Balkanalysis.com

News from Balkanalysis.com: Summer Recess, New Books, Essential Articles

Balkanalysis.com would like to inform its readers that the site will be on summer recess through September. Look for new articles and photos to be posted then. Until we€šÃ„ôre back, readers may like to check out two new books from Balkanalysis.com director Christopher Deliso, and to peruse the archive- as well as new hand-picked essential background articles presented for you below.

The first new book, The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West, published by Praeger Security International, details in depth the sordid story of how Western interventions in the Balkans during the 1990′s directly allowed foreign Islamic terrorist groups to set up shop- and how Western policy since has created a climate in which extremist groups can thrive, boding ill for regional security.

A work of unprecedented depth, The Coming Balkan Caliphate analyzes the situation on a country-by-country basis, and will be useful for general-interest €šÃ„òbeginners€šÃ„ô to Balkan issues and experienced professionals alike. Relying on five years of field research and dozens of interviews with ranking security officials from several Western and regional countries, The Coming Balkan Caliphate dispels myths and enhances our knowledge of the emerging extremist threat coming from the Balkans.

The second new book, Hidden Macedonia: The Mystic Lakes of Ohrid and Prespa, is a travelogue out now from London’s Haus Publishing, which details the author’s circular journey around Lakes Prespa and Ohrid, through Greece, Albania and the Republic of Macedonia. Along the way, the history, culture and contemporary life of the great Macedonian lakes are intertwined with a little adventure, camaraderie and good food and drink. Hidden Macedonia will appeal to travelers looking forward to visiting the region, or those who are content to imagine the Macedonian lakes from afar.

Finally, here is a list of twelve original and essential articles (in no particular order). All are among those published over the last year, and will enhance readers€šÃ„ô knowledge and help tide you over until we return from summer recess.

Thanks for your understanding and continued reading.

-Balkanalysis.com

The Strategic Significance of Greek Thrace: Current Dynamics and Emerging Factors (Ioannis Michaletos & Christopher Deliso)

Turkey: Why a Coup, Soft or Hard is Unlikely in 2007 (Mehmet Kalyoncu, December 2, 2006)

Estimating Yugoslavia, (David Binder, December 22, 2006)

In Macedonia, New Concerns over Rural Fundamentalism (Christopher Deliso, October 2, 2006)

Bulgaria To Finally Open Secret Files (Jan Buruma, May 15, 2007)

A Brief Travelers€šÃ„ô Guide to Sarajevo’s Local Traditions, (Lidija Jularić, November 17, 2006)

Exclusive: How the US Ordered Increased Activity against Macedonia’s Islamists after the Fort Dix Arrests (Balkanalysis.com, June 22, 2007)

Turkey: Europe’s Emerging Energy Corridor for Central Eurasian, Caucasian and Caspian Oil and Gas (Mehmet Efe Biresselioglu, January 20, 2007)

Varieties of Religious Experience in a Macedonian Village (Christopher Deliso, September 27, 2006)

The Hijacking of a Nation (Sibel Edmonds, November 29, 2006)

Wahhabis in Labunista Antagonize Locals, as New Details Emerge about Italian Arrests, (Balkanalysis.com, January 5, 2007)

Greece, Turkey and Balkan Security: Interview with John M. Nomikos (Balkanalysis.com, December 12, 2006)

A Pause that Refreshes

By David Binder

Remember what it was like last winter and spring with the Kosovo issue? Hardly a day went by without a declaration or a prediction that a resolution would be achieved in days, weeks, a month. Independence was just around the corner. Condoleezza Rice, Nicholas Burns, Daniel Fried, Frank Wisner and the pathetic Michael Polt went before microphones and cameras to make these vows with the seeming assurance of biblical prophets on behalf of the Bush Administration.

They were echoed by longtime advocates of independence for Kosovo (some of them paid by Albanians) like Richard Holbrooke, Morton Abramowitz, Rep. Tom Lantos and Janus Bugajski. And those were only the Americans speaking.

Then on April 3, Marti Ahtisaari submitted his version of a solution-resolution to the United Nations Security Council. Did anyone hear a “kerplunk” sound of something dropping into the Hudson River behind the U.N. Building?

Since then the silence has grown.

It seems that Serbia, with a huge boost from Vladimir Putin and his able team of diplomats has succeeded in torpedoing Ahtisaari, paralyzing the Security Council and stalling the Albanian drive for independence. At least for a moment it leaves Serbia with more to hope for than could have been expected last winter and the Kosovo Albanians with less than they were counting on as late as April.

We now have a pause. (For an American it calls to mind the first great advertising slogan for Coca Cola, from 1929: “The pause that refreshes”).What might we expect when the pause ends sometime in the autumn? Predictions in foreign affairs are dangerous, especially concerning the Balkans. Yet I think we can discern several changes that may influence the Kosovo deliberations.

Even before his July meeting with Putin in Maine, President Bush seemed to be in the process of scaling down United States plans on Kosovo, leading him to one of his “what did I mean when I said that?” moments. In Rome on June 9 he stated: “In terms of the deadline there needs to be one”

However, a day later in Tirana, the president forgot that he had mentioned a “deadline” and then said: “The question is whether or not there is going to be endless dialogue on a subject that we have made up our mind about. We believe Kosovo ought to be independent.” And, a bit later, “At some point in time, sooner rather than later, you’ve got to say: Enough is enough – Kosovo is independent.”

Whether he expressed such plaintive thoughts to Putin in Maine is not known. But it was clear that the two presidents decided not to tangle on the issue and to delegate it to their foreign secretaries. At least the Kosovo conundrum momentarily reached that height between the superpowers, which it had never ascended before.

Another factor has appeared, which may gain some bearing on the next stage of Kosovo deliberations: a decline in the political influence of the United States as President Bush’s time in office draws to a close.

A Pew poll conducted among 1,000 citizens in each of 47 countries and made public in June showed the United States in disfavor in 26 countries. Germans, French, Canadians and Britons said they trusted Putin more than Bush. Two-thirds of Germans said they disliked American ideas about democracy. Three-quarters of the French polled said the same.

Conceivably, these sentiments could translate here or there into government policies. Still, the Bush Administration continues to be numb to the interests and commitments of others. Among the numbest it seems is Condoleezza Rice. On June 28, she said at the US-India Business Council: “What is the meaning of non-alignment? It has lost its meaning. One is aligned not with the interests and power of one bloc or another, but with the values of a common humanity.” The next day India‘s foreign minister, Pranab Mukherjee, icily retorted: “India is a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement and believes that the movement has contributed substantially to the struggle against colonialism and apartheid.”

€šÃ„¶

*David Binder (born 1931) was a correspondent for The New York Times from 1961 until 2004. He specialized in coverage of central and eastern Europe, based in Berlin, Belgrade and Bonn. The current piece was published in Belgrade‘s Politika on July 7, 2007.

Ankara’s Growing Importance for Israel in the Post-American Middle East

By Mehmet Kalyoncu

Several developments are concurrently taking place in and around the Middle East, both national and regional ones, which are likely to have wider implications. First, the United States is reluctantly starting to realize that the mission “Operation Iraqi Freedom” is failing, and that fairly soon the withdrawal of troops from Iraq will be no longer an option, but a necessity.

Second, Turkey voted for its future with the parliamentary elections on July 22. The AK Party of PM Erdogan won a landslide victory, receiving 46.6 percent of the votes and thus becoming the only party in the past 57 years to increase its votes in the second term.[i] As such, the electoral victory has not only given the AK Party another five year in office, but also a strong popular mandate for its policy course in both domestic and foreign affairs. However, although Erdogan’s AK Party has indeed won the right to form the new government, questions remain over whether it will be able to govern.

Finally, despite all the international pressure and UN sanctions, Tehran is continuing its nuclear program. At the same time, its regional influence has grown, first through supporting the Shiite insurgents in Iraq and second through boosting its diplomatic relations with both Damascus and Riyadh.

What are the possible implications of these concurrent developments for Israel? One may be inclined to ask why for Israel but not for others. Certainly the same question may be raised for other states in the region, but what the implications will be for Israel is particularly important due to the particular position of Israel in the region. After all, the state of Israel has right to survive and to protect its citizens against potential threats. Yet it is not the only state which preserves those rights in the region. As such, with its unspecified but apparently immense military capabilities, Israel has a potential to trigger volatile events that are likely to affect both regional and international balance of power. Therefore, how would the outcome of the second development influence Israel, provided that the US withdraws from Iraq due to both its inability to maintain the costly war, and consequently is discouraged to confront Iran afterwards, and that Iran continues to become an ever more influential regional power as well as ever more antagonistic to Israel? These gradually materializing conditions put two options in front of Jerusalem to choose. It will have to either resort to military options against multiplied regional threats, or return back to its tradition of diplomacy, seeking to revitalize the old alliances, especially the one with Turkey.

The bell tolls for American withdrawal, as Tehran becomes a regional leader

A growing number of Democrat, and even Republican senators want to set a date for the withdrawal of the US troops from Iraq; their concerns have once again been ignored by the rejection of the Levin-Reed Amendment on US Policy on Iraq.[ii] However, the very fact that there is a demand for a phased redeployment of US forces from Iraq by the end of the year and growing public unrest over the failure of President Bush’s “new” strategy in Iraq, does suggest that the date for the withdrawal is soon, albeit not specified. The war in Iraq has cost the United States over 3,600 casualties, with an unspecified number of troops maimed or otherwise injured (believed to be around 30,000), and nearly $ 1 trillion in expenditures. This is expected to reach $2 trillion, provided troops remain in Iraq until 2010.[iii] Accepting the growing dissent over his Iraq policy, President Bush recently signaled “that he might be open to shifting toward a smaller, more limited mission in Iraq in the future.”[iv]

In the meantime, Iran has sought and to a great extent been successful in increasing its political influence in the region through supporting the Shiite insurgency in Iraq. Similarly, Palestine has provided a fertile ground for Tehran to boost its popularity among the Sunni Arabs as well. According to a recent ISNA (Iranian Student News Agency) report, Iran‘s foreign minister in a phone conversation with his Saudi counterpart, Prince Saud al Faisal, discussed and talked about conditions in Lebanon, Palestine and bilateral ties. Minister Mottaki in this phone conversation stressed the importance of cooperation between all Islamic and Arab countries so as to aid the nation of Palestine and to free it from its current state.[v]

Similarly, Iran‘s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad recently paid a day-long visit to Syria in order to congratulate President Bashar al-Assad on the beginning of his second seven-year term as Syria‘s president, and to review expansion of Tehran-Damascus political and economic cooperation.[vi]

Tehran‘s engagement with the Arab governments in the region has started to yield tangible outcomes for its own ends. According to the ISNA report, President Ahmadinejad and his Syrian counterpart Bashar al-Assad issued a joint statement calling for unity in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq.[vii] The report quotes the Iranian president, saying “cooperation between Tehran and Damascus is to the benefit of the region and both sides will stand strong against all regional enemies.” Drawing the international community’s attention to the effect and dangers of Israeli’s nuclear weapons on international and regional peace and security, notes the report, both sides asserted the necessity for swift steps to be taken in order to face this threat.

Further, the statement reportedly condemned the continued actions of the Israeli regime, perceived as aggressive. In addition, Sharkul Evsat newspaper reported that Iranian President Ahmedinejad offered his Syrian counterpart $1 billion in the form of military aid if the latter cuts off its recently developing relations with Israel, and if the latter considers using the aid for military purchases from Russia.[viii]

Reviving Ben-Gurion’s peripheral alliance in the new era

The course of regional and international developments makes it necessary for Jerusalem to reconsider, modify and re-implement the peripheral alliance initiative of Israel‘s first President, David Ben-Gurion. In order to break the isolation imposed onto it by the surrounding Arab states and to gain their respect, Israel sought to establish an alliance with the countries in the periphery of the Middle East, which also outnumbered the Arab population in the region. The alliance was so crucial to the Israeli interests, argues Ofra Bengio, that in order to secure US support for forming the alliance, Ben-Gurion portrayed it as if it was crucial to US interests in the region as well, “[Ben-Gurion] sought to use American involvement or support for the agreement as an incentive to the countries in question to join in. In other words, Israel sought to use the United States to galvanize the pact, and use the pact to consolidate U.S. support for itself.”[ix] The alliance ironically involved Sudan, Ethiopia, Iran, and Turkey.

Bengio further suggests that according to the CIA report captured by Iran [revolutionaries] in 1979 from the American Embassy in Tehran, at the end of 1958 Israel, Turkey, and Iran signed an agreement to form an organization called Trident, aiming to exchange intelligence information among the three’s respective intelligence services.[x] The immediate threats that necessitated the peripheral alliance in the late 1950s have not disappeared but multiplied over time.

The state of the alliance

Today out of those erstwhile allies, Iran has turned into a staunch enemy whose president-elect vowed to wipe Israel off of the map; similarly, upon one allegation after another on carrying out genocide in Darfur, Sudan is waiting to be invaded by the very mediator and guarantor of that alliance, while the United States has not only diminished its soft power and popularity to engage any government, but also is rapidly depleting its hard power capabilities to deter any government in the region. Once the United States withdraws from Iraq before fulfilling its goals, which seems to be inevitable, the withdrawal will, to the dismay of those who believe in the necessity of US leadership in global affairs, also shake the invincible image of the United States. From that point on, the dynamics of the power struggle are likely to change forever in the region.

What else remains from the old peripheral alliance? Turkey. Can Turkey play any constructive role in preventing a regional or international conflict which would dramatically risk the survival of Israel?

The answer is certainly not as long as the new government is unable to engage the Middle Eastern states. Even if the AK Party government would like to continue its multi-faceted diplomacy with regional powers such as Iran, Syria, and Israel, its ability to do so will be hindered by the domestic political instability likely to stem from, respectively, the debate over presidential election, the Kurdish issue, and cross-border operation into Iraq. The very fact that the new parliament will consist of deputies from the left-leaning CHP, the ultra-nationalistic, right-wing MHP, and ethnic-Kurdish independent deputies, promises no easy solution on either of those issues. In that case, it is nothing but unrealistic to expect politically unstable Ankara, even with the AK Party government’s apparently clear win, to play any effective role in the Middle East.

What kind of Ankara in the post-American Middle East?

Two possibilities lie ahead of Ankara in the second term of the AK Party government. Ankara will either continue its multi-faceted engagement with the Middle East, or it will be bogged down in a series of political turmoil, and as such will not only be alienated from the region where Tehran is rapidly gaining prominence, but also from the West falling short of fulfilling the EU accession requirements. The political atmosphere in Ankara in the AK Party’s second term will pretty much determine Turkey‘s diplomatic capabilities in the post-American Middle East as well.

Soner Cagaptay of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy has prophesized political instability in the aftermath of the July 22 parliamentary election.[xi] Based on his assumption that the public rallies in spring were indeed against the AK Party instead of its presidential nominee, Cagaptay argues that the lifestyle issues, more specifically headscarf issue, will mobilize masses against the AK Party after July 22.

In addition, he suggest, the new parliament’s failure to elect a new president in thirty days after July 22 will lead to its dissolution and open the way for new parliamentary elections. Given the fact that the AK Party avoided the hot-button issue of the headscarf and sought to embrace all ways of life in its first term, and promises to continue this course by not mentioning the headscarf issue even in its party program, it is unlikely to cause instability during the AK Party’s second term. However, the political faultlines, which Cagaptay implies are likely to emerge in the new parliament consisting of leftist, Turkish nationalist and Kurdish nationalist deputies, are likely to cause instability in the parliament unless the parties recognize the country’s interest in reconciliation over the presidential debate. The ensuing political instability would not only diminish Ankara‘s ability to continue reforms, but also its ability to be diplomatically as active in the regional affairs. Yet, the ongoing transformation in the regional balance of power and formation of new alliances necessitate Ankara to be even more active than before.

During the last four and a half years, the first-term AK Party government has proven to be the only one able to communicate with all the parties in the Middle East. While Ankara mediated talks between Damascus and Jerusalem, it also sought to use its influence on the Hamas leadership for moderation. In a geographical area where almost every Muslim individual grows up being taught that they should take revenge on Israel, which is perceived as far from credible in the quest for peace, the latter needs an ally capable of deflecting anti-Semitic frustration and articulating the view to Arabs that Israel has a right to survive.



 

[i] See http://secim.zaman.com.tr/secim/Election.do

 

[ii] “Democrats Lack Support to Force Vote on Pullout”, New York Times (July 18, 2007) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/18/washington/18cong.html

 

[iii] “Report: Iraq war costs could top $2 trillion”, Christian Science Monitor (January 10, 2006), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0110/dailyUpdate.html

 

[iv] “Bush Counters G.O.P. Dissent on Iraq Policy”, New York Times (July 11, 2007)

 

[v] “Iran-Saudi Arabia discuss Lebanon and Palestine“, ISNA (Iranian Student News Agency) (July 06, 2007)

 

[vi]Ahmadinejad to visit Syria“, IRNA (July 15, 2007)

 

[vii] “Tehran-Damascus call for regional unison”, ISNA (Iranian Student News Agency) (July 20, 2007) available at http://www.isna.ir/Main/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-963806&Lang=E

 

[viii] “Israil ile iliskini kes”, Yeni Safak (July 22, 2007), available at http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/dunya/?t=22.07.2007&c=4&i=57134&ˆšÃ‘¬ˆžsrail-ile-iliˆšÃ–Ÿkini-kes

 

[ix] Ofra Bengio, The Turkish-Israeli Relationship: Changing Ties of Middle Eastern Outsiders, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2004, pp. 40-1

 

[x] Ibid. pp. 44-5

 

[xi] Soner Cagaptay, H. Akin Unver “July 2007 Turkish Elections: Winners and Fault Lines”, Research Notes: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Number 14 (July 2007), pp. 8-9

Kosovo’s Apparently Suicidal Police Minders Power Down

The July 3 decision by Richard Monk, the UN police commissioner in Kosovo, to ban rubber bullets in anticipated upcoming showdowns with Albanian protestors angry at the slow pace of independence bodes ill for the efficacy of UN policing, against protestors who have already been emboldened by the apparently weak-willed nature of the UN mission. A scenario by which UN peacekeepers could actually be taken hostage and used as political collateral by protesters is thus becoming likely, for the first time.

Behind the commissioner’s decision was the deadly events of February 10, when two Albanians from the Vetendosje (Self-Determination) group were killed by UN peacekeepers firing rubber bullets. The police involved were reprimanded and sent back to their home country, Romania, but no further charges were filed as the UNMIK claimed it could not allocate individual responsibility.

The Romanians, like the Serbs Orthodox Christians, were already unpopular among Muslim Albanians. But the February incident increased the hatred even more so. “Now, you cannot find a Romanian living outside of [the Serbian enclaves of] Gracanica and Caglavica,” attested a local Serb in May. “They do not trust and are not trusted by Albanians.”

Where this has become a problem for the United States owes to the fact that, as American law enforcement officials complained to Balkanalysis.com last fall, the US has effectively “farmed out” its intelligence-gathering operations to Romanian and Ukrainian underlings. With the best American assets shipped out to Afghanistan and Iraq, doing the legwork in Kosovo — which could blow up at any time — has been left to assistants who have zero trust or credibility among the Muslim Albanians, who view them quite rightly as pro-Serbian. And since the only counter-terrorist investigations in Kosovo involve Albanian organized crime and foreign-funded Albanian Islamic extremists, the reliance on Romanians and Ukrainians seems at very best counter-productive, and at worst downright stupid.

The police commissioner’s decision to ban rubber bullets was no doubt meant as a confidence-building measure designed to assure Albanians that there would be no repeat of the fatal February shootings. At the same time, however, UN programs to diminish the lawlessness and violence of Kosovar society through voluntary gun collection programs have failed miserably. A province-wide operation conducted a few years ago, and billed brightly as a major step in demilitarizing Kosovo, succeeded in collecting only a few hundred guns, and most of them old or unserviceable. In Kosovo, therefore, the surreal situation exists where the international police force meant to be safeguarding the police disarms itself while allowing fanatical and paramilitary elements to stay well-armed.

The absolutely farcical nature of this disparity becomes evident in the earnest words of Commissioner Monk, who instituted in March “a bottom to top review” of peacekeeping procedures and tactics for dealing with protesters:

“I received notification from [UN headquarters in] New York that all police contributing nations are being consulted with a view to banning their use in peacekeeping missions. I also directed that all out-of-date rubber bullets be returned to their respective state or destroyed and I have prohibited the carriage or use of rubber bullets by any police unit in Kosovo for whatever purpose.”

In other words, even as Kosovo is awash in guns, grenades and heavy weaponry, and even as the Albanian clan chiefs’ historic decision to allow contract killings in the case of inter-Albanian vendettas has sent murder rates soaring, the UN is intent on nothing other than destroying its own deadly arsenal of rubber bullets.

In thus bending over backwards to appease its disgruntled, independence-craving subjects, has the UNMIK signed its own death warrant? There is ample precedent for scenarios in which angry protesters might overpower police- with dark consequences for Kosovo’s vulnerable minorities.

During the March 2004 riots, for example, American and other UN police testified that the only thing that saved them was, as a very last resort, the use of deadly force. But this was a luxury that was a long time in coming as the riots unfolded. “As Americans, our philosophy is that deadly force can be used,” said one Texan peacekeeper interviewed at the time by Balkanalysis.com director Christopher Deliso. “The UN takes a somewhat different approach. So it is sometimes frustrating and restricting, working for the UN. To save life and property we were not allowed to use deadly force.”

The policeman recounted how a multi-national force tried to deter heavily-armed Albanians who were rapidly burning down Caglavica and marching on Gracanica. Some 5,000-6,000 rioters were “lined up with rows of Molotov cocktails prepared beforehand. [They had] AK-47′s, heavy machine guns, hand grenades, pistols, hunting rifles, farm tools, knives, rocks, you name it. We were ordered not to fire.”

Further, he added, “the Indian policemen, who were facing the worst of it at the front, were asking for permission to use rubber bullets. That permission was not granted at the time. The ground commander thought that we could deter the mob with our presence alone. But with the use of firepower we could have driven them back, thus saving a lot of houses.”

In the end, not even a powerful water cannon proved sufficient to disperse the mob: it was only when an Albanian bore down on the peacekeepers in a dump truck, with the intent of running them over, was one policeman forced to disobey orders and shoot the man in order to save the contingent. The Albanians, who had felt it their right to act with impunity, were stunned: “the crowd went silent when they saw that he was dead,” recounted the Texan. “Now we’re probably going to have a new monument go up somewhere in Pristina, for this latest hero of the national cause.”

Now, three years later and with independence for the restive Albanian majority still deferred, the UN is predictably panicking. But in its bid to prevent the creation of such future “martyrs’ by disarming itself, the international mission has perhaps just signed up for its own martyrdom in the line of duty.

No wonder that front-line riot-control duty, formerly the domain of Eastern Europeans, has been assigned to Indians and other purportedly “expendable” third-world contingents. After all, they should have no trouble adapting to the new rules. They already know how it is to keep the peace with barrels empty.

Eastern Mediterranean Oil Politics: the Emerging Role of Cyprus

By Ioannis Michaletos

The issue of oil drilling rights in the eastern Mediterranean Sea has emerged over the past few months, after the initiative enacted by the Cypriot government to proceed in handing out research and drilling rights for expected oil reserves deep under the sea, estimated to be worth some 450 billion USD at current prices (1).

Cyprus proceeded in cooperating with the other interested parties — due to geographical proximity- Egypt and Lebanon, whose exclusive economic zones might also be rich in oil. Furthermore, Israel and Cyprus are also cooperating, and it seems likely that they will also form a consensus on how to share the undersea wealth still to be found.

Naturally, longtime rival Turkey has viewed the developments that unfolded between January and March 2007 with increased attention and alarm, and has made threatening demands against the Cypriot Republic. On the 27th of January, the President of the non-recognized Turkish state of Northern Cyprus, Mehmet Ali-Talat, stated that there is a chance of unexpected and violent developments due to Cypriot actions in relation to the oil issue (2). Then, on the 30th of January, the Turkish daily Hurriyet reported the demand by Ankara towards the Lebanese and Egyptian governments to withdraw their intention to research for oil in an area where Turkey has interests as well (3).

Moreover, the newspaper noted the willingness of the Turkish administration to react dynamically should its interests not taken into account. The accusations by Turkey that Cyprus does not represent the whole of the Island and the defense by Nicosia that it will continue with its project resulted in the circumnavigation of Cyprus by the Turkish Navy in a “tour de force” in early February (4). By that time the overall situation resulted in a multitude of press releases and op-eds in Turkey, Cyprus and Greece commenting on the possibility of a conflict with oil as the cause. Even though the international media did not give analytical coverage to the above, it came to the attention of the industry’s decision-makers interested in exploiting the vast amounts of hydrocarbon that rests beneath the Cypriot Sea.

On the 6th of March, Ronald Schilcher, the USA Ambassador in Cyprus, addressed the public via the CNNTurk TV sation and expressed the opinion that it is Cyprus’ sovereign right to decide whether it wishes to exploit oil that is found in its territorial or exclusive economic zone (5). This was a clear indication that the USA is very much interested in securing a strong percentage of influence in order to gain contracts for the extraction of oil in an era where energy security has become the catch phrase, and a political nightmare for many concerned power-brokers and corporations across the world.

Now, despite Turkish opposition, Cyprus has already begun the process of initiating a bidding procedure for the aforementioned oil fields. 11 areas off of southern Cyprus will be the first where the tests for oil will begin. The total surface area is around 70,000 sq. km, and there are also good indications of discovering natural gas as well. French consultants employed by the Cypriot government have already stated that at depths in excess of 3,000 meters there is also a high probability of discovering gas fields as well.

Cyprus has already stated that it will issue three types of permit in relation to the oil fields. The first will be for tests covering a one-year time-frame, the second for three years and lastly a 25-year development license according to which the companies will be able to produce and process oil and gas. As part of its marketing endeavors, from now until mid-July (when the first permits are set to be issued), the Cypriot government plans to organize trips across the major oil capitals of the world in order to market the new riches of the island to prospective investors.

The recent developments around the Cypriot oil treasure are also related with previous Turkish-Israeli initiatives that started back in 2001, when the Geophysical Institute of Israel, an Israeli research team and the TRAO Company (Turkish Petroleum) conducted explorations in the Alexandretta Gulf close to the Turkish–Syrian border. The head of the Israeli group, Ephraim Levi, stated in the Turkish press that there are large amounts of gas as well in the wider area and the results from the initial research were positive and satisfactory. However, over the past few years the cooling of Turkish-Israeli relations has put a hold on their joint exploration project, though it has not been abandoned.

The most recent development in energy relations between the two states was the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ehoud Olmert to Ankara in late February, when the plan for constructing an underwater oil pipeline from the Ceyhan Turkish port to the Israeli one of Aschalon. It is important to note that the first port mentioned is the major oil terminal for the Eastern Mediterranean region and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline transferring Caspian oil ends there (6). Therefore, the oil politics in this periphery are related with the wider geoeconomic structure created since the end of the Cold War, and of course it has attracted the interest of all global powers and energy related entities.

Another notable development is the agreement reached between Libya and Turkey in late 2004, concerning the exploitation of probable oil reservoir basins off the coast of the former. The investment by the Turkish companies was estimated at 2 billion USD. However, there is no current information regarding whether the research findings were satisfactory to proceed in commercial exploitation (7).

For the time being, the issue of Cypriot oil is gathering importance and all interested parties are trying to place themselves in a position of advantage. Large oil companies from the USA, Russia, the UK, China, Norway, France and Germany seem to be interested in investing for the assumed hydrocarbon reservoirs off the coast of Cyprus. For their part the government and business officials in Nicosia are touring the world’s oil capitals like London, Houston, New York and Moscow in order to muster support for the plans and advertise their deep sea wealth.

As can be easily understood, the importance of energy has as an effect the culmination of various diplomatic and geopolitical schemes. The US administration, which has traditionally gravitated towards a pro-Turkish stance on the perennial Cypriot issue, has moved a bit towards healing the sensitivities of the Greek Cypriots and the relations between the two states can be considered as excellent for the time being. The US Ambassador to Cyprus said in April that his country continues to value Cyprus as a close partner in the joint effort to combat terrorism, proliferation of WMD and organized crime (8). Addressing a ceremony for the donation of an underwater camera by the US Embassy and the US Customs to Cyprus’ Marine Police, Mr. Schlicher also said that he is pleased “the US and Cyprus continue to work closely together in many areas and that our co-operation with Cypriot law enforcement agencies continues to be excellent.”

Another parallel development is the enhanced French involvement in Cyprus and the wider Mediterranean region. Cyprus and France have signed an agreement for defense cooperation between the two countries in a bid to strengthen bilateral relations – a decision taken during Cyprus President Tassos Papadopoulos’ visit to France in November 2006. The agreement was signed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nicosia by Cypriot Minister of Foreign Affairs Yiorgos Lillikas and French Minister of Defense Michele Alliot-Marie.

In statements after the signing ceremony, Mr. Lillikas expressed his satisfaction and noted that it is a natural development of everything that was agreed during President Papadopoulos’ meeting with President Jacques Chirac. “France and Cyprus have always had excellent political relations, they have and share a common vision on international issues and now as EU partners have shown that with their approach they can contribute to peace in the Middle East,” Mr. Lillikas added.

“The crisis in Lebanon gave both countries the chance to cooperate in the military field with benefits not only for both countries but mainly for Middle East countries. I wish and hope that just as Cyprus proved to be a factor of stability in the Middle East region, the solution to the Cyprus problem and Cyprus‘ reunification will prove that Cyprus can, reunited, with the cooperation of all partners such as France, help in peace and stability in the region,” he also said.

Ms. Alliot-Marie said that it was an agreement which allows relations to strengthen between the two ministries, and added: “It provides for greater exchange in training issues, on the level of joint maneuvers, when analyzing the geostrategic situation. It is a continuation of the existing relations.” Already, both states train jointly regularly and French Special Operations Forces are backing up the Lebanon UN forces through the use of Cypriot bases, assorted with an aeronautical French team (9). Recent information that surfaced in a Greek defense journal reveals that during the military parade on the 14th of July in Paris, a Cypriot unit will participate- the first time an EU Army corps has been invited for the French national day, a sure indication of the warming in relations between these countries (10).

Overall, the island of Cyprus has upgraded its political, economic and military value and apart from the three guarantee forces of the 1959 Zurich treaty (Greece, Turkey and the UK), the USA and France, as well as Russia and the surrounding Middle Eastern states, are entangled in the regional political developments that amongst other include energy security. Cyprus is already a well-developed state and a recent report that was published by the European Commission last month describes future economic prospects as “excellent.” The production of hydrocarbon will further empower this island of 800,000 citizens to become the regional hub of Southeastern Europe, the East Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Middle East, thus reaching a market of around 1 billion people. On the other hand, the delicate geopolitical balances should be taken into account since the turbulent recent history of the region has produced conflicts and quagmires mostly related to the control of energy routes and supplies. The aspirations of some of the strongest global interest groups will once dominate the fate of the Eastern Mediterranean centered on Cyprus and based on the “black gold” underneath.

References:

(1) jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=420&&issue_id=4024

A paper by the Jamestown Foundation discussing the Cyprus oil issue

(2) www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=64926

Article by the Turkish Daily News newspaper concerning Ali-Talat’s statements

(3) www.iht.com/articles/2007/01/30/news/union.php

Article by the International Herald Tribune on the Turkish threats to Lebanon-Egypt

www.strategypage.com/qnd/balkans/articles/20070208.aspx

Report by the Strategy Page service on the Turkish Navy movements

(4) https://turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=67677

Article by the Turkish Daily News on the statements by the US Ambassador in Cyprus

(6)

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=2824

Paper by the Global Research organization on Turkish-Israeli joint energy projects

(7)Hellenic Defense Journal, Vol. 14, April 2007, P. 111

(8) www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/Embassies/HagueEmbassy.nsf/All/1D63CB4871188EAFC12572BB003957FA?OpenDocument&print

Press release by the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the US Ambassador’s statements

(9) www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/6AD36B7AD6606DFFC225729100367E73

Press release by the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the signing of the Cyprus-France defense agreement

(10) Strategy Defense Journal, Vol. 152, June 2007, P. 25

Exclusive: How the US Ordered Increased Activity against Macedonia’s Islamists after the Fort Dix Arrests

The May 7 arrests of six Islamic radicals, four of them ethnic Albanians originally from Macedonia and Kosovo, led American intelligence officials to issue a direct order to their Macedonian colleagues, urging them to redouble efforts against known and unknown Islamic radical elements in the country, Balkanalysis.com can now report.

The alleged aspiring terrorists have been held without bail since their arrest and were indicted on June 5. While the majority of news reports on the subject have remained preoccupied with details such as the “true’ nationality of the men arrested or their prior experience as refugees, or the larger legal issues of whether the FBI had erred into using entrapment, little was said of the ripple effect the operation would have on unfolding counterterrorism developments in the Balkans specifically.

However, according to two Macedonian intelligence officials speaking off the record, in a meeting held soon after the arrests in New Jersey, “we were told by our American colleagues to intensify our work [against Islamic extremist elements], and to find out more about their operations hereˆšÂ¢Â¬Ã„¦ and identify new players.”

This testimony contradicts the conventional wisdom that states the US is omniscient when it comes to counterterrorism work in the Balkans. This belief is cultivated by popular culture (television shows depicting ingenious agents performing daring and efficient operations, etc.) yet has apparently been instilled in the hearts of many. For example, one American official in Skopje surveyed by Balkanalysis.com regarding local security developments, shortly before the Fort Dix arrests were made, stated confidently that “we have a very good handle on the situationˆšÂ¢Â¬Ã„¦we are aware of everything going on [involving Islamic radicals].”

However, the fact that the US administration was caught off-guard by the Fort Dix arrests, and their links to the Balkans, is indicative that this is not always the case. What remains unclear is whether the order to the Macedonians to pick up the pace came as a result of a directive from Washington- and if so, from whom.

In the bigger picture, the fact that the arrests came also less than two months before President Bush’s trip to neighboring Albania can also be attested as a reason for enhanced vigilance. It would have happened, in other words, with or without a botched jihadist plot in New Jersey. A second major reason for a clean-up is of course the NATO conference in Ohrid on June 28-29, which has led to unprecedented security measures in this idyllic lakeside tourist town in preparation for over 800 foreign guests.

Indeed, according to the Macedonian intelligence officers, the CIA has, over the past 9 months, dramatically increased the frequency of requests for information on the growing fundamentalist Wahhabi community in Macedonia. This new focus has been mirrored by allied services, such as the British, French and Italian, not only in Macedonia but in Bosnia and, as Balkanalysis.com recently reported, in Albania as well.

Nevertheless, the disconnect between “mission accomplished’-type rhetoric and the reality is still wide. A less than discreet operational protocol is occasionally revealed in the details. A veteran European intelligence officer with long experience of the Balkans mocked an alleged American “intelligence-gathering” procedure in Skopje. “Once a week, without fail, they send someone from the embassy down to an Islamic bookstore in the Carsija (old town) of SkopjeˆšÂ¢Â¬Ã„¦and they buy all of the new Islamist literature, if there is any, bid them good day and go back.”

A second case indicating less than perfect knowledge was seen a year and a half or so back, when a Skopje newspaper presented the US Embassy with publicly-available data received from an outside party, confirming that an Albanian-language jihadist website, previously registered in Lebanon, had been transferred to the name of a Macedonian woman in an ethnically-mixed neighborhood in the central Macedonian town of Veles. “They seemed genuinely surprised by this and thanked us,” said one newspaper representative involved. Despite the provocative jihadist content of the website, nothing more was heard about whether the investigation yielded any results- or, more likely, whether it was even begun.

The discrepancy between assumed greatness and a more pedestrian reality is not surprising, considering the internal criticism that Western counterterrorism efforts have received in the past. In Balkanalysis.com director Christopher Deliso’s new book, The Coming Balkan Caliphate: the Threat of Islamic Extremism to Europe and the West, several former security professionals in the Balkans weigh in on the topic, generally supporting the thesis that the US does not necessarily know all that goes on- and, in some cases, deliberately seeks to avoid doing so.

The most outspoken of these officials is Tom Gambill, an OSCE Security Officer in Kosovo from 1999-2004. In numerous meetings and through private correspondence, Gambill presented evidence of a concerted Islamic fundamentalist build-up in Kosovo, sometimes involving known terrorist entities, to army and intelligence officials from the US and allied countries. When he mentioned such intelligence data gleaned from sources in the field indicating a terrorist presence, however, he was often ignored. “The peacekeeping motto was, “don’t rock the boat.’ So long as everything bad that was going on could be hushed up or smoothed over, the policy was to leave it alone.”

Gambill’s testimony is reminiscent of the situation in Bosnia a few years earlier where, according to the Jerusalem Post, the Clinton administration had sought “to keep the lid on the pot at all costs” regarding its role in abetting the Iranian infiltration of the country with mujahedin, military trainers and heavy weapons during the 1992-1995 civil war. While that was done to suppress an embarrassing and shortsighted government policy, the disregarding of dubious developments in Kosovo has had more to do with the general mediocrity and every-man-for-himself dynamic of a non-accountable UN peacekeeping mission.

While the foiled plot to massacre soldiers at Fort Dix appears to have been more a case of wishful thinking than anything else, it was an important case in that it showed that Balkan Muslims who had previously been helped by America could in fact turn against their benefactors. There have not been any demonstrated connections between the plotters and any groups in Macedonia, though US authorities were no doubt correct to err on the side of caution in ordering their local colleagues to take a more active stance.

Despite the unlikelihood that a specific connection will be found linking the “Fort Dix Six” to Macedonia, some dedicated security officers there took satisfaction in knowing that the arrests in New Jersey had spurred the US into action. “This (the arrests) was the best thing that could have happened for us,” said one intelligence officer. “Now we can get down to work and hopefully the Americans will respect more what we have to say.”

Future counterterrorism operations in Macedonia will likely branch out to new terrain. While the major population centers such as Skopje and Tetovo remain the places where most known radicals live, at present a significant trend is the growth of fundamentalist groups in the central and central-western mountainous areas of the country, from the Karadzica-Kitka massif westward to Debar, including rural areas near Prilep, Brod and Kicevo. Outside funding from Saudi Arabia, Turkey and others is responsible for the growth of Islam in predominantly poor and ethnically-confused mountainous areas that, with time, could materialize into more significant areas of concern, as the state has done little to offer social alternatives for marginalized groups.

……………………….

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Albanians in Tetovo Stunned by OSCE Official’s Call for Minority Language Obligations, but Government Fails to Capitalize

It was completely ignored in the local and international press. But the visit and speech of a top-ranking OSCE official to Macedonia on May 10 might just herald a turning point in the “international community’s” stance on minority rights and responsibilities in this small Balkan country, one necessitated by a realization that European Union countries are starting to suffer from the very same ills that have been notable in Macedonia for years, and which in fact led to a brief war in 2001.

Nevertheless, the government failed to take advantage of this support for Macedonia and the tacit acknowledgment that it is being treated as an equal with the Western countries- displaying yet again the hazards of a chronic head-in-the-sand policy of ignoring outside views on the country.

Ultra-liberal European views on minority rights have predominated for years in the Balkans, where allegedly altruistic interventionists have carried out social engineering experiments that would have been shot down in their home countries, usually to add luster to their careers, pad their resumes and make themselves feel like “players” on the international diplomacy scene. Some extreme examples of philosophies adopted by such people include the “consociationalism” project of Dutch professor Arend Lijphart, guaranteeing minorities veto power over majority-introduced legislation, and the Badinter Principle of rule, a convoluted but influential scheme by which the approval of the majority of the minority is needed to pass legislation.

In fact, the precise applicability of the latter is the issue that has been disingenuously manipulated by an ethnic Albanian party in Macedonia, the DUI, which found itself frozen out of power and has only recently returned to Parliament. Contrary to Macedonia‘s constitution and the Ohrid Agreement that ended the 2001 war (and which included heavy doses of minority protections), the DUI has sought, unsuccessfully, to make the Principle apply to the formation of government. If it had its way, the Principle would be applied universally and that merely as a stepping-stone to ethnic federalization.

If such a federalization project (itself perhaps merely the precursor to a “Greater Albania’ taking chunks of several neighboring countries as well as Kosovo) comes to pass, it will be partially the fault of the bumbling bureaucrats from without and their grand visions for multi-ethnic society. This has involved a fair amount of schizophrenia. In the case of Bosnia, the West is making concerted efforts to force the tripartite federation to devolve into a single state that would ruled by Muslims- a likely recipe for another war. In the case of Macedonia, however, European officials are apparently trying to keep federalization at bay, to preclude such a conflict.

Western officials have thus grown concerned by the Albanian approach to minority ‘rights’, which often seems to be code for federalization. The attitude can be seen in the previous bellicose threats of the DUI to order “their’ municipalities (meaning multi-ethnic municipalities where a DUI candidate won the mayoral seat) to boycott cooperation with the state. In one such municipality, Skopje‘s Cair, visitors can see this sentiment newly spray-painted as graffiti on a wall near the Skopjanka shopping mall: “Cair is not Macedonia,” it reads in English.

Such separatist sentiments, and the increasing trend of Albanians to not learn the Macedonian language, concern foreign officials. Within 15 years basic communication between the two groups will be minimal. However, more broadly, the reason why officials are taking a different tack now is a result of the more severe tests vocal and aggressive minorities, most acutely Muslim immigrants, are making of the very liberal rights laws in numerous Western countries, especially Britain and the Scandinavian states. Conservative websites such as the Brussels Journal carry frequent and often entertaining reports on this hot topic.

Now, with cherished old concepts of “Frenchness’ or what it means to be a Briton now being challenged, and whole swathes of Muslim-populated urban territory refusing the assimilate, powerful European states are finally starting to realize what Balkan countries such as Macedonia have known for years- that giving minorities unlimited rights without at the same time requiring certain responsibilities is a recipe for disaster.

One crucial and fundamental responsibility of minorities is language acquisition. At least this is so according to the very senior OSCE official who visited Macedonia last month and shocked an audience that had expected a much different lecture. In a speech called, “The Role of Education in Building a Pluralist and Genuinely Democratic Society,” OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Rolf EkˆšÃ‰Â¬Â©us made a succinct but powerful case for why minorities must learn the majority language of the country they inhabit.

Speaking in front of a crowd of professors, students and local politicians, EkˆšÃ‰Â¬Â©us gave a speech that caught the mostly Albanian audience by surprise. After a decade of being coddled when demanding — and getting — unending privileges while contributing little to the state’s welfare, and indeed causing a ruinous war in the process, it was not hard to understand why the Albanians might be surprised. The sea change in policy was evinced in pointed language that spoke directly to the source of the problem.

This, however, was preceded by the usual arguments for minority rights- which perhaps contributed to the way in which the primarily Albanian audience was caught off-guard. The high commissioner first underscored that the right to an education is a fundamental human right which “should be guaranteed without discrimination of any kind,” and that states “are obliged to promote mutual respect and understanding, and co-operation among all persons living on their territory, irrespective of those persons’ ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, in particular in the fields of education, culture and the media.”

The turning point in the speech began with the link to the pan-European problem of ethnic separatism. “While a pluralist and genuinely democratic society should enable the preservation of minority rights, separation along ethnic lines should be avoided at all costs,” affirmed Commissioner EkˆšÃ‰Â¬Â©us, “since it reinforces ethnic divisions within communities and serves as a fertile breeding ground for negative stereotypes and prejudices among different ethnic groups.”

The commissioner went on to discuss the importance of language, which “can be a tool of integration.” The crucial statement followed thus:

“However, for this to function properly, both the majority and minority must be willing to accept compromise. Integration, therefore, involves responsibilities and rights on both sides. The minority should be prepared to learn and to use the language or languages used by the State, normally the language of the majority. At the same time, the majority must accept the linguist rights of persons belonging to national minorities.”

For Macedonians, who have bitterly complained that they have made all of the compromises and received nothing in return from their country’s only restive minority, this should have been music to their ears. However, there were apparently few ears to hear, and no one subsequently reported the groundbreaking statements, which represent a sharp change of direction in policy from a representative of one of the most powerful Western institutions.

Commissioner EkˆšÃ‰Â¬Â©us went even further, however. Adding that a “lack of proficiency in the State language can further increase ethnic tension and segregation of communities along ethnic lines,” he hypothesized a long-term strategy for state survival in Macedonia, which would include “increasing State-language classes in the existing state curriculum and/or introducing bilingual educational programmes in schools,” a process which for minorities “benefits their integration into society and their access to public goods.” Such a scenario was decidedly not what Albanians wanted to hear, and in the question-and-answer period that followed they made this clear, according to one lecture attendee.

In fact, the depth of the disaffection felt by Albanians was reflected in the official blurb describing the event as published on the official SEE website. It emphasized the parts of the speech that called for protection of minority rights- but deviously made no mention at all of the commissioner’s call for minorities to take responsibility and learn the majority language.

A second vital topic in Commissioner EkˆšÃ‰Â¬Â©us’ speech had more subtle but equally significant implications- the deleterious role of politics in higher education. While not naming the South-East European University per se, it was clear that the OSCE official was voicing the great disappointment with which European donors see the steady decline of the university owing to the intrusion of politics and poor educational standards. Citing the most frequent problems in such universities, the commissioner called for “depoliticizing the appointment of school directors,” increasing the participation of independent experts, and fighting “undemocratic school governance”

The commissioner began the speech, in fact, by recalling that six years ago, when the SEE opened, European officials had “hoped that establishing such a University would support interethnic understanding, which is a necessary step for a well-integrated, multilingual society.”

The SEE began like all noble but ill-conceived Balkan humanitarian projects. During the late 1990′s, the so-called “Tetovo University” was banned by the government, leading to altercations between the authorities and angry Albanians. All that was needed, it was thought, was a shiny, modern university which would appease the latter and help guide them away from clan-based tribalism and into the 21st century. And so the SEE came into being, a sort of European fire brigade meant to put out the flames of nationalism in the form of a university. Of course, it didn’t work, and soon after the SEE opened, war broke out. A few years later, the previously illegal Tetovo University was legalized too.

That the commissioner’s concerns have come to pass owes to the predictable politicization of appointments in an institution that was seen by the Albanian parties as simply another goodie bag to be distributed, as well as to the generous — but finite — outside funding program which initially attracted many foreign professors motivated less by dreams of inter-ethnic harmony than by a 3,000-euro-per-month salary.

However, now that the SEE has devolved to substantially lower state-level salaries, and the international donations have dried up, most such professors have fled, leaving the SEE as just another crummy university with mainly local staff, riven by factionalism, political control and cronyism- albeit with nicer equipment than at other state schools.

According to present and former international faculty at the university, educational standards are often abysmal and corruption is rife. Off the record, professors speak of how ill-qualified offspring of political apparatchiks are promoted to positions well beyond their abilities and how militant groups and even Islamic fundamentalists are using the university as a recruiting ground. “You had to think twice when grading the exams of the students,” confided one former international teacher, “as you never knew who their father might be.”

All things considered, one might think that the center-right Macedonian government might highlight the Western call for the national integrity of the country that Commissioner EkˆšÃ‰Â¬Â©us’ visit and speech represented. However, they failed to take advantage of this great and unexpected gift, which by means of a not very challenging extrapolation put the country on equal footing with all of Europe on the issue of minority rights and responsibilities. Through the OSCE, Europe was speaking Macedonia‘s language, and all that was needed was a response. None came.

Most scandalously, planned meetings of Commissioner EkˆšÃ‰Â¬Â©us with Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski and Macedonian Deputy Prime Minister Gabriela Konevska-Trajkovska were all cancelled, “with very little prior notice” according to one official. In the end, the highest official the distinguished guest met was Imer Aliu, the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for the sector involved in implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and a nominee of the Albanian DPA party, the coalition partner of Gruevski’s VMRO-DPMNE. No offense to Mr. Aliu, but simple protocol demands that an official of the commissioner’s stature be received by the prime minister or president.

This blunder of protocol appears infinitely more suicidal in light of the specific content of the OSCE high commissioner’s speech in Tetovo. Numerous media reports have increasingly mentioned that European officials are becoming more and more disenchanted with the government’s perceived disinterest in at least listening to their well-meaning advice.

When visiting officials are not even acknowledged when they take considerable risk to defend Macedonia‘s national interest, as was the case with Commissioner EkˆšÃ‰Â¬Â©us, it becomes hard not to sympathize with these concerns. And so under the current conditions, if the high commissioner, or another official of his stature, returns to Macedonia he or she will have every reason to weigh the options before taking a spirited stance in support of the country.

Turkey’s Parliamentary Elections and the Long-Debated Cross Border Operation into Iraq

By Mehmet Kalyoncu

The timing of the Turkish army’s dramatic, though long expected, military move against the PKK across the Iraqi border has some suspecting that there is more than exigency behind the bold offensive. Considering that the pivotal Turkish parliamentary elections are due next month, is not the northern Iraq offensive really all about channeling the surging “patriotism’ of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) to erode votes from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of candidate and prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan?

Ever since the Turkish military’s digital intervention with the civilian administration on April 27th, there has been no shortage of political crises, each one causing the democratic process in the country to falter. The generals’ e-memorandum followed the halted parliamentary voting for president out of which the Republican People’s Party (CHP) managed to produce a regime threat. Then came the military’s insistence for an immediate cross-border operation against the Kurdish PKK camps in Northern Iraq, which is nowadays pronounced to possibly deal with the Barzani government as well.

At the same time, Turkey has gone into pre-election mode, and those parties who are bashing the AKP government for its alleged inability to deal with the most severe national security threat, most notably the MHP), now the main contender, have boosted their popular support. The phenomenon of politically expedient MHP nationalism has much less to do with the PKK or the so-called independent Kurdish state than it does with the parliamentary elections of July 22.

Secular vs. Islamist — OUT / Islamist vs. Nationalist — IN

For a long time, Turkish society was easily split and polarized along the lines of the secular-minded vs. the Islamists. However, the AK Party’s record over the last four and a half years has changed the whole equation, thereby making it less possible, if not impossible, to identify an Islamist counterpart or threat against the secular regime of the Republic.

This record has been noted by Western observers as well. “Mr. Erdogan’s government has been Turkey’s most successful in half a century,” argued the Economist in May. “After years of macroeconomic instability, growth has been steady and strong, inflation has been controlled and foreign investment has shot up. Even more impressive are the judicial and constitutional reforms that the AK government has pushed through. Corruption remains a blemish, but there is no sign of the government trying to overturn Turkey’s secular order. The record amply justifies Mr. Erdogan’s biggest achievement: to persuade the EU to open membership talks, over 40 years after a much less impressive Turkey first expressed its wish to join.”1

Nevertheless, ethnic Turkish vs. Kurdish nationalism fomented by the surge of PKK activities in the southeastern border of Turkey still provides fertile ground to polarize the country and evenly split the electoral vote. Given the hitherto conciliatory attitude of the mildly Islamist AK Party towards the secular establishment, its unprecedented economic and political successes, and finally its deliberate effort to avoid hot button issues such as the wearing of the head scarf depleted options for many in the ultra-secular circles to attack the AK Party.

Nevertheless, the PKK question and the possibility, perceived as a looming threat, of an independent Kurdish state have always been the weak spot of the AK Party, whose very legitimacy both at home and abroad is pretty much dependent on its continuous commitment to the EU and the United States- both of which seem profoundly allergic to any sort of cross-border military operation by the Turkish military. Therefore, the matter of dealing (or not dealing) with those two imminent threats is literally the only ground on which the AK Party government’s popular prestige could be undermined.

A less effective, but not totally ignorable, issue to be exploited is that of corruption. Yet given all the other parties’ records on corruption, it would be futile to attack the AK government with such allegations. It would in fact prove ineffective, especially so for the Nationalist Action Party, whose former minister has recently been sentenced with the highest corruption charges in the Republic’s history.

When it comes to exploiting popular sentiment over the Kurdish secessionist issue, however, the MHP has proven by far the most suitable contender against the AK Party. In his public rallies, MHP leader Devlet Bahceli frequently accuses the AKP government of being sluggish and dependent on the United States and the European Union to deal with the most severe national security threat, the PKK.2 Bahceli’s inflammatory and nationalistic speeches seem to be paying off. Recent polls about the upcoming parliamentary elections and the long debated cross-border military operation in Northern Iraq indicate that the new fault lines of “Islamists vs. nationalists” have already taken shape, rapidly closing the gap between the AKP and MHP constituencies.

The Polls: Changing Numbers

Two recent online polls, conducted by Turkish polling groups Turkiyesecimleri.com and Secimsonucu.com asked the participants to identify which political party they would vote for in the upcoming July 22 parliamentary elections, indicating a sharp increase in the expected vote count for the MHP, a slight increase or decrease respectively in the AK Party votes and an absolute decline in the Republican People’s Party (CHP) votes.

According to the first poll, which surveyed some 159,897 people, the top-three ranking is as follows: the AK Party (39.19%), the MHP (24.6 %), and then the CHP (12.72%). Compared to the November 3rd 2002 election results, which brought the AK Party into office with a sweeping electoral majority (34.38%) while making the CHP have to be content with 19.39% and leaving the MHP outside the parliament with only 8.36% (below the 10 % threshold), the poll shows a plummeting in the CHP votes whereas a sharp, almost incomprehensible, surge in the MHP votes has been registered. The second poll, to which some 224,328 people responded, demonstrates the same pattern of change: the AK Party in the lead at 32%, followed by the MHP with 21%, and finally the CHP at 16%.

What can possibly explain this pattern? Why did not the decline in the CHP votes, the main rival to the AKP, reflect as an increase in votes for the latter? And what caused such a radical increase in the popularity the MHP, which today offers essentially nothing more than it ever has, and which could not even get into the parliament five years ago?

The recent presidential election process, which was eventually aborted and delayed until after the parliamentary elections, has in fact been a political showdown between the AK Party and the CHP. The latter’s extreme tactics, such as invoking military intervention to halt the AKP majority parliament voting for the president, and making it a matter of regime threat have alienated a substantial number of its own constituency. These tactics have in fact also resulted in the resignation of some of the party’s deputies. They have publicly stated that the reason for their resignation was their party’s anti-democratic attitude toward the presidential elections. The public opinion polls were at the same time hinting that a growing number of people from center left and center right parties were gravitating toward the AK Party, thereby hinting that a second reactionary vote explosion would almost double the AKP votes.

However, that old standard-bearer of nationalism, the MHP, has instead emerged as a main contender to the incumbent AK Party, thanks to leader Bahceli’s inflammatory speeches. They have played on wounded pride among the Turkish people over the Iraq invasion and resulting deterioration of the security situation in the border area, and so fueled popular unrest against the AK Party government. Essentially, the MHP leader is accusing the government of being a mere puppet in the hands of the United States and the European Union, unable or unwilling to assert itself to safeguard national security against Kurdish insurrectionists.

An example of this rhetoric manifested in a recent rally speech in the eastern Anatolian town of Erzurum, a place well known for the strength of its nationalist sentiment. Bahceli urged PM Erdogan to unleash the army in order to erect the Turkish flag at the top of Mount Qandil, where the PKK terrorists are based in Northern Iraq.3

According to another poll carried out by the website Turkiyesecimleri.com, to which some 10,211 people responded, 72.12% of Turks support military intervention in Northern Iraq, while 13.42% oppose it outright, A slightly higher figure (14.46%) prefer a diplomatic solution. Simultaneous developments such as the confrontation between Ankara and Iraqi Kurdish leader Barzani, the AKP Government’s hopeless wait for action from the United States against the PKK, and the surge in the MHP votes, show that fanning the nationalistic sentiments against the AKP government who seem sluggish to deal with the most imminent national security threat is the best strategy to garner popular support nowadays.

It is hardly difficult to realize that neither can the Nationalist Action Party win the elections simply by bashing the AK Party for its failure to deal with the PKK, nor can the Republican People’s Party (CHP) prevent the AK Party from retaining office by portraying it as a major threat to the secular regime.

However, their concerted effort before the elections and in a future parliamentary coalition after the election will dramatically curb the AK Party’s ability to govern. The result will likely manifest itself not only in a slowdown in the EU accession process, but also in a more consistently aggressive attitude toward the Kurds of Northern Iraq. In this equation the Turkmen minority of that region, whose rights Turkey claims to be protecting, will also assume greater importance.

What is at Stake for the AKP, the US and the EU?

Unless the United States and the European Union change their course against the PKK and provide substantial assistance to the AKP government to tackle the terrorist organization, Turkish democracy, which has so far managed avoiding a repeat of the lively old tradition of the military coup, will be exposed to a civilian one. That is, the AK government will simply be punished by a sizeable moderately nationalist vote at the ballot box, just because of its compliance with the United States and the European Union, and its seemingly sluggish approach to the national security threat.

No matter what will be considered as the reason for the AK Party losing its mandate and Turkey returning back to the chronically ineffective coalition governments that preceded this government, for majority mainstream voters in Turkey and for the moderate majority in the broader Muslim world, the reason for the democratic failure will be simple: the United States and the European Union, whose support for democratic change in the Muslim world is perceived simply as shallow rhetoric. Jamal Khashoggi, editor of Saudi Arabia’s al-Watan newspaper, says the Turkish experience has broader implications: “If that experience fails,” he writes, “it will be a setback for modern Islamist movements and it will be a disaster for the western dream of encouraging a secular form of Islam.”4

Certainly, there are and will be interest groups in both Washington and Brussels whose primary objective is not to make sure a sustainable democracy takes root in Turkey but to secure a government in Ankara that would be more compliant with their narrow interests than the AKP government has been. However, policy makers in both capitals should act according to their respective country’s and Union’s long-term interests. In his 1997 tome, The Grand Chessboard, the veteran American diplomat Zbigniew Brzezinski provided a definitive account of how the United States’ and the European Union’s long-term interests are tightly intertwined with sustainable stability in Turkey: “Turkey’s evolution and orientation are likely to be especially decisive for the Caucasian states. If Turkey sustains its path to Europe — and if Europe does not close its doors to Turkey — the states of the Caucasus are also likely to gravitate into the European orbit, a prospect they fervently desire. But if Turkey’s Europeanization grinds to a halt, for either internal or external reasons, then Georgia and Armenia will have no choice but to adapt to Russia’s inclinations.”5

Recent developments prove that Azerbaijan could also face a similar fate. In complete disregard for what Baku has to say about it, Russian President Vladimir Putin counter-proposed his American counterpart George W. Bush’s proposal to install aEuropean missile defense shield in a facility in Azerbaijan, which was built during Soviet times, and is still available for Russia’s use under a continuing agreement between Russia and Azerbaijan.6 Paralyzed with its own chronic problems and likely to experience major blunders over its EU accession with France’s Nicholas Sarkozy, Ankara is far from recognizing the possible political and security implications of Moscow’s growing influence in the region, let alone somehow being able to counter it.

Finally, Ofra Bengio’s reminder about the background of the rising National Action Party (MHP), whose supporters were active recently to publish and distribute Metal Firtina, the fiction prophesizing a major war between Turkey and the United States, hints at what we can expect regarding the possible changes in the Turkish public opinion: “[m]ost of the parties or groupings had in their background anti-Semitic tendencies. This was especially true of the Republican Peasants’ and National Party (Cumhuriyetci Koylu Millet Partisi, CKMP), which later became the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), headed by Alpaslan Turkes. In the 1930s the Turkish ultranationalists were strongly influenced by Nazi propaganda, and anti-Semitism became one of their trademarksˆšÂ¢Â¬Ã„¦ Hitler’s Mein Kampf was published and extensively distributed by Turkish nationalists.”7

 

1 “Turkey: The Battle for Turkey’s Soul”, The Economist May 3rd 2007 available at http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9116747 (accessed on June 6, 2007)

 

2 “Bahceli, AK Parti’ye yuklendi”, Zaman available at http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?haberno=547628&keyfield=6465766C65742062616863656C69 (accessed on June 5, 2007)

 

3 “Bahceli, AK Parti’ye yuklendi”, Zaman available at http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?haberno=547628&keyfield=6465766C65742062616863656C69 (accessed on June 5, 2007)

 

4 “Arab Islamists view Turkey crisis as test for democracy”, Financial Times May 15 2007

 

5 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books 1997, p.149

 

6 “Russian President Putin proposes Azerbaijan for US missile defense shield”, Today’s Zaman June 8 2007

 

7 Ofra Bengio, The Turkish-Israeli Relationship: Changing Ties of Middle Eastern Outsiders, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, May 2004, p.76

Western Intelligence Services Focus on Albania’s Islamist Groups ahead of US Presidential Visit

By Christopher Deliso

With additional reporting from Albania by Stavros Markos

Tirana is swarming with American and British intelligence officers and Secret Service personnel ahead of American President George W. Bush’s June 10 visit to Albania. While such attention is standard procedure before any such trip anywhere in the world, specific local conditions are being factored in to the equation. According to published Albanian media sources and off-the-record testimony from Western intelligence officials, the US security detail, with support from the ever-faithful British MI6, is particularly keen to neutralize small Islamic fundamentalist organizations operating in the country. But a mysterious explosion near the US embassy on May 16 and two munitions seizures on May 30 have still not been attributed to any group.

In 1999, after the Kosovo intervention, Secretary of Defense William Cohen and President Clinton were both forced to cancel visits to Albania because of threats from a mostly Egyptian, but Saudi and bin Laden supported, terrorist cell that had entrenched itself in Albania during the early 1990′s. As will be seen, there remains great confusion regarding the circumstances of these cancellations and the foggy fate of one of Albania’s leading terrorist supporters during the 1990′s, Abdul Latif Saleh.

The Wider Context: A Complex Range of Turbulent Issues

On his trip, President Bush will also visit the Czech Republic, Poland, Italy and Bulgaria. The main event underpinning the trip, the June 6-8 Group of Eight (G8) summit in Germany, promises to be a tense affair dominated by the final status of Kosovo. Two days later in Tirana, Bush will meet with Albanian President Alfred Moisiu and Prime Minister Sali Berisha. It is likely that the outcome of the G8 Summit, and whatever agreements can be reached behind the scenes there, will color the president’s public comments in Tirana- regardless of whatever packaged soundbytes his speechwriters have already prepared.

The president is visiting Europe at a particularly sensitive time. A proposed but highly unpopular missile shield in the Czech Republic s already bringing out protesters. While there will probably not be protests in “pro-American” Albania, the independence of Kosovo, and the showdown with Russia and Serbia that the West has forced with this policy adventure, looms large- as do concerns over lurking Islamist elements.

Further, the president will hold meetings with the prime ministers of the three new candidate countries for NATO membership (Croatia, Albania and the Republic of Macedonia), something that has led Greek media to conjecture that the latter will receive an invitation to join NATO under its constitutional name- anathema for the Greeks, for whom the “Macedonian name issue” is returning as a hot political topic in advance of election season. In Albania itself, there have been several attacks by nationalists against Byzantine churches and Greek Orthodox Christians in the south.

A final issue is the legacy of America’s controversial detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which lives on in Albania- the only country so far which has taken in prisoners discharged from the military facility. Most cannot return to their home countries, for fear of being tortured or killed. This was the case with the five Chinese Uighurs taken in by the Albanian government.

However, a recent BBC profile of ex-Guantanamo prisoners in Albania presents the daily reality of these de facto refugees in a highly unflattering light. A May 18 visit from the British media group to “the ramshackle refugee centre on the outskirts of Tirana” where eight Guantanamo “graduates” live mentioned the case of an Algerian who “cannot leave the country to be re-united with his familyˆšÂ¢Â¬Ã„¦ [nor] can they join him to live in Albania.” While the man, Abu Mohammed, is a trained doctor, not knowing the Albanian language he has little chance to find such work in the country. While Albania has presented its acceptance of the ex-prisoners as a gesture of help and support to its American patron, the mens’ lawyers and reports such as the BBC’s indicate that the country is being used more as a dumping ground for the unwanted “human trash” of the so-called “war on terror.’

Security Preparations

Along with the invasion of Iraq, Guantanamo is one of the main issues to have angered Albania’s Islamist groups. Since some of these groups have shadowy foreign sponsors, the Americans are obviously taking no chances with security. On May 16, an explosion in a Tirana cafˆšÃ‰Â¬Â© located very close to the US Embassy injured one waitress. According to the Associated Press, “police are investigating who was responsible and what sort of device was used.”

Most recently, on May 30, “a plastic bag containing a few grams of explosives was found at 2 p.m. [in] a courtyard at the economics faculty of Tirana University, about 100 meters [from] the U.S. Embassy,” reported the IHT, adding that “half an hour later, a package containing 30 grams (1 ounce) of explosives was found at Mother Teresa Square, near the office of President Alfred Moisiu.”

While it cannot be proven, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that these were deliberate plants by the authorities made in order to scare citizens into accepting the draconian security measures that will be in place for Bush’s visit. Indeed, Tirana residents are likely to feel more than a little restricted. According to BIRN, the Albanian capital will be turned into “a high-security zone.” This apparently means “a complete shut down of traffic in the capital and rooftop snipers on every major building along the route of the Bush motorcadeˆšÂ¢Â¬Ã„¦ most residents of apartment blocks close to places Bush is expected to visit will be prohibited from appearing on their balconies.” For the record, the preparations are being made under direction of the US Secret Service by a working group headed by Deputy Premier Gazmend Oketa.

Most recently, the Albanian parliament passed an extraordinary law that allowed a select team of US troops to accompany Bush on his visit. The act, passed by the Albanian parliament’s Law and National Security Commission, applies only to Bush’s visit.

While the high level of security is usual practice for a presidential visit it, as well as the grenade explosion and explosives seizures, are at the same time somewhat at odds with the country’s reputation as a bastion of pro-Americanism.

Indeed, the extravagant security operation is being conducted with the awareness that Islamic extremists operating in Albania and neighboring Kosovo could pose a threat, despite numerous efforts to contain them. The borders with Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro remain porous and easily exploitable.

According to several security sources, Albania itself hosts a small fundamentalist Wahhabi community, funded by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. It is this factor that, according to a former MI6 officer, led the British spy agency to double its presence in Albania in mid-2006. The former officer adds that with the election of French President Sarkozy, a ‘strong Europe’ conservative, we can expect the French DGSE to take a more robust role in the region as well, in coordination with the British.

Islamic Inroads

Further, the Albanian newspaper Shqip recently claimed that a “Wahhabi sect” active within the Islamic Community in Albania poses a threat as a potential supporter of terrorism in the future. As elsewhere in the Balkans, the report notes, Muslims in poor rural areas are taking monthly “salaries” in order to dress and behave in the Wahhabi fundamentalist way.

However, the Islamic community allegedly does not have the authority to control extremists inside their society, “often claiming that this problem is an obligation of the Penal Code of the Albanian Constitution.” In January 2002, a senior Islamic Community offficial, Salih Tivari, was murdered by extremists after pledging to cut down foreign influence and funding within the Islamic Community.

A number of foreign Islamic charities, such as the “mainstream” Islamic Relief, still work in Albania under humanitarian pretexts. In neighboring Kosovo, Islamic relief has tried to become an economic, social and religious force in rural areas forgotten by the West such as Skenderaj (indeed, the charity itself describes “isolated mountain villages” as its speciality in Albania). The organization has field offices in interesting locations: Shkodra, a largely Catholic city in northern Albania; and Pogradec, a not especially religious town but one strategically located on Lake Ohrid near the Macedonian border. Macedonian security officials have noted that attempted penetration of foreign Islamist charities via Albania was carried out, unsuccessfully, in the past.

While the Lake Ohrid area is not regarded as a significant area for Islamic extremism, it has not stopped international sponsors from reinforcing the faith. In the small village of Lin on the northwest corner of the lake, for example, the United Arab Emirates built an impressive mosque — the Fakhira Harib el Khili Xhamija — in 2001.

In Shkodra, as elsewhere in Albania, religious fault lines are being exploited by both conservative Christian and Muslim groups. Tensions have risen with perceived provocations between Catholics and Muslims, as was the case when a cross was put up in Shkodra, and then mysteriously vandalized in January 2006. And, when civic leaders wanted to honor national hero Mother Teresa with a statue, three Muslim groups — the Association of Islamic Intellectuals, the Albanian Muslim Forum and the Association of Islamic Charities — publicly protested.

The former, a relatively new group which allegedly supports interfaith relations, declared that a statue of one of the world’s most renowned humanitarian figures would be a “provocation” to Muslims.

In November 2005, Muslim groups were further enraged when Albanian President Alfred Moisiu, speaking at the Oxford Union in England, declared that only a “shallow” sort of Islam exists in Albania, a country with allegedly much stronger and more durable Christian roots. The MFA and other Islamic groups condemned the president for “insulting Islam.”

Other issues, such as the building of churches and the previous debate over whether Albania should accept the discharged Guantanamo prisoners, have also provided great opportunity for rhetorical displays from such pressure groups, which are becoming increasingly vocal and active. As the rhetorical battle heats up, and the imminent independence of Kosovo dissolves the urgency of strictly nationalist mentalities, the animosities between Catholics, Muslims and occasionally Orthodox will only increase.

Final Puzzling Discrepancies

The Albanian intelligence service, the SHISH, operates under the direct orders of the Americans and, when deemed appropriate, the British. This was not always entirely the case. In fact, ironically, the reason why Islamic extremists entered the country in the first place was due to the former head of the spy agency, Bashkim Gazidede, a devout Islamist. During the early 1990′s, the SHISH was therefore both arresting foreign extremists under CIA orders and enabling others. When terrorist leaders such as Osama bin Laden himself visited Albania, it was under the pretext of subsidizing the desperately poor post-Communist country. Sali Berisha, then president, was happy to accept the help, even making Albania Europe’s only member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference- without gaining parliamentary approval.

According to Albanian security expert Damian Gjiknuri, Gazidede, a former chairman of the Islamic Intellectuals Association of Albania was in the early 1990′s “working around the clock receiving official delegations from the Arab world, hence deviating from the official duties and even compromising national security.” In 1997, after the corrupt pyramid schemes collapsed and brought total anarchy to the country, the Berisha government was toppled and Gazidede fled, in July 1997. Reportedly, he went to the Middle East and was later protected and employed by Turkey’s MIT intelligence service.

What happened subsequently is opaque. It was reported that the former spychief returned to Albania in December 2005, following Sali Berisha’s re-election, on a Turkish Airlines flight. However, a European security official claims that this “sighting” was of a body double, and that Gazidede really returned via ship, from Turkish-held North Cyprus. Neither account can be confirmed. Since May 2006, German and Albanian news reports have claimed that Gazidede was given a state job overseeing property issues, but is now in Rome for medical treatment. In any case, it seems that Gazidede is no longer in a position to cause mischief.

A more perplexing disappearance has been that of Abdul Latif Saleh, once a major player on Tirana’s Islamic fundamentalist scene. This Jordanian radical employed by the Saudi government was also the business manager in Albania for Yassin al-Qadi, a Saudi tycoon was designated a terrorist sponsor by the US Treasury in October 2001. Although his American assets were frozen by the Bush administration, al Qadi’s web of business connections means he has not been touched abroad, and indeed his close connections with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan resulted in his exoneration in that country last year.

In the 1990′s, al-Qadi was one of the leading Arab investors in Albania. His 15-story business centers (they would be seized by the Albanian government in 2002) were known, ironically, as Tirana’s “Twin Towers.” Al-Qadi, the founder and chief investor in the terrorist fundraising charity, Muwafaq (“Blessed Relief’), was alleged by the US government to have laundered $10 million for bin Laden through his business interests and charities. Investigators would also claim that Abdul Latif Saleh, the 45-year-old general manager of al-Qadi’s construction company, sugar importing firm and medical center, had been given $600,000 by Osama bin Laden for terrorist cells in Albania.

In September 2005, a US Treasury announcement reiterated its claims about the Jordanian. “Saleh has multiple ties to al Qaida, ranging from the Al Haramain Foundation to Yasin Qadi to Usama bin Laden,” said Stuart Levey, the Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI). “This designation identifies him as a terrorist facilitator and ensures that he will no longer be able to operate unencumbered.”

What this actually meant remains unclear. If Saleh would not be allowed to operate”unencumbered,” would he still be allowed to operate at all, and if so, why? At the same time that US forces in Afghanistan were rounding up random dark-skinned individuals and sending them to Cuba, it was allowing well known terrorist supporters in Europe, such as Saleh, to vanish into thin air.

For example, on November 12, 1999, “following a tip-off from US security services,” Saleh was detained by the Albanian SHISH and was then mysteriously flown by the US “to an unknown country.” A Tirana newspaper claimed that the arrest was related to President Clinton’s upcoming visit to Kosovo. Nevertheless, Saleh was apparently released undamaged, since he was able to make it back to Albania to be expelled again in 2002. According to the US Treasury, Saleh’s last known address was in the United Arab Emirates. Various reports have since placed him everywhere from Yemen to Afghanistan to supporting Muslim extremists in Kosovo.

Why the US would allow a known terrorist supporter to ride off into the sunset, even as it was detaining hundreds of people whose connections to terrorism were tenuous to non-existent, is likely to remain an enigma; however, Saleh’s affiliation with Yassin al Qadi, a powerful mogul with substantial investments around the world and former clients such as the US military itself, may well have played a part in the hands-off approach. A source with close ties to the US intelligence establishment would not confirm the scenario, but conceded that “this possibility cannot be denied.”

On April 30, 2007 the UN Security Council issued a press release updating its information on Saleh. It did not present any new information regarding his whereabouts, but it did note that he had been given an Albanian passport on two occasions (March 8, 1993 and December 1, 1995). This seems to have come shortly after a Tirana newspaper published this information.

The press release also replaced the name of one of Saleh’s alleged terrorist affiliations — the Salafist Group for Call and Combat — with the renamed version of the same Algerian Wahhabi extremist group, The Organization of Al QaˆšÃ‰Â¬Ã˜da in the Islamic Maghreb. On April 11, 2007, the group claimed responsibility for an Algiers bombing that killed 24 and wounded 222. North African terrorist groups have been fingered almost unanimously by Western intelligence experts as the most dangerous new development for possible terrorist attacks in France or Spain.

Interestingly enough, the press release also replaced under its “other information” section the word “na” (not applicable) with “expelled from Albania in 1999″- thus ignoring the Albanian government’s subsequent expulsion of Saleh in 2002. This omission only casts further doubts on why the shadowy terrorist sponsor was allowed to escape Albania, at a time when the Clinton-pioneered “extraordinary renditions” policy was in full swing in that country.

An Israel in the Balkans?

By David Binder

Could Kosovo, as a newly independent state in the middle of the Balkan Peninsula, become a second Israel? A thorny question: Merely linking Kosovo and Israel in the same sentence could invite accusations of anti-Zionism on the one hand or anti Illyrianism on the other. Yet there are some historic parallels.

I do not propose to evaluate the parallels in terms of good or bad, but rather to explore the question of what happens when great powers try to resolve ethnic and territorial disputes by authorizing a new national state. A basic question poses itself: whether the creation of an Israel or a Kosovo is a factor fostering stability in its region, or fostering strife.

Since its birth Israel has fought five wars as well as engaging in numerous lesser combat actions. In modern times, Kosovo has been the scene of major battles at the end of World War II and again in 1999. The foundation of the State of Israel began with the partition 60 years ago of what had been the British Mandate of Palestine into separate homelands for Jews and for Palestinians.

The UN General Assembly approved the United Nations Partition Plan with a two-thirds majority. In May 1948, a provisional government announced the creation of the State of Israel. US President Harry Truman, who had previously been skeptical about the viability of an independent Jewish entity, swiftly declared de facto recognition of Israel (de jure recognition followed in 1949).

While American political support for Israel was strong and steady, substantial financial assistance was slower in coming. It started with a $100 million loan in 1949, but now amounts to nearly $3 billion in annual grants.

Kosovo became a ward of the United States in a similarly stumbling fashion. In late December 1992 – eight months into the Bosnian civil war – President George H.W. Bush sent a letter to President Slobodan Milosevic declaring: “in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.”

At that time there was no physical conflict whatsoever in Kosovo. So the Bush message struck the Serbian leadership like a bolt out of the blue. But the marker was set and the warning was repeated later by the Clinton Administration. The US finally implemented it in March 1999 with heavy air attacks.

Then, as soon as Serbian forces withdrew, President Clinton dumped Kosovo into the hands of the United Nations. Since it was taken over by the UN, Kosovo, the eternal economic basket case, has received more than $500 million from the United States and $3 billion from the European Union.

In the case of Israel, foreshadowing its creation was the Nazi genocide, which provided surviving European Jews and their supporters with a powerful argument for establishment of a Jewish homeland. In addition, from World War I on there was also a strongly articulated contention that nations had the right to self-determination. In the case of Jews that was the starting point of the Zionist cause in the late 19th century. In the argumentation of Albanians, Kosovo was the scene of genocidal actions by Serbs -although they do not dare to compare it to the fate of European Jews in World War II. (Their contentions were also weakened by the Albanians’ savage treatment of Kosovo Serbs).

Rather, the most vehement Albanian demands are framed in terms of the right of self-determination. For a long time they have been staunchly backed by the United States. As Condoleezza Rice stated on May 15: “it is important now to recognize that Kosovo will never again be part of Serbia.”

As it enters its seventh decade, Israel appears to be a fairly secure entity, despite being surrounded by hostile neighbors. The Zionist dream of Greater Israel (Eretz Yisrael Hashlemah) – including biting off big chunks of its neighbors – has been reduced to nibbles by militant settlers in West Bank lands. Yet Israel for all its extraordinary accomplishments remains a factor of great instability, not only in its immediate vicinity but well beyond. Now here is Kosovo on the eve of possible independence -no longer as a ward of the UN, but of the European Union. What are its prospects? Given the ambitions of the more militant elements among the Albanians — including fanatical elements in the diaspora – one wonders whether an independent state of Kosovo will contribute to stability in the region. (Stability, we must keep in mind, is the declared policy goal of the United States and of the European Union in the Balkans.)

As with the Zionists of yore harkening back to Biblical times, contemporary Albanians cultivate myths of Illyrian ancestry which would make them coeval with classical Greeks, and of an ancient “Dardania,” encompassing Kosovo, southern Serbia, western Macedonia and northern Albania. (Some chauvinistic elements toy with the idea of renaming the province “Dardania”.) Myths are harmless if they are confined to books and songs. For a dozen years Illyria Newspaper, published in the Bronx, carried a map of the “Greater Albania” encompassing pieces of Macedonia, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro. But the Illyria-Dardania myths have also inspired forays by armed Albanian militants into places like western Macedonia and southern Serbia, as well as irredentist threats to southern Montenegro (“Malesia”) and northwestern Greece (to Albanians, “Chameria”).

Could a new State of Kosovo with its barely tested government and security forces, made up in large part by former Kosovo Liberation Army fighters, cope with such elements? Could the European Union and the remains of KFOR still posted in the region contain Kosovo?

*David Binder (born 1931) was a correspondent for The New York Times from 1961 until 2004. He specialized in coverage of central and eastern Europe, based in Berlin, Belgrade and Bonn. The current piece was published in Belgrade‘s Politika on May 25, 2007.