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In Macedonia, Foreign Perceptions Indicate Government’s Blind Spots

While considerable foreign support remains for Macedonia and its leadership, the tenor and tone of recent foreign media reports reveal possible trouble ahead.
By Christopher Deliso*
After a snowy weekend in which first-round presidential and local voting unfolded peacefully and without major reported incidents of fraud, Macedonians are feeling relief that they seem to have passed their [...]

One Last Hurrah for Bosnia’s International Rulers

By Dr. Darragh Farrell*
By the beginning of next month it should be known who the next High Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) will be. It is probably safe to assume that the next High Representative will also be the last, despite the fact that the previous two holders of the post, Christian [...]

Post-Soviet NATO, or the Rebirth of the Warsaw Pact?

By Anahit Shirinyan*

On February 4, 2009, the presidents of the seven member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, signed an agreement in Moscow during a session of the Collective Security Council to set up a rapid response force.

In the past the CSTO had such a rapid deployment force consisting of 3,000 troops however, as noted by Russian Federation President Dmitry Medvedyev, all this merely existed on paper. The new agreement envisages increasing the number of troops to 10,000. Each of the member states will allocate one battalion to the rapid reaction force. Each nation’s battalion will be stationed on its own soil and under its command.

Will Armenian forces fight against the Taliban?

The signing of the agreement has lead analysts to conclude that Moscow wishes to bring the Warsaw Pact back to life and that the new agreement is nothing less than a challenge to Washington and its NATO allies. In particular it was Russian President Medvedyev who gave rise to such conclusions when he declared that the force to be created would be combat ready, armed with the latest military technology and on a par with NATO forces in terms of overall military resources.

Medvedyev also noted that the CSTO and EurAsEC (Eurasian Economic Community) summits signal new qualitative Russian relations with the member states of these organizations both on a multilateral and bilateral level. According to official information,   The officials at various levels enumerated possible missions such as: deterring and repelling aggression by conventional military forces; defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the organization’s member countries; conducting “special operations”; and dealing with asymmetrical threats and challenges, including international terrorism, radical Islam, and other forms of “violent extremism,” trans-border organized crime and drug trafficking, and even natural or technological disasters.

These challenges, by the way, are mostly hanging over the head of the central Asian republics and their source is to be found in neighboring Afghanistan. As expressed by Sergei Prikhodko, the Russian President’s Foreign Policy Advisor, Afghanistan is the primary threat to the organization in terms of security.   “The CSTO summit and its decisions are the joint response to those threats arising from its southern borders – the activities of the Taliban, the situation in Afghanistan and, to a large degree, in Palestine,” he stated.

Collective disagreement

The signing of the agreement, however, wasn’t unanimously accepted by all member states of the organization. Ukraine signed on with certain reservations, agreeing to the deployment of its forces to individual missions rather than on a permanent basis. The agreement led to widespread displeasure in Belarus. The political opposition there charged Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenka with violating the country’s constitution because it prohibits the deployment of Belarus armed forces outside its state borders.

In addition, the Belarus Constitution notes that the Belarus strives to be a neutral nation. Nevertheless, a spokesperson for the country’s ministry of foreign affairs publicly declared that the Belarus army cannot be stationed in post-Soviet hot spots, in conflict zones, given that the country’s constitution doesn’t allow it.

Perhaps what is noteworthy is that the CSTO member states are either not buoyed by the prospect of the application of collective forces in general or either each of them regards that new mechanisms are more beneficial. In addition, some of the CSTO member states are on friendly terms with one another.

In the estimation of analysts, the new agreement is most beneficial for Russia. As noted by Kremlin advisor Gleb Pavlovsky, the CSTO is of prime significance to Russia “in opposition to Georgia, a vengeful aggressor state that seeks to revise borders”. Experts are of the opinion that the most important program in the back of Moscow’s mind is to employ CSTO forces as a peacekeeping detachment across the post-Soviet expanse.

Aleksei Maleshenko, a resident scholar at the Moscow office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, views the new agreement as the latest step by Moscow to strengthen its influence in former Soviet countries. Nevertheless, Mr. Maleshenko doesn’t think that the CSTO will begin to play an active role in regional security issues. “I cannot picture the CSTO taking any real action. For example, it will not fight against NATO in Abkhazia or within the borders of Georgia. In the same manner, it will not come to the rescue of any of the presidents in the case of an Islamic-inspired uprising,” notes Mr. Maleshenko.

“In a more tangible sense than other CSTO countries, Armenia regards this arrangement as beneficial to itself. Yerevan welcomes the February 4 decision to create a rapid response force in Yerevan’s own frame of reference,” writes the Eurasia Daily Monitor, alluding to the Karabakh conflict. “Armenia views the CSTO primarily as a conventional military actor as well as a framework for Russian protection of Armenian territorial gains against Azerbaijan. This traditional view contrasts with that of Central Asian governments, which expect the CSTO to deal with asymmetrical threats and challenges, such as those associated with terrorism, from non-state sources”.

The prime targets of the CSTO, terrorism, Islamic extremism, narco-trafficking, etc, are truly the most vexing problems confronting Central Asia. However, these countries however aren’t all that disposed to deploying there forces in other locations. In addition, conflicts amongst these countries on a host of issues (water resources, ethnic problems) continue till today and securing cooperation amongst them is a complex task indeed.

What is most important, however, is that for Russia the central Asian countries aren’t the most reliable of partners. It was only after Russia agreed to give Kyrgyzstan a financial package     of $300 million in cash (in addition to $1.7 billion investment and $180 million in debt relief) to close the American military base at Manas.

In the words of Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev the reason for the move is because the rent being paid by the United States wasn’t sufficient as well as the fact that a negative backlash had taken hold in Kyrgyz society regarding the activities of the American forces.

The Manas military base, established in 2001, plays an important role in the U.S.-led war against terrorism in Afghanistan. The possibility that the Kyrgyz authorities will back down from their ultimatum to close the base if the U.S. agrees to a rent increase, cannot be ruled out.

At the same time, Tajikistan announced on February 6 that it was ready to allow its airspace to be used by non-military NATO aircraft for the transfer of materials to Afghanistan. According to other news in circulation, Uzbekistan still holds out hope of mending fences with the West, particularly the United States. One of the rumors is that Uzbekistan might soon possibly pull out of the CSTO all together as it did once before in 1999.

Due to their natural resources and military strategic position, the nations of Central Asia have found themselves at the center of conflicting interest amongst global geo-political forces. For this reason they are attempting to reap benefits by cooperating with all parties. This factor makes them unreliable partners for Russia.

A scarecrow for NATO

In the opinion of political scientist Sergei Kiselyov, the attempt by the Russian authorities to erect a scarecrow for NATO is perhaps doomed to failure. In Mr. Kiselyov’s view what awaits Russia is the fate of the useless CIS and the never realized Russia-Belarus union state.

In such conditions, when the CSTO has practically no possibility of becoming a political-military alliance on an equal footing with NATO, representing the common interest of the member states, the question arises as to why the need for the “improved” alliance in the first place.

Perhaps, the Russian program to transform the CSTO into a competing military-political alliance vis-à-vis NATO seeks to create an illusion, rather than a reality. Russia will not be capable of ensuring cooperation amongst the “allies” in emergency situations. Instead, Russia will be able to create conditions where the West will pay it more importance and will more frequently enter into cooperation with it regarding pressing international and regional problems.

It is by no means coincidental that the CSTO confirmed Afghanistan as the prime target for joint action. Medvedyev declared that the CSTO is ready to cooperate with the United States in the war against terrorism in Central Asia. And all this comes at a time when NATO intends to intensify its anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.

………………

*Anahit Shirinyan is an investigative journalist with Hetq Online, based in Yerevan, Armenia. She holds a master’s degree in international relations from Yerevan State University. Her articles mainly focus on Caucasian regional issues, Post-Soviet developments and Armenian-Turkish relations. She has published several articles in the South Caucasus Regional Analytical Journal of the Caucasus Journalists Network.

The Hetq Online website has been operating since 2001, when it began as an initiative of the Armenian Association of Investigative Journalists. Today, Hetq Online is the leading voice for independent journalism and analysis in the country. The present article on Balkanalysis.com was originally published by Hetq Online on February 16, 2009.

Exclusive: NATO Internal Investigation to End with Staff Transfer in Skopje

On Monday, 19 January, a NATO general will be dispatched to Skopje from the Allied Joint Force Command in Naples, Italy, to look into complaints made against a military official currently employed in a senior position in the alliance’s Macedonia liaison office.
It is likely that this visit will result in an important personnel change in [...]

Victor Friedman on Macedonia: the Balkanalysis.com Interview

Professor Victor Friedman is one of the world’s foremost experts on Balkan languages, and has been studying them for almost four decades, since 1993 as a linguist at the University of Chicago. Professor Friedman has a special place in his heart for Macedonia, which he first visited in 1971. This year finds him back in [...]

The Battle for Tskhinvali: Georgia’s Initial Attack

By Scott Taylor for Balkanalysis.com*

Editor’s note: Two former British military officers working as OSCE observers during the August conflict in South Ossetia have recently spoken out in The Times of London, condemning Georgia, and not Russia, for the commencement of hostilities then. Their verdict harmonizes with the following special briefing for Balkanalysis.com, written by Canadian war reporter Scott Taylor.

These revelations, along with a November 7 New York Times article questioning the US government’s official line blaming Russia, citing other OSCE monitors, is already having repercussions for international relations. Caught in a lie, the US State Department is predictably enough now saying that it is ‘not important’ who started the conflict.

Robert Wood, deputy spokesman at the State Department was quoted as saying: “I think we need to get away from looking at who did what first, because, as I said, I don’t think we’ll ever really get to the bottom of that… the important thing is for us to move forward, and that’s what we’re trying to do, in terms of trying to reconstruct Georgia, bring about stability to the general region. And that’s what we are going to focus on.”

However, just because the US government has decided that it will not “focus on” finding responsibility for a deadly and unnecessary conflict, that is not stopping intrepid journalists from fulfilling their responsibilities for them- as Scott Taylor now reports.

………………

Tskhinvali, South Ossetia: For the casual observer,  relying only upon the scant coverage offered in the Western media, the outbreak of hostilities in the Caucasus last August was presented and understood as an act of aggression on the part of the Russian Federation. The real story, however, was more complex.

When Russian tanks began pouring  into the disputed territory of South Ossetia to engage the Georgian military, the US State Department reiterated its stance that Georgia was simply exercising its  control over sovereign land.

Few pundits or analysts understood the South Ossetians’  long-standing declaration of autonomy from the Tbilisi regime.

Most significantly, almost no one understood the fact that Georgia had unleashed the initial attack on 7 August, killing Russian peacekeepers in the process, and committed some horrific war crimes before the tables were turned on them militarily with Russia’s entry into the fray three days later.

Since 1989, ethnic Ossetians and Georgians have been engaged in four separate clashes for control of this region, the most recent being the one this past August, sparked by the Georgian invasion. At the time, the world’s attention was focused on the Beijing Olympics opening ceremonies.

That night, Georgian tanks rolled into South Ossetia in an attempt to submit the breakaway region, around midnight- despite the explicit assurances of Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, issued just a few hours earlier on national radio, that no attack was in the offing.

South Ossetia must be one of the very most difficult places I have ever tried to reach as a reporter. Geographically, it’s linked to North Ossetia, Russia by only a single winding pass cutting through the Caucasus Mountains. All access routes to the south, into Georgia proper, have been blocked since the conflict, and the extensive Russian-Georgian border remains closed.

It was thus only possible to get to Tskhinvali, de facto capital of South Ossetia, from the north. Despite assurances from the highest levels of the Russian administration, Russian border guards at the crossing prevented our team from entering, claiming that no foreign journalist were allowed into the conflict zone.

We thus were forced to spend three frustrating days waiting, stranded at a remote mountain checkpoint, before a phone call from the press secretary of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s came, ordering the local commander to let us pass.

The lack of on-site independent monitors when the Georgian tanks rolled into South Ossetia on 7 August ensured that the first media reports were inconsistent and vague.

So, since very little has been reported about the initial Georgian attack, I made it my business to find out what really happened in those pivotal early hours of the five-day showdown between the world’s largest country and its small, but US-supported Caucasus neighbor to the south.

Ossetian officials admit that they had reason to be suspicious in the days leading up to the attack, though there was little they could do in any case. They were aware an attack was looming after the Georgians began massing armored formations along the administrative boundary on 1 August, and in response mobilized the statelet’s small but spirited militia.

They also saw to it that additional medical supplies were stockpiled at the Tskhinvali hospital. Nevertheless, President Saakashvili’s public assurances of peace prompted the people to sleep unworried on that fateful night- in which, shortly after midnight, Georgian missiles rained down on an unsuspecting barracks housing Russian peacekeepers. Some 150 people died in the unprovoked sneak attack.

Georgian army units in T-72 tanks then penetrated Ossetian terrain, but were forced to take an alternate route to the west, crossing a garbage dump and canal; the main road had been mined as a precaution by the Ossetians.

As the Georgian tanks entered Tskhinvali, additional Georgian columns swept clear the few villages outside the city, then captured the ridgeline north of it. From this vantage point the Georgians could engage the columns of fleeing Ossetians and provide fire support for their troops inside the city.

Then, in villages along the main road leading northwards towards Russia, ethnic Georgian villagers carried out attacks on their Ossetian neighbors. The only route into the city was thus made unsafe, and civilians were trapped.

Nevertheless, the Georgian military made several baffling errors that in the end ruined their chances of a complete victory. Their aircraft attacked, but failed to destroy, a key bridge on the main road. Still more puzzling, they failed to even attempt to block the vital seven-kilometer tunnel linking South Ossetia to Russia.

“If they began their attack at the tunnel, this could only have resulted in a complete Georgian victory,” one senior Ossetian commander told me. “No matter how bravely we fought, without the Russians we would have been finished in a few days.”

Casualties quickly mounted inside occupied Tskhinvali, the scene of fierce fighting between heavily armed Georgians and rag-tag Ossetian militia fighters. Compounding the carnage, the city hospital was shelled repeatedly by the Georgians.

Dr. Nikolai Zagoyev, the head surgeon in this hospital, told me that he and his surgical staff would perform a total of 700 operations by candlelight in the operating room- hastily relocated to the basement. With the road blocked, and no helicopters available, there was no possibility to extract the casualties – both military and civilian – from the combat zone.

“Twenty-five of my medical staff became casualties in the attack,” said Dr. Zagoyev. “Conditions were deplorable, blood supplies were so low my doctors donated their own blood to patients before performing surgery. We didn’t have the possibility to even test for blood types. It was a miracle that so many of our patients survived.”

According to Dr Zagoyev, priority was given to medically treating the lightly wounded South Ossetian soldiers so that they could return to the fighting. “Some of our soldiers were injured two or three times, and we would simply stitch them up while they still clutched their rifles,” he stated. “The fighting was only a few blocks away, and they would rush straight back out to rejoin their units”

Although the Georgian tanks reached the center of Tskhinvali, they crucially could not completely secure the city in the first 72 hours of the invasion. Despite being heavily outgunned, the South Ossetian militia continued to fiercely resist with short sharp ambushes.

“The Georgians were in their tanks with the hatches down, driving on streets which they did not recognize,” said Vitaly, a 32-year-old policeman/reservist who was wounded during the fighting. “We live in this city all of our lives, we know every alley, every sewer, even hiding place. They could have been here for 10 years and they could not crush the resistance.”

On my tour of the battle zone, it was very clear that it had been a fierce fight. The shattered remains of Georgian tank turrets still litter the central square in Tskhinvali, grim testimony to the intensity of the resistance put up by the Ossetian fighters.

Frustrated and unable to suppress the Ossetians, the Georgians engaged in a campaign of vandalism, arson and looting. The tide turned on the morning of 10 August: Russian armored units, supported by helicopter gunships, poured through the tunnel from North Ossetia and swept south, preparing to take their revenge for the cowardly Georgian attack on their barracks.

The Russian  tank columns blasted their way down the main highway then swept west to clear the Georgians drom the ridgeline above Tskhinvali. “Until this point, the Georgian airforce had been in control of the airspace, even though we knocked out some of their aircraft with groundfire” said a senior Ossetian commander.

“Once the Russians came, the situation was reversed. Without the  helicopter gunships, it would have been impossible to clear the Georgians from the heights”.

The Georgian soldiers put up only a minimal fight against the Russians, and their orderly withdrawal from South Ossetia quickly turned into a panicked rout. The ethnic Georgian villagers that had turned on their Ossetian neighbours, fled south if they were able to do so. Those trapped behind the lines faced the brutal revenge of the enraged Ossetians.

As the Russian troops broke through into Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian militia took their turn at burning and looting the hastily vacated Georgian homes in retaliation.

The Russian troops quickly routed the Georgians, driving them more than 20 kilometers back into Georgia proper. By this point Georgia’s Western allies had become alarmed at the escalation of events, and the US State Department voiced support for an embattled President Saakashvili as they denounced what they termed “Russian aggression.”

When the battlefield was pushed south in pursuit of Saakashvili’s shattered units, and the dust settled on South Ossetia, the entire region was a scene of tragic devastation.

Although a massive Russian-sponsored reconstruction program is now underway, the immediate future for the surviving Ossetians will prove difficult. The onset of winter is imminent, utilities have yet to be fully restored, and outside of Tskhinvali there are very few habitable buildings.

With the majority of able-bodied Ossetian males still mobilized for military service, a lot of the reconstruction and labor work is being conducted by the women. Most of the Russian troops still in the territory are construction battalions, and they are also heavily engaged in restoring the basic infrastructure.

The hardliners in South Ossetia point to the fact that with Russian assistance they were able to win a military victory. However, the pragmatic Ossetians have either fled north to start a new life, or are making plans to do so as soon as possible.

“If I could find a buyer for my home, I would leave here tomorrow,” said Evelena, a 51-year-old widow who runs a small informal bed and breakfast. “But who in their right mind is looking to buy a house in a potential war zone like Tskhinvali?”

……………………..

*Award-winning Canadian war reporter Scott Taylor is the author of five bestselling books on conflict zones from the Balkans to Iraq and Afghanistan. He is the editor of Esprit de Corps Magazine, Canada’s leading journal on military affairs.

Russian Pipeline Development, International Deals Point to Resurgent Role

By Ioannis Michaletos

Energy issues related to the rapid increase of Russia’s prominence on the global political stage, greatly assisted through the country’s use of its energy riches, have captured considerable attention from world policymakers. Russian is the major supplier of natural gas to Europe, providing an estimated 50 percent of gas consumed in the EU. Moscow’s major strategy here is to increase this dependency, while at the same time to develop closer ties with Asian powers such as China, so as to counterbalance any potential retaliation by Europe in case relations between them deteriorate in the future.

After the five-day war in Georgia in August, there were numerous calls for breaking or sharply limiting ties between Brussels and Moscow, mostly echoing the American neoconservative strategy that seems determined to pursue a renewed Cold War, conditions permitting. In order to fully examine the situation at hand, one should present Russia’s strategy, which has been indicated in several ways intimating the country’s future intentions.

Over the past few years, Russia has gives its utmost attention to completing a series of infrastructure projects in the Eurasian region. One is the Burgas-Alexandroupoli (B-A) oil pipeline from Bulgaria to Greece, allowing oil sent via ship on the Black Sea to bypass the crowded Bosporus. Another, the South Stream gas pipeline, partially seeks to bypass Ukraine, which has drifted towards NATO since the “Orange Revolution” in late 2004. Similarly, the North Stream gas pipeline, meant to bypass another former Soviet neighbor now oriented against it, Poland, will allow Russia to supply Germany and Western Europe in general with 55 billion cubic meters of gas.

At the same time, Russia has engaged domestically in the modernization of its own pipeline infrastructure. It has also started upgrading the oil terminal of its Arctic Murmansk port, and has found additional gas deposits on Russian-owned territory. The Caspian pipeline system will be used in order to secure imports of oil from Central Asian states; a great percentage of those will be used to supply the B-A pipeline.

The region surrounding the Caspian is one of the focal areas in Eurasia, mainly because of its immense energy potential. Presently, Kazakhstan exports over 1 million barrels of oil via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium pipeline (CPC), while Azerbaijan manages to export 800,000 barrels from the BTC pipeline, a number that will increase up to 50 percent over the coming years.

The CPC pipeline has a total length of 1,510 km and transfers hydrocarbons from the gigantic Tengiz oil field up to the Novorossiysk Russian port on the Black Sea. It is estimated that by 2010 over 1.3 million barrels could be thus transferred on a daily basis. The projects are however facing several issues, the most interesting being the absence of a conclusive agreement between neighboring countries regarding sovereignty issues in the Caspian Sea- a chronic headache that has slowed development.

This is an issue of great importance. A country like Azerbaijan produces over 80 percent of its oil offshore, and up to 60 miles from the coastline. Iran claims it has the right to exploit some 20 percent of the total Caspian surface area (143.244 sq km), whereas Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan argue jointly that the Iranian percentage should actually be 13 percent, maximum.

For the moment, the strongest partner in this region is Russia, since it effectively controls the pipeline networks and the export revenues of Kazakhstan, while the two main Russian rivers, the Volga and the Don, are interconnected via a channel. In essence, Moscow provides the Caspian states the capability to connect to the Black Sea and the North Sea through its own territory.

The Western Siberian pipeline is another key route. The completion of the Western Siberian oil pipeline will supply the Asian market and, from a geo-economic point of view, will ultimately lead to a decrease in the significance of the Singapore Straits, from where the bulk of Middle Eastern oil currently passes on its way to China and Japan.

On March 21, 2006, the first strategic agreement was implemented for the exportation of Russian natural gas to China. The Gazprom- CNPC (China National Oil Corporation) agreement anticipates a yearly exportation of some 40 billion cubic meters of natural gas to China from the Western Siberian Pipeline, starting in 2011.The pipeline to be constructed has a total length of 3,000 km, and is estimated to cost over $10 billion. There is still no specific information regarding how the total cost is going to be shared by the involved parties, since other technicalities remain unsolved. However, this is clearly a major deal that harmonizes the Chinese need for more energy and the Russian need to expand and diversify its export base, for both economic and geopolitical reasons.

The aforementioned projects will cost, according to unofficial estimations, from $70 billion to $100 billion. This is small change, if one takes into account that the revenues from oil alone for 2007 were approximately 180 billion Euros, and before the price hike that saw the oil index go from $75 to $147 per barrel during the first quarter of 2008.

Currently, however, due to the global financial crisis, the price of oil has decreased to $87 per barrel. Nevertheless, the value of the dollar has risen by 15 percent in less than three weeks, so the fall is less than would seem.

Russia, should it completes the above projects, would be able to alter to its advantage one of the strongest points of the so-called maritime powers (i.e. USA), and that is the control of vital geo-economic points such as maritime straits or ‘sensitively-placed’ countries. Such impediments can simply be bypassed by the main energy corridors that will flow through Russia on the Eurasian terrain.

Furthermore, Moscow has also been able to exercise strong influence in the energy industries of the other CIS states with its abundance of natural resources. Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have strategic partnerships with the likes of Lukoil and Gazprom, and great portions of their hydrocarbons are being transferred to the West over Russian soil and via Russian pipelines.

Moreover there are several relevant energy projects underway in Russia’s near-abroad. Kazakhstan is promoting a multibillion program by 2020 to modernize its oil industry. The country aims to achieve the status of an energy supplier for the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and to invest in Georgia itself as well. Turkmenistan has similar plans, that include mostly investing in identifying and exploiting new reservoirs of oil and natural gas by 2020. And the Russian corporation Lukoil plans to invest $5 billion in an oil project in Uzbekistan, while Gazprom has formed a strategic partnership agreement with Tajikistan. At the same time, Russia has moved to enhance its influence through the media in such states by increasing its television presence in Central Asia.

Despite the degree of unpredictability that the current global financial crisis is having for all the major players, these simultaneous events and developments indicate that Russia’s economic and political resurgence, driven by its wealth of natural resources, can only be expanded, in parallel with its pipeline network- meaning the country will remain a force to be reckoned with for America and Europe in a variety of spheres.

……………………

Frequent Balkanalysis.com contributor Ioannis Michaletos is a Balkan security analyst for the RIEAS Institute in Athens, Greece. He is also Southeastern European Coordinator and Editor for the World Security Network Foundation.

Postscript: Author’s Choice of Further Relevant Sources Online

www.rusenergy.com/english

www.gazprom.com

www.iea.org

www.energyintel.com

www.rbcnews.com

www.press.lukoil.ru

www.en.ria.ru

www.gasandoil.com

www.ipem.ru

www.naturalgas.org

www.eia.doe.gov

www.energytribune.com

www.lukoil.com

www.mosnews.com

www.oilru.com

www.energybulletin.net

www.europeanenergyreview.eu

The Karadzic Capture and Serbia’s Return to Power

The dramatic arrest of former Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic, hiding as a bushy-bearded spiritual guru in Novi Beograd, will no doubt inspire a Hollywood film in the not-too-distant future. And it has already inspired a lot of pathos and hyperbole, with one foot similarly in the door of fiction (Madeleine Albright accusing Karadzic of [...]

Vermonter Helps Macedonian Jews Plant Hope

By Christopher Deliso*
It’s a clear warm spring day high on a barren, charred plateau in Macedonia, and Mike Goldstein is holding a Hebrew prayer book in his hands, with a row of tiny saplings decorating the freshly-turned earth at his feet. A retired general in the Vermont National Guard, Mike has been asked by the [...]

In the Middle of the Road

By David Binder*
Serbia is both blessed and cursed. So, too, are those blessed and cursed that are forced by geography or other circumstance to deal with Serbia. They usually become entrapped.
The reason is obvious. As defined in the last century by Jovan Cvijic, the preeminent Serbian geographer of the Balkans, “We built our house in [...]

News from Balkanalysis.com: Summer Recess, New Books, Essential Articles

Balkanalysis.com would like to inform its readers that the site will be on summer recess through September. Look for new articles and photos to be posted then. Until we’re back, readers may like to check out two new books from Balkanalysis.com director Christopher Deliso, and to peruse the archive- as well as new hand-picked essential background articles presented for you below.

The first new book, The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West, published by Praeger Security International, details in depth the sordid story of how Western interventions in the Balkans during the 1990’s directly allowed foreign Islamic terrorist groups to set up shop- and how Western policy since has created a climate in which extremist groups can thrive, boding ill for regional security.

A work of unprecedented depth, The Coming Balkan Caliphate analyzes the situation on a country-by-country basis, and will be useful for general-interest ‘beginners’ to Balkan issues and experienced professionals alike. Relying on five years of field research and dozens of interviews with ranking security officials from several Western and regional countries, The Coming Balkan Caliphate dispels myths and enhances our knowledge of the emerging extremist threat coming from the Balkans.

The second new book, Hidden Macedonia: The Mystic Lakes of Ohrid and Prespa, is a travelogue out now from London’s Haus Publishing, which details the author’s circular journey around Lakes Prespa and Ohrid, through Greece, Albania and the Republic of Macedonia. Along the way, the history, culture and contemporary life of the great Macedonian lakes are intertwined with a little adventure, camaraderie and good food and drink. Hidden Macedonia will appeal to travelers looking forward to visiting the region, or those who are content to imagine the Macedonian lakes from afar.

Finally, here is a list of twelve original and essential articles (in no particular order). All are among those published over the last year, and will enhance readers’ knowledge and help tide you over until we return from summer recess.

Thanks for your understanding and continued reading.

-Balkanalysis.com

The Strategic Significance of Greek Thrace: Current Dynamics and Emerging Factors (Ioannis Michaletos & Christopher Deliso)

Turkey: Why a Coup, Soft or Hard is Unlikely in 2007 (Mehmet Kalyoncu, December 2, 2006)

Estimating Yugoslavia, (David Binder, December 22, 2006)

In Macedonia, New Concerns over Rural Fundamentalism (Christopher Deliso, October 2, 2006)

Bulgaria To Finally Open Secret Files (Jan Buruma, May 15, 2007)

A Brief Travelers’ Guide to Sarajevo’s Local Traditions, (Lidija Jularić, November 17, 2006)

Exclusive: How the US Ordered Increased Activity against Macedonia’s Islamists after the Fort Dix Arrests (Balkanalysis.com, June 22, 2007)

Turkey: Europe’s Emerging Energy Corridor for Central Eurasian, Caucasian and Caspian Oil and Gas (Mehmet Efe Biresselioglu, January 20, 2007)

Varieties of Religious Experience in a Macedonian Village (Christopher Deliso, September 27, 2006)

The Hijacking of a Nation (Sibel Edmonds, November 29, 2006)

Wahhabis in Labunista Antagonize Locals, as New Details Emerge about Italian Arrests, (Balkanalysis.com, January 5, 2007)

Greece, Turkey and Balkan Security: Interview with John M. Nomikos (Balkanalysis.com, December 12, 2006)

A Pause that Refreshes

By David Binder
Remember what it was like last winter and spring with the Kosovo issue? Hardly a day went by without a declaration or a prediction that a resolution would be achieved in days, weeks, a month. Independence was just around the corner. Condoleezza Rice, Nicholas Burns, Daniel Fried, Frank Wisner and the pathetic Michael [...]

Ankara’s Growing Importance for Israel in the Post-American Middle East

By Mehmet Kalyoncu
Several developments are concurrently taking place in and around the Middle East, both national and regional ones, which are likely to have wider implications. First, the United States is reluctantly starting to realize that the mission “Operation Iraqi Freedom” is failing, and that fairly soon the withdrawal of troops from Iraq will [...]

Kosovo’s Apparently Suicidal Police Minders Power Down

The July 3 decision by Richard Monk, the UN police commissioner in Kosovo, to ban rubber bullets in anticipated upcoming showdowns with Albanian protestors angry at the slow pace of independence bodes ill for the efficacy of UN policing, against protestors who have already been emboldened by the apparently weak-willed nature of the UN mission. [...]

Eastern Mediterranean Oil Politics: the Emerging Role of Cyprus

By Ioannis Michaletos
The issue of oil drilling rights in the eastern Mediterranean Sea has emerged over the past few months, after the initiative enacted by the Cypriot government to proceed in handing out research and drilling rights for expected oil reserves deep under the sea, estimated to be worth some 450 billion USD at current [...]

Exclusive: How the US Ordered Increased Activity against Macedonia’s Islamists after the Fort Dix Arrests

The May 7 arrests of six Islamic radicals, four of them ethnic Albanians originally from Macedonia and Kosovo, led American intelligence officials to issue a direct order to their Macedonian colleagues, urging them to redouble efforts against known and unknown Islamic radical elements in the country, Balkanalysis.com can now report.
The alleged aspiring terrorists have been [...]

Albanians in Tetovo Stunned by OSCE Official’s Call for Minority Language Obligations, but Government Fails to Capitalize

It was completely ignored in the local and international press. But the visit and speech of a top-ranking OSCE official to Macedonia on May 10 might just herald a turning point in the “international community’s” stance on minority rights and responsibilities in this small Balkan country, one necessitated by a realization that European Union countries [...]

Turkey’s Parliamentary Elections and the Long-Debated Cross Border Operation into Iraq

By Mehmet Kalyoncu
The timing of the Turkish army’s dramatic, though long expected, military move against the PKK across the Iraqi border has some suspecting that there is more than exigency behind the bold offensive. Considering that the pivotal Turkish parliamentary elections are due next month, is not the northern Iraq offensive really all about channeling [...]

Western Intelligence Services Focus on Albania’s Islamist Groups ahead of US Presidential Visit

By Christopher Deliso
With additional reporting from Albania by Stavros Markos
Tirana is swarming with American and British intelligence officers and Secret Service personnel ahead of American President George W. Bush’s June 10 visit to Albania. While such attention is standard procedure before any such trip anywhere in the world, specific local conditions are being factored in [...]

An Israel in the Balkans?

By David Binder
Could Kosovo, as a newly independent state in the middle of the Balkan Peninsula, become a second Israel? A thorny question: Merely linking Kosovo and Israel in the same sentence could invite accusations of anti-Zionism on the one hand or anti Illyrianism on the other. Yet there are some historic parallels.
I do not [...]

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