Balkanalysis.com

By Anita McKinna

The January 14 protests organized by the Vetëvendosje party in Kosovo were nothing new for this movement, which has since in its origins utilized mass protests as its trademark. The heavy-handed police response to it was not unique in attempting to block the protest, as was previously evidenced by the tragic events of 10February 2007.

What was a new development, however, was what Vetëvendosje’s protesters were agitating against: the failure of the government to implement a motion that was passed by the Kosovo Assembly, a motion that had actually been initiated by Vetëvendosje MPs.

Bills and Ultimatums

On December 7, 2011, the Kosovo Assembly approved a three-point motion related to the government’s implementation of reciprocity measures against Serbia in the political, economic and trading realms. Practically, this meant blocking the entrance of Serbian goods into Kosovo, while Serbia continued to do the same with Kosovan goods entering Serbia.

MPs from Vetëvendosje and the other opposition parties (LDK and AAK) voted the motion through with a total of 42 votes for and 33 against (in addition to two abstentions). This was the first successful motion that had been raised by an opposition party. The government refused to implement the motion, and Vetëvendosje issued an ultimatum viewable on its website on December 19, 2011.

It stated that if the government did not implement the motion by 1January 2012, then from 14 January it would start blocking Serbian goods from entering Kosovo at the border points at Dheu i Bardhë and Merdare. This deadline passed, and the protests went ahead.

Coming as this did during a delicate time in the negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia, Vetëvendosje did not receive support from international actors in Kosovo. In fact, International Civilian Representative Pieter Feith argued that “this is not responsible behavior by an organization which is represented at the Kosovo Assembly.”

For his part, Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi voiced his opposition to the protests and used his status as former KLA commander to try and persuade his audience on Kosovo television: ‘there may be pseudo-patriots who regret not contributing when they had the opportunity but who did not do so when they should [have]… they refused the KLA uniform, and now they want to go to Dheu i Bardhë or to Merdare.”

The Protest, and the After-Protest

Yet did Thaçi reveal a bit too much with this reference to the war? Did he betray a concern that he was beginning to feel threatened by the growing popularity of Vetëvendosje and its brand of nationalism? After all, the movement has come a long way since its ‘Kosova Action Network’ roots, fighting the oppression of the Milošević regime. After becoming a political party before the December 2010 elections, it managed to secure 12.69% of the vote, making it the third-biggest party in Kosovo.

The fact that the party had managed to get a motion passed in the Assembly has further indicated the strength of Vetëvendosje and the resonance of its message among Kosovo Albanians. Its protests against government corruption – with particular attention placed on the unpublished contract for the Vermicë-Merdarë highway – would have been an added incentive for Thaçi to discredit the new party.

The police response to the non-violent protest on 14 January suggests that Vetëvendosje was seen as a threat. In a response that Vetëvendosje claim was orchestrated by Thaçi himself, police used tear gas and water cannons (in near freezing temperatures) against the  protestors, and there were reports of protestors, including MP Glauk Konjufca being brutally beaten by police.

The Kosovo police response was criticized by Amnesty International as being an excessive use of force, and Ombudsperson Sami Kurteshi described the police intervention as being ‘unnecessary, unjustifiable and disproportionate’ and alleged that police threatened Ombudsperson staff and impeded them from monitoring the protests.

The day after the protests, a group of 25 NGOs announced that they would protest against the police violence during the protest in front of the Government building. It is somewhat ironic that a past rallying cry of the Kosovo Albanians was that the Yugoslav police had carried out similarly heavy-handed crackdowns on them.

Activist Origins

Vetëvendosje started life as the Kosova Action Network, which was established in 1997, supporting the demands of the ‘Independent Student Union of the University of Pristina’ to regain access to their university buildings through non-violent protests.

After the war, the KAN turned to an issue on which it could garner broad support: helping families of missing persons from the recent war. In 2004, it protested against United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and championed independence for Kosovo. In 2005 the slogan ‘no negotiation – self-determination’ transformed KAN into Vetëvendosje (the Albanian word for self-determination). This movement protested against the presence of UNMIK in Kosovo and then against the Ahtisaari plan and decentralization.

On February 10, 2007 Vetëvendosje held a protest against the Ahtisaari plan, which ended with two protestors dead and dozens injured, after Romanian UNMIK police fired at protestors with out-of-date rubber bullets. Vetëvendosje’s leader Albin Kurti was arrested for organizing the protest and spent almost two years in detention in a case that was described by various human rights groups as being politically motivated.

The case against Kurti collapsed in February 2008, when Ramë Gashi, President of the Bar Association, refused to take part in the trial and announced that no other lawyer would be willing to represent Kurti. Vetëvendosje campaigned to boycott the 2009 local elections, but in June 2010 announced that it would take part in the next elections as a political entity.

From Student Network to Nationalist Political Party

Vetëvendosje’s transformation from an action network into a political party is not the only transformation it has made. While the broad goals of fighting against international pressure on Kosovo and for Kosovo’s sovereignty have remained constant throughout its existence, the rising importance of the ethnic Albanian nationalist factor has been more recent.

In November 2005, Albin Kurti made a speech in London in which he accused first Milošević, and then UNMIK, of focusing on the ethnic dimension of the conflict in Kosovo, thereby increasing the ethnic divide. He asserted that:

‘…young people in Kosova, during the ’90s tried to tell Milosevic that they were students but Milosevic told them: no, you are Albanians… therefore it is Milosevic that wanted desperately to make the conflict ethnic and strangely this continues still today. The newly-coined dualism in Kosova, ‘Albanians-Serbs,’ is linked with the tendency to represent the conflict in Kosova as inherently ethnic. This is wrong and very harmful…”

In its manifesto, published in December 2005, Vetëvendosje similarly shunned the focus on ethnicity in post-war Kosovo: “only freedom makes it possible for us to transform a community characterised by ethnicity into a political one.” But by 2008, Vetëvendosje’s public rhetoric included more references to Albanian nationalism. An article by Vetëvendosje member Shqiptar Oseku from March 2008 argued that:

“EULEX is being deployed here in order to stop the strengthening and empowerment of the Albanian factor. Europe had to take Kosova from the Serbs, first of all thanks to the insistence of the United States. But, it is taking care that the Albanian ethnic community never becomes dominant… This is the sole reason why Kosova will be ruled by EULEX!”

More recently Vetëvendosje has argued for a referendum for Kosovo to join Albania. Unification is a highly popular concept within Kosovo (and highly unpopular amongst the international presence), and this could explain the shift towards the promotion of ethnic nationalism, especially since Vetëvendosje has become a political party. What is clear is that if Vetëvendosje continues to gain popularity at the same rate, Prime Minister Thaçi would be correct to see it as a genuine threat.

Key Information

Vetëvendosje is a political party in Kosovo created by activist Albin Kurti, which has roots in student protest networks of the 1990s and which has increasingly taken a hard-line nationalist stance, even advocating for union with Albania.

Running on a platform defining itself as being in opposition to the five political parties previously represented in the Kosovo assembly, Vetëvendosje gained 88,652 votes in the 2010 parliamentary elections.

Overall, this result made Vetëvendosje the third-largest party in Kosovo, but it was registered as being the second largest political entity in the capital Pristina, as well as the eastern municipality of Gjilan and the southeastern municipality of Kaçanik. It is also believed to have strong links with similar nationalist organizations and parties in Macedonia, Albania and the European diaspora.

Members of Parliament from Vetëvendosje

Visar Ymeri (Chairperson)
Liburn Aliu
Albana Fetoshi
Albana Gashi
Albulena Haxhiu
Afrim Hoti
Afrim Kasolli
Glauk Konjufca
Florin Krasniqi
Albin Kurti
Alma Lama
Rexhep Selimi

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By Anita McKinna

The recent protests by local residents against the return of displaced persons from other ethnic communities in Ferizaj and Mitrovica highlights a problem that has plagued post-war Kosovo: the politicization of returns.

On 8 November 2011, it was reported that the planned visit by 12 Serb heads of families to their former village of Nerodime, Ferizaj, with a view to returning permanently, was met with protests from Albanian residents. The predominant reason given by the protestors for the disruption was that the Serbs had committed crimes in the village during the war.

The head of the village council, Hyzri Lekaj, was quoted in Koha Ditore as asserting that ‘those Serbs who have expressed the willingness to return here committed massacres, terror, maltreatment, burnt houses, against the unprotected Albanian population.’

Lekaj explained that ‘we will not allow Serbs to pass through, we are not against the return, but we are against their behaviour.’

While the issue of inadequate transitional justice is a legitimate concern in Kosovo, the residents politicized the issue by demanding not only that those who committed crimes in the village be punished accordingly, but also that Serb blockades in the north of Kosovo be removed.

Another recent example of the politicization of returns has been the reconstruction of Albanian-owned houses in Kroi i Vitakut, in North Mitrovica. These particular houses have been the subject of Serb protests for more than two years, due to their location in the Serb-dominated north of Kosovo, with some crossing the “yellow line” (a negotiated boundary line drawn west of North Mitrovica stemming from a 2002 agreement between KFOR and UNMIK that informally divides returning displaced persons into ethnic communities) from the Albanian-inhabited western side to the Serb-inhabited east.

Serbs protested in October after the Kosovo government announced that it would allocate €900,000 for the reconstruction of the houses. Given the tense situation in the north of Kosovo since the events of July this year, and the on-going negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade, sceptics may argue that the decision to invest so heavily in this particular returns project (Kosovo’s total 2011 budget for returns is €6,000,000) was designed either to promote an increased Albanian presence in northern Kosovo, or to provoke Serb retaliations in order to sway international opinion away from Serbia’s partition ambitions, or both.

Similarly, given the staunch opposition to Kosovo’s independence north of the Ibar River, it could be argued that the political motives for Serb protests against these returns outweigh concerns over safety.

It is not only Serbs who have drawn attention to political interest in this particular returns project. In December 2009, Balkan Insight reported that residents who had returned to this part of North Mitrovica with the help of government funding felt as though they were being manipulated for political gain, as they were only given enough money to reconstruct part of their homes to ensure their return, and were expected to fund the rest personally, thus leaving them with substantial financial problems.

The tensions surrounding this issue have escalated in recent weeks, with a violent incident unfolding the day after the Nerodime protest. It was reported by Telegraf  that late on 9 November three Serbs were shot after apparently attempting to steal doors and windows from one of the Albanian houses that was being reconstructed. One of those injured later died. After this incident, Kosova Press reported that the reconstruction process stalled for two weeks but then resumed, prompting new protests from local Serbs.

The politicization of the issue of returns has been a problem throughout the post-war period, and has contributed to the failure of the international administration, and Kosovo’s institutions, to realize significant numbers of permanent returnees to Kosovo.

This is the situation despite the issue of returns being an emphasized priority of the international administration of Kosovo throughout the post-war period. It was the fourth of eight standards set out in the 2003 Standards for Kosovo document, which aimed at bringing Kosovo in line with accepted European standards regarding democracy and multi-ethnicity.

The right of all refugees to return to Kosovo was also reaffirmed in Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo’s status settlement. Yet despite the issue gaining such attention, according to a report published by the OSCE late in 2010, only a small proportion of people displaced by the Kosovo war (mostly, from minority communities) have returned to their homes.

Given that it has been more than a decade since the end of the war, many of these people by now have made new lives for themselves outside Kosovo and are therefore unlikely to return. But those who still wish to return face serious obstacles, including a lack of employment prospects, concerns about the conditions in which some minority community members live (highlighted in a recent OSCE report on Croats living in Viti), and the fear of violence against minority communities (fuelled by incidents such as the murder in October of a Serb in Hoqa e Madhe, Rahovec, which was condemned by the Youth Initiative for Human Rights).

While obstacles to successful and sustainable returns are immense, the continued politicization of this issue by both Serb and Albanian communities, illuminated by these recent protests, only exacerbates these obstacles and damages Kosovo’s European and international reputation.

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By Anita McKinna

The recent arrest of former KLA commander turned politician Fatmir Limaj under suspicion of committing war crimes, and the death of a protected witness in the case, illuminate two deficiencies that have plagued Kosovo’s post-war justice system: MP immunity and a lack of adequate witness protection.

An Untouchable?

After being acquitted of war crimes by the ICTY in 2005 and having so far survived EULEX investigations into allegations of corruption without being charged, many thought that Fatmir Limaj was untouchable.

Then, new allegations of war crimes emerged in March and eight of Limaj’s former KLA comrades were arrested, according to an EULEX press release, ‘on the grounded suspicion of killings, torture and other offenses against Kosovo Albanian and Serb civilians’ in the detention center of Kleçkë/Klečka during the war. Nevertheless, Limaj avoided arrest. He was questioned at the time but released over confusion as to whether members of the Kosovo Assembly were granted immunity from such charges.

Free the ‘War Hero’

These arrests sparked protests against EULEX, not only from members of the public but also from members of the government. Support for those involved was equaled by anger against EULEX for initiating the arrests. Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi described the arrests as an attempt to de-legitimize Kosovo’s statehood, and to blacken the name of the KLA, according to the EU Observer. Protests flared up in 26 centers in Kosovo, with chants of ‘Free Limaj, Limaj the war hero,’ and ‘EULEX go home.’

Yet while Limaj expressed a wish to give up his right to immunity and face justice with his fellow accused, he left the final decision up to the Assembly to clarify. EULEX was powerless to move forward with the case while such confusion existed.

The issue was eventually referred to the Constitutional Court, which ruled on September 21^st that MPs, the President, the Prime Minister and cabinet members ‘do not enjoy immunity from prosecution for actions and decisions taken outside the scope of their responsibilities,’ recounted Balkan Insight.

On the same day, Limaj was questioned by the Special Prosecution for five hours on suspicion of involvement in organized crime, money laundering, extortion and misuse of his official duty. The next day he was sentenced to one month’s house arrest by the Pristina District Court in relation to the war crimes case.

An Important Step

The Constitutional Court’s clarification of the issue of MP immunity represents an important step forward for Kosovo’s justice system and for Kosovo more generally: indeed, this immunity had come to be seen by many not simply as an added perk of being a member of the Assembly, but as in fact a primary reason for seeking such a position in the first place.

In its evaluation of the 2010 elections, the European Commission expressed concern (.PDF) about several individuals, including many on Limaj’s PDK party lists who were under suspicion of having committed war crimes and that ‘individuals see election to the assembly as protection against indictment.’ As well as the implications for individuals within Kosovo’s political establishment, this decision was an important message to the people of Kosovo that no-one was above the law. It also marks a victory for transitional justice in Kosovo, in a political landscape that is still dominated by former KLA members.

No Time To Celebrate

However, supporters of justice did not celebrate this development for long as, a week after the Constitutional Court’s decision Agim Zogaj – a key witness in the case against Limaj – was found dead in Germany. According to documents leaked to Prishtina daily Koha Ditore in June, Zogaj testified that Limaj had ordered him to kill prisoner Blerim Kuçi (now Mayor of Suharekë/Suva Reka) in the Kleçkë/Klečka camp. German officials ruled the suspicious death a suicide, though members of his family blame EULEX for its failure to protect him, reported Balkan Insight.

Nevertheless, regardless of the circumstances of the death of Agim Zogaj, the fact that he died while under protected witness status less than a week after Fatmir Limaj was detained reinforces a message that has been received clearly by the people of Kosovo since the end of the war: that it is just not safe to testify against members of the Kosovo political elite.

Indeed, Limaj’s first trial in The Hague was blighted by witness intimidation, with Beqa Beqaj sentenced to four months in prison after intimidating witnesses connected with the trial. The first trial of former Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj also involved numerous allegations of witness intimidation (as has been noted officially by the ICTY).

It is clear that this most recent incident will set back not only the case against Limaj, but will also do nothing to reassure potential witnesses in the future. It has already been reported in Serbia’s B92 that another potential witness now refuses to testify against Limaj, for safety reasons. Regardless of the outcome of this case against Limaj, these recent events indicate that while progress is being made in the development of Kosovo’s justice system, there is still a long way to go.

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By Maja Šoštarić in Prishtina

Anyone who has seen the classic 1956 movie “The Searchers,” starring John Wayne and Natalie Wood, must remember the scene where Wayne carries Wood after finally having found her. At the end of his restless quest, he looks her deep in the eye and tells her the following memorable words: “Let’s go home, Debbie.”

Kosovo can perhaps be compared to Natalie Wood in that scene, since the youngest world’s country often needs a strong cowboy to make sure things go back to normal. The real question is then: is the EU that cowboy, or should it become one?

Suspended Animation

A morning mini-bus to Skopje is just about to depart from the Prishtina bus station. At the very last minute before departure, two young men with black rucksacks hop on the bus. After some initial haggling over why on Earth they had to be so late, the driver demands to see their travel documents and bus tickets, after which the men show their brand new Kosovo passports.

Again, at the Kosovo-Macedonian border, the men repeat the same action with some odd combination of satisfaction and defiance. A border police officer takes a quick, uninterested look, then stamps the passports and lets the bus enter Macedonia. The young men, who are exiting Kosovo for the very first time in their lives, can’t help but grin proudly.

In fact, for Kosovars such a smooth, visa-free border-crossing is possible in only five countries: Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Turkey and Haiti (the last one is doubtless not the common destination for Kosovars). Other countries either do not let the citizens of Kosovo enter their territories without a valid visa, or do not recognize their ‘blue’ passports at all (thus not approving their entry whatsoever – Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina being the most quoted examples).

Despite the existence many other more pressing issues, visa liberalization is a never-ending topic of discussion in Kosovo. Accordingly, on April 7, 2011 Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci, as well as a number of the country’s ministers, spoke at a meeting on visa liberalization, notably on the issue of reintegration and repatriation. Both local and international decision makers and NGO representatives were invited.

Mr Thaci called upon Kosovo’s municipal leaders to do their best to facilitate the local repatriation procedures for readmitted persons of Kosovo living illegally across Europe.  Visa liberalization for Kosovo would imply visa-free travel (of up to 90 days) to the Schengen countries. One-quarter of Kosovo’s estimated population of 2 million lives abroad, mostly in Germany, Switzerland and the Nordic countries.

A Question of Priorities?

Although the government is obviously striving to make some progress in terms of gaining visa liberalization, the EU does not seem to be impressed. Not addressing the Kosovo status issue, the EU has recently accepted the role of mediator in a newly launched technical dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo.

The interlocutors from Kosovo civil society organizations perceive that for the EU, Serbia is a higher priority than Kosovo. As a recent study of the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society and Foreign Policy Club (Aiming High: A European Vision for the Dialogue Between Kosovo and Serbia, March 2011) affirms, Kosovo is an unequal partner.

The study argues that while Serbia is a regular contractual partner of the EU, Kosovo is only a “mild EU protectorate” (with executive powers in both ICR/EUSR and EULEX’s hands). “Kosovo custom stamps are recognized by both the UN and all 27 EU member states under the UNSCR Resolution 1244,” explains Engjellushe Morina, Executive Director of the Kosovo Stability Initiative (IKS), “and still, Kosovo exports, thus all goods with Kosovo stamps, are currently being blocked by Serbia and Bosnia.”

Kosovo wants to raise this stamp issue, which is another important problem next to visa liberalization, in CEFTA, which it is currently chairing. The dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo is about to deal with technical issues, such as customs, airspace and cadastre records. There is much local pressure on both governments not to make concessions, and there is also some pressure on the EU to finally show that it is a respectable actor in global politics. It is clear that the dialogue, among other things, must help Kosovo to end its current international isolation.

Life in “a Ghetto”

Unlike its Balkan neighbors, Kosovo remains the only country that has not yet specified where exactly it stands on the path towards EU integration. There is no visa roadmap, no Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), and, needless to say, no EU membership application.

Of all Western Balkan countries, besides Kosovo, only Bosnia and Herzegovina has never submitted a formal membership application. Still, it did sign an SAA (2008) and its citizens have been able to travel visa-free since December 2010. Consequently, not only is Kosovo by far the most isolated country of the Western Balkans and Europe; according to the Forum 2015 and the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society study entitled Living in a Ghetto (2009), it is argued that Kosovo also remains the most isolated country of the world.

The above-mentioned Forum 2015 analysis points out that when it comes to traveling across Europe, Kosovars face more obstacles than any other nation in the Balkans. They remain the most rejected Schengen visa applicants, pay the highest application costs, and encounter many other hurdles due to non-recognition of their travel documents.

Kosovars find this situation extremely difficult because, on the one hand, their primary motivation for traveling do not seem to be tourist visits or work abroad; quite on the contrary, they cite family visits as their main traveling purpose.

On the other hand, the economic situation of many of Kosovo’s impoverished citizens makes it impossible for them to cover the high costs of visa issuance. Consequently, those citizens who are economically better off (and these are a clear minority in Kosovo) also have much better chances of obtaining visas for travel across Europe.

Navigation, without a Roadmap

When in May 2008 the European Union launched a visa liberalization process for the countries of the Western Balkans, it defined a roadmap with a number of criteria every country had to fulfill before being placed on the Schengen White List. As an ESI Discussion Paper notes, things in Kosovo looked much better back in 1991: after the break-up of Yugoslavia, Kosovars could still travel to a few dozen countries without a visa, using their old Yugoslav passports.

Then, in 1999, a UN protectorate was created following the war, which left Kosovars with a choice of either an UNMIK Travel Document (enabling them to travel to only three countries without a visa – Albania, Macedonia and Turkey) or accepting a Yugoslav (later Serbian) passport. The latter was difficult to obtain, since after 1999, most Kosovo archives were transferred to Serbia. Thus, Kosovars had to travel to Belgrade in order to obtain the Yugoslav passport, which they did, because it then enabled them to travel visa-free to approximately 40 countries of the world.

The next turning point happened in August 2008, when Serbia started issuing biometric passports, thus doing its own homework in order to obtain a visa roadmap. According to the ESI paper quoted just above, over 7,000 Kosovars received a Serbian biometric passport, which, after December 19, 2009 (when Serbia was granted a visa-free regime), would enable them to travel to the Schengen countries without a visa.

Going Biometric

Nevertheless, in 2009, it became extremely complicated for the rest of Kosovars to obtain a Serbian passport. In its Proposal from 15 July 2009, the Commission suggests that, until the establishment of a specific ‘Coordination Directorate’ in Belgrade, Serbia should stop issuing biometric passports to Kosovars.

Furthermore, the Commission considers that, “in view of security concerns regarding in particular potential for illegal migration from persons residing in Kosovo and persons whose citizenship certificate has been issued for the territory of Kosovo under UNSCR 1244/99,” the holders of Serbian passports issued by the Coordination Directorate (i.e., citizens of Kosovo) should be excluded from the visa-free regime in Serbia.

Since the EU cannot agree on its status, Kosovo was subsequently put on the Schengen ‘Black List’ (next to Taiwan and the Palestinian Territory). Moreover, no Kosovar can obtain a Serbian (‘red’) passport without traveling to Belgrade, which is a costly and time-consuming matter, since Serbia does not recognize Kosovo IDs or passports.

Eventually, in its 2009 Communication to the European Parliament and the Council (COM 2009, 5343) entitled Kosovo – Fulfilling its European Perspective (in short, Kosovo Study), the Commission put forward a proposal to launch “a visa dialogue with the perspective of visa liberalization” for Kosovo, however refraining from using the terminology it normally used with other Western Balkan countries (such as ‘visa roadmap’).

So where does Kosovo stand today? Exactly where it stood back in 2009: it still has no EU guarantees for a visa-free regime. There is no document in place, be it a roadmap or a ‘comprehensive strategy,’ as some now propose calling it. In fact, as Edon Cana, Secretary General in the Ministry of European Integration of Kosovo, underlines for Balkanalysis.com, it is pure semantics as to how the document is called. The name is irrelevant – what matters is that Kosovo has not yet been offered an official list of criteria.

A Lack of Consensus

A frequent explanation for this is that the EU has no common agreement on Kosovo’s status. While 22 out of 27 EU countries have officially recognized Kosovo, Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia and Romania have refused to do so. Therefore, it is impossible to talk about integrating into the Schengen area a country that is not even recognized as such by all EU member states.

Conversely, the European Commission Liaison Office in Prishtina underlines that the visa facilitation measures should not be overlooked. Pending the entry into force of a possible visa free regime with Kosovo, it is important to focus on how the visa process can be facilitated for some categories of applicants (students, members of civil society organizations, etc.). The EU already has several visa facilitation agreements with countries as diverse as Albania, Ukraine or Moldova. These measures include, for instance, lower visa fees, simplified visa procedures or more scholarships and exchange programs for students and researchers.

In the case of other Western Balkans countries, this was done through visa facilitation agreements. This, the Commission believes, may be difficult to achieve with Kosovo at this stage.

However, a certain degree of visa facilitation could theoretically be achieved in Kosovo as well, on the basis of the Community code on visas. This would involve a formal decision of the relevant Council formations (visa committee) based on the assessment of the Local Schengen Cooperation (LSC) group. This is a group chaired by the European Commission Liaison Office gathering heads of visa offices of the Schengen Embassies/offices.

In the framework of LSC, within the same country/location there should not be any significant discrepancies in the service fee charged to applicants by different Member State consulates; a significant information sharing should occur; and other relevant service fees (such as insurance fees) should also be harmonized. Currently, the visa fee is still €60 for some and €35 for other categories of travelers, and the visa fee waivers don’t apply necessarily to the same categories from one visa office to the other.

In the absence of an official visa roadmap, Kosovo government has taken a number of unilateral steps in order to meet the criteria modeled after those presented to other neighboring countries. In May 2009, the government adopted its own Roadmap for the implementation of criteria for visa liberalization process between the Republic of Kosovo and the European Union.

Furthermore, as Edon Cana from the Ministry of European Integration elaborates, there have been substantial achievements in four roadmap areas: readmission and reintegration of readmitted persons, civil registries and document security, integrated border management (IBM), and fight against corruption and organized crime.”

Readmission Guarantees: A Complicated Process

In June 2010, the Government adopted the Law on Readmission. Under this law, Kosovo has to take back all its citizens who are illegally residing in the EU, as well as other third-country nationals if the member state in question can prove that they came to the EU via Kosovo.

While other Balkan countries had to conclude singular readmission agreements with the EU, in Kosovo’s case, the situation is further complicated by the fact that the country is not recognized by five member states. Therefore, it needs to conclude a series of single bilateral agreements, plus adopt a law that covers the non-recognizers and the countries where Kosovo migrants are a negligent minority.

Apart from adopting the law, Kosovo has so far either concluded or started negotiations on bilateral readmission with a number of European countries. Also, Secretary General Cana adds, Kosovo has revised a mechanism for reintegration of repatriated persons, and has also begun working on improving document security (with the objective of issuing biometric passports).

Of course, a precondition for issuance of biometric passports is that the civil registry and cadastres, taken to Belgrade in the 1998/1999, are properly returned to Kosovo authorities and brought back in order.

“The most challenging issues for the government are certainly in the area of readmission and repatriation, as well as in fighting corruption,” Fatmir Curri, Program Coordinator at Kosovo Civil Society Foundation (KCSF) and one of the key experts on visa liberalization in Kosovo stated for Balkanalysis.com. “The government should have started earlier to deal with all these matters,” adds Curri, avoiding – as does everyone else in Kosovo – speculation about a possible timeframe for the EU’s ‘strategy’ regarding the list of criteria for visa liberalization.

A Special Envoy To Be Appointed?

The last such timeframe was September 2010; when the expectations were not met at that time, citizens became more frustrated, and the government in turn started blaming the EU. Prime Minister Thaci promised to deal with the issue without further delay, if his party, the PDK, won the December 2010 elections.

Accordingly, in civil society circles, rumor has it now that the government is planning to appoint a special Kosovo envoy in Brussels, responsible only for visa liberalization matters. No one seems to understand the logic behind this, given that Kosovo already has a Ministry of European Integration in Prishtina as well as an ambassador in Brussels, who both are in charge of lobbying for visa abolishment. In a report entitled Challenges of Integration, Kosovo NGO Çelnaja assesses that the ministry is in urgent need of further human and financial resources in order to be fully functional.

Economic Woes Fuel Fear of an Exodus

With the estimated unemployment rate at 45% and 2 out of 5 Kosovars living below the poverty line (UNDP Kosovo Human Development Report 2010), Kosovo’s economic prospects do not look rosy at all. “Every second young person (aged 18-25) that is unemployed wants to leave the country,” Lumir Abdixhiku, executive director of the Riinvest Institute, says for Balkanalysis.com. Abdixhiku also notes with concern that Kosovo’s economy has three main drivers: government expenditures, remittances and donor money (financial assistance), none of which counts as an investment.

Having in mind Kosovo’s huge diaspora, remittances from abroad add up to €400 million (roughly 13% of the country’s GDP), which, according to Abdixhiku, will be downsized in the future, given what he calls a ‘third generation’ problem: young Kosovars not feeling as connected to their country as their parents and grandparents were. Therefore, with remittances falling and donors slowly leaving the country, Kosovo’s economic torpor might even worsen.

Turmoil on the Political Scene

Kosovo’s political situation is not bright either. The country experienced significant turmoil with the no-confidence vote for Prime Minister Thaci in November 2010, followed by extraordinary elections of December 2010 that reinstalled the PDK-Thaci-led government.

Thaci himself has been entangled in allegation of organ trafficking, originally mentioned by former Hague Tribunal Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte. The controversial allegations were noted in the December 2010 report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, drafted by the Swiss rapporteur Dick Marty. The allegations, which enraged Kosovars and their ethnic kin from beyond the country, have so far not been substantially confirmed (though Serbia and human-rights advocates have called for an independent investigation. The issue remains a hot topic for ethnic Albanians.

Moreover, the construction-sector billionaire Behgjet Pacolli was – briefly – elected Kosovo’s president in February 2011. However, shortly after that, the Constitutional Court spotted significant irregularities and in March 2011, it annulled the presidential election. Eventually, in April 2011, the Assembly elected Atifete Jahjaga, who formerly held important positions in the Kosovo Police, as Kosovo’s first female president.

The country itself remains divided: as a report by the International Crisis Group has recently argued, the status of Kosovo’s North is an insurmountable issue: Post-Yugoslav Kosovo has never had effective control over the north of Kosovo and Prishtina argues that parallel institutions are in place there, thus presenting a danger of fragmentation of Kosovo sovereignty and a loss of credibility of its governing structures.

Critiques from Civil Society

Despite their often harsh criticism towards the government, Kosovo civil society representatives all agree that the main problem is the lack of political will within the EU as a whole, as well as the fact that it is undergoing a learning process based on the mistakes made in other Western Balkan countries. As Krenar Gashi, executive director of one of Kosovo’s most influential think tanks, KIPRED tells Balkanalysis.com, the EU seems to be acting too carefully and too strictly on Kosovo.

Europe’s Migration Fears

Is this really so? And if yes, then why? The EU and some member state officials often quote two explanations in this context. The first argument is the current political and economic situation of Kosovo as described, which fuels the perception among citizens that migration is a sheer necessity.

With the picture of Kosovo painted in such a pessimistic way, one should make an effort to try to understand the positions of certain member states such as Germany or Sweden (which, by the way, actually did recognize Kosovo) and their fear of further migratory influxes.

Kosovo authorities often claim that many Kosovo passport holders living in these countries are in fact not Kosovars: during the war years, they are said to have sought asylum as Kosovars because it was easiest for them to migrate to such places. In the meantime, it is argued, these asylum-seeking citizens have created an artificial number of Kosovo diaspora and a negative reputation for the country.

The European Commission, and also several civil society representatives from Kosovo, reject this argument however, since it is now impossible to prove who really was, and who was only pretending to be a Kosovo Albanian back in the 1990s.

Immigration Arguments and a Multiple Influx

Germany and Sweden, along with Switzerland, host the largest numbers of immigrants from Kosovo. Prishtina tends to argue that “there are only 2 million Kosovars; 500,000 live abroad already, so everyone who wanted to leave has already left.” The government also argues that “if the EU opens the borders, and even if all 2 million people leave, it is nothing compared to all those migrants from Romania or Bulgaria.”

Nevertheless, these arguments seem plausible only to Kosovars. The EU member states affected have every right to reconsider their immigration policies. The influxes they receive on a daily basis do not stem only from Kosovo: with the present conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, the general situation regarding illegal migrants and asylum seekers coming to the EU has a clear potential to become aggravated.

However, the EU’s oft-cited dilemma is that if it wants to be a credible global player, it must not allow internal policies of its single member states to affect its common foreign policy.

Also, there is a common view, as stated by a former ICO official in Kosovo, who contends that visa liberalization would open the way to more illegal work despite the fact it would only allow citizens to travel up to 90 days. The Kosovo authorities respond that whoever extends their stay in the EU beyond 90 days can be easily identified and legally punished.

In line with that, the second argument for why the EU might be or should be wary about integrating Kosovo is the fact that it has no common stance on the country’s status. However, there is a powerful counterargument coming from the EU itself. As the 2009 Commission Kosovo Study emphasizes, “…the approach of diversity on recognition, but unity in engagement provides a constructive basis for progress. In line with Council conclusions, the EU can agree on measures to support Kosovo’s political and economic development without prejudice to EU Member States’ positions on status.”

As already mentioned above, the lack of a common standpoint is a frequent excuse that is not really substantial, since in practice, the non-recognizers are not the ones posing real obstacles to Kosovo’s citizens.

Director of Celnaja Jeton Zulfaj agrees with the current view in Prishtina. He does not believe that the real problem with Kosovo visa liberalization lies in the five non-recognizing EU member states.  Speaking for Balkanalysis.com, Zulfaj cited the cases of Greece and Slovakia. Despite the fact that these two countries have failed to recognize Kosovo, Kosovo’s citizens actually tend to not encounter major difficulties visiting these states, provided they have a valid visa. Thus Greece and Slovakia, and occasionally also Spain, de facto recognize Kosovo passports.

Conclusions

Having all this in mind, let us return to the initial question: Should the EU be Kosovo’s John Wayne? The (mostly unilateral) efforts of the government to prove that Kosovo indeed deserves the roadmap are uncontested, even though at times they lack coordination or coherence.

On the other hand, Kosovo’s tough economic situation makes it very difficult for certain member states to consent to a launch of visa dialogue with Kosovo. However, that should not necessarily prevent the EU from speaking with a single voice in the framework of the common foreign policy, as it itself has already suggested, in the famous 2009 Kosovo Study.

The dialogue of Kosovo with Serbia might serve as a good start for both parties to finally normalize their relations and for Kosovo to exit its years-long isolation, and to forget the frustration over what it perceives as a massive injustice. The EU should give us any kind of criteria and tests it wants, argue both the authorities and civil society in Prishtina. But both are unequivocal that the EU needs to finally present Kosovo with the list. Kosovars can’t know what to do if there is no criteria, after all.

Put differently, if Kosovo was Natalie Wood from “The Searchers,” it would not want to be carried home by John Wayne. It would just request a small piece of paper with some directions on how to get there on its own.

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Editor’s note: A string of high-profile incidents, such as vocal opposition to the EU’s nomination of Romanian Col. Marian Petre to head a special police unit in Kosovo, indicate an increasingly assertive attitude from Kosovar politicians, media and other public figures towards the EULEX mission. Operating conditions for a once lauded law-and-order mission thus seem to be worsening as public dissatisfaction grows and politicized legal challenges loom.

………..………….

By Anita McKinna in Prishtina*

On April 18, a story broke in the Kosovo media: the EULEX security chief, Stefan Loren, had been suspended, allegedly due to ‘racist’ behavior towards his Albanian colleagues, while three other officers had been reassigned. EULEX described the dismissal and staff transfers as being due to ‘security concerns.’

The story gained big headlines in Kosovo’s media and was also reported by foreign sources, most of which (like RFE/RL) did not report the identity of the Close Protection Unit staffer involved. But Kosovar groups like The Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms were quick to describe Loren’s alleged actions as being ‘pure racism’ and declared that it was a further insult to the Albanian people to regard it as a security issue. It announced that ‘racism is a serious criminal offence and is not an administrative violation.’ And the Kosovo Omsbudperson, Sami Kurteshi, went so far as to say that the state should ‘reconsider’ its relationship with EULEX if the charges are confirmed, reported KosPress.

On the same day that the story about the EULEX employee’s dismissal was making headlines in the local press, EULEX also announced that it was not within its responsibility to oversee the return of local prosecutors and judges to the courthouse in north Mitrovica, but rather that this is a political issue to be resolved in dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade.

EULEX Steps Back from Mitrovica Issue

This announcement may have implications for both the future of Kosovo and for the role of the international presence there, as it suggests that the EU mission is not capable of promoting the rule of law throughout the whole of Kosovo. It also contradicts EULEX’s previous statements, which in fact claim responsibility for resolving this issue. In July 2010, EULEX chief Yves de Kermabon described the re-opening of the courthouse as being ‘a matter of urgency and of basic human rights’ and that ‘EULEX will continue to work hard to achieve this goal.’

Speaking for Balkanalysis.com, Krenar Gashi, head of local think-tank KIPRED, noted that it is ‘too much of a coincidence’ that the scandal over the sacked EULEX employee, as well as a volley of EULEX press releases about the outcome of other EULEX cases, came during the same week as the announcement about the north Mitrovica courthouse. Gashi believes this is the bigger scandal.

Fighting Crime: A Lack of Results

For Kosovars, the announcement from EULEX abdicating responsibility for the courthouse situation seemed just the latest in a line of unfulfilled promises made by the EU law-and-order mission. It has also repeatedly promised that ‘big fish’ would be caught in its fight against corruption. Last summer, when transport minister Fatmir Limaj’s office and home were spectacularly raided by police, it seemed as though such a promise was about to be delivered. But nothing came of it- neither any announcements about the progress of the investigation, nor further arrests. Mr Limaj has used the lack of action from EULEX to take the offensive, recently accusing it of tarnishing Brussel’s image by making baseless accusations.

More damage to EULEX’s image came when it was recently revealed that after last July’s high-profile arrest (complete with live media coverage) of the Governor of the Central Bank, the charges against him were largely based on flimsy evidence, such as anonymous letters. For many, these failures are examples of EULEX’s ineptitude. A recent article in The Guardian – penned by Andrea Capussela, another recently fired EULEX officer – described the European mission as ‘a shining example of incompetence.’

According to the author, the groundbreaking (and costly, at 100 million euros per year) EU civilian mission – created ‘to prove the possibility of an effective common foreign policy’ for the Union – is instead being undermined by ‘incompetence, weak management and possibly even disloyalty to the mission’s mandate.’

Destabilization Fears?

Some Kosovars believe that the truth is much more sinister, and that EULEX is in fact not interested in tackling corruption in a meaningful way, because that would mean destabilization of Kosovo’s political structures. Speaking for Balkanalysis.com, Yll Hoxha, Executive Director of the Foreign Policy Club, adds that EULEX is ‘focused only on PR shows, not results.’ He believes that EULEX is tackling cases selectively and deliberately ignoring concerns about the conduct of Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi’s government. Hoxha laments this lack of action and states that ‘nobody is interested in destabilizing society.’

For his part, Mr Gashi is not surprised that EULEX is more focused on PR than results in tackling corruption. He believes that the way the EU mission is structured (with the vast majority of its staff being police rather than prosecutors and judges) makes it obvious that EULEX’s priority is to keep the peace, not tackle corruption.

For Ramadan Ilazi, head of the FOL (Speak Up) Movement, such a lack of results is having a negative effect on people’s perceptions of corruption in Kosovo. Ilazi asserted for Balkanalysis.com that, if corruption is as widespread as EULEX says it is, then it ‘should not be difficult’ to find evidence of that corruption. The lack of results so far leads people to think that if EULEX cannot find evidence, then corruption must not exist. For Ilazi this is evidence of the destructive role that EULEX is playing.

Several years ago, when the EULEX mission optimistically commenced operations, it made concerted efforts to distance itself from its deeply unpopular predecessor, UNMIK. But a lack of meaningful results in tackling corruption and the decision to distance itself from the issue of the north Mitrovica court, coupled with the recent arrests of ex-KLA members on war crimes charges (including Fatmir Limaj) has led many Kosovars to fear that EULEX may well exceed UNMIK in terms of its unpopularity.

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By Matteo Albertini in Milan

In the three-plus years since the February 2008 declaration of independence in Kosovo – where over 90 percent of the population is at least nominally Muslim – the Vatican has sought to increase its presence, and now in more and more overt ways.

Despite the fact that barely 5 percent of Kosovo’s population is Catholic, the Vatican is now going beyond its initial activities (formerly limited to bolstering the existing presence of Catholicism), as it perceives a strategic interest in attempting to convert Kosovar Muslims. Although the Vatican is not alone in this pursuit (chiefly American Evangelical organizations, among other Christian and Muslim groups, are also found in Kosovo), it does constitute the single most powerful external religious institution active in the country.

The Holy See’s activities in Kosovo include increasing official personnel liaisons, erecting public buildings and operating religious educational institutions. Somewhat provocatively, these have included the construction of new schools in historically Islamic regions, like the southwestern region around Prizren, and proselytizing Muslims.

Symbolic Constructions

However, the most ambitious and expensive project to date has been the construction of a brand new Cathedral in Prishtina, dedicated to the “Blessed Mother Teresa,” the famous Catholic nun of Calcutta, who was born in neighboring Skopje, Macedonia, in an Albanian family. The Cathedral was inaugurated on September 5, 2010 by Kosovo’s former president, Fatmir Sejdiu; the day also marked the 13th anniversary of the death of Mother Teresa. Due to her worldwide prominence and relevance as a symbol of Catholicism, the late nun was put on the fast-track to sainthood, being beatified on October 19, 2003. (At present, she is one declared miracle away from becoming officially named as a saint).

At the inauguration, the president praised the building as a symbol of religious tolerance in the world’s newest country, which has been marked by a persisting struggle between Albanian Muslims and the Orthodox Serbian minority. In the past, this struggle has frequently involved attacks on religious structures, including vandalism of churches, mosques and cemeteries. However, Albanians of either Muslim or Catholic background have generally had good relations with each other due to a strong feeling of shared ethnic nationalism over religion.

Among the general population, the construction of the Prishtina cathedral has not only been accepted but encouraged: few Kosovo inhabitants seriously objected to the construction of the new cathedral of “Blessed Theresa of Calcutta,” even though it was built on an area previously suggested as a potential site for a new (and more needed) high school in Prishtina.

However, some protest has come from Muslim organizations, who have claimed that Catholics are benefiting from preferential treatment by the authorities, allegedly seeking to emphasis Kosovo’s links with the largely Christian EU.

Allies and Identities

To a certain extent, this is true: despite the relatively low percentage of Catholic Albanians in Kosovo, the government is looking to the Roman Catholic Church as a potential and powerful ally in its struggle to gain complete international recognition. The building of the Prishtina cathedral thus represents a gesture of gratitude for what significant actors from Catholic-majority countries have done for Kosovo in recent years.

However, it must also be remembered that religious faith has been for decades the principal way (along with language) by which contrasting Albanian and Serbian identities have been forged: being Orthodox has inevitably always meant being part of the Serbian ethnic group, while being Muslim has generally implied being Albanian. Disputes over religious sites and places of worship have been frequent during the war and the period of post-war international administration, and have by no means been cleared up in today’s Kosovo.

As Jahja Dracolli, professor of History at University of Prishtina pointed out in a recent interview, “religious places have always been part of shifting power balance between religions as well ethnicities in these areas.” This is the reason why, as an example, Kosovo’s territory is studded with soldiers’ and refugees’ cemeteries: “we died here, this country is ours.”

Raising Rome’s Profile: A New Appointment

Although the Catholic minority of Kosovo comprises only around 5 percent of the population, in the last few years the Church has experienced a resurgence, and has registered an increasing number of conversions, in conjunction with renewed interest from the Holy See and its official members.

Evidence of this interest came two months ago, on February 10, when the Vatican commissioned for the first time an apostolic delegate to Kosovo: the present Nuncio in Slovenia, Juliusz Janusz. This decision seemed to indicate a primary change in Vatican diplomacy towards Kosovo: since 1999, the Holy See pursued a “low profile” position, aimed only at guaranteeing its presence in the few Catholic-inhabited areas, such as Gjakove in the west, or the surroundings of Prizren. This approach was in sharp contrast to the activist role the Vatican took in Slovenia and Croatia starting in January 1992.

Coherently with this resolution, the Holy See did not recognize the independence of Kosovo in 2008, and also did not send a diplomatic representative to the country. As Federico Lombardi, Director of Radio Vaticana, said on that occasion, “the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo creates a new situation which obviously will be followed with great attention from the Holy See… But an this moment the Holy See feels first of all the responsibility of its moral and spiritual mission, concerning also peace and good behavior in relationship between nations.”

Vatican Diplomacy- Taking Considerations for the Serbian Orthodox Church

This position became necessary in order to not irritate the Serbian Orthodox Church, which is strongly opposed to the independence of Kosovo, as it would deprive Serbia of its more ancient monasteries (such as Dečani, Gračanica and the Peć Patriarchate).

More recently, in an interview with the Catholic news agency Kathpres on April 13, 2010, Cardinal Walter Kasper – president of the Council for the promotion of Christian unity – explicitly confirmed the position of the Catholic Church on Kosovo: “we, of course, know that Kosovo is a heavy wound and pain for the SPC [Serbian Orthodox Church]. We also know that it is the cradle and center of Serbian Orthodoxy in Kosovo. We understand that and wish to have consideration for it.”

Therefore, the nomination of a new apostolic delegate to Kosovo needed to be followed by a note clarifying that “the mission of an apostolic delegate is not of a diplomatic nature but it responds to the requirement to meet in an adequate way the pastoral needs of the Catholic faithful.” The note added that the appointment of Janusz does not mean a change of relations between the Holy See and the Kosovo state. This declaration was clearly directed to the Serbian Orthodox Church, in order not to compromise the sound relations between the two churches.

Meet the Nuncio

Juliusz Janusz, the newly appointed apostolic delegate for Kosovo, is currently serving as Papal Nuncio to Slovenia. Rather than as a specialist in Balkan matters, Monseigner Janusz might be described as the Vatican’s expert in complex situations.

On 25 March 1995, he was nominated Nuncio for Rwanda, where the Catholic hierarchy had been accused of protecting and helping war criminals. At the time, he repeatedly refused to consider persecuting – or even discuss – the responsibilities of many bishops alleged to have endorsed massacres against the Tutsi during the civil war in Rwanda. Later, on 26 September 1998, Monseigner Janusz was appointed as Nuncio for Mozambique- a key country in the diplomacy of the Holy See.

In Mozambique, the negotiations between the socialist Frelimo party and anti-communist Renamo party (supported by Rhodesia and South Africa), were conducted with the central mediation of the Community of Saint Egidio, an official Catholic community. Nuncio Janusz has long worked with the Community of Saint Egidio, which has extensive operations in Kosovo. In general, he is considered to be a great diplomat, and has certainly acquired experience confronting more difficult situations than Kosovo should prove to be.

The Target Market- Kosovar Muslims

Excepting for the concern to not inflame Serbian Orthodox feelings, the interests of the Holy See in Kosovo are at present directed less at the Serbian minority than at the country’s Muslims. In 2008, Pope Benedict XVI launched his campaign to “find the Christian roots of Europe,” starting a wider project of evangelization.

Since then, the ethnic Albanian Catholic bishop of Kosovo, Dodë Gjergji, has concentrated mainly on conversion of Muslims to the Catholic faith. During a convention of the European Democratic Party in Brussels in April 2008, Gjergji stated that as Kosovo is increasingly looking to the European Union and the Vatican for support against Serbia, there is a need for a new “cultural baptism” of the county.

Previous to his promotion to the status of bishop, the Kosovo-born Gjergji had served as the Apostolic Administrator of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Sapë in neighboring Albania, from 2000-2005. The following year he was named bishop of the Diocese of Prizren in Kosovo. Interestingly, the bishop had earlier begun his career in the priesthood in Skopje, Macedonia during the late Yugoslav period in 1989.

Conversion Trends

The absence of a multinational Muslim hierarchy of similar strength, along with the substantial laity of Kosovar Islam, might allow the Catholic Church to “occupy” some sectors of social and cultural life in which the state is highly deficient: these include social assistance, education, and communitarian events.

The resurgence of Catholic organizations and schools in Kosovo is often justified by the renewing of a well-known tradition among Albanians, usually referred to as “Christians in hiding” or “Crypto-Christian” or, in the Albanian language, laraman (meaning “two-colored”). The indication meant is that the people thus referenced converted to Islam centuries ago because of the advantages granted by being Muslim in the Turkish millet system of governance, but maintained non-Islamic practices at home.

In an interview for The Economist published on December 30, 2008, Dracolli underlined that “religion has always been secondary” to being Albanian: he said that converts want to “return to the old religion they believed they had” to demonstrate they are part of “the Euro-American trend.”

Although arguable – the fact that Albanian were Catholic five centuries ago does not explain why their descendants would decide to go back from the Islamic to the Catholic faith – this consideration resembles the justification frequently made by new converts. As recalled in a Reuters report from September 28, 2008, and discussed independently in a previous Balkanalysis.com field report, many Albanian converts said that they had chosen the Catholic faith because Western countries do not like Muslims, while they also seek support, protection and investments from the West.

This is a crucial point in the willingness of converting, and shows how the “crypto-catholic” route is partly an “invented tradition”- good for justifying the need of an “identity baptism” more than a “cultural baptism.”

The boost of conversions enjoyed by the Catholic Church in today’s Kosovo is however not just dependant on the possibility of becoming part of a “Western” world, or a member of a religious family seen to be less disliked than Islam; it but can show the efficiency and the capillarity of the social-humanitarian Catholic machine.

Seeking help for their economic and social problems, Muslim families have sometimes found no aid from the Islamic communities (some of them blamed as “extremist” or “fundamentalist”)- and were forced to turn towards Catholic organizations. Through them they have received help, and accepted to convert to Catholicism because that religion could answer basic needs, ranging from health and hygiene to education.

From this point of view, conversions in Kosovo show as religion can be primarily a rational or economic choice, and not just a cultural/symbolic one. However, there’s more beneath the surface: as pointed out by a recent article from Avvenire, an Italian, Catholic-oriented newspaper, relations between Catholic and Muslim in everyday life are not as smooth as they might seem at official levels: for one example, inter-faith marriages are still deeply reprimanded in many families. Thus, the increasing rate of conversions to the Catholic faith could lead to deeper struggles inside Kosovar society in the future.

The Vatican in Kosovo: A More Active Role in Future?

Indeed, an increasing tendency towards attempting conversions will guarantee that the Catholic Church, and thus the Vatican, will have a deeper involvement in Kosovo affairs, with all of the implications this entails.

The Vatican’s readiness to take a role was formally expressed by the appointment of Nuncio Janusz as apostolic delegate: even if it is not a proper diplomatic recognition, it shows the growing interest of the Vatican towards Kosovo, which may lead, in the not-so-distant future, to a significant change in behavior between the Holy See and the Kosovo government.

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By Anita McKinna

The election of a man as president who has spent most of his life outside Kosovo, and who is married to a Russian, has met with questionable support amongst Kosovo’s Albanian population.

Behgjet Pacolli’s New Alliance for Kosovo (AKR) party won only 8% of the vote in December’s elections, barely even clearing the 5% threshold required for gaining seats in parliament. And the voting process for the presidency itself revealed hostility to Pacolli’s election, with opposition MPs boycotting the voting session and Hashim Thaçi having to summon his MPs to a meeting after the second round of voting, when initially 11 of his PDK MPs voted against Pacolli.

The final result was more favourable for both Thaçi and Pacolli, but Assembly Speaker Jakup Krasniqi declared that Thaçi’s mid-session meeting was unconstitutional, and went so far as to say that the solution had only been reached ‘with votes under pressure.’ Even Thaçi’s deputy, Fatmir Limaj, voiced his disapproval and declared that ‘tonight the worst possible solution was made.’ Opposition to the appointment too has been voiced by KLA veterans’ and civil society groups.

Objections within Kosovo are largely based on Pacolli’s close business connections with Russia. His Mabetex construction company has won lucrative state contracts in Russia and other former-Soviet countries, and it has been said that Pacolli’s continued business success relies on such contracts.

These strong connections have raised questions as to Pacolli’s true allegiances, especially given that Russia has so strongly opposed Kosovo’s independence and supported Serbia’s right to retain Kosovo inside its borders. Media within Kosovo has subsequently described Pacolli as the ‘Trojan horse of Russia.’

Yet despite misgivings about Pacolli’s legitimacy as Kosovo’s president amongst Kosovo’s Albanians, his election could serve to turn the tide in Kosovo’s favor in the international arena. During December’s election, Pacolli promised to accelerate and open doors of membership in international organizations and to prioritize new recognitions of Kosovo’s independence, which would boost Kosovo’s international profile.

Election promises aside, Pacolli also has an impressive record in lobbying countries to recognize Kosovo. He has taken credit for the recognition of 25 countries- and has thus been somewhat more successful so far than those within Kosovo’s government.

There are also voices in Belgrade who approve of Pacolli as president, which could prove to be an important starting point for improving relations between Kosovo and Serbia. This improvement in turn could prompt more countries to recognize Kosovo’s independence and increase the confidence of potential international investors in Kosovo.

Pacolli’s election as president comes at a time when Kosovo’s reputation in the international arena has been tarnished by persistent allegations of organ trafficking, allegedly carried out by members of the KLA during the 1999 war. Prime Minister Thaçi in particular has been implicated. Positive moves in terms of improving relations between Serbia and Kosovo would certainly help Kosovo’s international reputation.

One issue that could prove to be a sticking point for the international community is allegations that Pacolli participated in money laundering and corruption in Russia, as well as his alleged mafia connections inside Kosovo. This issue is particularly important for the EULEX rule of law mission and its goal of improving Kosovo’s weak justice system, especially in light of the high-profile organ-trafficking scandal.

Pacolli and his Mabetex company were investigated in 2001 but no charges were filed, and all investigations were eventually dropped. Western diplomats in Pristina have unofficially voiced concerns over Pacolli’s business dealings, but so far no one has publicly aired their concerns.

The importance of the rule of law in Kosovo has, however, been highlighted. In his first meeting with the new president, head of EULEX Xavier de Mahnac emphasized this point and asserted that ‘I came here to reassure the President that EULEX is dedicated to promote the rule of law all over Kosovo.’ EU Commissioners Catherine Ashton and Štefan Füle also declared in light of the presidential election that ‘we count on the new government to tackle its reform priorities, in particular, to… enhance the rule of law.’

So far, Behgjet Pacolli has indicated that he intends to toe the line of the international administration and has recited its mantra of multi-ethnicity; public statements by representatives of the ICO and EULEX in relation to his new role have thus been positive. If he can preserve these good relations with the internationals, and make peace with rival political factions within Kosovo, Pacolli’s election as president could well open international doors for Kosovo.

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By Chris Deliso in Skopje

The currently fractious political situation in Pristina may be resolved with new parliamentary elections as early as this coming February (but not during 2010) the country’s acting president, Jakup Krasniqi has stated. The acting president made the announcement after meeting with leaders of Kosovo political parties officially represented in parliament.

Kosovo has been affected by the September 27^th resignation of its president, Fatmir Sejdiu. He quit after Kosovo’s Constitutional Court ruled that he could not simultaneously be both the national president and the head of a political party- in his case, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). The Economist recently noted that Sejdiu quit at the present moment because he may have aspirations to run against Thaci to be the next premier, since the position is more powerful than that of the presidency.

Although the parties reportedly differ over the actual ideal date for any elections, Pristina newspaper Koha Ditore cited Krasniqi as stating that Kosovo’s new assembly, its president, and the national president will be decided by March 28, 2011.

The acting president and the parties, it was also reported, seek to honor Kosovo’s Law on General Elections and the constitution, though some parties would like to see an early or mid-February vote and others would like to hold off until March. Nevertheless, in any case the Central Election Commission will have to be consulted as well. Krasniqi maintained that the CEC would prefer a date in early February. Now it remains only for next year’s budget to be decided, Koha Ditore also reported, for parliament to be dissolved. Kosovo’s international viceroy, Pieter Feith of the ICO, has also attested that dissolution is planned before year’s end.

Political pundits have begun expressing predictions for possible future coalitions. In one scenario, writes Pristina’s Zeri, the usually antagonistic Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) of Prime Minister Hashim Thaci and the currently opposition Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) could join forces to make a ‘national unity’ government. Thaci has recently held a positive meeting with AAK leaders. Government spokesman Memli Krasniqi claims that PDK desires to put the interests of the citizens “above its own,” reports Zeri.

One uniting factor at the moment, which would play to Albanian nationalism, is the public’s strong reaction to the upcoming retrial of AAK leader Ramush Haradinaj by the Hague Tribunal (felt as far away as Tetovo in Macedonia, where the ostensibly apolitical Islamic Community of Macedonia organized a protest on 6 October). During the 1999 NATO bombardment, Haradinaj was KLA military leader and Thaci its political one. This close cooperation ended however after the war, when both sought careers in politics.

The Hague charged Haradinaj, then prime minister of war crimes in 2005, but acquitted the “war hero” in 2007. However, the prosecution won in its appeal to retry him on two counts. Haradinaj’s request for provisional release was denied on September 11th, after the court ruled that doing so “would pose a danger to witnesses and to the integrity of the retrial,” according to Southeast European Times.

Quoting the ICTY, the SET adds that Haradinaj now stands accused of participating “…in a joint criminal enterprise aimed at asserting full control in the KLA operational zone of Dukagjin, which allegedly was carried out by the unlawful removal and mistreatment of Serb civilians, Kosovar Albanians, Kosovar Roma and other civilians, who were, or were perceived to have been, collaborating with Serb forces or not supporting the KLA.”

Even though AAK member Margarita Kadriu stated for the media that Haradinaj’s “lack of presence” is a blow for Kosovo at an important moment in its state-building progress, he may even become more “present” as a result of his absence.

Various explanations have been given for the idea of why a “national unity” government coalition between rival parties might be envisioned. In one of the more interesting, Zeri cited political analyst Avni Zogiani as averring that PDK and the AAK will unite because the US wants a stronger and all-inclusive coalition to help force the restive Serb minority of the north to fall into line and accept Pristina rule.

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By Christopher Deliso*

Despite several recent reports suggesting that radical Islam in Kosovo no longer represents a significant security threat, the beating of a prominent Albanian imam by Drenica-area Wahhabi Muslims indicates that the challenge within the Muslim community €šÃ„ì the real target of the foreign-funded extremists €šÃ„ì persists. The disproportional yet unexplained influence of these extremists in the fledgling state’s judicial and law enforcement institutions, cited by Islamic Community officials themselves, represents a challenge for the EU’s nascent law-and-order mission, EULEX.

The Latest Incident

On 12 January, Radio-Television Kosova (RTK) reported that Mullah Osman Musliu, chairman of the Islamic Community in Drenas in central Kosovo had been attacked and beaten by nine Wahhabi extremists. These men were arrested, though four were soon released. The other five remain in police custody.

The imam was reportedly a major funder of the former Kosovo Liberation Army that fought Yugoslav security forces throughout the late 1990s. The area involved, and indeed the whole Drenica region, was a hotbed for ethnic Albanian nationalism during the war. Indeed, considering that extremist impulses anywhere can be redirected according to the goal at hand, it is not surprising that the major foreign Muslim donors and lending institutions sought to strengthen their position here from the beginning.

According to a transcript, the incident occurred when Musliu visited a mosque in the village of Zabel in order to elect a new local imam. Across the Balkans, religious-based violence has often centered on issue of candidates for such positions, with the Wahhabis often disagreeing, violently so, with the candidate supported by the mainstream Islamic community. Along with ideology, control over Islamic Community funds and properties is often the main reason for dispute.

The attack on Musliu represented the second time in recent months in which Islamic Community members were attacked by extremists, who take their inspiration, and funding, from the austere Wahhabi sect of Islam, official state religion of Saudi Arabia. This and other Muslim states were leading donors to post-war Kosovo, building hundreds of mosques in the process, though their contributions are said to have dried up considerably due to much of the population’s disinterest in Islamic activities. Following Kosovo’s independence declaration in February of 2008, the reticence of many Muslim states to recognize this status led to widespread speculation that an element of revenge was justly playing out.

Calling the attack against him “an attack against the institution,” Musliu added: “this was not an accident. This was well-organized. Everyone involved in that attack passed at least by two mosques to come and pray in the mosque I was in,” according to the RTK transcript. Identifying his attackers as known extremists from the villages of Gllobar, Krajsmirovc, Nekoc, Preteshtica, and Llapushnik, the imam summed it up thus: “all the bearded-men of Drenica were involved in this attack.” Also condemning the attack was Kosovo’s Islamic Community representative, Resul Rexhepi.

A Question of Internal Influence?

A very interesting detail that emerged from this event was Musliu’s comment that authorities should react- “€šÃ„¶if they are not scared, because there is no security for our judges and police,” reported RTK. Rexhepi echoed this concern by stating that he wanted “to believe in the justice of our authorities.”

Considering that the number of radical Islamists among Kosovo’s Albanian population is relatively small, and that their appeal has been successfully repelled by secular consumerism and increasingly, Catholic conversion, the question of intimidation and other hostile tactics being exerted on judiciary and law enforcement officials in Kosovo becomes more acute. If the forces of radical Islam are indeed weak, then what could possibly inspire fear among such officials?

In the author’s past interviews with numerous American and European security professionals in Kosovo, the issue of intimidation of local authorities and the locals in general has been cited. Most significant, however, was a report that mid- to upper-level judicial appointments in certain regions of Kosovo, as well as other civil sector positions, were being given to fundamentalist sympathizers. If such practices are continuing, the European Union may encounter friction in the operations of its new judicial oversight security body, EULEX.

The 1,900-strong law-and-order component of the EU civilian mission replacing the long-running UN mission in Kosovo, EULEX will provide foreign judges to hear cases together with local judges, ideally, enhancing the latter’s professionalism and local validity, while taking some of the pressure off of them in controversial cases.

According to a senior representative, EULEX also contains a 35-person counterterrorism unit, of which two or three will be Americans. (A few American judges are also slated to be in the mix there, though EULEX primarily draws on nationals of EU countries, plus Croatia, Turkey, Switzerland and Norway). A more concentrated and capable security unit will indeed be a welcome improvement on the UNMIK’s often shoddy efforts. Nevertheless, the disorganized and competitive nature of intelligence-gathering between in Kosovo will remain, with important countries continuing to run their own operations from ever-larger and more sophisticated diplomatic headquarters, and NATO forces continuing to operate their own.

Owing to its all-pervasive former role, UNMIK was frequently scapegoated by locals of different ethnicities in Kosovo. However, the EU claims that its own new venture will be a €šÃ„òtechnical€šÃ„ô mission only, thus giving local authorities more responsibilities and control. This also means that pressure on law enforcement and the judiciary from €šÃ„òpressure groups€šÃ„ô such as Islamic radicals and organized crime syndicates will increasingly target local institutions, rather than foreign ones, though this pressure may well be exerted subtly, and in ways invisible to the casual outside observer.

To keep abreast of the situation, the EULEX will thus depend largely on the relative capabilities and testimony of its own on-site local judicial (and other) advisors. Their objectivity and the character of local pressures they endure will play important roles in the quality and quantity of information they receive. As with all other issues, that of fundamentalist Islam will be influenced by this test.

Foreign Support Continues

On December 30, 2008, Croatia’s Javno reported that a Kosovo Helsinki Committee study recently came to the “shocking revelation” that local Wahhabi leaders have been receiving “millions of euros” from Austria and other European countries, and that these funds are being used to pay Kosovo Muslims around 200 euros monthly to adopt the mores of Wahhabism. Of course, this is neither shocking, nor much of a revelation, considering that it has been standard procedure for foreign Islamic funders ever since NATO dislodged Yugoslav governance of the province in 1999.

The central role of Austria as a hub for Wahhabism in Europe dates back to the Bosnian conflict in the early 1990s, when it was the base for the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), a major al Qaeda funding conduit for the Bosnian mujahedin. During the war, it laundered approximately $2.5 billion for the Bosnian Muslim government of President Alija Izetbegovic.

The agency had been opened in Vienna in February 1987, by a Sudanese doctor and jihad apologist, Fatih al-Hasanayn. As former NSA analyst John R. Schindler wrote in his engrossing study Unholy Terror, “no person can claim greater responsibility for the achievements of the Bosnian jihad [than al-Hasanayn]€šÃ„¶ who handled the Muslim money that was the lifeblood of Sarajevo’s war effort.” Calling the Austrian capital a “spy’s paradise,” Schindler notes that the state police there “had a well-deserved reputation as a security service that looked the other way, particularly if the questionable activities were aimed outside Austria.”

After the Bosnian war, and especially after September 11, 2001, much effort was made by Western governments to dislodge radical Islamic networks and agencies such as the TWRA in Europe’s capitals. However, the foundations such groups established have survived in immigrant communities centered around radical mosques in places like Vienna and Graz, as well as cities in Germany and northern Italy, as Balkanalysis.com has reported. Although much reduced in financial strength and overall reach, these groups continue to operate in some capacity and tend to be the ones with most links to the Balkans, chiefly through the Bosnian, Albanian and small Macedonian Muslim diaspora communities. Two intelligence documents from Western European security services, recently reviewed by Balkanalysis.com, harmonize with open-source information indicating the continued importance of Austria as the main intermediary for disseminating funds and propaganda from foreign Wahhabi sponsors to the Balkans.

Fluid Alliances?

In the Croatian article, one Kosovar imam in particular is cited as responsible for the growth of radical Islam- Shefqet Krasniqi, “the only [imam] who can attract more than ten thousand believers to his prayers.” The article provides an image of this Albanian preacher at one of his gatherings). Krasniqi denies being a radical, and accuses Kosovar leaders of having €šÃ„òstrayed from their faith.€šÃ„ô

As Balkanalysis.com reported in October 2008, the Vatican’s increasing (if subtle) attempts to convert as many Albanians as possible €šÃ„òback€šÃ„ô to Catholicism are bound to inspire fierce opposition from the most committed among Kosovo’s Islamists. Thus, even if the total number of the latter is relatively few, their future reactions may become more extreme as Catholic efforts become more aggressive.

Nevertheless, Catholicism as a social mobility option has its rivals. And, for Kosovars, it seems almost as if a bidding war for their loyalties is on. In the Croatian report, Besqim Hisari, head of the Kosovo Helsinki Committee is quoted as saying that “€šÃ„¶you can only imagine how easy it is to get people to be recruited. The Wahhabists perfidiously exploited the difficult situation in Kosovo. And once they get the taste of the money, all these people will, without doubt, identify themselves with Wahhabism.”

This frank admission of pecuniary motive contrasts with depictions of Kosovars given in articles such as a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed touting Kosovo as a “model of tolerance.” According to pieces such as this one, the Kosovars are not dangerous Muslims, because they are hardly Muslim at all, and undyingly pro-American (plus, in a creative new addition to the national brand, they are apparently great admirers of Israel as well).

Nevertheless, as is the case elsewhere in the Balkans, the people of Kosovo are motivated primarily by perceived self-interest. Were America to change its foreign policy on Kosovo, such a change could not fail to register in various ways among large segments of the population.

There are instructive examples. Take Germany, which has gone to great lengths to earn its highly positive perception amongst Kosovo Albanians. Nevertheless, the arrest of three alleged BND officials at a bombing site in Pristina in November 2008 spread suspicion and doubts amidst a rumor-prone populace. The event quickly died down, but if misused by the (politically controlled) local media, could have resulted in demonstrations or worse. (The power of sensationalist media to marshal street mobs was vividly attested during the March 2004 riots, which targeted Serbs across the province).

Of course, change we can believe in is not to be expected from the incoming Obama administration, as the United States has made great political, military and financial investment in keeping Kosovars on its side. Both parties realize this, and have adapted their behavior and ambitions accordingly.

Analysts sometimes forget, even willingly so, that the primary reason for this lavish American attention is not altruism, but rather a security concern: that is, to prevent Kosovo from going down a different path. The attested continuing activity of Islamic extremists in the province represents just one of the potential paths that outside powers are still trying to usher the Kosovars down.

For present policy-making concerns, the Islamists€šÃ„ô relative chance of success is not particularly important. What is important to note is that they do remain a security threat which represents an unneeded distraction for Western nation-building processes, one which will have to be handled by Kosovo’s new EU security mission over the months ahead. The EU’s capability to understand, assess and eliminate this threat, one which was inexcusably allowed to happen by the previous UN administration, will have great ramifications for future Balkan security.

€šÃ„¶€šÃ„¶€šÃ„¶€šÃ„¶€šÃ„¶€šÃ„¶€šÃ„¶

*Balkanalysis.com director Christopher Deliso has written and researched frequently on security topics such as radical Islam in the Balkans. He is the author of the only regional study of the phenomenon, The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West (Praeger Security International, 2007).

By Christopher Deliso

When Kosovo’s Albanians celebrated the major Muslim holiday of Bajram, at the end of September, more than a few worshippers were conspicuous for their absence.

A trickle of media articles over the past few months have dealt with the issue of religion in Kosovo from a relatively unreported angle: the curious phenomenon of conversion. Apparently, Albanians in this Muslim-majority statelet have been increasingly €šÃ„òreturning€šÃ„ô to the Catholic religion, which their ancestors had forsaken centuries ago.

This story is interesting and relevant in its own right, but has become particularly revealing in light of the way it has been developed in the media, something that raises another set of issues. Whereas early reports of a new trend towards conversion mentioned the fact that Albanians had been Christians before the Ottomans arrived in the 14th century, and converted thereafter, only recently have reports begun adding an element of victimology to the narrative.

For example, a Sept. 28 Reuters report that took the pulse of recently reborn Catholics in Kosovo claimed that €šÃ„ò€šÃ„¶the majority of ethnic Albanians were forcibly converted to Islam, mostly through the imposition of high taxes on Catholics, when the Ottoman Empire ruled the Balkans.€šÃ„ô This almost seems to imply that other Christians were threatened with taxation by the Turks, but did not convert. It also ignores that in several places at different times, Christians seeking to convert were actually prevented from doing so because the Ottomans prudently sought they would lose a local tax base for relatively little in return.

Reuters€šÃ„ô description of €šÃ„òforcible conversion€šÃ„ô as something to be equated with desire for social advancement is a strange one. The real things that were forcible for the Ottomans were the forced kidnappings of young Christian men and women for the janissary corps and harems of Constantinople. Although there were far worse things to be suffered than paying high taxes by remaining Christian under the Turks, these were left out. In backwards hinterlands of the empire, as in Kosovo and Bosnia, the local Muslim lords were known for being especially pernicious towards those who did not desert their religion.

Although this disparity led to simmering resentments which had long-term influence, as pointed out by former NSA officer John Schindler in the Bosnian context, the article does not consider how inter-ethnic problems in Kosovo today might perhaps have roots in this phenomenon. Schindler notes that it was particularly in border hinterlands of the empire such as Bosnia and Kosovo that the rule of the Turks and converted local lords allegiant to them was especially vicious. The Orthodox Christian Serbs clung to their religion- and suffered under the rule of those who found it expedient to change their own. Understanding the context of local opinions today requires an appreciation of this former relationship.

Within the Albanian community itself, how is the conversion issue playing out? The Kosovars interviewed by Reuters tended to take the €šÃ„òcrypto-Christian€šÃ„ô route, by which they claimed that their forefathers only pretended to be Muslims: “€šÃ„¶for centuries, many remembered their Christian roots and lived as what they call €šÃ„òCatholics in hiding.€šÃ„ô Some, nearly a century after the Ottomans left the Balkans, now see the chance to reveal their true beliefs.”

The timing is indeed quite impeccable. Yet the experiences of this reporter indicate perhaps another motivation at work. In April, our team visited precisely the same church in Klina where the Reuters piece starts off at with the Sopi family (perhaps related to the famous, deceased Albanian bishop of that name?) However, speaking informally with young Albanians outside the church, a very different concept emerged. As one 20-year-old student put it: “we know that the West does not like Muslims and is against Islam. It is better for us to be Christians again.”

In Pristina, inside a small Catholic church, the caretaker informed us that some 21 people had come in the previous three months to re-embrace the faith; more were expected to emerge. As the Reuters article points out, a large Catholic cathedral is being built here, much to the displeasure of Muslim leaders. The article quotes the head of the Kosovo Islamic community, Mufti Naim Ternava, who is opposed to the building of the new cathedral at the heart of Pristina, as criticizing rural church-building as well: “€šÃ„¶no human brain can understand how a church should be build in the middle of 13 Muslim villages,” he said.

Supporters of Kosovar Catholicism inevitably point to Mother Teresa, born in nearby Skopje, who has became the symbol of Albanian Christianity far and wide, a cultural process that has brought criticism from Muslim groups in Albania itself. Recent examples of some of these animosities are discussed in my book The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West (Praeger Security International, 2007), in which I maintain that, in Kosovo the end of the nationalist question (i.e., with the achievement of statehood) is the beginning of the religious one.

After Kosovo’s Albanian leaders declared independence on February 17, some explained the Arab world’s failure to recognize this decree as a sort of revenge. Kosovo had taken so much money and aid from them, but in the end had turned its back on Islam. And, when overt conversion to Catholicism came after simply irreligious Westernization, it was like adding insult to injury. This hypothesis has not been proven, but remains an interesting one. And months later, the Arab world has done little to champion the Kosovar cause.

In a surreal twist, Iran’s relations with Serbia have actually been bolstered more since then than they have with Kosovo. Belgrade’s recent victory at the United Nations, in getting the right to make a case over the legality of Kosovo’s secession, would have been much more difficult had the Arab countries banded together to defend it. Perhaps they are holding out for future concessions?

Nevertheless, some in the Islamist internationale see a definite opportunity in the new Kosovo. The day after Kosovo declared independence on February 17, the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, stated that “there is no doubt that the independence of Kosovo will be an asset to the Muslim world and further enhance the joint Islamic action.” The nature of this €šÃ„òaction€šÃ„ô was left unclear. But from what we have seen over the past decade in Kosovo, it is unlikely to be without dangers.

Although some say it has been definitely defeated, fundamentalist Islam in Kosovo has had a long history and incubation period. Certain Western intelligence agencies believe it still poses a potential long-term problem, if politicians are unable to increase the standard of living and assure real independence.

The arrival of fundamentalist Islam was the result of strong cross-border logistical networks, €šÃ„òsafe houses€šÃ„ô and propaganda channels blossomed after August 1999, when the United Nations began administering Kosovo following NATO’s bombing campaign. At that point, Wahhabi proselytizers from the Arab world descended on Kosovo in force. They arrived chiefly through humanitarian and cultural organizations, many under the umbrella of the Saudi Joint Committee for the Relief of Kosovo and Chechnya and the Saudi Red Crescent Society. According to numerous former UN officials in Kosovo, however, these ostensibly humanitarian groups spent most of their time building mosques, proselytizing, and paying Albanians monthly stipends to dress and act according to conservative Wahhabi mores.

Although American pressure led to some charities being uprooted following 9/11, many remained durable. A prime example is the RIHS. In 2003, leaked UN police reports and photos indicated the ongoing activities in Kosovo of a Kuwaiti worldwide charity, the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS), which had been blacklisted by the Bush administration in Pakistan and Afghanistan for having ties to al Qaeda early the year before, and which had, in Albania during the early 1990s, been used to shield terrorists belonging to Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

At the same time in war-torn Bosnia, the RIHS was creating radical youth groups to disseminate jihad propaganda, catering to war orphans and other impressionable young people. The fact that the RIHS had, despite also being implicated in 500 simultaneous bombings in Bangladesh in August 2005, been allowed to continue its activities in Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia came to light in June 2006, with a Bosnian prosecutor’s investigation into some 14 million euros in RIHS funds that mysteriously could not be accounted for. Yet despite reportedly changing its addresses and information frequently in Bosnia, the organization still apparently works freely in the world’s newest independent state, Kosovo.

Along with building hundreds of new mosques, disseminating Islamist propaganda and inculcating it into the young, the proponents of Wahhabism sought to spread their tentacles by establishing an Islamic banking system in rural areas historically prone to isolationism and radicalism. One such charity, Islamic Relief, had already by September 2004 provided 500 loans to impoverished Kosovar farmers and small businessmen, according to “Islamic principles.” In poor areas where the West has shown little interest in supplying aid, the foreign Islamists have been happy to do so.

A further concern here is the convergence of terrorism with organized crime in Kosovo, particularly the global trafficking in human beings, narcotics and weapons. Kosovo has served as a terrorist transfer zone, in which Wahhabi-run villages and mosques became safe harbor for foreigners wanted in Western Europe or in their own countries for terrorism links.

The direct connection between terrorism and narcotics trafficking has been revealed on numerous occasions, as with Norway’s September 2006 arrest of al Qaeda operative Arfan Qadeer Bhatti. He and his accomplices were planning attacks on the US and Israeli embassies in Oslo; according to Norwegian news reports, they even planned to behead the Israeli ambassador. This Pakistani terrorist had connections with a Kosovo Albanian drug lord and even visited Pristina and Pec, a small town in western Kosovo, where he could administer to one of Kosovo’s largest Wahhabi flocks.

Nevertheless, radical Islam has failed to catch on with the masses, and the Vatican €šÃ„ì led by a Europe-focused German Pope €šÃ„ì is eager to build on its success in spreading Catholicism more widely.

An Italian journalist specializing in security issues who has conducted investigations in Kosovo, Paola Casoli, stated for Balkanalysis.com that the Catholic church’s “[ecumenical] concept and the huge network of relations due to the Vatican’s foreign politics [means] the presence of the Vatican through its representatives on the ground is obvious enough.”

According to Casoli, the church’s different approach to dealing with local Albanians also accounts for its success. “Add also the presence of ecclesiastic or ecclesiatic-related organizations, such as Caritas,” she says, citing a young Catholic Albanian, who maintained that the church “remained close to people’s needs, instead of [the Muslim groups that were] building mosques in every village.”

Casoli also sees the success of Catholicism in Kosovo these days as partially linguistic in nature. “Islamism imposes Arabic when addressing God and praying to Him,” she says, “whereas Albanians speak Albanian and not Arabic as their mother tongue,” and thus prefer this form of worship.

The reaction of Kosovo’s Muslim leaders has been fairly muffled, in part, Casoli maintains, because of a desire not to attract attention to their own movement.

At present, Balkanalysis.com believes, any danger of disputes or clashes between Catholic and Muslim Albanians is much more likely in Albania itself, where Islamic groups are more vocal.

The most active is the multilingual (Albanian, English and Turkish) non-governmental organization, the Muslim Forum of Albania, which has consistently spoken out against €šÃ„òChristianizing€šÃ„ô efforts, the veneration of Mother Teresa, and against criticism of Islam in general. The organization employs the modern guise of Islamic activism €šÃ„ì that is, aiming its directives to the €šÃ„òinternational community€šÃ„ô and speaking the language of political correctness €šÃ„ì in achieving its goals.

The most recent example, a press release from June directed to the OSCE, exemplifies this tactic. It is also ironic in light of the media’s recent focus on forced conversion to Islam in Ottoman days. Au contraire, opines the MFA: “€šÃ„¶what concerns our Forum the most are the many comments that have been made in Albania during these recent years where Islam has been depicted as a religion that goes contrary to Europe and the myth which claims that it was imposed upon the Albanians by Turkey. Comments that belittle the Muslims, Turkey and depict the Albanians as Christians converted by force in Islam have unfortunately found their way even [into] the Albanian school textbooks [in] recent years.”

Clearly, matters of religious belief are still being shaped by divergent historical interpretation in the Balkans today. If it were only a question of spirited debate, however, things would be relatively tame. However, a series of low-profile incidents, most unreported, continue. They include defacement of monuments in the north and churches in the Greek-minority south. One of the most interesting questions for the future is the extent to which a Catholic-Muslim divide in Kosovo will be felt in neighboring Albania, a country with strong social and historical connections.