritage pointed out by UNESCO since 2006 include building over archeological areas, expansion of public transport that could endanger historic sites, and exploitation of sites by tourism developers.

One example of a building perceived as being under threat is the underground Basilica Cistern (Yerebatan Sarnici, in Turkish), an early Byzantine water supply source and one of the city’s most-visited tourist attractions, is apparently also at risk- but this time, as a result not of earthquakes, but of its own popularity.

According to Istanbul’s Chamber of Tourist Guides, heavy traffic on the streets above the cistern, located in the historic Sultanahmet district, may be a load too great for the grand old structure. In a public statement issued on July 26, the Chamber stated that the weight of tour buses and some newer structures was putting the Cistern’s roof at risk of collapse, reported Hurriyet.

Despite various decrees and plans at the municipal level to ban heavy traffic in the area, critics are noting that tour bus drivers do not always follow the rules. A heavily-used tramway also runs in the vicinity of the historic monument.

However, traffic is not the only problem. Citing a press source within the Fatih Municipality, which administers the Cistern and surrounding sites, the newspaper disclosed that “…in order to reduce the risk to the Basilica Cistern, a provincial administration building located on the street above will be demolished to minimize the weight that must be borne.”

As an ancient city with a very modern outlook and growing population, Istanbul faces numerous dilemmas, as UNESCO officials have noted. At issue is how to expand and modernize the city without damaging the historic fabric that makes it a place of vital interest to not only its citizens, but to people across the world- and how to protect the city from natural disasters that, unfortunately, may be not too many years in coming.

……………………

Note: Regularly-updated information on all seismic activity in Turkey is visible online at the website of Bogazici University’s Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Research Institute.

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