Balkanalysis.com editor’s note: the following excerpts offer a just a glimpse into the rich selection of analyses and reports that comprise our new work, Studies in Greek Security, Volume II: 2012-2015. Available now on Amazon Kindle, this book is the successor volume to the previously published Studies in Greek Security: 2006-2011, both by Chris Deliso and Ioannis Michaletos.
Excerpt from Chapter 3, “The Kammenos Doctrine, 2.0.”
September 24, 2015
The ANEL view towards Greece’s regional security role has to do with both economic and military identification. As a maritime power, Greece is seen as having a near abroad from the southern Balkans to the coasts of Egypt, Israel and Lebanon; this general area of influence is considered as vital to accentuate Greek power projection. Kammenos has also voiced a plan to expand military cooperation with these countries, including continuance of Israeli Air Force practice in Greek airspace, as a replacement for Turkey, where cooperation stopped following the Mavi Marmaris incident of May 2010.
Interestingly, when asked about Greece’s role in the Balkan region by other Greek military officials in May, Kammenos stated that Greece “had no interest” in being involved in those areas. Specifically, he associated the narrowly-averted terrorist plot in Kumanovo, Macedonia with the returning foreign fighters from Syria. This statement confirmed that he, at least officially, views the Balkans as more of a foreign policy and diplomatic orientation for Greece.
The second element of Greek defense’s regional orientation is due to a perception of the country (and Cyprus) as vital for international trade and commerce, and undersea gas transit in future (the Levantine Basin riches, disputed with Turkey in the case of Cyprus). Thus a robust Greek naval and air force presence in the Aegean is part of the Kammenos doctrine for reasons of economic security as well as defensive security. Nonetheless, both Kammenos and the Syriza left do not show much stomach for interventions in foreign wars, which is consonant with the views of most Greek politicians in modern history. Thus in the end, Kammenos is more of a centrist in this regard.
Excerpt from Chapter 13, “Thessaloniki Court Sentences Kurdish Militant, Four Months after Anti-Terror Raid in Athens.”
June 5, 2014
A partial result has been achieved by Greek judicial authorities, four month after a historic Greek-Turkish-American intelligence operation against Kurdish militants in Athens.
Two days ago, a Thessaloniki court sentenced Hüseyin Fevzi Tekin to seven years in jail over a a 2011 bombing that killed one person. The Thessaloniki Court of Appeals heard additional witness and also based its case on fingerprint evidence. Tekin had been a key member in the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C). He was arrested, along with three other members, on February 10. He was living in Athens under a false Bulgarian identity in a Gyzi safe house.
At that time, Tekin was arrested along with Murat Korkut, Bilgehan Karpat and İsmail Akkol- reportedly involved in the 1996 murder of Turkish businessman Özdemir Sabancı in Istanbul. Tekin was also convicted for illegal weapons and explosives possession (a large cache had been found by police in the Gyzi apartment).
Excerpt from Chapter Greece and Turkey: Offensive and Defensive Balance of Air Power in 2012
February 19, 2012
The Greek Air Force is oriented almost exclusively towards Turkey. The Turkish Air Force, on the other hand, has active obligations with the Kurdish conflict plus contingency plans for the Greek, Middle Eastern and Eastern Mediterranean fronts. It can be concluded that a balance of power exists in the air, with no side having a definitive advantage for the moment due to strategic geography.
Greece: F-16’s (Block 50 and Block 52+) and Mirage 2000-5 Mk2: 113 jets
Turkey: F-16’s Block 50: 30 jets on order (an estimated 10 have already arrived)
Older modern jets
Greece: F-16’s (Block 30/40/50) and Mirage 2000 EGM/BGM: 92 jets
Turkey: F-16’s (Block 30/40/50): 203 jets
Greece: F-4 PI2000, F-4E/2020, F-4 RF and A-7E/H: 113 jets
Turkey: F-4 2020, F-4E, RF-4E and F-5: 144 jets
Greece: C-130 and C-27J Spartan: 27 planes
Turkey: C-130 and C-235: 80 planes
Greece: T-2E, T-6A, T-41D: 103 planes
Turkey: T-38A/B/C, T-41D, SF.260D: 189 planes
Buy Studies in Greek Security, Volume II: 2012-2015 for Amazon Kindle now!