Balkanalysis.com

By Chris Deliso

Although local and international media have depicted last month’s Islamic protest and church attacks in Macedonia as manifestations of inter-ethnic and inter-religious polarity, these events actually derived from internal power struggles between the country’s diverse Muslim parties and interests, Balkanalysis.com can report. However, the inevitable impulse towards mediation and political settlement may make the incorrect depiction a fait accompli in future.

At the same time, new information corroborating seven years of field research indicates that this internal turmoil is allowing rhetorical, financial and logistical opportunities for a small number of people who are truly dangerous, and directed from outside the country. Events and processes scheduled for the next couple years, such as a national census and local elections may act as triggers for further infighting, protests and divisiveness.

What Happened in Brief

In late January 2012, Macedonia received brief but intense international media attention following an unprecedented large-scale Islamic protest in the southwestern lake town of Struga, and attacks against churches, other structures and people. The official cause of the protest, allegedly, was the Vevchani Carnival’s caricature of Islam. (Eye-opening videos of the protest, in which Islamic and Albanian flags were waved amid cries of Allahu Akbar, abound on Youtube). However, the international media coverage of it all was simplistic and lacked proper context- thus improving neither reader understanding nor national and regional security.

First, it should be said that as of February 2012 there is no reason why Macedonia’s different local populations should not be able to co-exist as they always have, and without any outside interference. Unfortunately, it appears that various interests representing different centers of power – some visible, others less so – would like to use the recent incidents for their own varied yet overlapping goals. And, despite that the political leaders have now agreed to work together, these goals do not involve the greater public good.

Odd Timing, a Lack of Spontaneity, and the Media

Until this year, no one had ever seriously criticized the Vevchani Carnival, held every 13-14 January for roughly the last 1,400 years. The statistical chances of two protests from different parties, occurring within nine days of each other would thus seem rather low. Yet this is what happened, when first the Greek government in a note, and then the local Islamist community in force, lashed out at the carnival, on 19 January and 28 January respectively.

The carnival is a major winter cultural event in Macedonia that is regularly attended by international ambassadors and officials as well as by tourists local and foreign. Development in this eternally peaceful Macedonian Orthodox village has been supported by the US, EU and World Bank, and it has a thriving sustainable tourism industry and welcoming atmosphere. Those who showed up at the later Struga protests (Muslims from that town and the villages neighboring Vevchani) have known all their lives that the carnival and the Vevchani locals are entirely harmless; anyone who knows both populations immediately understands this. Yet the protesters have very disingenuously sought to portray things otherwise.

An awareness of what is customary in local reality possibly can explain why the Muslims did not react immediately. When Muslim rioting and protests have occurred in Europe, as after the Paris youth deaths or after the Danish cartoon controversy, it has usually been fairly spontaneous. The recent protest in Macedonia was anything but- it was well-organized, supported by local officials, and took place a full two weeks after the carnival. It was another example of the truism that in Macedonia, nothing happens by accident.

What did transpire in the interim, however, was an indignant protest statement on 19 January from the Greek foreign ministry regarding the same carnival, which had featured a ceremonial funeral float for the country- a gag targeting Greece’s current financial problems, and not symbolic of any real ill-will against the country. And when examined more closely, it seems clear that the skit was actually designed for internal consumption, as it included a mock Orthodox death notice that listed among the supposed bereaved, Macedonian public figures who have over the years been identified with a “pro-Greek” position.

The rationale behind the official Greek reaction can be understood in two ways. First, it offered an easy opportunity to temporarily distract Greek citizens from worsening internal political and economic problems. Second, Greek diplomacy is currently concerned that the negative (albeit merely symbolic) ruling of the International Court of Justice in December 2011 will result in increasing international pressure to resolve the name issue. Therefore, the Greek MFA is seeking to take advantage of any trifling matter that can be depicted as a sign of ‘provocation’ from the Macedonian side. Athens thus seems to think it can stall for time or endlessly defer the process through pointing out alleged cases of Macedonian ‘provocations.’

It is also possible that diplomats in Athens were unnecessarily angered because they are unfamiliar with the event, and thus took it much more seriously than they should have. For example, burning all the masks at the end of the carnival is a traditional ritual, not a singular provocation against anyone or anything.

It is very interesting to note that there was no initial uproar from Muslims after the carnival, and the usual news wraps-ups devoting most of their attention to the Greek sketch. It was only on 28 January that Muslims in the Struga area took to the street to protest. In a telephone interview for Skopje’s Sitel TV conducted a few days after the protest, Struga Mayor Ramiz Merko evaded the question when asked why the Muslims did not seem to have a problem with Vevchani until after the Greeks did. However, the interviewer did not push the issue and this vital question has still not been answered.

A question that still remains, therefore, is whether the Muslims acted completely independently, or played off of the Greek involvement with a ‘copycat’ – but much more serious – protest, or if the two sides could even have been coordinating activities due to a common interest in obstructing the country’s progress. We have absolutely no opinion or information regarding this possibility, and only mention it because it is one of the hypothetical possibilities being weighed now by investigators. However, it does seem plausible that without the Greek protest over Vevchani (an example of the more aggressive Greek policy since the Hague ruling), the Muslims would not have gotten the idea to protest. It is thus possible that this whole incident was entirely avoidable and in a way accidental.

Macedonian officials were further concerned by very damaging and inaccurate news articles, such as an Associated Press piece of 30 January and another of 31 January that soon had around 160 Google News citations, including several US newspapers and even TV networks. Like a similar Reuters report on the same day, these articles depicted the incident as an inter-ethnic one, mentioning the 2001 conflict in the same breath as recent events. The articles take for granted a direct causal connection between the carnival and the protest (although as we have seen, it was not spontaneous) and also make erroneous claims regarding the demographic breakdown and population figures for Muslims in the country.

These articles also provide a distorted selection of quotes from local Muslim leaders and politicians, ignoring those characterized by rough language, and instead transmitting the more politically-correct comments out of the vast totality of commentary made for local media during the crisis period. The second piece provocatively states that Muslims “accuse the [Christian] majority of stoking hatred,” ominously adding that “ethnic tension has been simmering in this small Balkan country since the end of an armed rebellion in 2001.”

These implications portray the whole issue in a completely incorrect light and exaggerate the supposed demise of inter-ethnic relations. It is unclear whether this sensationalism can be attributed to bad writing or to an uninformed editor. But it cannot be due to an uninformed author, as at least the AP work was written by longtime local correspondent Konstantin Testorides, who is presumably better informed about local realities. (Mr Testorides did not reply to an email request for clarification from Balkanalysis.com).

Motive: Political and Economic Control of Struga

Understanding the recent events in Macedonia depends on an understanding of the unique structure of local power- something that the international media has ignored completely. The public figure most associated with supporting the Islamic protest is Struga Mayor Ramiz Merko, who gave permission for it to be held and who has been very vocal in this and in several previous cases of supporting Islamist projects. Although Reuters quoted Merko as saying “we should avoid further incidents and not be influenced by politics,” the Struga mayor has from the beginning sought to manipulate the incidents to increase his political prestige.

This representative of the ethnic Albanian governing coalition member, DUI, has been elected twice, in 2005 and 2009, but it is believed that he will not be the party’s candidate in the 2013 election. This may be partly because he angered party leader Ali Ahmeti by publicly threatening to run with rival ethnic Albanian parties in the 2009 race. Since leading the NLA paramilitary force in 2001, Ahmeti has kept an ironclad grip on party power. For party members, it is better to remain on his good side.

Although a lot can happen between now and the elections, informed sources believe that DUI’s next mayoral candidate will be Artim Labunisti, a doctor and descendent of an established, ‘old’ Struga family. They expect that he could even have crossover appeal with Macedonian voters, something that would be highly unusual for an Albanian party’s candidate.

A local from the Macedonian Muslim village of Labunista praised this idea, telling Balkanalysis.com that the doctor’s grandfather, Murat Labunisti, “was highly respected in our village, and had studied in France.” (In fact, the name of the village’s elementary school has been changed from ‘Josip Broz Tito’ to ‘Murat Labunisti’). Other sources indicate that this candidate was discussed favorably in an internal DUI meeting approximately three months ago.

In the purely politico-economic sense, Struga today is somewhat reminiscent of Atlantic City in the 1920s. Being the mayor of a large municipality such as this puts an individual and party in a position to hand out jobs, favors, contracts and tenders- and, of course, a chance to profit from this interaction. Controlling this machinery not only means controlling cash; it also means the ability to continue deferring non-financial personal debts accrued to a varied group of ‘creditors.’ If one is the mayor of such a place, it is thus best to stay so for as long as possible.

Presuming that Merko will not run with DUI, he could conceivably reach out to another Albanian party, such as the New Democracy of Imer Selmani, or run as an independent. However, running against a strongly supported local candidate would jack up the price of votes from local businessmen, and significant collateral would have to be brought to the table in order to buy them. At very least we can say that the political situation in Struga is fluid.

There is more, however. Despite two attempts, the Struga municipal council could not pass the 2012 budget by the end of December; according to law, this means that the Ministry of Finance in Skopje must intervene. To avoid endangering the fate of this 13.5-million euro jackpot, the budget was illegally passed on January 5. The decision was backed by 14 councilors from DUI and the Macedonian parties SDSM and LDP. Four councilors from the ethnic Albanian DPA voted against it, while nine councilors from the Macedonian VMRO-DPMNE and the (Macedonian Muslim) PEI abstained.

Local representatives of VMRO-DPMNE, which is ironically ruling on the national level in coalition with DUI, announced that they would go to the Constitutional Court over the issue. Legally, if the budget is not adopted by the end of the year, they argued, “the next step would be a decision on temporary financing, which entails the dissolution of the Council,” reported Alfa TV on January 15.

This infighting between political parties, and the tacit issue of control of substantial funds, may not have been directly related to Mayor Merko’s decision to support an Islamic show of force on the city square three weeks later. But it is definitely worth bearing in mind as we consider the bigger picture. It is interesting to note that, while minority Albanian parties relish in playing a kingmaker role on the national level, in ethnically-mixed areas led by the Albanian parties, like Struga, Macedonian parties apparently get to serve a similar function.

More Politics: from Local to National and Back Again

Still another source of local political influence is the above-mentioned PEI (Party for a European Future) of businessman Fiat Canoski, a wealthy Macedonian Muslim who emerged from impoverished origins in the village of Oktisi. Today Canoski’s most visible business is the private FON University, headquartered in Skopje but with branches throughout the country (including in Struga, where it competes with a university linked to Merko). The university’s faculty includes professors from a wide spectrum of political and business life and, like other universities in the country, has thus become an inherent part of Macedonia’s system of dispersed power through patronage.

The PEI was created in May 2006, partly in reaction to years of Albanian chauvinism, but also because Canoski cleverly saw that he could control the swing vote between the Macedonian and Albanian parties. After the post-war decentralization project had annexed the largely Macedonian Muslim-populated villages to Struga, some locals became irritated when the Albanian parties (particularly DUI) went on an aggressive campaign to convince the Macedonian-speaking Muslims that they were ‘really’ Albanian, on account of their shared Islamic faith. Merko and DUI had won the historic race for Struga largely thanks to the Macedonian Muslim vote, and the creation of a rival party run by this crucial population only increased their leverage in economic and political life on the local level.

However, after summer 2006 elections marred by gunfights between rival Albanian parties DUI and DPA, the PEI joined the coalition of the victorious VMRO-DPMNE, which included DPA (even though it had won less of the ethnic Albanian popular vote than the DUI). The PEI remained in coalition after the early elections of 2008, when DPA was replaced by DUI. After Canoski ran unsuccessfully for mayor of Struga in 2009, his party blamed Merko and DUI for falsifying results. A very complex and interesting situation thus emerged in which the Macedonian Muslim population splintered as well between persons employed by DUI/Merko on the local level and PEI devotees. This was worsened by the 2011 parliamentary elections. After secret negotiations in Struga, it was decided that Canoski’s party would no longer be part of the renewed VMNRO-DPMNE and DUI coalition.

According to several sources, the news devastated Canoski, who had already entered into a fateful familial ‘marriage alliance’ between his son and a daughter of Velija Ramkovski, another (equally non-observant) Macedonian Muslim who, near the end of 2010, had been arrested for alleged tax evasion. Ramkovski’s business empire included the influential A1 TV, which had once supported the government, but in recent years sharply turned against it. Ramkovski had also shown political ambitions, running unsuccessfully for parliament at one point, trying to appeal largely to farmers. True to form, he used his television station to advertise his campaign, and some ethnic Albanian media half-jokingly began referring to him as the “Macedonian Berlusconi.”

The cross-connections continue on the national level. The most vocal supporter of the Ramkovski cause since November 2010 has been the opposition Macedonian party SDSM, which gambled on making a ‘media freedom’ issue out of this cause célèbre. However, despite an undeniably sympathetic international diplomatic corps, the SDSM stratagem failed to destabilize the government, as Ramkovski had managed to make enough business and political enemies to preclude such a possibility.

However, the war of attrition did in some way affect ethnic and religious politics. A1’s constant assault on the government helped send a few more MPs to the SDSM in summer 2011 elections; and this trimming of the margins increased DUI’s leverage in the new post-election cabinet.

Thus, in a historic appointment that was lauded by all the foreign ambassadors, Macedonia got its first ethnic Albanian defense minister, Fatmir Besimi from DUI- exactly 10 years after the war started by his party’s founders. Of course, average Albanians were somewhat unimpressed, as the defense ministry is no longer one of the most powerful. Indeed, the army is used most often for supporting NATO missions- despite that Macedonia is still being kept out of NATO due to Greek objections to the country’s name.

Creating a New Ethnicity

A side effect of all these events is that they have accelerated developments and trends within the Muslim parties’ public discourse. In 2011, a luxury residential building that PEI leader Canoski was building in Skopje was ordered to be toppled for allegedly violating its approved design parameters. (Although on 5 January Canoski did announce that he would rebuild it). Then, at an organized event in Skopje on September 28, 2011, Canoski appeared with leaders of a Struga-based NGO, Rumelija, to pronounce the existence of a new ethnicity in Macedonia: the Torbeshi, whose rights his party pledged to champion.

The term ‘Torbeshi’ has generally been used negatively, referring to the Macedonian Muslims’ conversion from Christianity under Ottoman times; the implication is that they were people whose core beliefs could be bought for whatever one put in their bag (torba).

This term has always been controversial and has never been universally accepted by Macedonian Muslims, such as the Gorani, who inhabit northwestern Macedonia and southern Kosovo. The penetration of DUI into Macedonian Muslim villages and the presence of Turkey in municipalities such as Plasnica and Centar Zupa (another legacy of the controversial decentralization) have also fractured unity among Macedonian Muslims, and have led many to identify themselves with these groups.

The manifesto that PEI created for the event, the Torbeshka Deklaracija, strongly resembles in linguistic tone and substance similar manifestos made by all other Balkan ethnic groups in the past 150 years. The book offers new explanation of the word Torbeshi, cleansing it of its negative connotations: rather than being a synonym for opportunism, the word simply referred to people who were known for traveling with a bag.

From the historical view, we find in the text that this new-old ethnicity has medieval origins in the Bogomils – the heretical Christian sect that was most popular in parts of Bulgaria and Bosnia- something that is interesting but that cannot be proven. Other, possibly more controversial claims are that the founder of modern Egypt and Turkish leader Attaturk had Torbeshi roots. At the same time, one can find voluminous histories written by other Macedonian Muslims who passionately claim that they are in fact Macedonians. The situation is opaque, confused, and highly prone to politicization.

The desire to create a new nationality does not rest merely on sentimental attraction, however. The book also calls for the Macedonian Constitution to include the Torbeshi as a constituent people. Arguments that head in this direction, particularly since the ethnic Albanian uprising of 2001, tend to suggest participation in a quota-based system of benefits and entitlements. Most importantly for the present article is that the major element used to give coherence to this new identity – one that is depicted as being separate from the Albanian, Macedonian, Bosnian or Turkish ones – is Islam.

Politics, Ethnicity and Religion: the Creation of a Hybrid Population in Struga

The situation in Struga is not, as has been reported, a simple ‘Christian Macedonian vs. Muslim Albanian’ scenario, a sort of 2001-redux with a stronger religious element. What it actually demonstrates are intra-ethnic and intra-religious tensions- not inter-ethnic or inter-religious ones. In fact, the rivalry, discourse and cooperation of the diverse Muslim interests in Macedonia has increasingly involved manipulating the one thing they have in common, religion.

Essentially, the intermingling between the Albanian DUI and the Macedonian Muslims is creating a unique hybrid population in Macedonia. It is a very unique mix: a party created along fierce Albanian nationalist lines, with a tough paramilitary core and Muslim culture, alongside a traditionally peaceful but extremely conservative rural population characterized by arranged marriages and diaspora labor, and identifying itself strongly with Islam.

Every political party in the world seeks to expand its base and to seize more power. In order for DUI to do this in southwestern Macedonia, it has had to do two things. First, it has had to take on as local leaders and members of its local branches persons who are authoritative and respected in their own villages- meaning that some of the most devout Islamists in the Albanian party are not (or, were not) actually Albanian. Secondly, as the phrase goes, in politics you have to give the people what they want: for a population that identifies itself primarily with Islam, the campaigning and overtures to locals have also been Islam-oriented.

Thus a sort of Islamic arms race has ensued in the last seven years, with local officials from both the Albanian and Macedonian Muslim sides competing to donate money, building permissions, jobs, scholarships and more for persons, structures and activities connected with Islam, while the rhetoric is growing increasingly strong as well. And the muftis are absolutely delighted with this largesse.

The symbiotic relationship is being used by local leaders looking to prolong their grip on power, who have been taking increasingly bold stands. A prominent example was the controversial case of a 2010 mosque project in the depopulated Vlach village of Gorna Belica, above the Muslim villages in the Jablanica range. Although the government said the construction was illegal, Mayor Merko pushed hard for this Wahhabi-initiated project. According to Nova Makedonija on November 9, 2010, he stated that “no one is allowed to touch God’s house.” Before the mosque, the summer houses in the village had been used as impromptu prayer and Islamic teaching centers by Muslim youth groups.

Political Interference, Intelligence Failures, Bad Publicity and the Role of Institutions

Examined within this fuller context, the recent events in and around Struga become more striking. The protest was organized together with Struga mufti Ferhat Polisi, and received the blessings of Mayor Merko – currently of DUI, but with an uncertain future – and involved the participation of Macedonian Muslims (including members of PEI). Ethnic Albanians also participated, and some intelligence sources even place members of the Tirana-based ultranationalist Red and Black Alliance as having been in Struga at the time.

This group, which advocates a Greater (or, ‘Natural’) Albania arose in opposition to Albania’s national census, claiming that the Greek minority was being artificially enhanced. It is led by Kreshnik Spahiu who, according to Balkan Insight, recently resigned after having served for four years as deputy chairman of Albania’s High Council of Justice, because of an investigation into his activism. This group is believed to have strong connections with the Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination) nationalist party in Kosovo, which grew out of a similar youth protest movement. The Alliance also has local affiliates in Macedonia, including key supporters within DUI and DPA. Thus Macedonian investigators of the protest are trying to distinguish between the possible participants, and whether they may have had different motives.

It should be noted that due to the sudden politicization of the whole issue – which now involves the participation of the OSCE and the major embassies – a criminal investigation will likely be sacrificed for a political solution that would guarantee ‘stability.’ This is absolutely the worst result but as said above, it is not accidental. It was guaranteed the moment that the local and international media depicted the whole issue as an inter-ethnic incident. It therefore became necessary to give equal hearing to ‘both sides of the story,’ so that people who had advocated for violence were given moral equivalence with people guilty of making a joke.

Regardless of how the issue is politically ‘solved,’ investigators will be obliged to proceed professionally. There are still many unanswered questions, regarding violent attacks against churches and the replacing of a Macedonian flag with an Islamic one in Struga. The lack of answers to these important questions has frustrated many. Some senior officials are concerned that the police suffered an intelligence failure in the two weeks between the carnival and the protest.

Apparently, there had been rumblings in the mosques and a plan was being drawn up, but nothing was done to prepare for it. It was decided that the protest would be held on Saturday (market day in Struga, ensuring maximum turnout from the nearby villages), and announced in the mosques beforehand. And, somewhere in the villages, someone was able to print and bind (not just photocopy) dozens of copies of violent, 12-page propaganda pamphlets specifically referencing the Vevchani Carnival. These revealing texts were not mentioned in the media.

There are different possible reasons for the failure to predict, contain or foil the protest. Internal relocation of intelligence officers knowledgeable about Islamist groups, prioritization issues, and simply other distractions may have been to blame. It should not be forgotten that during the month of January the government was intensively preparing for two much-hyped and high-profile events: the five-day visit of a large British investment delegation headed by Prince Michael of Kent (from 28 January through 1 February), along with a six-city tour of Turkey by Macedonian officials, seeking to drum up investment interest from this major ally (from 29 January-3 February).

These two events most certainly required significant and time-consuming police work on protocol, logistics and security cooperation that would easily have taken precedence over any goings-on in a backwater like Struga, especially if nothing out of the ordinary was expected to happen there. Thus, if there ever was a moment in which someone could secretly gin up trouble for a distracted Macedonian leadership, and embarrass it at the same time, that moment would have certainly been January 2012.

Absolutely the last thing President Ivanov needed during an official British visit was to be taking time to entreat Reis Rexhepi to get his followers to cool down, and it was certainly not ideal timing either for Macedonian officials to have to deal with charges of ‘Islamophobia’ in the world media while trying to build friendships in Muslim Turkey. Indeed, just when the government had expected to be highlighting foreign investment interest before two key allies, world media was instead showing churches in flames and angry Muslim mobs protesting with Arabic flags in the street. Not auspicious.

Despite the temptation to proceed more quickly, senior officials are letting the police investigation run its course. This is due to respect for the legal responsibilities institutions have in such cases, and undoubtedly it is also a nod to the ‘confidence-building’ measures that accompany every similarly politicized case in Macedonia in which the ‘international community’ gets involved. Yet the hands-off approach is also due to the need to oversee what the final outcome will be: the actual information trail may end up telling a more interesting story than could be imagined, in terms of the sources, information and disinformation, and the way the whole system is used to arrive at an intelligence result.

Knowledge Gaps and the Hidden Hand: Tablighi Jamaat in Macedonia

Perhaps we can help speed things up a bit, however. In October of 2011, a meeting was held in Labunista by visiting members of the global Islamist missionary group Tablighi Jamaat, according to secret intelligence obtained by Balkanalysis.com. All of the men were Macedonian Muslims originally from the Struga villages, but living in Switzerland and Austria. One of the topics of discussion was future collaboration between the sect’s Macedonian and Bosnian Muslims (at home and in the West) and the chiefly Albanian tekfiri militant wing, based in Skopje, which is believed to have contacts with Bosniak tekfiri groups in Austria.

Although plenty of ‘famous’ local Islamists have been mentioned in local media, the leader of this wing is known to very few, and the structure itself remains elusive. Senior officials attest that this is largely due to the age bracket of the membership (17-25) and the many operational difficulties that arise due to this serious limiting factor.

Barring a major and chronic security problem in the host country, the US tends to use institutional partnership and delegate non-essential intelligence tasks. The host country is usually eager to participate, but may not have the requisite capabilities. This becomes problematic when a target is too elusive but a report needs to be submitted anyway, since no one likes to admit failure or weakness. Since not even the US invests in cross-checking data in this particular theater of activity, no one is the wiser if the information turns out to be flawed or insufficient.

For two examples, American officials did not know about crucial splits within the tekfiri and Salafi leadership until six weeks ago, and they did not know at all about the attempted creation of a weapons training center by local Muslims in Labunista in summer 2010 (or that the counter-intelligence service was investigating its possible links to Albanian militants) until almost a year later. Both facts are very interesting for several reasons. And while a careful reading of the leaked US cables discussing Islamism in Macedonia indicates knowledge of some of the most prominent Islamic personalities in the country, it does not indicate awareness of those figures who are truly dangerous. For that you have to do your own research rather than delegate it.

The new details regarding the solidification of Tablighi involvement in Macedonia are highly interesting, as it indicates increasing cooperation between young extremists from a multi-ethnic background. Balkanalysis.com, probably alone among world media, has for the past six or seven years focused on the activities of the missionary group in Macedonia. Yet only now can the fuller story be told.

According to senior officials, the movement’s roots in the country date back to 1993. At that time, a (still active) ethnic Albanian from Tetovo, who had been living in Scandinavia in the late 1980s, became involved with the missionary group in Pakistan and developed good connections among Tablighi members, there and in Afghanistan. (It should be remembered that at that time, the “Arab-Afghan” jihadis were being redirected from the former war against the Soviets in Afghanistan to the war against Serbs and Croats in Bosnia). This figure provided the key local connections for Albanian and Macedonian Muslims who had gone to study in the Middle East. It is estimated that 30-50 Macedonian nationals were thus trained in the mujahideen camps in Pakistan due to this connection.

Since the late 1990s, Tablighi members have been showing up in the Struga villages. A Labunista local tells Balkanalysis.com that they made a favorable impression on him at first sight, back in 1999. “They were very nice, and you could see they were real believers and educated,” he said of the white-robed missionaries, who said they were in the village to see local friends who had studied Islamic theology in the Middle East. “They were cool- they didn’t care about anything [political].”

The Tablighi movement started in 1926 in Pakistan as a reaction to Hindu missionary activity, and has its European headquarters in England, from where much of its outreach to the Balkans has come. The group’s plans to build a ‘mega-mosque’ there have caused great controversy. Despite claiming to be entirely apolitical, this broad network of believers has drawn significant attention from various governments, as several individuals connected to high-profile terrorist plots or attempted plots have been known to frequent Tablighi mosques.

There is a vast literature on the movement, so there is no need to go into great detail here. But it is interesting to note a couple of defining features of the movement. Like missionary groups from other religions, it tends to target socially disadvantaged or excluded populations; in Macedonia, this includes not only the long-suffering Macedonian Muslims but impoverished Roma populations, as well as non-Muslims with mental or drug-related problems. The second interesting feature, and the one most relevant to the current investigation, is the group’s apolitical identity, and decentralized, secretive and network-based character. In ‘emerging market’ countries like Macedonia, the movement can keep a low profile, never being associated directly with anything, but often being involved behind the scenes by manipulating the pre-existing internal conflicts and political infighting within Muslim communities for their own ends. It cannot be proven that this is what occurred in Struga in January 2012, but it would fit the profile.

In 2005, the Macedonian counterintelligence service, DBK (now UBK) discovered that Pakistani and British Pakistani missionaries had recently visited the Struga villages, which indicates that the pattern was still going on at that time. Local Muslims told Balkanalysis.com a few months later that a small number of young believers would go for periods of 3-4 months to Pakistan and Afghanistan for spiritual training. From the latest information, it now appears that Macedonian Muslims in the diaspora (chiefly Italy, Austria, Switzerland and Slovenia) have assumed more prominent decision-making roles due to their connections and activities, meaning that direct cooperation with such foreigners is no longer necessary.

An intense but limited period of foreign intelligence activity occurred from 2004-2006 in the Struga villages, first from the French and then Italian intelligence services. Official secret documents obtained by Balkanalysis.com thereafter indicate that diaspora members of these villages were very much engaged with some of the most radical Islamist leaders in Bosnia and Austria, helping to organize their visits in the area. Arab, Albanian and other foreign Islamist leaders were also included in this network.

A bit earlier, in the spring of 2005, Macedonian military intelligence had received a proposal from  a third friendly nation, to insert a trusted person from a Middle Eastern country into the villages. Although it would have been a ‘clean’ operation, with no possible connection to anyone in the country, the plan was ultimately rejected as too risky by an organization not accustomed to managing such missions.

By 2006 and early 2007, the Italians had grown so concerned that they expelled two Macedonian citizens and briefly detained over 30 more on suspicions of radicalism. (Another local Muslim who knew some of these men, however, told us that this must have been a mistake as they were not radical. Since this is a standard reply in similarly tight-knit communities, it is impossible to confirm or deny the claim).

The recent information is so concerning because until now, no one could have expected Macedonian Muslims to be violent: conservative yes, but violent- never. The strategic significance of the recent protests may thus have more dangerous implications than the 2001 inter-ethnic war: for in Struga, Macedonians of different religions were presented as enemies for the first time. We can only hope that this is not a sign of things to come, but with the continuous infighting for votes and influence within Macedonia’s diverse Muslim populations being manifested in increasingly vociferous displays of political Islam, the divisions could worsen over time.

One of the most likely triggers will be the national census: deferred twice in 2011 due to ethnic Albanian objections, it will bring all of the simmering disputes over ethnicity and the internally-debated identity of Muslims to the surface. The next round of elections in Macedonia in 2013 will also bring with them opportunities for new incidents. It seems likely that non-Muslims will continue to be caught in the crossfire of the internal war between Muslim parties, in those areas of the country where the rivalries are strongest.

Brief Chronology

*Note: this timeline is not meant to imply any connection of events. It simply lists the order of recent contemporaneous events that are mentioned in this article or that may have relevance to it, in reverse chronological order.

February 11, 2012: The mayors of Struga and Vevchani hold a five-hour meeting, coming out after it with a joint declaration of future friendship and cooperation

February 1, 2012: Macedonian-language graffiti found on mosque in southern city of Bitola reading ‘death to Shiptarite (Albanians)’- perpetrators unknown, but some media pointed out that the unusual combination of Cyrillic and Latin letters in text might point at a non-native speaker

January 31, 2012: Church of Sveti Gjorgi in the Tetovo-area village of Mala Recica – headquarters of the incumbent ethnic Albanian DUI party – suffers arson attack by unknown persons; local Albanians help to put out fire

January 31, 2012: Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov brings together Orthodox and Muslim chief leaders, his personal good relations with the Reis, Sulejman Rexhepi, result in a strong call for peace and restraint from Rexhepi

January 30 and 31, 2012: The Associated Press and Reuters publish three damaging articles that soon spread to major US newspapers and websites, sensationalizing the events and placing them within an ‘inter-ethnic’ context evocative of the 2001 war

January 30, 2012: The Church of Sveti Nikola in Muslim-majority village of Labunista is hit with a nighttime arson attack; police find no suspects, and some local Muslims suggest that ‘Christians’ were somehow responsible

January 29, 2012: Macedonian government officials leave for a six-day trip to Turkey to highlight investment opportunities for Turkish businessmen in Macedonia

January 28, 2012: A large delegation of British businessmen led by Prince Michael of Kent arrives on a five-day visit, to meet high-level officials and learn about investment opportunities throughout the country

January 28, 2012: A minibus containing Vevchani passengers is stoned by angry Muslims in Struga; a cross on a church in Macedonian Muslim-majority village of Labunista is attacked, as is the village’s medical center, reportedly because people from Vevchani are employed there

January 28, 2012: A large and pre-organized Islamic protest occurs in Struga; Muslim masses chanting Allahu Akbar wave Albanian and Islamic flags, and condemn the Vevchani Carnival for insulting Islam

January 24, 2012: Committee of Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament adopts a draft resolution, following topics raised by a British MEP supportive of Macedonia; resolution proposes implementation of the second phase of the Stabilization and Association Agreement, and references the International Court of Justice’s verdict of 5 December, which was critical of Greece

January 19, 2012: The Greek government lodges an official protest note against the Vevchani Carnival over its satire of Greece’s financial woes

January 15, 2012: Alfa TV from Skopje reports that the Struga VMRO-DPMNE branch will seek Constitutional Court input over the municipal budget, illegally passed 10 days earlier by Mayor Merko’s supporters

January 13-14, 2011: The annual Vevchani Carnival is held in the Macedonian Orthodox village of the same name; local and international media discuss it in a positive light soon after

January 13, 2011: The Macedonian government announces that an important British trade delegation led by Prince Michael of Kent will visit the country in two weeks’ time

January 5, 2012: Struga’s council illegally passes a 13.5-million euro 2012 municipal budget, five days after the deadline, with Mayor Merko’s DUI party getting extra votes from SDSM councilors; VMRO-DPMNE and PEI local councilors abstain from the voting

December 31, 2011: Deadline expires for Struga to pass the 2012 budget. By law, the Ministry of Finance in Skopje must intercede- meaning monetary control would leave the hands of local leaders

December 5, 2011: The International Court of Justice rules on a case brought by Macedonia, upholding Macedonian charges that Greece violated the 1995 Interim Accord by blocking Macedonia’s NATO membership at Bucharest in 2008; although the ruling does not specify punitive measures, the Greek MFA instructs its diplomats that they should follow a more aggressive policy of criticizing alleged Macedonian violations of the Accord, as frequently as possible

November 11, 2011: The Skopje-based British Business Group organizes Macedonian leaders’ investment presentation in London before potential investors, along with a meeting with Prince Michael of Kent, amid plans to arrange a British visit to Macedonia; the event would be followed in mid-December by two unofficial scouting trips to Skopje from an investor representative

November, 2011: DUI leaders reportedly decide that incumbent Struga Mayor Ramiz Merko will not be allowed to run on their ticket in the 2013 local elections; local doctor Artim Labunisti is suggested as a possible candidate

October, 2011: A meeting is held in Labunista by local Muslims visiting from the diaspora, members of the global Islamist missionary group Tablighi Jamaat; one of the discussion topics of discussion is future collaboration with a Skopje-based tekfir militant group

September 28, 2011: At a public event in Skopje hosted by Rumelija, an NGO close to Macedonian Muslim businessman and MP Fiat Canoski, the ‘Torbeshi Declaration’ is announced, voicing support for the creation of a new national ethnic group, the Muslim Torbeshi. Printed estimates are that between 100,00-150,000 citizens could be thus identified, which would make the Torbeshi the second-largest national minority

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By Chris Deliso

A brief analysis of a once top-secret CIA report, written in 1949, provides a glimpse of US understanding of communist Yugoslavia at a pivotal moment in the Cold War- after Tito’s famous break with Stalin the year before.

In the broad sweep of contemporary history, the views expressed therein can be assessed favorably as indicating an accurate judgment of the situation at the time. The report (.PDF), dated June 20, 1949 is titled Estimate of the Yugoslav Regime’s Ability to Resist Soviet Pressure During 1949. Unfortunately, there are no references to sources, methods or US capabilities that went into crafting the report. However, those seeking in-depth reading on the American views at the time and larger context can read Coleman Armstrong Mehta’s lengthy thesis (.PDF) on CIA assessments from 1948-1950.

The 12-page estimate highlights seven key findings regarding Yugoslav security, economy and political stability. It was published for internal use only and addressed to the intelligence heads of the army, navy and air force, and the Joint Staff’s Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Special Assistance to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, the Director of Security and Intelligence of the Atomic Energy Commission, as well as the CIA’s Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination. In true Cold War style, there is also a ‘burn after reading’ suggestion.

Security Findings

Tito’s break with Stalin occurred in summer 1948 and was due in part to dissimilar views on the nature of a socialist state, doubts on the transposability of certain Soviet economic models, and not least, the proud Tito’s disinterest in looking to Moscow as the seat of supreme leadership.

In this light, after the break and chill in relations (which would not thaw until Stalin’s death), there were concerns about how the Soviet strongman might act towards Yugoslavia. The most important short-term conclusion of this report was that the Soviets, and satellite states, were not expected by the CIA to engage in any direct military action against Yugoslavia during 1949, but that “border incidents against Yugoslavia will probably increase.”

The CIA also expected “a more hostile, but probably ineffective propaganda campaign” against the Yugoslavs, and added by stating that “no large-scale guerrilla warfare” would be likely to occur in 1949. In conclusion, the CIA expected that Tito’s regime “would meet no insurmountable obstacle during 1949.”

This conclusion is reached following an examination of the perceived three courses of action Stalin could follow, should he wish to topple the new Yugoslav regime. These were: use of satellite states in direct war; a Soviet invasion; or support for “organized guerrilla warfare,” which would constitute a “war of attrition.” The third was considered the most serious possibility, though still not likely.

In this context, it is striking to note that the eventual dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s occurred with wars that began with (or featured aspects of) guerrilla fighting, particularly in the case of Kosovo. It was only the uncharted waters of the new, post-Cold War environment that made option one (in the modern example, aerial bombardment by NATO) even conceivable.

The possibility of an attack on Yugoslavia by neighboring states was dismissed by the CIA, as the Yugoslav Army was “the second-largest and second-most competent in Eastern Europe,” and could “defeat any combination of bordering satellite armies.” And the assessment also noted that a direct Soviet invasion would not succeed; “prior to any direct attack upon it, the Yugoslav Army would probably have from thirty to sixty days to regroup in the mountainous region south of the Sava and Danube rivers, thus preventing its annihilation by the USSR forces.” It was probably the intention of the authors to imply that Soviet commanders understood this as well, though it is not explicitly stated.

In 1949, the CIA estimated that Stalin would not support guerrilla fighting as it would be taken as a declaration of war by Tito. Quite interestingly, the report suggests that Tito would take “vigorous counter-measures” against any threat to his rule, including sponsoring guerrilla wars in Albania and Bulgaria, which would create “seriously difficulties, and especially for the “insecure Hoxha Government in Albania.”

Tito’s capability to withstand less dramatic, but equally hostile efforts from the Soviets was also considered in the report. The Soviets could hypothetically “infiltrate” small anti-Tito “bands” in neighboring states in order to “disseminate anti-Tito propaganda, enlist recruits, incite local insurrections, perform acts of sabotage, disrupt communications, and prepare the way for assassination of Tito and his aides.”

To this robust list of alleged capabilities, it was posited that arms, supplies and propaganda leaflets could also be dropped in by Soviet aircraft. Much from this menu of sabotage and guerrilla activities listed had in fact been used by Tito’s Partisans successfully against the Nazis.

Perceptions of the Communist Threat: Coloring Views of Macedonian Secessionism

Looking back, probably the most important theme conveyed in the CIA report seems to be that in 1949 the US understood all resistance or possible resistance to Tito in some relationship to Communism- even the ethnic and nationalist threats. This view would color the US perception of these groups for decades, leaving it from the 1960s to experts from ostensibly unrelated fields, like sociologists (something that today would be called ‘interdisciplinary’ input) to identify the ethnic and nationalist character of the opposition to Tito, that would outlive the dictator and re-emerge in dramatic fashion a decade after his death.

Rather, the 1949 report states that the primary danger of minorities in Yugoslavia was that these groups could allegedly be propagandized by the Soviets, “to overthrow the Tito regime in return for promised preferential treatment.” In other words, secessionist nationalist would somehow prefer client-state status under hardcore communism with a nationalist veneer to Tito’s light communism, which also allowed a symbolic amount of nationalism.

The once top-secret report notes that “certain minority groups” in Macedonia, Montenegro and other Yugoslav republics might aspire to overthrow Tito’s regime. The Macedonians are specifically named, though others, such as Albanians, Croats and Serbs, are not. In this light, one of the more intriguing elements of the report is the estimate that “the proclamation of an ‘independent Macedonia’ would have little success in gaining the support of any significant number of Yugoslav Macedonians.”

The CIA concluded, however, that such a proclamation was unlikely to be made, in the immediate future at least. It does not expand on where such a proclamation could be expected to come from, even if it did- from an internal Macedonian group, or from one in Bulgaria or Greece. The report also does not detail why Macedonians would not support the creation of an independent state, which leaves in doubt the reason for why it was seen as unlikely.

The CIA report also comes to a chillingly prescient conclusion: “if seriously threatened at any time in 1949 by the formation of a Macedonian state, Tito could engineer mass deportations of unreliable Macedonians to other areas in Yugoslavia. He could also cut off Yugoslav aid to the Greek guerrillas and might even come to some understanding with the Greek National Government.” The final two of these policies did occur in precise form as predicted, while the first, ‘mass deportations,’ was actually being done by the Greek Right, and accepted by Tito.

Looking at the situation through the lens of the communist threat also reveals why the CIA report dismissed any major support for a Macedonian state, from another point of view: it assessed that the Soviets’ image had been losing credibility in general among the Yugoslav public. It implies that if the nationalist-based secessionist threat was indeed fundamentally inspired by communists, perception damage suffered by the latter would adversely affect enthusiasm for the former. Of course, the historic relationship between national liberation and communist parties in this case is very complex and contentious.

The 1949 report notes that “since the beginning of the year, Yugoslav-Soviet relations have increased in hostility.” Yet despite extensive Cominform propaganda campaigns, the Soviet rhetoric was perceived as appearing more “hollow and ineffective” to the Yugoslav audience. In fact, it was argued that Soviet propaganda, ironically enough, had the effect of “rallying the extensive non-Communist population to Tito’s camp.”

Internal Communist Threats to Tito, and Secret Police Countermeasures

The CIA report estimates that, along with nationalist secessionists, Tito was also confronted with a potential threat from approximately 8,000 enemies within (2 percent of the party’s total membership)- most of whom, once again, exemplified the ‘Communist threat.’ These were comprised of: “old-line” Communists with experience in Russia, sympathetic to the Kremlin; Partisan fighters dissatisfied with their post-war rewards/jobs; and Communists who had fled (Royalist) Yugoslavia as dissident refugees before WWII, and who were repatriated after it, and thus had not participated in the Partisan resistance and lacked any loyalty to Tito.

The report goes on to reveal that such disenchanted elements “are allegedly attempting to organize active opposition to the Tito regime by concentrating on wresting control away from the army.” Tito’s countermeasures were said to include retiring disloyal persons “as a group” and “replacing known unreliables with young stalwarts.”

Intriguingly, the report adds that the UDB secret service played an instrumental role in preserving Tito’s authority, and that it in fact used some of the same tactics that were perceived as potentially being used against the regime. UDB members were “considered loyal and will provide stern counteraction to any campaign to infiltrate Cominform agents extensively, perpetrate widespread acts of sabotage, foment disturbances or insurrections, or organize assassination plots.”

In regards to any Soviet attempts to use proxy guerrilla groups from satellite states, the report also confirmed that “Tito can thwart the potential threat of such groups through his security police.” Throughout the Cold War, the UDB would gain a fearsome reputation for its efficient activities against perceived enemies of the state, both at home and in the extensive Yugoslav diaspora communities around the world.

Economic Issues and Military Assistance Projections

The CIA report, which concludes with a detailed assessment of the Yugoslav economy, also drew conclusions regarding Yugoslav economy and trade, noting that while the Soviets might entertain a strategy to force the collapse of the Yugoslav economy, any such attempt would fail due to “prevailing internal and external conditions.”

The report assessed that in any case the Soviets would not apply economic sanctions against Yugoslavia in 1949, as this would adversely affect their own imports of “strategic metals” from the country. In any case, sanctions would not “impair seriously” Yugoslavia’s general economy even if they were applied. The report noted that in the three years since 1946, Yugoslavia’s economy was rebuilding, and that grain production had approached pre-war levels, as had that of steel, non-ferrous metals, electricity, textiles and timber, with food shortages expected to be alleviated during 1949.

More negatively, however, Tito’s ‘Five-Year Plan’ for industrial expansion was viewed as “unrealistic,” with a lack of capital, Western technical assistance and trained workers hindering it, while gold reserves were low. An appetite for Western loans was noted as something expected to be increasing in the coming period.

Finally, should an emergency situation arise due to Soviet military attack, the report concludes that Western aid might be required. However, any military equipment for Yugoslavia would ideally be better provided by the West, the CIA believed, than “the means for production of such equipment.” It is not clear from this whether the report’s authors were making a case for efficiency, or outlining a long-term goal of preventing a competitive Yugoslav arms manufacture industry.

A Portrait of Tito

The CIA report also discusses Tito as a leader, though indirectly and partially. It is revealing in that its estimation of him was essentially accurate and held true far beyond 1949- thus showing that the aspiring leader would not significantly change his leadership style or chosen overarching Cold War role into the future. This assessment no doubt helped the Americans to predict the limitations of behavior and outlook of what would turn out to be an autocratic rule for decades, until Tito’s death in 1980.

In his life, Tito would become known for craftily playing “both sides,” trying to highlight his country’s advantages of being somewhere between both East and West, which would mature into the non-aligned movement. According to the 1949 report, he is “confident of Western determination to maintain him as a constant irritant to the Kremlin.”

This status, it was argued, meant also that Tito could feel assured of continued economic assistance from the West and steady imports of needed Western industrial goods. However, “following a policy of self-protection and economic self-interest, he will continue to trade with the East in certain strategic items,” it was added.

By Chris Deliso

On 14 December, a one-day business forum organized by the Macedonian-Israeli Business Club, and featuring officials from Macedonia and other countries was held in Skopje. Along with presentations from some of the organizers and visitors, the event allowed an opportunity for businessmen to discuss their offerings together in more detail.

Although Macedonian-Israeli business ties are already developed and date back to the 1990s, the event marked the first formal meeting of its type in Skopje. There are hopes that it will become an annual event, while Macedonian participation in similar events in Israel is also expected.

The event was opened by a speech from Dejan Dejanov, President of the Macedonian-Israeli Business Club. Also speaking for the organization was Gjiorgji Jancevski, President of the club’s Supervisory Board. Looking back on the progress made in the past year, he noted that over 50 businesses and individuals have joined the group since last March, when the club was founded. Adding that it and its activities are “based on the traditionally good relations between Macedonia and Israel,” Jancevski concluded that the event showed “that our endeavors have been successful.”

Speaking for the Macedonian government, Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Pesevski pointed out the high number of guests who packed one hall in Skopje’s trade fair, SAEM, calling it “an unexpected and positive surprise.” Characterizing the economic development of Israel as “a model for Macedonia and other countries in the region,” Pesevski pointed out that Macedonia has established “very good relations with MASHAV [the Israeli Agency for International Cooperation and Development], stating that “a MASHAV representative will be permanently present” in Skopje. Until now, the most visible such organizations in Macedonia have been the American USAID followed by various smaller EU bodies, and Turkey’s TIKA.

Indeed, later in the event, MASHAV’s Director for International Projects and Public Private Partnerships, Efraim Ben Matityahu spoke, as did Daniel Werner of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. The latter gave an overview of MASHAV products in Macedonia, while Ben Matityahu discussed MASHAV’s general activities and its background.

The roots of the development agency can be traced back to the foresight of David Ben Gurion, “who sought to share Israel’s experience in the developing world.” The director also noted that so far only Israel and South Korea have been recognized for making the transition from the classification of developing to developed country. Further, the cooperation of MASHAV with local companies is meant to “push the private sector to a higher level.”

Of course, despite best intentions, this economic cooperation will not always be easy. During the present period marked by global financial crisis and uncertainty surrounding the future of the euro, Macedonia has thus far been largely spared. However, the effects are expected to be felt during the coming year and the more the country becomes open to foreign trade, the more it will be susceptible in future to fluctuations in global markets.

In this light, Vice Prime-Minister Pesevski noted his government’s awareness of the present economic climate, and stated that it is prepared for challenges stemming from the “disturbing situation in Europe,” adding however that “in such times, opportunities can arise.”

Macedonian businessmen do see plenty of opportunities in working more closely with Israel, which may also have something to share about surviving the crisis. The Israeli Ambassador to Macedonia, David Cohen provided an overview of the Israeli economy, noting that Israel posted 4.7% economic growth in the first quarter of 2011, recovering quickly from the crisis due to the robust involvement of the state. Ambassador Cohen professed his sentiment that “we all work to extend our multilateral trade relations” and that Macedonia and Israel “share a common set of values and interests.”

Israel is well known for its high-tech industry. Learning from the “Israeli success story” here was specified by speakers such as Ognen Orovcanec, President of the Assembly of the Macedonian-Israeli Business Club, who specified high-tech as one of the areas for future growth in Macedonian-Israeli cooperation.

In this light, Ambassador Cohen also pointed to the high level of R&D investment in Israel by many multinationals. Despite strong competition from Asian countries, many firms have established themselves in Israel, including Microsoft, IBM, Cisco and Dell. Being first in the world in R& investment, stated Cohen, “has made Israel a center of technology and innovation.” A result of this, he continued, is that many technological breakthroughs have been made by Israeli companies- like VOIP technology, which enables people to speak over the Internet.

Along with Macedonian and Israeli speakers, the business forum also included presentations from the president of the Kosovo Business Alliance, Agim Shahini, Enver Ferizaj of Albania’s KASH, and the vice-president of the Chamber of Commerce of Republika Srpska, Mihajlo Vidica.

These foreign guest presenters stressed business-friendly reforms made by their governments, such as favorable tax regimes, low-cost labor forces, infrastructure upgrades and opportunities in specific sectors such as agriculture. These points were also made in the Macedonian context by Ekaterina Dimitrovska, Executive Director of the Macedonian-Israeli Business Club. Dimitrovska also pointed out Macedonia’s recent track record as an internationally-recognized leading reformer, as well as its impending development of industrial zones around the country.

The major sponsor of the December 14^th business forum was Crimson Capital, a finance corporation headquartered in Prague with offices in Skopje and Pristina. Speaking for Balkanalysis.com, Managing Director Michael Gold discussed the company and its operations, explaining that it lends “to businesses which have a hard time getting money from the banks,” such as promising start-ups, women-owned companies and so on. For Mr Gold, small and developing countries such as Macedonian and Kosovo present unique opportunities for finance. For example, while 3% of these countries’ loan portfolios go to agriculture, “approximately 30% of our loans are dedicated to agriculture”- an area that will become more important as issues of food security grow more acute in the future.

According to Mr Gold, “the best opportunity for Macedonia to cooperate with Israeli companies is in terms of new technology and methods to improve productivity and quality, as well as marketing.” Pointing out that “a lot of companies are good at producing,” the Crimson Capital managing director noted however that “they don’t always know how to sell what they produce… the experience of Israel, which was challenged by a need to find markets, will be valuable for Macedonia.”

There are bound to be some positive surprises in the future, noted Mr Gold, who expressed his confidence, indicating that Macedonian companies have a lot of opportunities ahead. In general, “their capabilities are a lot greater than outsiders know- and greater than even they themselves know!”

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Balkanalysis.com Research Service- While potentially violent ethnic nationalism and related ideologies in the Balkans may diminish in the long term, they are not likely to do so during the next few years.

A minefield of upcoming anniversaries in the coming period will serve to enhance heated local and international rhetoric over the validity of competing ideologies and narratives. If the post-Communist period in the region can be defined as the years of ‘transition,’ the coming period may someday be remembered as the years of regression, a time when retrograde, obscurest and tribal views influenced the balance of power, economy, social and religious life, and ultimately the continuously evolving identity of the region.

Perhaps not incidentally, a conspicuous number of these events involve the deep influence left by the Ottoman Empire, even more important given modern Turkey’s ascent to regional power, and the issue of Macedonia, almost as vexed now as it was during the turbulent times of a century ago. The reappraisal of the Balkans’ mixed legacy represents an ongoing info-war for cultural hegemony that, while not violent, is being waged with grim determination using a variety of means.

The world over, humans have long embraced the practice of associating meaning to rather arbitrary, decimal-system time notations- and to sustain them, have often exerted great energy into organizing events and proclamations having political, economic, media, social and other import. The following is a partial list of such decimal-system anniversaries between 2012-2016, many of which will elicit the stated type of reactions, and become ‘events’ in themselves.

2012

February 28, 2012: 15^th anniversary of the ‘soft’ military coup in Turkey that forced the resignation of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan of the pro-Islamist Welfare Party- the forerunner of today’s ruling AK Party

March 30, 2012: 580^th anniversary of the birth of Mehmet II, Ottoman conqueror of Constantinople

April 5, 2012: 20^th anniversary of the start of the Siege of Sarajevo during the war in Bosnia

August 30, 2012: 90^th anniversary of the final battle in Dumlupınar, ending the Turkish Independence War in 1922 (Victory Day)

October 8, 1912: Centennial of initial hostilities between the Balkan League (Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia) declared war on the Ottoman Empire

October 18, 2012: Centennial anniversary of the Treaty of Lausanne, and end of the Italo-Turkish War; Italy was awarded the Ottoman provinces of Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica (today’s Libya)

October 28, 2012: Centennial anniversary of the Greek liberation of Thessaloniki from the Ottoman Empire

November 8, 2012: 35^th anniversary of the discovery of the royal tomb of Phillip II of Macedon in Vergina, Greece

November 28, 2012: Centennial anniversary of Albania’s declaration of independence from the Ottoman Empire (Flag Day)

2013

March 4, 2013: Centennial anniversary of the Battle of Vizani and Greek liberation of Ioannina from the Ottoman Empire

March 11, 2013: 70^th anniversary of the deportation of the Jews of Macedonian to Treblinka by the Bulgarian army in WWII

March 12, 2013: 10^th anniversary of the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić

May 4, 2013: 110^th anniversary of the death of Gotse Delchev, Macedonian-independence revolutionary leader against the Turks

May 29, 2013: 560^th anniversary of Ottoman capture of Constantinople

May 30, 2013: Centennial anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of London, ending the First Balkan War

June 16, 2013: Centennial anniversary of the Second Balkan War (Bulgaria’s declaration of war against erstwhile allies Greece and Serbia)

July 26, 2013: 50^th anniversary of the great earthquake in Skopje, Macedonia

August 2, 2013: 110^th anniversary of the Ilinden Uprising in Krusevo, Macedonia, against the Ottomans

August 10, 2013: Centennial anniversary of the controversial Treaty of Bucharest and official end of the Balkan Wars

September 9, 2013: 20^th anniversary of the Battle of the Medak Pocket in Croatia

October 19, 2013: 10^th anniversary of the death of Alija Izetbegović, first president of the post-Yugoslav Bosnian Federation

October 29, 2013: 90^th anniversary of the proclamation of the Turkish Republic by Ataturk (Republic Day)

November 9, 2013: 20^th anniversary of the destruction of the Bridge of Mostar during the Croat-Bosniak War

November 10, 2013: 75^th anniversary of the death of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkish national leader

November 17, 2013: 40^th anniversary of the major student protests in Greece against the ruling junta (Polytechneio)

December 1, 2013: 95^th anniversary of the declaration of the union of Transylvania with Romania (the National Day of Romania)

2014

February 7, 2014: 150^th anniversary of the death of pioneering Serbian linguist and author Vuk Stefanović Karadžić

February 15, 2014: 15^th anniversary of the capture of Kurdish PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan by Turkish special services in Kenya

February 26, 2014: 10^th anniversary of the death of Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski in an airplane crash near Mostar

March 3, 2014: 90^th anniversary of the constitutional abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in Turkey

March 17, 2014: 10^th anniversary of the March riots of Kosovo Albanians against Serbs and internationals in Kosovo

March 24, 2014: 15^th anniversary of the beginning of NATO bombings against Serbia

April 2, 2014: 10-year anniversary of the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to NATO

May 21, 2014: 150^th anniversary of the unification of the Ionian islands with Greece

June 28, 2014: Centennial anniversary of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, the heir to the Austria-Hungarian throne, leading to WWI

July 20, 2014: 40^th anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus

July 28, 2014: Centennial anniversary of the invasion of Serbia by the Austro-Hungarian Army, starting hostilities in WWI

July 29, 2014: Millennial anniversary of the Battle of Kleidion/Belasica, in which Byzantine Emperor Basil II decisively defeated the Bulgarian army of Tsar Samoil

August 2, 2014: Centennial anniversary of the secret Turkish-German treaty that brought the Ottoman Powers into WWI on the side of the Central Powers

August 23, 2014: 150^th anniversary of the birth of Eleftherios Venizelos, future Greek national leader

September 14, 2014: 200^th anniversary of the formation of the famous Greek secret society, the Filiki Etairia

2015

April 24, 2015: Centennial anniversary of the symbolic start of the ‘Armenian Genocide’ in eastern Anatolia, by the Ottoman authorities

April 25, 2015: Centennial anniversary of the beginning of the Battle of Gallipoli between Commonwealth and Ottoman troops in WWI (ANZAC Day)

May 6, 2015: 610^th anniversary of the birth of Albanian national hero Georgi Kastrioti Skanderbeg

July 11, 2015: 20^th anniversary of the ‘Srebrenica massacre’ of Bosniak Muslims by Bosnian Serb forces during the war in Bosnian

August 5, 2015: 20^th anniversary of the Battle of Knin, ending the Serbian Republic of Krajina in Croatia (Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day and the Day of Croatian Defenders)

September 6, 2015: 130^th  anniversary of the unification of Eastern Rumelia and Bulgaria (Unification Day)

September 13, 2015: 20^th anniversary of the signing of the Interim Accord between Greece and Macedonia

October 5, 2015: 15^th anniversary of mass Belgrade protests resulting in the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević

October 28, 1915: 75^th anniversary of Greek Prime Minister Ioannis Metaxas’ rejection of Mussolini’s capitulation ultimatum during WWII (Ohi Day)

December 9, 2015: 25^th anniversary of election of Slobodan Milošević as Yugoslav president

December 14, 2015: 20^th anniversary of the signing of the Dayton Agreement in Paris, ending the war in Bosnia

2016

March 31, 2016: 25^th anniversary of the first multi-party elections in Albania

May 20, 2016: 75^th anniversary of the Battle of Crete in WWII

May 21, 2016: 10^th anniversary of Montenegro’s successful referendum for independence from the state union with Serbia

June 25, 2016: 25^th anniversary of Croatia and Slovenia’s declarations of independence from Yugoslavia

July 10, 2016: 150^th anniversary of the birth of world-famous Serbian scientist Nikola Tesla

September 8, 2016: 25^th anniversary of Macedonia’s declaration of independence from Yugoslavia

November 8, 2016: 150^th anniversary of the massacre at Arkadi Monastery in Crete, during a revolt against the Turks

November 19, 2016: Centennial anniversary of the WWI Battle of Bitola, in which Serbian troops captured the city from the Central Powers

By Chris Deliso in Skopje

Editor’s note: With fears of a North African immigrant inundation leading the French and Italian presidents to call for reform in the EU’s Schengen visa system, and newer EU members Romania and Bulgaria preparing to join the Schengen Zone, more scrutiny is falling on the perceived role of Western Balkan countries – most of which now enjoy liberalized non-visa access to Schengen member states – in contributing to illegal immigration.

With a population of only 2 million, Macedonia would seem an unlikely threat to EU stability in this light. However, worries over how to handle a possible “alarming” future illegal migration trend persist, as the following Balkanalysis.com exclusive report reveals.

EU Document Description

A draft document leaked by an official of the EU delegation in Skopje, meant for internal use only and to be completed by Monday May 9^th, examines the impact of visa liberalization on Macedonia.

The draft document, provisionally entitled Local Schengen Cooperation (LSC) Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2010-2011 Report, gives an overview of activities carried out since visas were abolished in December 2009, and points out some of the challenges perceived to lie ahead for the EU in this area. (Note that since it is a draft document, some items may be deleted, amended or expanded upon in the final version; direct quotes cited herein may thus not appear in the final version).

The internal document notes that five LSC meetings (four in 2010 and one in 2011) “have been held since the entry into force of the Visa Code.” On December 19, 2009, visas were abolished for Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro, meaning that any of their citizens having biometric passports could travel in Schengen countries without a visa for up to 90 days per six-month period (though they could not seek employment). Albania and Bosnia were granted similar privileges the next year, while Kosovo alone remains frozen out.

Interestingly, while 16 EU member states have consular offices in Macedonia (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, United Kingdom), “no representational arrangements are known to have been concluded between member states for the purpose of examining applications and issuing visa[s] on behalf of a member state not present in the country.”

Thus, with no “external service providers” for application collections, the European Union Delegation has been tasked with coordinating local Schengen cooperation meetings, the report adds.

Structure of Work, Priority Meetings and Relevance for Intelligence Interpretation

The draft document goes on to describe the structure of LSE meetings in Macedonia. It notes that the meetings, regularly-held at the EUD headquarters and chaired by the EUD’s Head of the Political and JHA issues, Information and Communication section, are “generally well attended.” Given Macedonia’s small size, such meetings are never required outside of the capital, Skopje, it adds.

Another point regarding EU structure and methods to note here is that while “some member states share these minutes with their capitals… some draw up their own reports for their headquarters.”

In this regard, identifying which specific missions tend to fall into which category would be of use for any intelligence analysts trying to interpret the degree of text interventions – and motivation behind such actions, in order to better understand the relationship between the local missions and ministry-level decision-makers, and the motivations of each in depicting local scenarios for policy and sometimes personal goals.

Significantly, the last LSC meeting (held on 3 March 2011) “was partly dedicated to the issue of the high flow of asylum-seekers from the country into Schengen states. Officials from the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs were invited to present the measures taken by local authorities to reverse this trend.”

This again indicates the EU’s overarching concern with visa-liberalization abuses by locals. In this context, it has to be remembered that in the immediate aftermath of Macedonian visa-free travel, Belgium was inundated by busloads of primarily ethnic Albanians and Roma who had been falsely told that they merely had to demand asylum upon arrival in order to receive lavish social benefits in the EU.

Although Macedonian authorities quickly discovered the lucrative scam behind the operation – which was well-publicized by local media, leading to a sharp decrease in asylum-seekers – the events so alarmed the EU that Belgian officials were dispatched to the wilds of the Lipkovo region – a truly historic, unprecedented event – in order to personally explain to the locals that they could no longer pretend to be in need of asylum, in order to simply escape their rural existence.

EU Local Practices in Dealing with Monitoring Post-Liberalization Developments

Since April 2010, the internal document continues, regular LSC meetings conducted between the 16 member states in Macedonia and the EU Delegation allowed these parties “to discuss and exchange information on implementation of the visa free regime, migratory risks, number of asylum applications of country’s citizen registered, ways of transport, etc.”

Exchanges of monthly statistics on visas issues have been exchanged between EU states- another security loophole in what is already the leakiest ship in this landlocked country.

Further, “monthly statistics on types of visas issued and/or refused in a unified format are exchanged on a monthly basis and compiled by the EUD. It was agreed that MS consulates will exchange information within LSC on selection of external service providers, accreditation of commercial intermediaries and withdrawal of such accreditation, cooperation with transport companies, etc. on ad hoc basis. Information on cases of false or forged documents is exchanged.”

In addition, “valuable information is exchanged within LSC on asylum claims made by the country’s citizens in member states. Different aspects of this issue such as number of procedures launched, return procedures, ways of transportation, places of origin and socio-cultural profile of asylum-seekers have been discussed. Concerned member states informed about their respective asylum procedures including social benefits offered to asylum-seekers and their particular and ad-hoc return procedures during LSC meetings.

EU Future Plans: Profiling Macedonian Citizens, Exchanging Information, and Forestalling “Alarming Trends”

The most significant part of the document is the fourth and final section, titled “Challenges in 2011-2012.”

It begins by noting that following the abolishment of visas, what the EU considers “a high number of the country’s citizens” applied for asylum in EU and Schengen countries: in 2010 alone, some 7,550 Macedonian citizens applied for asylum in EU member states, “thus ranking as the 9^th main country of origin of asylum-seekers.”

However, as was mentioned above, and in fairness to the country, this figure may well be distorted by the initial spike in asylum-seekers drawn in by early scams, and thus not representative of current or future trends.

Regardless, the EU is taking no chances with a country the total population of which would constitute a mere suburb of many large European cities.

The report calls for “further monitoring and exchange of information on the implementation of the visa liberalisation” as being “the main challenges for LSC in 2011-2012.”

This policy is expected to include “exchange of information on some issues (statistics of registered asylum applications on a regular basis, overstays and other breaches of the visa free regime, differences in benefits offered for voluntary return procedures,” as well as “more information on the profile of asylum-seekers.”

These efforts, according to the recommendation presented in the internal document, “should be strengthened in order to improve the capacity to rapidly detect and react to any new alarming trend.”

Final Analysis: Implied Goals, Perceptions, and Possible Oversights in the Security Realm

An objective analysis of this internal EU draft document, in the context of both local diplomatic trends and wider EU policy-making, reveals several things. First, it provides further evidence that the EU, and its member states present in Skopje, have made a dedicated, organized and ongoing effort to deal with issues related to abuse of visa liberalization by Macedonian citizens, and that they will continue to do so.

The document, however, seems to implicitly link, without going into explicit detail, the one-off abuses of liberalization following December 19, 2009 with a long-term possible trend- one that is, in fact, not likely to continue (at least not in the form seen previously).

This has had political ramifications, however: the EU gave Macedonia as a state an embarrassing slap on the wrist, due to the actions of a few, tarnishing its image and slowing its progress towards EU membership. Rectifying this situation became an unwanted political headache, and required time-consuming diplomatic assurances from both the Macedonian foreign minister, Antonio Milososki and Gordana Jankulovska, the interior minister.

However, the document, interestingly enough, makes no mention of terrorism fears or use of the country as a transit zone for radical or criminal elements seeking to enter Europe illegally, nor of the occasional Macedonian complaints of “immigrant-dumping” by Greece.

Nor does it consider the expected new trend – previously predicted by Balkanalysis.com – of a long-term shift in illegal migrant movements into the EU from Turkey-Greece (where the EU’s FRONTEX mission has been making a serious difference) to Turkey-Bulgaria, where border security capacities are weaker. Issues of Bulgarian-Macedonian border susceptibility are not addressed, though admittedly it is possibly not in the purview of the present document to discuss this scenario.

Rather, it seems that in the case of Macedonia, the EU is most concerned with the social issues (abuse of social welfare and medical care, etc.)- issues that have strongly political connotations for the internal debates in fractious and partisan EU countries today.

From the point of view of security, the most interesting detail to emerge from the draft document may well be the admission that “harmonising the list of supporting documents has not been assessed as a priority need in the context of visa free regime with only an insignificant number of non-biometric passport holders. So far, no steps have been taken towards preparing a harmonised list of supporting documents.”

This is interesting because in a country like Macedonia, where the EU and other international actors are constantly pointing out corruption in the public sector and bureaucracy, there are is a plethora of supporting documents out there to regulate.

Control over the dissemination of such documents is thus a weak point. Also, their locally (not universally) recognizable character and basic construction (only passports and personal, state-issued IDs use any degree of technological sophistication) means that the rest can be easily forged by anyone with the requisite skill and determination. This is not even to go into the issue – one that has been highly politicized in the past – of passports said to have been illegally given to non-citizens over the years.

In conclusion, while the EU in Macedonia appears to be trying to find consensus on how to handle visa liberalization-related issues affecting the country, the presently discussed leaked document seems to be marked by an imprecise analysis and several possible oversights.

However, as of Thursday, May 5^th, it was still being circulated to EU embassies and consulates in Skopje with requests for additions, and its final form may thus well reflect a broader range of views and topics than those presented in the draft version.

By Chris Deliso in Skopje

On April 19, the Delegation of the European Union in Macedonia hosted a public event for business figures and the media to mark the official launch of the EU-funded Business Advisory Services (BAS) Programme, at the EU InfoCentre in Skopje.

Run by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), this technical assistance program will provide funding for the local consulting and advisory sector, for at least 96 local business projects, to be overseen by the EBRD Skopje office.

The BAS Programme, which has operated for over 15 years in 31 countries, including Macedonia, gives local SMEs access to external advisory services on a cost-sharing basis, while also providing “direct assistance at the enterprise level with systemic market development interventions to develop a sustainable local infrastructure of SME support,” according to the organization. The EBRD Shareholders’ Special Fund is now funding a portion of BAS’ projects, whereas these were formerly completely donor-funded.

At the event, participants were provided with a solid overview of the EBRD’s mission and planned continuation of activities with the BAS in Macedonia. The Bank’s projects will have a significant impact for the consulting/business advisory sector in Macedonia, while promoting the potential for economically- and strategically-important business developments in areas such as renewable energy, as will be seen below.

The Proceedings

The morning event began with an opening speech by Dieter Thiel, Head of Operations for the EU Delegation in Macedonia, and was followed by an address by Minister for Economy Fatmir Besimi. Overviews of EBRD activity in the country were also provided by Elena Urumovska, head of the EBRD’s Resident Office in Skopje and BAS National Programme Manager Jovan Gavrilovski, who gave a detailed recap of the BAS’ efforts in the country since 2002.

These totals so far amount to 487 projects with individual projects, involving over 4.3 million euros of donor financing, matched by over 2 million euros from client contributions. The largest share (35 percent) of total BAS consulting projects in Macedonia have been in the sector of environment, while 33 percent have been in the areas of quality management and certification.

Finally, an overview of the BAS Programme and its potential effects for Macedonia were provided by Valeria Della Rosa, the BAS Programme Manager, who came from the Bank’s London headquarters for the occasion.

The BAS Programme- Who Benefits?

An intrinsic goal of the BAS Programme is to stimulate interest and demand for qualified business advisory services, first of all by raising awareness among firms regarding the benefits of having such input; concomitantly, this also ideally leads to an increase in the supply of qualified and experienced local advisory services.

So, who will benefit from the EBRD’s new initiative? Speaking for Balkanalysis.com, BAS Programme Manager Della Rosa stated that in Macedonia “the primary beneficiaries are going to be the local small- and medium-sized businesses, and local consultants.” While EU-funded projects often involve considerable involvement from foreign consultants, for the current initiative in Macedonia “99 percent of consultants engaged with these projects are local.”

Conditions and Supported Consulting Sectors

For BAS projects, local consultants are typically hired for short-term (4-6 months) assignments. The relevant SME is provided with a grant covering up to 75% of advisory costs (with costs capped at 10,000 euros). The grant is only paid, however, following the successful completion of the project, with a mandatory project evaluation one year after, according to the Bank.

The types of advisory services supported consist of specialized areas within five categories: market performance; management effectiveness; cost reduction; quality management and environmental management. The specific opportunities available to local consultants across these categories include analysis, development planning, feasibility studies, restructuring, impact assessments, computerization and ISO certification advisory.

To apply, SMEs must have less than 250 employees, be majority private- and locally-owned, and have little or no experience with having used external consultancy previously. Companies must be willing to pay 25-75% of the net project costs, and must have a debt structure acceptable to the Bank, a demonstrated potential for growth, and a “genuine need” for business advice and ability to absorb and implement it.

Macedonia: Existing Capacity?

One question that comes up with respect to the BAS’ ambitious plans is to what extent Macedonia at present has the domestic consulting capacity required for executing almost 100 to-be-determined projects. However, Programme Manager Della Rosa is not concerned.

“Considerable progress in advisory development has been made since the EBRD started in 2002, and a base has been built,” she noted, pointing to the success of the MCA2000 (Macedonian Consultant’s Association). The larger projects have helped entrepreneurs conform with EU directives, while providing a chance for the local advisory sector to be involved with more work resulting in higher levels of professionalism.

“I’m very optimistic,” Della Rosa stated, noting that Macedonian has been “quite far ahead in some areas, such as energy efficiency and environment in recent years, for example with projects such as the Integrated Project on Pollution Control (IPPC).”

Targeted Industries?

Considering the large number of projects for which the ERBD has planned to devote funds, another question that emerges is whether there is a specific foreseen breakdown of number of projects per industry.

This is not the case, according to the programme manager. “Projects are demand-driven,” she stated. “We don’t target particular industries or businesses, and we don’t exclude any applicants, except for [those outside the EBRD mandate].”

Such industries specifically not funded are the defense industry, gambling, tobacco, banking and financial services. In Macedonia, which is largely agricultural, it is expected that the foods and food-processing industries will be well-represented among applicants, though there is plenty of opportunity for other sectors. Energy and environment projects seem to be of special interest to the EU in the period ahead.

Future Funding: EBRD Development of Green Energy Sector

For investors and European governments today, the alternative energy sector in the Western Balkans stands out, for both geo-strategic and strictly business reasons.

Since 2002, projects related to energy efficiency have comprised only 1 percent of BAS projects in Macedonia, so it is clear that more efforts will be given to this sector in the near future.

Indeed, according to the most recent official EBRD data sheet on Macedonia, the Bank’s overarching strategic plans for the next year in Macedonia include providing long-term funding to local banks under the EU/EBRD Sustainable Energy Credit Line Facility (WeBSECLEF).

According to the Bank, this investment facility has been set up “to provide debt financing for energy efficiency projects and small renewable energy projects implemented by private entities (in industry or in buildings used for commercial services in the Western Balkans.” It is expected to “act as a catalyst to unlock the great potential in the region to reduce energy intensity and promote diverse sources of green energy.”

What’s Next- 2011 and Beyond

The currently planned phase of BAS activity in Macedonia, running through 2013, will include a minimum of 96 projects and involve a budgeted financing of 1.63 million euros, the vast majority of this coming directly from the European Union.

As part of the overall plan, 4 Market Development Activities will be implemented towards developing the needed sustainable local consulting infrastructure. It is expected that the first 60 BAS projects will be achieved during 2011.

Also during this year, at least 2 trainings will be conducted for local consultants or industry sector in specifically the wines sector, energy auditors in the building sector, and the Macedonian Consultants Association (MCA2000), with a view towards accrediting this entity for full membership in the International Council of Management Consulting Institutes (ICMCI). The 2011 plan also includes some promotional and local media visibility efforts.

Fast Facts: EBRD Activity in Macedonia

According to the most recent Bank-published information (cumulative, as of January 2011), the EBRD has completed in Macedonia 68 projects, with a net business volume of 715.9 million euros. The total project value is equivalent to 1.4 billion euros, while gross disbursements equal 458.3 million euros.

The EBRD’s current portfolio in Macedonia amounts to 300.9 million euros, equaling a portfolio share in the private sector of 55 percent. A major recent investment that the Bank is keen to point out is the 5 million euro credit line extended to Ohridska Banka, Macedonia’s fourth-largest bank (since 2007, a subsidiary of the French Societe Generale Group). The credit line is meant to boost Ohridska Banka’s lending portfolio to local SMEs and make it more competitive with the larger banks operating in the country.

The Bank’s report provides an overview of the country’s economy, interestingly pointing out the perceived need for adhering to the “tight fiscal and prudent monetary policies that have delivered stability to the economy throughout the past decade.” It also notes that the 2009 global financial crisis had “very moderate” impact on the Macedonian economy and caused “no delay in the signing or implementation of projects.”

Indeed, it appears that domestic rather than global factors have shaped EBRD activity in Macedonia. A quick look at the EBRD’s in-country project numbers over time indicates a predictable sharp dip during times of uncertainty, such as the 2001 war and again in 2005.

However, since 2006 project totals have consistently risen, with a sharp spike in activity noted from 2008-2010. Provided that outside donors, investors and key governments continue to predict general stability on the domestic and regional level, this trend should continue to increase.

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Text and photos by Chris Deliso in Skopje

Each year on March 11, Macedonia’s small Jewish community, bolstered by guests local and foreign alike, gathers for a solemn commemoration of the Holocaust. On that date in 1943, 7,148 Macedonian Jews – 98 percent of the country’s Jewish population – were deported to the Treblinka death camps by occupying Bulgarian forces. However, this year’s commemoration was somewhat bigger.

Indeed, the series of events held in Skopje, Bitola and Stip (two other former Jewish centers of life), coordinated by the Macedonian and Israeli governments, along with Macedonia’s Holocaust Fund and its small Jewish Community, spanned almost the course of an entire week.

The reason for the unprecedented attention was the opening – at long last – of the much-anticipated Holocaust Memorial Center of the Jews from Macedonia, fittingly located on the site of Skopje’s former Jewish quarter, along the north bank of the River Vardar.

Although the entirety of the $23-million complex, which will also include an adjoining hotel (to provide sustainable revenue for the Center’s future well-being) and perhaps an arts/cultural center, is not yet complete, an impressive three floors of exhibits, multi-media presentations and historical information on Jewish life over the ages were opened just in time for the ceremonial opening.

For all those who have worked long and hard for the initiative to succeed, this achievement is especially satisfying (for a lengthy discussion of the Jewish heritage in Macedonia, including original photos from 2005-2007 of the early phases of construction, see an earlier Balkanalysis.com piece here).

The week’s events started off on the Tuesday (March 8th) with a commemorative session at the Macedonian Academy of Sciences & Arts (MANU), followed that evening by simultaneous exhibitions of historical photographs documenting Macedonian Jewish life at the city museums of Skopje, Bitola and Stip. On the following day at noon, the honorary guard of the Macedonian Army started from Bitola and Stip, conveying the ceremonial urns from these cities to the capital.

On Wednesday evening, several hundred local and foreign guests gathered at the Macedonian Opera and Ballet for an event held under the patronage of President Gjorge Ivanov. It included a commemorative concert by the Macedonian Philharmonic Orchestra, which was preceded by several speeches – including a congratulatory message relayed via video from US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, an event unexpected by most in attendance, which was met by warm applause.

One of the most powerful messages of the night was delivered by World Jewish Congress Research Director Laurence Weinbaum. After conveying the regards of WJC President Ronald Lauder, he commended Macedonia for its principled and determined approach to property restitution for descendents of Jews murdered in the Holocaust and the Jewish Community in general.

In so honoring “the dead and the living,” said Mr Weinbaum, Macedonia has “set an example to which other nations should aspire. There are nations that are larger, richer, better known and more powerful than Macedonia, but none more decent, gracious, good-hearted and noble.” Mr Weinbaum also expressed his appreciation for the Macedonian government’s strong friendship and support for Israel.

In his heartfelt keynote address, President Ivanov noted the many contributions Macedonia’s Jews had made to the country during the past century, including Jewish participation in the struggle for freedom, first from the Ottoman Empire and later from other occupying forces. And, though the modern-day Jewish community in Macedonia essentially dates from Ladino-speaking Sephardic Jews who migrated to the area from Spain during Ottoman times, President Ivanov reminded guests that the expansive archeological site of Stobi (a former Roman city, in the center of the country), holds the remains of one the oldest synagogue in Europe- proof that the Jewish heritage here is much older.

On the following day, Thursday, the major dedication ceremony for the new commemorative center was held under the patronage of Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski. The event began with a solemn procession led by the military guard, transporting the urns from the Skopje City Museum, down the pedestrianized Ulica Makedonija, and across the historic Stone Bridge to the site of the new complex- set amidst a veritable construction zone of new buildings, statues and other structures now being developed as part of the Skopje 2014 architectural program.

Here, several hundred seated guests from the diplomatic corps (including leaders of neighboring states Bamir Topi of Albania, and Filip Vujanovic of Montenegro) were flanked by throngs of well-wishers and numerous journalists. Several speakers, beginning with Macedonian Holocaust Fund Director Liljana Misrahi, spoke of the importance the new center will have for perpetuating the legacy of Jewish life in Macedonia, and educating locals and visitors alike about the identity, role and significance of the Jews of Macedonia.

Several times during the week it was noted, as by the Macedonian Jewish Community’s president, Bjanka Subotic that most Jewish survivors of WWII have since died, and with their immediate descendents being but few, the present generations have a duty to carry on their memory. For Misrahi, the new commemorative center will serve as an answer to the rhetorical question of “but mother, who are we?” to come from future generations of Jewish children. The detailed exhibits, histories, photographs and other materials inside the center go a considerable way towards answering these questions.

Representing the state of Israel, Vice Prime-Minister Moshe Ya’alon gave a strong speech which highlighted the importance of Macedonia’s Holocaust memorial center – one of only four in the world – in the context of current realities of resurgent anti-Semitism in Europe, and even in developed EU countries such as Holland, Denmark and Britain. Reminding the audience that the seeds of the Holocaust were planted in the years preceding the Second World War, when anti-Semitism grew unchecked and was met by “indifference,” Ya’alon also spoke of the need for the West to confront powers that both deny the Holocaust and seek to destroy the state of Israel, specifying President Ahmadinejad of Iran.

Another prominent international speaker, the Rabbi Andrew Baker, Director of International Affairs for the American-Jewish Committee and President of the International Advisory Board of the Holocaust Fund of the Jews from Macedonia, reinforced the severity of what the Macedonian Jews suffered and the importance of what their descendents have now achieved. “The tragedy of the Jews of Macedonia during the Holocaust is a particularly painful one, even when placed amidst the many other horrific accounts of deportation and murder,” he stated.

For many, the most moving part of the ceremony was the final recitation of the Jewish prayers Kaddish and El Malei Rachamim. Recited under clear blue skies, the ethereal, elegiac sound of the prayers emanating from the former Jewish quarter felt both appropriate and unreal, since the sounds emanating from the city’s “old town” today are primarily the cacophony of mosques and occasional clang of a church bell.

Even though things will never be as they once were in a country where little more than 200 Jews survive, at least for a moment one could feel something of what the culturally richer Skopje of old must have been like. Plagued as it still is by inter-ethnic and inter-religious mistrust, Macedonia today would be a significantly better place had its Jewish population survived to enhance the culture and diversity of daily life. This painful point was one that none of the speakers mentioned directly, though it is certainly obvious when countenanced from the point of view of current-day events here.

Following the ceremony, guests were invited to take a complementary tour of the new Holocaust Memorial Center. It became immediately clear that, despite the absence of much news about progress over the past few years, planners had indeed been very active in developing what is certainly the most modern museum in the country, and one of the most engrossing and unique in the region.

Upon entering, guests are treated to old photos of some of the Macedonian Jews who died in the Holocaust (this reporter was moved to see one elderly man point to one of these photos, sighing and telling his friend, ‘ah, here’s my father’). A huge chandelier of sorts, made up of 7,148 delicate strands (one for each of the victims) hangs from the center of the facility, from the third floor through the open center, interspersed with a Macedonian phrase calling for remembrance.

Further on, visitors can learn through maps, photos and other displays historical, social and cultural details of the Jews of Macedonia and the Balkans. These carefully prepared exhibits are remarkable, and not only because (unlike with many museums in the region) the English translations are excellent. Moving onwards through the center, one not only goes backwards in time but also gains an appreciation and understanding of a once vital, and now all but lost part of the Macedonian population. The quality and tasteful presentation of the whole entity will surely serve as an example for similar cultural centers in Macedonia and beyond.

In the buzz of all these new happenings, the main annual event – the March 11th commemoration of the Holocaust at Butel Cemetery in Skopje – was unfortunately omitted from most media coverage. This melancholy annual gathering allows the survivors – each year, fewer and fewer – and their descendants, well-wishers and foreign diplomats – to gather and ensure that their suffering is never forgotten.

However, with the major steps that the Jewish Community has achieved over a long period of hard work and long cooperation with the state of Israel, international Jewish organizations and other supporters, they have now finally achieved something remarkable, and something that will put this small Balkan country on ‘the map’ of international Jewish sights- as it well deserves.

In the form of the Holocaust Memorial Center, a symbol of the legacy of Macedonia’s Jews will endure far into the future, a testimony which would certainly have made their ancestors proud.

………………………………..

Readers who enjoyed this article may also like the present author’s 2006 essay “Letter from Macedonia,” on the history and modern-day experience of the Jewish community in the country, with unique, first-hand testimony from community members.

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By Chris Deliso in Skopje

Fierce debates on illegal immigration vis-à-vis terrorism fears and unemployment woes have hardened political and social discourse in Western Europe. And, at the same time that a jittery Brussels issues threats to the Balkan states over perceived abuses in the visa liberalization programme, the region’s key role in the lucrative trade of human trafficking has been reaffirmed by recent arrests.

The programme’s extension on November 8 to include Bosnia and Albania, comes almost a year after Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro were given visa-free travel. Now, Albanian and Bosnian ministries responsible for issuing new, biometric passports have been swamped with applicants. Average citizens here compare life in their home countries to “being imprisoned,” reported AFP on November 14, and look forward to a brighter future in the EU- despite repeated statements from Brussels that the programme is intended for short-term travel, not work or study. Among Balkan nations, only Kosovo passport-holders remain left out in the cold.

Recent Arrests Point to Organized Transnational Networks

In Greece, police in the Peloponnese on 11 November discovered a truck carrying 143 Afghan migrants, who had paid 2,500-3,000 euros each to be transported by a Syrian-led gang to Italy by boat, according to another AFP report.

Meanwhile, interesting details about a smaller human trafficking ring have emerged in Macedonia. Six “Palestinians” and four Somali citizens were detained Thursday in the northeastern city of Kumanovo, reported Skopje daily Dnevnik. Citing an interior ministry announcement, the newspaper stated that the migrants were from 16-40 years old, and had entered illegally from Greece. When detained, they had reached the last staging post in the journey before they were to cross the southern border with Serbia.

The immigrants were found in the impoverished Roma neighborhood of Sredorek, near the bus station and the center of the town. Police found the men hidden in the residence of 51-year-old Metodija Kamberovski, reported the newspaper, having been tipped off after a relative of Kamberovski’s reported seeing strangers in the house.

It was then discovered that one day earlier the immigrants (presumed to be economic migrants) had illegally crossed the Greek-Macedonian border by train (though the precise scenario here remains unclear). They then went by train from Bitola to Skopje, and thereafter by bus to Kumanovo. There, an individual (identified by police by the initials “A.I.”) took them to the safe house.

The Dnevnik piece provides vivid testimony from the relative of the arrested man who was the one to turn him in. “I went into the house and saw that my cousin was drunk, and sitting in the room with some unknown Arabs,” recounted Ramadan Mucevski. “I was so scared. I began to wonder why my cousin was here and why they wanted to stay in his house. I told him that they are terrorists and murderers, and that they should not be in his house. Then I communicated [their presence] to the police.”

According to police, the arrested Kamberovski had an agreement with “A.I.” to shelter the migrants in his home, in return for 1250 euros. The next day, they were to have been smuggled into Serbia. Police are currently investigating further while holding Kamberovski in 30-day detention.

Anatomy of an Operation

Human trafficking in Macedonia from and to EU-member Greece is a well documented and frequently discussed issue, though it is not often that the actual workings of the operation are disclosed. Local intelligence received by Balkanalysis.com over the past three years indicates some examples of how one variety of such operations works. In light of this, it is quite interesting to note that the latest group of migrants traveled to Kumanovo via public transportation- apparently, without arousing the attention of train or bus conductors along the way.

Another method of transport, which involves local participation, could be considered nothing more than glorified taxi work by individuals not otherwise involved in any suspicious activities. Usually, a “friend of a friend of a friend” mentions that the prospective driver, using his own car, will be paid 100 euros per passenger (up to four), plus gas. The driver would then be sent from Kumanovo to Tabanovce, on the Serbian border, having received instructions about exactly when and where to go in this mostly uninhabited, hilly border area. There he would be entrusted with illegal immigrants who had been smuggled across by handlers on the Serbian side. Inevitably most were simple economic migrants looking to work in the EU.

However, the driver would not be performing the operation alone. Two accompanying cars would go in front of him, at staggered distances of up to 10km each, as safeguards against any police activity on the main E-75 highway leading south to the Greek border. If any police presence was noted, they would be immediately informed by mobile phone to get off the highway and take the back roads. Finally, the immigrants would be left somewhere in the middle of nowhere on the frontier with Greece, to be picked up by the next individual who would shepherd them across that border. The same operation alternately worked in the reverse direction. In neither case would the recruited drivers have any idea about whom they were working for, in the bigger picture of trans-national crime syndicates.

Illegal Immigrants and Turkey-Greece Relations

The major point of origin for most illegal immigrants through the Balkans remains Turkey, however, and Greece absorbs the bulk of them. Athens reiterates its self-perceived position as Europe’s “eastern front” when complaining to the European Union about its struggle with immigration and Turkey. More pointedly, numerous statements have been made by Greek officials and former officials, suggesting that Turkey’s policy is to flood Greece with illegal immigrants as a sort of “asymmetrical weapon” against its western neighbor. In 2009, the Greek ministry for foreign affairs and the interior ministry demanded Brussels to make improved combating of illegal immigration a prerequisite for Turkey to join the EU.

However, Turkish officials have claimed that they are being targeted unfairly and that they end up bearing a disproportionate share of the cost in dealing with illegal immigrants from Asia, Africa and the Middle East. For example, Turkish newspaper Today’s Zaman in October 2009 cited a respective costs summary that fueled Ankara’s displeasure. While “…70 euros are provided to Turkey per person to offset the cost of re-admission, hosting, processing and deporting to the country of origin,” stated the newspaper, “the EU gives 1,000 euros per person to the Greek side.”

Egemen Bağış, the state minister for issues related to EU accession, was also quoted as attesting that the EU was relatively unappreciative of Turkey’s efforts to stem the tide of illegal immigrants crossing its lengthy borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria. “Without us being involved in the resolution of the problem,” noted Bağış, “the EU can’t protect its borders from illegal immigration or the narcotics trade.”

In 2008, Turkey detained 65,000 illegal immigrants before they could leave the country, “marking a big spike from the previous year,” the newspaper added. “Ankara maintains that the problem is a heavy financial burden on the state budget.”

However, again larger geopolitics and foreign relations dictate that this remains an issue that can never be resolved. Turkey does not require visas for many fellow Muslim countries, such as Iran, Algeria and Morocco, to name a few. As Balkanalysis.com contributor in Greece Ioannis Michaletos notes, this means that immigrants who would otherwise not be able to enter the EU “can pass through Iran and then easily traverse the whole of Turkey with no visa, and enter the Balkans en masse… no one has seriously pressured Turkey to have a visa or border control with Iran, which is considered by the US to be a state sponsor of terrorism.”

Michaletos, who has written about the illegal immigration industry in depth on the World Security Network website, discloses some of the routes that the mainly Muslim immigrants take to arrive in Turkey. “From North Africa, aspiring immigrants just book a flight to Istanbul, with no visa required… or, from Somalia, they travel to Khartoum airport in Sudan, gain a travel visa to Turkey, and from there move on to the Balkans.” Michaletos notes that the recent emergence of a notable Somali community in Athens has raised security concerns there. “Basically, Turkey under the Erdogan goverment has opened its borders to the Islamic world,” he concludes.

Indeed, with fears of terrorism at a renewed high in Europe, following the German government’s successive warnings of a potential “Mumbai-style” attack, it is clear that the Islamic dimension of the greater immigration is driving European fears- even if this is rarely explicitly stated, it is certainly a factor in larger private negotiations between the EU and Turkey.

Ill-Will, Poor Policy, and Predictable Results

European Commission reports over the past decade or so indicate a vexed legacy of patchy cooperation with Turkey on the issue of immigration cooperation. From the law-enforcement point of view, the situation was acknowledged earlier by the unveiling (on November 4) of an EU border policing operation along the Greek-Turkish border on the River Evros- something that many Greeks believe has come far too late, reported the Washington Post. Turkey refuses to take back anyone smuggled out of its borders, unless that individual is a citizen of a state with which it has a land border, thus excluding the majority of African and Southeast Asian migrants shuttled through the country.

The EU mission, known as Frontex, is a multi-national deployment consisting of 175 officers. Led by a Finnish brigadier general, Ilkka Pertti Juhani Laitinen, and seconded by Spanish border security expert Gil Arias Fernandez, the mission has achieved dramatic results so far. Being a temporary mission, it will expire unless extended; however, at time of writing the number of new job openings being advertised on the official Frontex website indicates that it will probably remain operational for some time to come.

While experts from places like Britain and Norway have criticized Greece for alleged poor standards in treatment of asylum-seekers, it is clear that the Greek authorities do not have the capabilities to deal with the massive rise in illegal immigrants coming from mostly Muslim countries in Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Now, Greek officials and the EU are being attacked by human rights groups such as Amnesty International over the mission in and of itself.

Further, as the Washington Post article notes, the issue is felt more strongly further north, in the places that are the final destinations for immigrants- and where high-profile political statements have been made in recent months over immigration and the perceived failure of Islamic integration in Europe, by key leaders such as French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

“The growing presence of immigrants, particularly Muslims who bring with them their own customs and religious practices, has become one of the main irritants in Western European societies,” the article states. “Immigration has become a prominent and sometimes sour part of the political debate even in countries with long liberal traditions, including Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and France.”

Now, the chronic ill-will on all sides has created a sort of domino effect, with successive countries along the route accusing their neighbors of “immigrant dumping”- though the biggest resentment of all is still reserved for the northern European countries, ironically often the first to criticize Balkan countries’ own treatment of illegal immigrants.

For some, the EU’s perceived hypocrisy on human rights issues has been additionally soured by the message that – all visa liberalization overtures aside – Balkan natives are clearly not wanted in the EU. The Economist avers that “for the stabilisation and integration of the western Balkans, it is hard to imagine anything more important” than visa liberalization for these countries; nevertheless, voices within the EU are calling for a change of course following a rapid (and very predictable) rise in asylum-seeker requests from Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. Belgian Minister for Migration Melkior Vatle recently spoke out “to warn these countries about the consequences of the misuse of visa liberalisation,” reported Balkan Insight. These sort of desperate and dire pronouncements just serve to underscore how unprepared and confused the EU remains about its own policy-making in the region.

Macedonia particularly was criticized last winter when busloads of ethnic Albanian villagers begin turning up to seek asylum in Belgium following the abolition of visas. At the same time, this small country at the very center of the Balkans is also voicing criticism of both the EU and its southern neighbor, Greece. The government has long alleged that Greece, wishing to get rid of its own problem with migrants from Turkey, simply passes these individuals on, or at least allows them to cross the border without problem.

In 2010 alone, 94 foreign nationals have asked for political asylum in Macedonia, reported Skopje daily Utrinski Vesnik on 19 November. Most of them claimed to be Palestinians and Afghans, though natives of Somalia, Eritrea, Algeria, Sudan, Iraq and Iran were also noted.

The newspaper quoted police spokesman Ivo Kotevski, who stated that “our government has repeatedly complained to Brussels because of the practice of Greece [and its] deliberate release [of immigrants] into Macedonia, and its refusal to take them back, despite the readmission agreement we have with the [European] Union- which is not unilateral. Such a practice is even more irritating as at the same time [the issue of] Macedonian asylum-seekers stirred up a huge fuss in the Union.”

In the final appraisal, it seems that EU policy regarding immigration – whether that be for legal, tourist travel from aspiring EU member states, or classic illegal migrants from further afield – has been conducted in a reactive and illogical manner, as quick-fixes driven by internal and domestic politics, compounded by a demonstrated inability to predict the results of both inaction (in the case of years of neglect in Greece), and action (in the case of predicting what would be the result of visa liberalization without adequate preparations). It increases the mistrust and apprehensions Balkan citizens have about their perception by the EU, at the same time that the bloc is trying to keep them on board towards solving their own internal and bilateral issues in order to join the club.

Assessment: Future Likelihoods

The European Union will continue to face difficulties in its immigration enforcement efforts, owing to its own internal dueling agendas and the widening gap between right- and left-wing parties in member states, despite the best efforts of joint enforcement bodies such as Europol. Any major future terrorist attacks within the EU’s borders will exacerbate these latent rifts further, and bring the whole immigration issue – and with it relations with the Balkans and Turkey – under intense scrutiny.

Meanwhile, the EU’s desire to integrate the Balkans into the bloc, apparently a train now running on its own inertia, will continue to force European leaders to make unpleasant demands on their Balkan counterparts regarding immigration-related issues. At the same time, the EU’s own law-and-order mission in Kosovo, Eulex, has fallen considerably short of the goals envisioned during its planning stages in 2006, adding to concerns over the EU’s ability to work in tandem on common security issues. And a recent comprehensive Gallup survey (.PDF) indicates that pessimism in the Balkans is increasing, rather than decreasing; ironically, in the country closest to EU accession, Croatia, popular support for joining the bloc has sunk to 28 percent (on the other end of the spectrum, 93 percent of Albanian citizens believe joining the EU will be beneficial to them).

Further, Turkey’s growing influence in the Balkans, Middle East and even Africa has solidified to the point that the EU has very little political leverage anymore on immigration issues in Ankara. It is debatable that, as some Greeks and others believe, Turkey would like to use illegal Muslim immigration as a means of spreading Islam in Europe. More realistically it can be said that, as a transit country with vast borders, Turkey would not be able to eradicate human trafficking to Europe even were it to devote more assets towards doing so.

However, as the EU and Greece have made some progress in Evros, it is likely that the “front” will shift northwards. As the Washington Post noted, the Turkey-Bulgaria border will become the main entry point into the EU should Greece become perceived as “difficult” by would-be migrants. Further, Bulgaria has a significant Turkish minority and weaker state institutions than does Greece, making it likely that the support networks needed for human trafficking will be relatively stronger there. And then the problem just ends up – once again – thrust onto the borders of Macedonia and Serbia, albeit from a different direction. The EU’s “progress” in Greece may simply result in moving the problem to other places where it is less capable of countering it.

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By Chris Deliso

High on a windswept ridge in Macedonia’s barren northeastern expanse, some 17 kilometers down a rough dirt track heading towards Kratovo, it stands as a cryptic reminder of the country’s still largely undocumented past: the rocky remains of what was once an important outpost in the Early Byzantine imperial hinterland.

Nevertheless, the lack of specific references in Late Antique and Byzantine sources means that we may never know what the name of the settlement or its fortress actually was- a tantalizing omission that could only be resolved “by epigraphy finds, which we so far haven’t encountered,” says Dr. Carolyn Snively, an archaeologist and professor from Gettysburg College in Pennsylvania.

For the last decade, Dr. Snively has been working jointly with international and Macedonian experts, supported by local workers at Konjuh- in the process, shedding light on this little-documented period of Macedonia’s remote history.

Recently having arrived back in Macedonia, Dr. Snively will soon lead excavations into an eleventh season of work. The dig will last from May 28 through August. Earlier today, she shared some insights and projections for this season’s upcoming work with Balkanalysis.com.

Background and Significance

The Konjuh site was originally discovered in 1938, but only worked on extensively during the 1970s by Yugoslav archaeologist Ivan Mikulcic. This expert drew the original plan of the site, which has been redrawn several times. Although the plan “seriously needs to be updated,” says Dr. Snively, “we have not had an architect on site with enough free time and surveying skill to do it in recent seasons.”

Although the name of the settlement and fortress has vanished, pottery finds date the ruins, clearly a fortress standing watch over now buried remnants of an urban settlement and church, to the 6th century- and the reign of Emperor Justinian I (r. 517-565), one of the greatest Byzantine rulers. Under Justinian, imperial authority was reasserted as far as northern Africa and parts of Italy. Justinian’s expansion efforts were executed by a powerful military led by his renowned general, Belisarius, considered a master tactician who could win battles even when cut off from communications with the capital or other parts of the army.

The Kratovo region, part of the mineral-rich Osogovski Mountain range, has always had strategic importance for its mines. Romans, Byzantines and Ottomans all excavated it extensively for gold, silver and iron. In the 6th century, the Byzantine Empire was beset by barbarian tribes in the Balkans but still held on to large areas through an extensive system of fortresses that allowed military garrisons to provide some measure of protection for settlements and ongoing economic activities. Indeed, an important part of the Justinianic legacy was the re-fortification of the region as part of his general military strategy.

At the fortress site, finds have revealed that one significant local activity then was the excavation of iron ore, a substance which archaeologists have discovered in large quantities among the various artifacts discovered to date.

The mining was carried out near today’ss village of Konjuh. A tiny enclave of a few hundred people, without even a village shop, the village is about 1km south of the ridgeline upon which the bygone fortress stands. Here there are no great stone towers or constructions, at least no remaining ones here, but the steepness of the ridge and its width at the top would have provided protection for defenders and adequate space to store weapons, provisions and, when necessary, people.

The fortress ridgeline is surrounded by valleys and, further on, flanked by other small ridges that could also have served as military outposts. At the top, the acropolis, there is a remarkable 3m (15ft)-deep cistern, and the remains of several small stairways and paths chiseled into the sides of the rock. Naturally formed turrets overlook the plain, behind which Byzantine bowmen could have taken aim at any invaders below.

Below the fortress, on the lower town located on a northern terrace, excavators have made their most substantial discoveries. A street system, and the base of a Late Antique church indicate organized settlement occurred there over a period of several centuries. The settlement likely dates from the 5th century, says Dr. Snively, adding that “there was probably a 3rd or 4th-century settlement in the vicinity, though I don’t think the inhabitants started living on the northern terrace until the need for building a fortification arose later.”

2009: Upcoming Plans

In keeping with the professional approach to managing the site, the remains of the foundations are all painstakingly reburied each year at the end of the digging season- partly, for their own protection, since the project hasn’t the funds to hire a full-time guard. According to Dr. Snively, the team won’st re-dig everything that has been buried in previous seasons. “This year, we will concentrate on excavating the apse of the basilica we discovered last year,” she says.

This exciting discovery confirms the significance of the site as a former center of civilization with some amount of population. According to Dr. Snively, one of the main goals of the 2009 dig in terms of this structure will be “to define the basilica’s shape and dimensions- we can say with 95 percent certainty that it is a 6th-century basilica, which would have been built within a few decades of Justinian’s fortification works.”

Indeed, the whole region is remarkably rich in sites once populated during the Late Antique period. According to Katie Haas, an archaeology student from Gettysburg College who has come to Macedonia for the summer thanks to a grant from the Mellon Foundation, “there is a marked efflorescence of Late Antique sites in this region.” As a member of the dig team, Katie will concentrate on the important job of small finds analysis- particularly, spatial pattern analysis of the site. She is part of a nine-person team (comprised of American, British and Macedonian archaeologists, who will be aided by local workmen.

Methodology and Cultural Heritage Protection

While locals have since learned to respect the site’s integrity and have developed good relations with the excavation teams, some nefarious diggers have in the past attempted to search here, as almost everywhere in Macedonia, for gold – in the process, breaking their drill heads when inadvertently striking the solid bedrock.

While occasionally outsiders continue to show up illegally, Dr. Snively does not anticipate any trouble this summer from the “wild diggers,” as such people are known in the press. Indeed, other local inhabitants are more in danger, as when the villagers’ sheepdogs were sadly poisoned en masse by a probable sheep-rustler- indicating that this still is the wild east to some extent.

Part of the archaeologists’ sustained good relations with the locals owes to education and trust-building efforts carried out since 1998. But it also owes to something that helps explain why the fortress has attracted relatively little attention thus far- a lack of shiny objects. The lack of major awareness of the site, despite its historical significance, probably stems from the fact that neither gold nor silver, nor colorful mosaics have yet been discovered. Traditionally, these sort of big-ticket items are what draw attention from the central government (this is of course not only the case in Macedonia).

Although archaeologists do not anticipate making stunning discoveries of buried treasure at Konjuh, the possibility cannot be completely excluded. Working with extraordinary diligence since 1998, Dr. Snively has deliberately not chosen to dig for burial areas on the site – even though such spots would have the best chance of containing jewelry and coins €“ partly because there has not been sufficient support available to protect the site during the off-season. Were the site to gain a reputation for riches, the thinking goes, it would become more difficult to protect it from looters.

Another reason why the team is deliberately not looking for burial sites is because of lack of sufficient support for an activity which would greatly enlarge the scope and character of the operation.

“If we found a cemetery, we would then have to bring in a physical anthropologist too,” says Dr. Snively, noting also the further permits and bureaucratic requirements that would be needed in such cases. While the Macedonian government has pledged an all-out campaign for excavating “mega-sites” like Stobi, Heraclea and Ohrid-area locales, more modest sites like Konjuh have gone largely unnoticed.

Konjuh: “A Great Example of Cooperation”

Konjuh locals have also been happy to see the site remain undisturbed, archaeologist Snively believes, because it has provided an occasional source of employment for the economically depressed village, when additional workers or watchmen have been needed over the past decade. “Injecting even a few thousand dollars into the local economy makes a big difference in a small village like this,” she notes.

The cultural heritage protection aspect of the Konjuh fortress site is particularly intriguing to Seth Elder, an American Fulbright scholar from DePauw University in Indiana. Seth chose to come to Macedonia for his research on the practical connections between archaeology, local communities and economic development. Since arriving in Macedonia last year, and touring numerous sites, he has gained insight into the Konjuh site from a comparative sense.

According to him, “the Konjuh site is a great example of cooperation between local and international archaeologists, and also with the local community. Since Macedonia has been somewhat isolated from international archaeologists’ attention, there’ss a real need for more work like this to be carried out in the future.” He also emphasizes the need for Macedonian archaeologists to publish their findings more widely in foreign journals, as this activity is a key part of attracting the attention of outside experts who often have the ability to acquire funding and personnel for increasing archeological efforts.

Future Tourism Potential?

Indeed, one of the very interesting aspects of the site for the future is its specific placement. The fortress is set in what is today literally the middle of nowhere, on a ridge above the Kriva River near Konjuh. However, some raised concrete pillars that might seem equally mysterious to outsiders may hold the key for the area’s development as a tourism destination. Long-neglected skeletons of bridge supports, these and other similar structures dot the wilderness in eastern Macedonia- unfinished pieces of proposed railway and highway links to Bulgaria. For various reasons, the long-hoped-for infrastructure project has never been completed. If it were, the site would be ideally located for travelers to access.

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By Ljubica Dzabirova*

The principle of proportionality implies balancing of power, actions and measures. Being a relatively young country, Macedonia does not yet have the experience and legal basis to really be able to apply proportionality in its judicial system. However, in the case of applying proportionality in the political system, the question is whether it is suitable to have such balancing between competing values and interests, which can significantly intervene in the autonomy of policy choices.

Background

The principle of proportionality is a fundamental principle of European Union Law. According to this principle, the EU may only act to exactly the extent that is needed to achieve its objectives, and no further. This principle has underpinned the European Union since its beginning in 1957. It is also explicitly specified in the proposed new Lisbon Treaty for Europe.[1] In the presently applicable primary law, this principle is clearly formulated in the third paragraph of Article 5 of the Treaty[2] establishing the European Community as follows: “European Union law is the unique legal system which operates alongside the laws of Member States of the European Union (EU)€š Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.”

However, the principle of proportionality is given different meanings by different researchers. There is no agreement on what this principle refers to or covers. For the purpose of this article, I use the definition of the principle of proportionality given by Jan Jans.[3] The principle of proportionality, in its most elaborate form, consists of three different elements: suitability, necessity, and proportionality, elements that need to be assessed cumulatively.

The full proportionality test of a specific measure thus involves a three-step assessment. The first step is the assessment of suitability, i.e., whether the measure at issue is suitable or appropriate to achieve the objective it pursues. Suitability requires a casual relationship between the measure and its object.[4]

The second step of the full proportionality analysis is the assessment of necessity, i.e., whether there exists an alternative measure which is less restrictive than the measure in question, and which is (at least) equally effective in achieving the pursued objective. If such alternative measure exists, the measure at issue is not necessary.

The third and final step is the assessment of proportionality stricto sensu, i.e., proportionality in its narrow sense. This step involves an assessment of whether the effects of the measure are disproportionate or excessive in relation to the interests affected. At this stage the true weighing and balancing takes place. The more intense the particular interest, the more important for the countervailing objective it needs to be.[5]

The principle of proportionality is usually applied in the legal/judicial systems of countries. Nevertheless, considering in detail the main elements of the principle of proportionality, there is no reason not to apply it in politics as well. It was initially developed in the German system as a political maxim: that any layer of government[6] should not take any action that exceeds that which is necessary to achieve the objective of government.[7]

Applying Proportionality in Macedonia

Applying the above definition in Macedonia opens a question of whether, and, if so, to what extent, the principle of proportionality is part of Macedonian politics and the Macedonian judicial system.

The hesitation, when talking about the application of the principle of proportionality in Macedonian politics may arise, because proportionality usually exists, and plays an important role, as a principle to assist with the choice between competing social values and interests on the basis of the weights attributed to these values and interests.

Nevertheless, the question is whether it is suitable to balance, and thus make choices between political and non-political values and interests. Whether it is appropriate to debate and assess whether or not the societal value or interest pursued by a certain political party outweighs the burden that a certain measure or action can impose. It is obvious that such balancing between competing values and interests can significantly restrict policy choices and their autonomy.

A sort of trend, maybe latent and invisible, which seems to be interpreted by political actors in Macedonia, is that applying proportionality implies dissolution of boundaries between political and non-political values and interests, and is thus weakening the power of their autonomy. €š”Proportionality concerns the evolution€š of a concept of governance which transcends the more traditionally conceived private/public divide and which challenges previous assumptions about the locus of political and economic authority.”[8]

The trend toward fading barriers between the political and non-political values and interests should be therefore a guideline to follow when we want to find solutions to the lack of democratic participation in Macedonia. And, of course, the main difficulty then becomes ways to reconcile these solutions. A first answer to this question can be found through the European proportionality principle, by analyzing it from both a normative and a case law perspective, i.e., whether the action, non-action, measure or certain behaviour imposed by the political actors is suitable, necessary and proportional stricto sensu.

On the other hand, talking about proportionality in the judicial system, Macedonia does not yet have sufficient experience and a legal basis to apply proportionality. The national judicial scrutiny of restrictive measures can take place before either the Administrative Court, the basic courts of the country, or before the Constitutional Court. The Administrative Court will review acts enacted by public administration and the review will typically be applicable in vertical legal relationships, i.e. in relationships involving individuals and legal persons on the one hand, and state authorities on the other.[9]

In the administrative review procedure, proportionality analysis is not common. As a general rule, the Administrative Court cannot review discretion, but only legality. In other words, it does not have recours de plaine pouvoir, and cannot decide cases on their own merits. The result of this is that, generally speaking, proportionality analysis is not possible within the review of administrative discretion.

Exceptionally, the Administrative Court can decide cases on the merits in a limited number of situations when it has enough data to do so. For example, when the Court decides to annul an administrative act due to its illegality, it can decide the case by reaching a judgement which replaces the annulled act.[10]

Second, in case the administrative body does not adopt the act within the time prescribed by law the Administrative Court can decide the case on its own, thus replacing the administrative act which was not adopted on time by its own judgement.[11]

Similarly, in case the act has not been adopted on time and the Court resolves not to decide the case on its own, but gives an order to the administrative body to act accordingly, and the administrative body does not act, the Administrative Court can decide the case on its own.

Although the situations presented above show that, in certain cases, the Administrative Court can decide a case on its own merits, in reality the Court rarely, if ever, decides to avail itself of this right, even in situations when it has enough data to decide the case on its own.

Ordinary jurisdiction has not confronted the issue of proportionality yet. However, recourse to ordinary jurisdiction will anyway be possible only in horizontal cases, involving non-governmental actors, such as trade unions, in situations comparable to those that emerged in Walrave und Koch,[12] and more recently in cases Laval[13] and Viking.[14]

In other words, litigants will include an individual or legal person on the one side and another entity of private law, such as professional association or an NGO on the other. If, in such situations an EU provider is caught up in the provision of services by such a private actor, it will be protected by Community free movement rules. On the other hand, member states will have an obligation to bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with the EC Treaty.

Within the scope of private law, the Macedonian Law on Obligations[15] restricts the freedom of contract, where it is contrary to the Constitution, strict legal norms or public morality.[16] While this definition is circular and adds nothing to the Constitutional restrictions, it is worth noting that, typically, civil law judges will question these issues only exceptionally, and only against decisions of the Constitutional Court. It is not likely that they will engage in any balancing or proportionality analysis in cases where e.g. “State interest” is clearly defined by law.

Definition of possible restrictions is, in Macedonian legal culture, reserved for the legislator. This means that basic courts will, as a rule, defer to the legislature and follow its legislative choice. This is, of course, contrary to the Community doctrine of supremacy, as defined in the Simmenthal.[17]

Ideally, to ensure compliance with Community law, Basic Courts, confronted with application of national law which is claimed to have restricted the freedom to provide services, should be in a position to apply the full proportionality analysis (Gebhard test)[18] on its own, and “€šÃ„¶it is not necessary for the court to request or await the prior setting aside of such provision by legislative or other constitutional means.”[19]

However, within the present Macedonian legal framework, this would be possible only in respect to secondary legislation which is typically adopted by the government or its bodies.

Here, Basic Courts can directly apply the law to the case before them, while at the same time referring the issue of legality of the secondary legislation to the Constitutional Court without staying the proceedings. In case of laws, Basic Courts have to stay the proceedings and refer the issue to the Constitutional Court.

Another most likely focus of review is the Constitutional Court. It has jurisdiction for concrete constitutional review instituted by the courts and for abstract constitutional review of legislation. It also decides constitutional complaints. However, due to the reasons described above, it is to expect that the Constitutional Court will typically deal with proportionality analysis in abstract review, and possibly in constitutional complaint proceedings. While protection before the Constitutional Court can be effective to set aside restrictive legislation, due to the Simmenthal principle[20] it is inappropriate for purposes of concrete protection of Community based rights.

Conclusion

On the one hand, proportionality provokes discussions about the readiness and willingness of its application in the Macedonian judicial or political system. On the other hand it also touches upon issues, such as sensitive local moral standards, tradition, culture and political and judicial experiences. This suggests that applying proportionality in Macedonia is not a simple process of adjudication. Rather, it requires a prudent and sensitive appreciation by the Macedonian actors of diverse values, and the different possible ways of acting consistently with the elements of the principle of proportionality: suitability, necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu.

*Ljubica Dzabirova is a PhD researcher in law at the University of Amsterdam, currently doing field research at the World Trade Organisation in Geneva; she has also been employed by the Macedonian Government’s Secretariat for European Affairs since 2003.