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Leaked 2015 Document Reveals Failed UNHCR Plan To Colonize Macedonia during Migrant Crisis

By Chris Deliso

May 20, 2018

There is nothing the United Nations loves more than a good occupation, and in fall 2015, Macedonia almost got one. An extraordinary leaked document reveals how, during the height of the migrant crisis, the UNHCR was preparing to take a controlling role should the government be unable or unwilling to manage the flow of migrants coming from Greece on the ‘Balkan Route.’

The 32-page draft document (uploaded on here) was the outcome of a local workshop held from 31 August to 2 September, and attended by representatives of the government, defense, interior and social ministries, plus relevant NGOs and charities. The proposal, leaked to by a participant, confirms our exclusive reporting from December 2015, that the UN was preparing to settle over 30,000 migrants in the country.

Of course, this did not happen, as the presidentially-declared law on crisis situations enabled an efficient, coordinated response that allowed minimal retention of migrants – who did not want to stay anyway – and their swift exodus via train to Serbia and onwards to Germany, which at the time was recklessly encouraging economic migrants and asylum seekers to flood the Continent. The aftershocks of Angela Merkel’s dictatorial decision will have permanent ramifications for Europe’s future.

Context: Why the UNHCR Failed to Achieve Goals

By early September 2015, Macedonia was gripped in an exhausting year-long political crisis, and had survived a Kosovo-based Albanian terrorist plot to destabilize the country in order to create an international protectorate and ethnically partition Macedonia. This plot had been foiled through a police action on May 9, which however left eight policemen dead. The incident left most Macedonians further enraged with Zoran Zaev’s then-opposition SDSM party. However, a Western force-brokered political solution, the so-called Przino Agreement of July 2015, created a special prosecutor (that would be weaponized against leaders of the then ruling VMRO-DUI coalition. The Agreement also called for new elections and decreed that a ‘technical government’ would take over on 15 September.

As part of the deal, SDSM was allowed to take control of two ministries – Interior and Labour and Social Policy, while having major roles in others, despite having been convincingly crushed in April 2014 elections. It was an interesting choice; obviously, any political party wants to control the police, but Labour and Social Policy? That would be most useful in the case of a… large-scale migration crisis. (It should be remembered that all of the successive technical governments existing until 2018 saw the same party choose the same ministries).

The general instability left only one leader, President Gjorge Ivanov, capable of making decisions. Had he not invoked the law on crisis situations that summer, the UNHCR plan could very well have been realized with the willing participation of a government in which the key ministries were controlled by a leftist party. Instead, a well-coordinated operation led by sovereign Macedonian decision-making (in which the UN played an important but limited role) occurred.

Another important contextual element is that neighboring Kosovo, of course, was run by a UN administration (which still has some activities there) from 1999 through 2008 independence. After this it was replaced by the EU’s EULEX mission. Both were essentially means for money laundering and participation in larger criminal activities, ironically enough actually strengthening the power of local mafias due to the international peacekeepers’ need for drugs and prostitutes. Almost 20 years since the UN’s involvement in Kosovo, the country is hardly better off than before and most citizens would like to move to Western Europe. But a few people local and foreign alike have gotten very wealthy from the occupation.

The UN’s long-standing global reputation for enhancing criminality, committing crimes against humanity, and using crises to further extend the powers of an already bloated bureaucratic elite are well known. For these people, Macedonia has no significance as a country or culture- it is just another piece of territory to be checked off, another promising market for which Excel spreadsheets tabulated with desired expenses are needed.

Inside the Draft Document: How the UNHCR Chose the Worst-Case (and Most Lucrative) Scenario to Push an Occupation Agenda

Although it is not signed or finalized, the document is very revealing as it shows UN preferences and default instincts towards crises. It discusses both pre-existing government actions and decisions, as well as UNHCR suggestions and plans. It thus collates two approaches. It does not provide any tabulation of costs, though by calculating the requested materiel and cash, a reader can easily understand the financial windfall that the UNHCR’s desired operation would have been.

Under Section 1.2 of the document (‘Planning Scenario’), the UNHCR describes the then-government’s migration expectations thus:

The Government of FYR Macedonia’s “Operational Plan in Case of Increased Influx of Migrants” outlines three scenarios:

  1. First scenario when there is continued influx of migrants who stay in the country for a short period of time;
  2. Second scenario when the migrants stay longer in the country (up to 1,000 on top of the existing caseload) that includes construction of a new asylum seekers reception centre with 1,000 beds, established at a plot on the territory of the Municipality of Kumanovo near the highway;
  3. Third scenario additional 2000 people should be received thus increasing the Asylum Seekers Reception Centre’s capacity to 3000 people.

The document thus begins by noting the reality of the current situation on the ground, the government’s logic, and its red lines for migrant reception.

The rest of the document is a calculated effort in how to overcome these bothersome limitations in order to get the desired result of a soft occupation. To do so, the UNHCR (and quite likely, local partners seeking to enrich themselves from the expected financial windfall) had to lie about the real situation and analytical probabilities.

The report then adds the government’s policy of allowing migrants 72 hours to transit the country, and facilitate their travel, while providing camp accommodation to a strictly limited number of migrants. And this is precisely what happened.

However, the UNHCR relied on its own analysis, predicting possible closure of the Serbian-Hungarian border as a justification for the following scenario, which they sought but did not get:

“Worst case scenario: Borders are closed and 30,000 refugees remain in the country, desperate to leave. The country is undergoing a political crisis and elections are scheduled for April 2016. With the winter season approaching, it is very likely that the challenges to meet the needs of the refugees will increase.”

In other words, the UNHCR was banking on creating a ‘migrant bubble’ in Macedonia in order to make it a semi-protectorate. However, they were outsmarted, as was the EU and others with hostile intentions, when Macedonia began building a fence on the Greek border. The migrant bubble thus instead formed in Greece.

The UNHCR planners knew that their analysis was wrong. They admitted that “usually, planners would choose the most likely scenario.” However, they used the above reasons (among others) to push for maximal action. It is hard to tell whether their analysis was based on ignorance or simple greed, but it is clear to anyone with local knowledge that some of their conclusions were absurd.

One example was their citation of border crossings – basically, all of them – that would have to be overseen, despite the unlikelihood of them being used by migrants. Thus the UNHCR suggested:

“Additional potential hot spots would be the borderlines with Albania (Debar-Struga region) and Bulgaria (Strumica, Berovo and Kriva Palanka region/borderline). Kosovo as an additional transit route should also be considered.”

This would, of course, require the inevitable participation of the UN in policing all of Macedonia’s borders, regardless of whether migrants actually used them (or of whether the UN was either needed or allowed to conduct such actions). The report then makes another flawed assumption to arrive at the real point- the numbers.

“Given the fact that the capacity of the current rest area is already exhausted, the authorities should plan for additional rest areas along the route of the refugees/migrants, sufficient to meet the needs of 33,000 individuals.”

As we will see, this sweeping recommendation was just the beginning (and hardly the most scandalous) of what the UN aid agency was seeking from the Macedonian authorities.

UNHCR’s Wish List: Border Control Roles, Mass Migrant Resettlement, and Lots of Money

After listing the government’s own plan for how it had and would deal with the crisis, the UNHCR draft document added its own, much more ambitious plans. As far as we know, Macedonia’s general public was never informed of the plans the UN had for their country in 2015.

Some of these suggestions have however been implemented in Greece and other countries. But trying anything similar locally would be extremely dangerous for Macedonian security.

Thus, under the ‘Shelter and Site Construction’ section of the document, the UNHCR lists its objectives, even giving specific examples of what it intended for Macedonia:

  • Assist new arrivals in renting urban shelter space
  • Protect vulnerable refugees in rental apartments from eviction (see at-tached vulnerability criteria);
  • Increase the ab-sorption capacity of host families through shelter material distribution.

The concept of giving economic migrants free apartments (and with ‘eviction protection’ that not even locals enjoy) indicates that the UN did not simply wish to house migrants temporarily in camps until the crisis was over. Rather, it was a plan much more similar to Merkel’s failed ‘integration’ experiment. Yet the UN’s dream experiment in social engineering, as attested by the document, goes even further with the next ‘example’:

  • Distribute US $75 (once) to all newly arriving families at way stations
  • Identify vulnerable refugees at risk of eviction;
  • Distribute US $75/month to vul-nerable refugees in rental apartments;
  • Identify host fami-lies in need of shelter material;
  • Distribute shelter material kits to host families
  • All 50,000 new arri-vals (10,000 families) are sheltered in ur-ban areas upon arri-val, using the shelter cash grant;
  • 10,000 vulnerable asylum seekers (2,000 families) are not evicted from their rental apartments;
  • 5,000 host families can shelter refugees in accordance with minimum standards.

You do the math.

These recommendations would result in at least two desirable outcomes- corruption and social disruption that would then be used to justify further UN involvement and thus further profit. The prospect of an amorphous international institution just handing out cash to tens of thousands of people is an obvious money laundering tactic- one can only imagine the kind of banking partners that would be selected for such an operation.

More insidious, however, is the proposal that 75 US dollars would find anyone, let alone a family, an apartment in the most desirable location (the capital of Skopje). The vast differences between actual and real rental costs would have to be made up by someone (public funds? More UN funds? Other?), but would most likely have meant the gradual distribution of migrants across economically-depressed areas of the country, where housing is in less demand and more affordable. This would have geographically dispersed the security risks and social fragmentation between alien populations. Any problems would then be used by the UN as justification for increasing its own presence in the country, and essentially replicating its former Kosovo business model.

The most shocking part of the UN plan, of course, is the final suggestion that migrants would live with “host families.” This is not the Peace Corps we are talking about here. In a family-based and conservative society, one would be hard-pressed to think of many people prepared to open their homes to random Third-World economic migrants; that such an idea could even have made it to draft document level shows both how far-left the UN has become, and how certain they are that they can get away with anything in unknown and ‘experimental’ countries like Macedonia.

33,000 Migrants in Camps, 33,000 Mattresses, and a Hell of a Lot of Other Stuff To Buy

Alongside these plans for social disruption, the UNHCR called for its meat-and-potatoes standard- organized camps.

In humanitarian operations, this is where the biggest opportunity for money laundering and corporate profit lie, and everything from food packets to industrial heaters are specified in the document. It confirms what the UNHCR told in fall 2015, about the failed plan to build mass camps. It recommends:

  • Government to identify, in coordina-tion with UNHCR a suitable site (s) for accommodating 33,000 people (if possible site has building already in-cluded to avoid temporary shelter )

Along with this recommendation, the draft document finely calculates everything that should be purchased, and in what capacities, for a period of just four months. The tacit expectation, of course, would be for a longer and more lucrative mission. The sectors involved covering everything from construction, plumbing and transport to food and pharmaceuticals. Such an operation would of course rely on existing relationships the UN has in all sectors among the global corporations involved with the migration business.

Conclusions: Will Past Prove Future?

The UNHCR draft document goes on to specify many other functions of need (such as communications, translators, gender sensitivity, weekly meetings and so on). In the text, the organization makes sure that it gives itself an equal or complementary role with the government and the army. Had such an operation been allowed, the UN would have very quickly turned Macedonia into a new Kosovo.

Such an outcome would be highly desirable not only for the UN and its generally expansionist and criminal mission. It would also have been highly appealing to Greece, given the ongoing dispute over the name issue, and been a relief to the European countries further north that were themselves failing to solve a crisis that their globalist leaders had deliberately created.

Almost three years later, Macedonia still survives, if barely, as a sovereign state. But more importantly, it has remained secure and not disrupted by social upheaval accompanying mass migration. However, the population has been beaten down and divided by the political crisis and the pace of economic growth has stagnated under a compromised leftist government. In terms of eventual membership expectations, the EU now puts Macedonia in the same basket as Albania. As increasingly risible international negotiations continue, each passing day seems to present Macedonians with yet another mandated name and identity that can be exchanged in return for invitations to international organizations that will never come. The national humiliation is almost complete.

While such situations elsewhere in the world would prompt some sort of revolt, Macedonia is not what it once was. And there are no signs that any group or leader will emerge to restore optimism, dignity or a desire for self-determination. As is the fashionable trend in ‘leading’ European countries today, a spirit of national suicide is being tolerated, if not embraced with the same enthusiasm as in European countries further north.

In the end, it is likely that if a new migration crisis occurs, the UNHCR’s ‘solutions’ of 2015 will be reconsidered and have more official support. The present article’s citation of the UNHCR’s own documentation can be used to better understand the impulses and operating procedure of the globalist machine that would like to take over the world, by exploiting one crisis at a time.

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