Editor’s note: Two former British military officers working as OSCE observers during the August conflict in South Ossetia have recently spoken out in The Times of London, condemning Georgia, and not Russia, for the commencement of hostilities then. Their verdict harmonizes with the following special briefing for Balkanalysis.com, written by Canadian war reporter Scott Taylor.

These revelations, along with a November 7 New York Times article questioning the US government’s official line blaming Russia, citing other OSCE monitors, is already having repercussions for international relations. Caught in a lie, the US State Department is predictably enough now saying that it is €šÃ„ònot important€šÃ„ô who started the conflict.

Robert Wood, deputy spokesman at the State Department was quoted as saying: “I think we need to get away from looking at who did what first, because, as I said, I don’t think we’ll ever really get to the bottom of that€šÃ„¶ the important thing is for us to move forward, and that’s what we’re trying to do, in terms of trying to reconstruct Georgia, bring about stability to the general region. And that’s what we are going to focus on.”

However, just because the US government has decided that it will not “focus on” finding responsibility for a deadly and unnecessary conflict, that is not stopping intrepid journalists from fulfilling their responsibilities for them- as Scott Taylor now reports.

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Tskhinvali, South Ossetia: For the casual observer,  relying only upon the scant coverage offered in the Western media, the outbreak of hostilities in the Caucasus last August was presented and understood as an act of aggression on the part of the Russian Federation. The real story, however, was more complex.

When Russian tanks began pouring  into the disputed territory of South Ossetia to engage the Georgian military, the US State Department reiterated its stance that Georgia was simply exercising its  control over sovereign land.

Few pundits or analysts understood the South Ossetians€šÃ„ô  long-standing declaration of autonomy from the Tbilisi regime.

Most significantly, almost no one understood the fact that Georgia had unleashed the initial attack on 7 August, killing Russian peacekeepers in the process, and committed some horrific war crimes before the tables were turned on them militarily with Russia’s entry into the fray three days later.

Since 1989, ethnic Ossetians and Georgians have been engaged in four separate clashes for control of this region, the most recent being the one this past August, sparked by the Georgian invasion. At the time, the world’s attention was focused on the Beijing Olympics opening ceremonies.

That night, Georgian tanks rolled into South Ossetia in an attempt to submit the breakaway region, around midnight- despite the explicit assurances of Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, issued just a few hours earlier on national radio, that no attack was in the offing.

South Ossetia must be one of the very most difficult places I have ever tried to reach as a reporter. Geographically, it’s linked to North Ossetia, Russia by only a single winding pass cutting through the Caucasus Mountains. All access routes to the south, into Georgia proper, have been blocked since the conflict, and the extensive Russian-Georgian border remains closed.

It was thus only possible to get to Tskhinvali, de facto capital of South Ossetia, from the north. Despite assurances from the highest levels of the Russian administration, Russian border guards at the crossing prevented our team from entering, claiming that no foreign journalist were allowed into the conflict zone.

We thus were forced to spend three frustrating days waiting, stranded at a remote mountain checkpoint, before a phone call from the press secretary of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s came, ordering the local commander to let us pass.

The lack of on-site independent monitors when the Georgian tanks rolled into South Ossetia on 7 August ensured that the first media reports were inconsistent and vague.

So, since very little has been reported about the initial Georgian attack, I made it my business to find out what really happened in those pivotal early hours of the five-day showdown between the world’s largest country and its small, but US-supported Caucasus neighbor to the south.

Ossetian officials admit that they had reason to be suspicious in the days leading up to the attack, though there was little they could do in any case. They were aware an attack was looming after the Georgians began massing armored formations along the administrative boundary on 1 August, and in response mobilized the statelet’s small but spirited militia.

They also saw to it that additional medical supplies were stockpiled at the Tskhinvali hospital. Nevertheless, President Saakashvili’s public assurances of peace prompted the people to sleep unworried on that fateful night- in which, shortly after midnight, Georgian missiles rained down on an unsuspecting barracks housing Russian peacekeepers. Some 150 people died in the unprovoked sneak attack.

Georgian army units in T-72 tanks then penetrated Ossetian terrain, but were forced to take an alternate route to the west, crossing a garbage dump and canal; the main road had been mined as a precaution by the Ossetians.

As the Georgian tanks entered Tskhinvali, additional Georgian columns swept clear the few villages outside the city, then captured the ridgeline north of it. From this vantage point the Georgians could engage the columns of fleeing Ossetians and provide fire support for their troops inside the city.

Then, in villages along the main road leading northwards towards Russia, ethnic Georgian villagers carried out attacks on their Ossetian neighbors. The only route into the city was thus made unsafe, and civilians were trapped.

Nevertheless, the Georgian military made several baffling errors that in the end ruined their chances of a complete victory. Their aircraft attacked, but failed to destroy, a key bridge on the main road. Still more puzzling, they failed to even attempt to block the vital seven-kilometer tunnel linking South Ossetia to Russia.

“If they began their attack at the tunnel, this could only have resulted in a complete Georgian victory,” one senior Ossetian commander told me. “No matter how bravely we fought, without the Russians we would have been finished in a few days.”

Casualties quickly mounted inside occupied Tskhinvali, the scene of fierce fighting between heavily armed Georgians and rag-tag Ossetian militia fighters. Compounding the carnage, the city hospital was shelled repeatedly by the Georgians.

Dr. Nikolai Zagoyev, the head surgeon in this hospital, told me that he and his surgical staff would perform a total of 700 operations by candlelight in the operating room- hastily relocated to the basement. With the road blocked, and no helicopters available, there was no possibility to extract the casualties €šÃ„ì both military and civilian €šÃ„ì from the combat zone.

“Twenty-five of my medical staff became casualties in the attack,” said Dr. Zagoyev. “Conditions were deplorable, blood supplies were so low my doctors donated their own blood to patients before performing surgery. We didn€šÃ„ôt have the possibility to even test for blood types. It was a miracle that so many of our patients survived.”

According to Dr Zagoyev, priority was given to medically treating the lightly wounded South Ossetian soldiers so that they could return to the fighting. “Some of our soldiers were injured two or three times, and we would simply stitch them up while they still clutched their rifles,” he stated. “The fighting was only a few blocks away, and they would rush straight back out to rejoin their units”

Although the Georgian tanks reached the center of Tskhinvali, they crucially could not completely secure the city in the first 72 hours of the invasion. Despite being heavily outgunned, the South Ossetian militia continued to fiercely resist with short sharp ambushes.

“The Georgians were in their tanks with the hatches down, driving on streets which they did not recognize,” said Vitaly, a 32-year-old policeman/reservist who was wounded during the fighting. “We live in this city all of our lives, we know every alley, every sewer, even hiding place. They could have been here for 10 years and they could not crush the resistance.”

On my tour of the battle zone, it was very clear that it had been a fierce fight. The shattered remains of Georgian tank turrets still litter the central square in Tskhinvali, grim testimony to the intensity of the resistance put up by the Ossetian fighters.

Frustrated and unable to suppress the Ossetians, the Georgians engaged in a campaign of vandalism, arson and looting. The tide turned on the morning of 10 August: Russian armored units, supported by helicopter gunships, poured through the tunnel from North Ossetia and swept south, preparing to take their revenge for the cowardly Georgian attack on their barracks.

The Russian  tank columns blasted their way down the main highway then swept west to clear the Georgians drom the ridgeline above Tskhinvali. “Until this point, the Georgian airforce had been in control of the airspace, even though we knocked out some of their aircraft with groundfire” said a senior Ossetian commander.

“Once the Russians came, the situation was reversed. Without the  helicopter gunships, it would have been impossible to clear the Georgians from the heights”.

The Georgian soldiers put up only a minimal fight against the Russians, and their orderly withdrawal from South Ossetia quickly turned into a panicked rout. The ethnic Georgian villagers that had turned on their Ossetian neighbours, fled south if they were able to do so. Those trapped behind the lines faced the brutal revenge of the enraged Ossetians.

As the Russian troops broke through into Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian militia took their turn at burning and looting the hastily vacated Georgian homes in retaliation.

The Russian troops quickly routed the Georgians, driving them more than 20 kilometers back into Georgia proper. By this point Georgia’s Western allies had become alarmed at the escalation of events, and the US State Department voiced support for an embattled President Saakashvili as they denounced what they termed “Russian aggression.”

When the battlefield was pushed south in pursuit of Saakashvili’s shattered units, and the dust settled on South Ossetia, the entire region was a scene of tragic devastation.

Although a massive Russian-sponsored reconstruction program is now underway, the immediate future for the surviving Ossetians will prove difficult. The onset of winter is imminent, utilities have yet to be fully restored, and outside of Tskhinvali there are very few habitable buildings.

With the majority of able-bodied Ossetian males still mobilized for military service, a lot of the reconstruction and labor work is being conducted by the women. Most of the Russian troops still in the territory are construction battalions, and they are also heavily engaged in restoring the basic infrastructure.

The hardliners in South Ossetia point to the fact that with Russian assistance they were able to win a military victory. However, the pragmatic Ossetians have either fled north to start a new life, or are making plans to do so as soon as possible.

“If I could find a buyer for my home, I would leave here tomorrow,” said Evelena, a 51-year-old widow who runs a small informal bed and breakfast. “But who in their right mind is looking to buy a house in a potential war zone like Tskhinvali?”

……………………..

*Award-winning Canadian war reporter Scott Taylor is the author of five bestselling books on conflict zones from the Balkans to Iraq and Afghanistan. He is the editor of Esprit de Corps Magazine, Canada’s leading journal on military affairs.

It is old news that geography matters in foreign policy. A dormant EC/EU had to learn this vital lesson in 1989, when communism crumbled behind its safe walls. Faced with the sudden prospect of bordering poor, unpredictable and unstable neighbours, it responded by anchoring the former soviet satellites of Central Europe with the offer of EU membership. But now that a new enlargement has been completed, geography matters even more. With the accession of Romania and Bulgaria on the 1st of January, the EU’s new eastern border has moved south, to the shore of the Black Sea. Across its waters, however, lies one of the most unstable and conflict-prone regions of post-Soviet Eurasia.

For centuries, the Black Sea region has been a theatre of violent conflicts and power struggles, due primarily to its geographical location and character as a transit route. During the Cold War, all Black Sea states (except Turkey) were within the Soviet sphere of influence and at the periphery of international strategic interests. But as the Soviet Union began to break down in 1991, the Black Sea region plunged into chaos, torn apart by several ethnic and separatist conflicts. The end of the Cold War’s artificial stability freed long concealed (and suppressed) historical grievances and a number of new independent states such as Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan emerged from the ashes of the Soviet Empire.

Nevertheless, most of them are still very weak democracies, facing territorial separatism, ethnic tensions, undemocratic trends in domestic politics, slow economic progress, environmental degradation and endemic corruption of public officials. The long years of armed conflicts have caused disruption to trade and damaged infrastructure. Due to its potential for conflict, the region has attracted relatively little foreign investment and most such countries are still today heavily dependent on the Russian economy. Unemployment rates are generally very high, with almost all states suffer from a hemorrhagic migration abroad of a consistent percentage of the working-age population.

Today the Black Sea region is also a major source and transit area of several security threats, from terrorism to international organised crime as well as arms and human trafficking. It is home to four so-called “frozen” conflicts — Transnistria, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia – the unresolved separatist issues which followed the breakdown of the USSR.

Despite years of diplomacy and talks, hopes for finding a peaceful and long-standing resolution for these conflicts remain bleak. Apart from fuelling bilateral tensions, these “frozen’ conflicts have been a bane for the region’s democratic and economic development, breeding instability and corruption and favouring the proliferation of organised crime. Uncontrolled territories in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh, for example, have become safe havens for the activities of powerful organised criminal groups involved in people smuggling, human trafficking as well as goods and arms trafficking. The phenomenon of arms trafficking is widespread in the region and much of the large weapons stockpiles abandoned by Russia in the early 1990s have ended up on the grey and black markets. The region is also a major source of drug production and a trafficking route for drugs coming from Central Asia and the Middle East (especially Afghanistan) into Europe. Large profits are also being made from smuggling people across the region with a promise of a better life in the West, and there is evidence that these profits are being reinvested into drugs and arms trafficking, as well as financing terrorist activities, as a recent Europol report highlighted.

This situation carries significant implications for EU security. A power vacuum in the region can potentially result in a security vacuum with consequences which are self-evident yet highly unpredictable. Because of its sudden and new geographical proximity to the wider Black Sea states, the EU will no longer be immune from the backlashes of instability and conflicts in the region, but rather will be directly exposed to a whole range of security threats, from organised crime to drugs and arms trafficking, as well as refugee and illegal migration pressures.

Aside from these security concerns, however, the Black Sea region offers many positive opportunities. The most obvious is in the field of energy. Thanks to its proximity to the oil-rich Caspian Sea and its vast energy resources, the Black Sea region can play a major role for the EU’s energy strategy, to secure alternatives to Russian energy supply.

Many ambitious pipeline projects were launched in the 1990s to guarantee direct access to Caspian oil via the Black Sea. These include the U.S. East-West Energy Corridor and the EU Traceca project (Transit Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia).

Although these failed to materialise when conflicts erupted in the Balkans and in the South Caucasus in the 1990s, it is in the interests of the EU that these projects be reinvigorated to ensure greater Western access to Caspian energy resources.

Perhaps most importantly, the Black Sea region matters for its strategic importance, owing to its proximity to the Middle East. Since 9/11, the US has played an active role in the region to safeguard its vast security and economic interests, especially access to Caspian oil and gas reserves. American “pipeline politics’ has gone hand in hand with its war on terror and the U.S. administration has been keen to support the NATO aspirations of some Black Sea countries.

Yet is the EU ready take up these challenges with similar energy? Can it exploit the region’s huge and lucrative potentials and prevent the Black Sea from becoming a permanent source of security threats?

Most likely, it will only be able to do so partially. The reasons are multiple. First, the EU does not have a Black Sea policy, or at least not a coherent strategy as such. It has opted instead for a patchwork of policies and approaches: enlargement to South-eastern Europe and Turkey, the “European Neighbourhood” policy and a structured cooperation with the South Caucasus states.

Indeed, therein lays part of the problem. While the EU enlargement policy – with its strict conditionality and convergence to EU norms and standards – has (at least so far) been relatively a success story, other policies failed to deliver the expected results. Bilateral cooperation with post-Soviet Eastern neighbours like Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, as well as with the South Caucasus states (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan), put in place since the mid-1990s hardly proved a recipe for stabilisation and prosperity. The over 3 billion euros from the EU’s TACIS funds allocated in the last ten years have failed to convince reluctant post-Soviet governments to introduce sound democratic and market-based economic reforms. Part of the problem is that the EU lacks sufficient leverage to push for such reforms. This is hardly a surprise if one considers that most of these states are still heavily under Russia’s influence. The 2006 energy crisis in Ukraine and Moldova, as well as Russian import bans on Moldovan and Georgian wines and water are a stark remainder of Russia’s economic power over its neighbours.

The EU, by contrast, continues to have a limited impact on the region. But the EU “stabilisation’ policy has also been too weak in its incentives to push for reforms. The so-called Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PACs), lacked not only a prospect for membership but also a strict conditionality and were based primarily on a multidimensional cooperation on economic and cultural questions and a political dialogue on issues concerning minorities, human rights and security in Europe.

The “European Neighbourhood” policy, launched officially on the eve of the 2004 “big bang’ enlargement, was aimed at addressing some of these problems. But judging by the results so far, the innovative offer of “everything except institutions,” has not been the trump card the EU was looking for as an alternative to enlargement. The colour revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia have not given way to the expected substantial democratic reforms. Moldova continues to struggle to control its separatist region of Transnistria and there are no signs of Belarus abandoning its totalitarian regime. Little progress has been made in fulfilling the various Action Plans, the EU’s own financial commitment for the region for 2007-2013 has increased but remains marginal and the EU has continued to politely dismiss the long-term membership aspirations of some of its pro-Western neighbours.

Paradoxically, with these differentiated approaches towards its neighbours the EU has in fact achieved the rather unexpected results of widening the economic, political and social gap between them. While in Romania and Bulgaria the EU accession process has arguably ensured the successful creation of sound democratic institutions and fast economic growth, the EU’s eastern neighbours have witnessed a halt or reversal of their democratic process, as highlighted by the 2005 Freedom House Report, with most struggling with macroeconomic and structural difficulties and declining standards of living.

So what should the EU do? For a start, think strategically. After the 2007 enlargement and with the accession negotiations already underway with Turkey, the EU has already become an actor in the Black Sea region. Developing a coherent and well articulated Black Sea policy to protect EU economic and strategic interests has therefore become imperative.

No doubt, anchoring the countries of the Black Sea region is not going to be easy, not least of all because without a realistic prospect of EU membership for most of these states, the EU lacks its most powerful point of leverage. On the positive side, however, the EU is now in a far better position to develop an ambitious and realistic policy for the region than it was some years ago. It can now draw on its expertise and the instruments developed in the past decade, by abandoning rhetoric and reinforcing its concrete actions.

The coming months may be crucial for the development of a coherent EU Black Sea strategy. German Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier made it clear that Germany intends to achieve concrete results in Black Sea Region during its presidency by examining the effectiveness of the European Neighbourhood policy.

Still, by itself this policy is not sufficient. The stability of the region requires political courage and long-term strategic thinking. The EU should certainly put “some meat on the bone’ on its neighbourhood policy, by offering to its neighbours concrete and lucrative economic incentives in exchange for serious and tangible commitments to democratic and market-based reforms and the protection of human rights. But a credible EU Black Sea policy also needs to demonstrate that the EU is serious about the resolution of all the “frozen’ conflicts in the region. The support for the EU Border Assistance Mission between Ukraine and Moldova and the appointment of a EU Special Representative for Moldova in 2005 is a positive sign that EU commitment heads in this direction.

However, concrete steps must be taken at regional and bilateral levels to find durable peaceful solutions. In this respect Brussels must also find the political courage and determination to take the initiative diplomatically with Russia. Unfortunately, EU reactions to Russia’s allegedly “imperialist’ policy to its near abroad have remained weak and not much more has been done beyond expressing disappointment.

Finally the EU needs to step in with greater support and financial involvement to support regional cooperation efforts. So far the EU has paid lip service to regional cooperation preferring to focus instead on bilateral relations. As active regional partners and new EU members, Romania and Bulgaria are likely to play an active role in this respect.

Romanian President Traian Basescu has made it clear on several occasions that Romania intends to promote more assertively the idea of a strategic vision for the Black Sea region and a greater involvement in regional dynamics. Black Sea economic cooperation in particular can offer the EU an ideal forum for promoting projects in the field of energy as well as non economic areas, such as the protection of the environment, controlling immigration and fighting arms and human trafficking. Ultimately, the extent to which the EU will be able to secure its immediate and distant neighbours in the Black Sea region will depend on its ability to increase its role and impact on the region and become a pulling factor for democratic change. A democratic and fully integrated Turkey will be crucial in this respect.

The benefits of a coherent, realistic and forward-looking strategy towards the Black Sea region are enormous. If the EU’s “close’ and “distant’ neighbours can successfully complete their economic and political transition, security threats will be weakened. Similarly, the creation of stable democratic institutions, functioning economic structures and vibrant civil societies will undermine the operation of criminal groups. To achieve this long-term objective all EU instruments and forces should be mobilised. Otherwise, the region may well plunge once again into chaos. However, this time EU citizens many not be immune.

*Lara Scarpitta is a PhD candidate at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies of the University of Birmingham. Before embarking on a PhD, Lara worked in Holland, Italy and recently in Brussels where she worked as an intern in the Cabinet of Vice President of the European Commission Franco Frattini, EU Commissioner for Freedom, Security and Justice.

The wars of independence in the de facto breakaway regions of Georgia’s Abkhazia and Russia’s Chechnya in the early 1990′s resulted in parallel discourses of defiance and searches for independence. Yet recently the paths of these Caucasian neighbors have begun to diverge dramatically. The Georgian government’s three-day military campaign in the Kodori Gorge in late July signified the desire to restore Georgian central authority, long rejected by an elected Abkhaz government. Alternatively, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin had recently held a meeting with his ministers to discuss the forthcoming normalization of relations with Chechnya.

Although both Russia and Georgia espouse the ideals of territorial integrity, which is the core issue behind objections to the secession of either Chechnya or Abkhazia, it appears that the Russian government, after years of empty resolutions, has found a feasible approach to assure Chechnya’s wavering loyalty to the center. The Georgian government, however, has begun to shift its operations from the political realm to the military one. The resolve to include and exclude Russia’s and Georgia’s respective secessionist regions is molding the diverging destinies of Chechnya and Abkhazia.

The two Caucasus republics share a similar history of Russian conquest and Soviet rule. Following the late 19^th-century Russian empire’s quest to acquire the Caucasus, both Abkhazia and Chechnya were subject to demographic manipulation, first through initial settlement by Russians in Chechnya and Russians and Georgians in Abkhazia, and later, through the political machinations of Joseph Stalin, who deported massive numbers of native Chechens following the Second World War.

Stalin also stripped Abkhazia of its Union Republic status, replacing it with the status of autonomy within the Union Republic of Georgia. The inevitable disintegration of the Soviet Union led to heightened tensions between the central and regional governments. Fearing that an independent Georgia would eliminate the autonomous status of Abkhazia, the Abkhaz citizens demanded the status of a Union Republic within the Soviet Union in 1989. The final dissolution of the USSR and the subsequent declaration of Georgian independence resulted in a statement of secession from the Abkhaz government in July 1992, which led to a brief but bloody war between Georgia and Abkhazia. Chechnya, a voice of secession amongst many regions in post-Soviet Russia, was the only territory to weather a war as a result. Russian territorial integrity was under threat following President Boris Yeltsin’s exclamations over the “parade of sovereignties” and the Russian government set to use Chechnya as an example of what would happen to defiant regions. Thus, both Abkhazia and Chechnya stepped into the post-Soviet era as challengers to their respective central governments.

However, the events of the past year indicate that the parallels between the two may be disappearing. Over the last two years, the Kremlin has been tightening its ties with the ruling government in Chechnya through Alu Alkhanov, a president who is widely believed to have been installed rather than elected in office in August 2004, and Ramzan Kadyrov, the prime minister, who is known for a shady past. Despite Kadyrov’s questionable background and Alkhanov’s controversial rise to power, the cooperative efforts to normalize Chechnya have been stepped up at an unprecedented rate, with investments to rebuild the Grozny airport, and with funding to reconstruct the homes destroyed during the two wars.

Unfortunately, out of the $2 billion dispensed for Chechen projects since 2000, only $350 million was spent as intended. However, on August 2, Russian media reported the plan of Putin’s ministers to see the completion of Chechnya’s reconstruction by 2010. The massive project will involve the infusion of five billion rubles, five times the amount issued in 2004, which will be used to repair roads, rebuild health clinics, hospitals and schools, and to revive agriculture.

Such increased confidence may come from the recent operations that have resulted in the deaths of the two most notorious Chechen rebel leaders, Shamil Basayev and Abdal-Khalim Sadulayev, who were the symbolic figures of Chechen rebel resistance. In its hopes that the elimination of the movement’s leaders will lead to a possible dissolution of the movement itself, the Russian Federal Security Service has called on illegal armed formations in the North Caucasus to lay down their arms in exchange for amnesty. So far, almost a hundred rebels have surrendered, among them the brother of the current leader of the resistance movement, Doku Umarov.

There is good reason to believe that Chechnya is indeed on a path to reconstruction and stabilization. Not only has the republic received assured support from the federal center, it has also received foreign offers of investment. In fact, the Chinese State Development Bank signed an agreement with Alkhanov to establish a system for financing investment in Chechnya, particularly in housing construction and infrastructure, automobile production, and the oil industry. The influx of investment from foreign sources signifies Chechnya’s first step towards economic autonomy. During the past decade, Chechnya has been heavily reliant upon federal subsidies. Hopefully, with the improvement of the political situation, and a decreased risk of terrorist insurgencies, other investors will take notice of Chechnya.

While Chechnya was experiencing rejuvenated interest from its federal authority, however, Abkhazia was witnessed a progression from stagnating relations to military engagement. The latest events at the Kodori Gorge indicate that the Georgian government is eager to reassert control over Abkhazia. The matter is intensified by the fact that the Abkhaz government is supported politically and militarily by Russia, which sees potential for its own gains within the region.

Upon a declaration of its independence, which was not officially recognized by any country in the world, Abkhazia nevertheless received strong support from Russia, which supplied significant military and financial aid to the separatist side. In fact, the continued presence of CIS peacekeepers, primarily made up of Russian troops in Abkhazia was used as one of the provocations for the Kodori operation. The Georgian government then displayed its military might before the potential protectors of the Abkhaz region.

Things took a turn for the worse for Abkhazia after its Foreign Minister, Sergei Shamba, announced in early June that Abkhaz authorities will never abandon the objective of creating an independent state in response to Georgia’s plan to make Georgia a federal state, which would offer broad autonomy and provide aid to develop Abkhazia’s economy.

Following this exchange, Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili reshuffled his cabinet on July 21, removing the state minister for conflict resolution, Giorgi Khaindrava. Khaindrava was the top official dealing with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This dismissal was preceded by the unexpected appointment in early June of Irakli Alasania, President Saakashvili’s special representative for the Abkhaz conflict, as Georgia’s new ambassador to the UN. It was largely due to Alasania’s efforts that the Abkhaz and Georgian sides agreed earlier this year to resume sessions, suspended in January 2002, of the Coordinating Council established under UN auspices. With the two remaining “doves” ousted from government, Georgia, under the direction of Defence Minister Irakli Okruashvili, began its preparations for military operations.Recent events may elucidate the ongoing conflict, yet they are incapable of highlighting the underlying causes of such cool relations between Abkhazia and Georgia. It is true that Georgia does not possess the same luxury of installing its own leaders, as Russia does in Chechnya, who could then implement reform under the guise of autonomous reconstruction. Yet the efforts to stabilize and improve the political and economic situation in Abkhazia have been overshadowed by the drive for the ever-elusive territorial integrity.

Unfortunately, Georgia has taken few steps to improve the economic prosperity of the breakaway region. The continued impoverishment of Abkhazia and its loss of economic opportunities mainly originated with Georgia’s reluctance to provide incentives to resolve the lack of economic progress. Often, the Georgian government uses the ongoing conflict as an excuse for its failure to solve economic problems.

However, unlike Russia and Chechnya, it is Georgia that stands to lose more from ignoring potential economic opportunities in Abkhazia. Georgia loses customs revenues from goods imported to Abkhazia which are then smuggled into Georgia. Furthermore, the strong potential for the Abkhaz per capita income, from mass tourism and high-quality agriculture, may be capable of outstripping the Georgian per capita income in the future. Thus, in a purely economic way, Georgia is hurting its own economic potential more than it is hurting the Abkhaz economy.

Yet, it would be unfair to lay all the blame on the Georgian government, however belligerent it has been in the last few months. The continued claims for sovereignty from Abkhazia are strengthened by the solid support provided by the Russian government. Practical support, in the form of pensions, railway infrastructure, and the provision of Russian passports to over 80 percent of Abkhaz residents, is enhanced by a growing economic dependency.

The Abkhaz economy is tied directly to the Russian economy and its trade is conducted in Russian rubles. Russia claims to act only as an arbitrator between the two factions, yet, its territorial interests are exposed through the amount of assistance it continues to provide to Abkhazia. Evidently, the Georgian leadership then not only faces the secessionist leadership, but also the Russian state, which has lately been reasserting its dominance in the CIS space. The internationalization of the internal conflict has decreased the negotiation space between the central and the regional leaderships.

Despite the similarity between their original goals and motives, Abkhazia and Chechnya are moving further apart in their dialogues with their respective governments. The deaths of two Chechen rebel leaders, compounded by a strong cooperation between the regional government and the federal center has provided Chechnya with an opportunity to rebuild its shattered territory. The economic boost, both from the Russian government and foreign investors, also works as an incentive for citizens of Chechnya who have been impoverished by the consequences of the two wars.

Alternatively, Abkhazia, supported by the meddling Russian Federation, still cannot agree on a feasible solution of its rights with the aggravated Georgian government. Unable to look past the argument of territorial integrity, Georgia continues to isolate Abkhazia. Of course, Georgia has less financial ability to offer the same kind of incentives to Abkhazia as does oil-rich Russia. Nevertheless, actions like the recent invasion into the Kodori Gorge hardly promote a spirit of cooperation between regions. The lack of economic integration only promotes the groomed closeness between Abkhazia and Russia. It would be a shame to see Abkhazia go through the same tragedy of violence and destitution as Chechnya before the Georgian government realizes that the way to negotiation is through incentives and not force.

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Kazakhstan native Alisa Voznaya is an analyst of political and security developments in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Alisa, who is part Russian, Ukrainian and Armenian is currently undertaking an M.Phil in Russian and East European Studies at Oxford University, and is associate editor there of St Antony College’s International Review. Alisa also holds a BA in Political Science from Simon Fraser University. She plans to continue working within academia while also working with news agencies reporting on Russia and the North Caucasus.

Almost 4,000 Chechens who fled from their country following the outbreak of war in 1999 have been granted prima facie refugee status by the Georgian government. As of April 2004, the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation has registered 3,856 Chechen refugees. However, since then the number seems to have decreased to 2.600. Aside from hosting these refugees, most of who reside in the Pankisi Valley of north-central Georgia, there are currently 16 individually recognized refugees and 22 asylum-seekers in Georgia. The latest statistics will become known by the end of September this year, as the 2006 re-registration exercise is already nearing completion.

The refugees from Chechnya in the Pankisi Valley have been the neighbors of the local population there for more than six years. During this time, these refugees have continually competed for the meager social services available; this dynamic has led to the development of a tense situation between the various communities living in the Pankisi Gorge. In 2002, the Bush Administration claimed that the Gorge was hosting small numbers of al Qaeda fighters from across the border, and in fact used this claim as partial justification for sending American military trainers for the Georgian army.

Although the increase in the number of refugees has become more and more widely recognized as a pressing issue in Georgian society in recent years, the issue remains beyond the Georgian government’s agenda, especially considering the emerging political situation, reflected by the tense relationship with Russia and still unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. Aside from this, the Georgian government has made a priority of alleviating the plight of some 220,000 internally displaced persons, and 50,000 returnees to the Gali District. However, the relatively cool attitude of the government in regards to the problem, and the rushed pace of life nowadays, have not deterred a slew of local civil society organizations and individuals from working to solve this crisis, and so to assist these refugees in seeking durable solutions to their precarious current status.

Today, there are three accepted durable solutions being considered: integration, resettlement, and repatriation. The one solution that is most often cited when talking about the Chechen refuges in Georgia is the first, “integration.’ Last year the United Nations Association of Georgia (UNAG) decided to respond to this persistent problem by introducing a project that applies the durable solution of integrating these refugees directly into Georgian society. The project focused on issues of compliance with local and international legal frameworks, fostering effective cooperation with NGOs and governmental agencies alike, and also stressed the need to overcome ethnic and religious prejudices. Indeed, a prerequisite for the success of this initiative is the involvement of the Georgian government, the NGO sector in the country and other international institutions.

During September-October 2005 a survey was conducted, with the goal of finding out the level of public awareness regarding integration issues among Chechen refugees residing in the Pankisi Valley. A total of 201 respondents holding refugee status, including 110 Kists and 91 Chechens were questioned. The survey revealed a rather low level of awareness on integration issues among refugees in the Pankisi Gorge.

After being informed about the essence of integration, only a relatively small numbers of Chechens expressed their support for this solution, since they felt skeptical and disappointed about ongoing governmental initiatives. The majority of Chechen and Kist refugees would instead welcome resettlement to a third country. Yet if integration is mandated as the only lasting solution, both ethnic groups would be willing to acquire a legal status, which would provide for the right to temporarily live and work in Georgia. Interestingly, Kists would prefer the Pankisi Valley as a place of residence, whereas Chechens would primarily rather live in other regions of Georgia, especially in Tbilisi.

In a continued effort to support refugees, embrace their plight and make them feel that they are an integral part of Georgian society, Georgia responded to a worldwide call from the UN General Assembly of 2000 to commemorate World Refugee Day on June 20. This year “Hope” was the theme chosen for World Refugee Day, in order to pay tribute to the unwavering hope of the world’s refugees and displaced persons, who have overcome enormous loss and hardship to start anew.

Such events have been taking place for five years now in Georgia and will continue for the years ahead, until we have to host the refugees. On June 19, Chechen refugees from Duisi Public Center enjoyed an opportunity to exhibit and sell flat handicrafts in Shardin Street in Tbilisi. The event was organized by UNHCR and its partner, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). The Minister of Refugees and Accommodation, Giorgi Kheviashvili and the Resident Representative of UNHCR, Naveed Hussein attended the event. The Day was marked in the Tskhinvali region of South Ossetia as well. The day was celebrated through a series of artistic and cultural events taking place on the ruins of the ancient Duisi outdoor amphitheatre, surrounded by beautiful mountainous scenery. Most of the performances were done by children, either dancers from the ballroom dancing troupe who came from the nearby village of Akhmeta, either singers from local choirs, or refugee children reciting poems in Georgian or performing national dances and theatrical plays. The ceremony was closed by the awarding of prizes to the winners of sports competitions which had taken place during the previous days.

The Minister of Refugees and Accommodation, together with the Resident Representative of UNHCR, warmly greeted refugees and guests before stressing the importance of celebrating this day together with refugees. “The meaning of celebrating such a day is that many people, who had to flee their country and cannot return to their homelands due to religious, political and other reasons, need all the support we can give to them” commented Naveed Hussein.

In the meantime, the UNHCR continues to render every effort to bring the plight of the refugees to the attention of the local as well as international community. The UNHCR also tries to persuade the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation to become more positive regarding refugee status determination and assigning procedures, where the issue remains open. Neither does the government voice its future plans with regards to refugees. Probably this is part of still unfolding national and international politics.

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*Ana Toklikishvili is presently the Public Information Officer at the United Nations Association of Georgia. Her three years of professional experience in the field of communications and public relations have included work with the World Bank Georgia Country Office and the BTC Co.-Cultural Heritage Project (Center for Archeological Studies). Ana holds a master’s degree in Public Administration from the Georgian Institute of Public Affairs, and a BA in English Language and Literature from Tbilisi State University

The week kicks off tomorrow with an analysis of the political dynamic in the little-understood North Caucasus Russian republics of Adygeya and Ingushetia, by Kazakhstan native and Oxford scholar Alisa Voznaya.

On Wednesday, we present an exclusive interview with the venerable Canadian journalist and publisher, Scott Taylor, who offers his insights on Azerbaijan’s new militaristic confidence following a recent trip to Baku.

Thursday the series continues with a detailed overview of the refugee situation in Georgia, presented by Ana Toklikishvili, Public Information Officer at the United Nations Association of Georgia.

Friday, we present a short analysis on the Azeri oil industry- and what it might mean for the future of energy transit.
We hope that readers enjoy this special presentation, which features several different perspectives on one of the key regions in today’s world.

Russia’s Interfax reported yesterday that the career diplomat and previous deputy head of the Georgian Permanent Mission to the OSCE, was arrested by Italian authorities- who accuse him of trying to smuggle 20 kilos of heroin into their country from Albania.

The timing could not be worse for the OSCE, self-appointed guardian of the moral order wherever it goes, as it now prepares to monitor Macedonia’s elections in only 2 days. In a vicious irony, the OSCE just two weeks held a workshop for combating organized crime.

Even if the Lomashvili case represents little more than a case of one “bad apple,” the embarassing incident is bound to sully the international organization’s reputation as a benevolent and law-abiding force for good. And it is bound to invite renewed scrutiny and questions: with whom was the Georgian operating in order to transit drugs from the Caucasus to the West via Macedonia and Albania? Did his pseudo-diplomatic status as an OSCE official provide ‘cover’ for illicit acts? And, most fundamentally, how high does the corruption go?

The long-standing issue of the international community’s indiscretions in countries under their occupation now returns to the focus, though it will no doubt soon be buried under the hysteria of ‘fair and free’ elections on July 5.Nevertheless, staff ranging from military to diplomatic to non-governmental have all been implicated, in the Balkans alone, of everything from human trafficking to murder. This sordid side of international peacekeeping missions is naturally suppressed by the occupying powers, and the mixed nationalities of the offenders shows that local exploitation is open to all comers.

It remains to be seen to what extent the OSCE drug-running case involves local Albanian mafia activity. The Italian government has gained incresing intelligence capacities following several successful crackdowns on coordinated mafia groups operating in Albania and Italy. Operation Harem, for example, concluded in December 2005 with over 80 arrests in Italy, Albania, Kosovo, Croatia, Ukraine and Germany. Large quantities of drugs were also seized, said the December report, which added:

“…the network allegedly forced eastern European women into prostitution in Italy and trafficked drugs as well as guns destined for the Ndrangheta organised crime group in Calabria, southern Italy.

‘The operation delivers a serious blow to an Italo-Albanian organisation involved in the trade of human beings and the traffic of drugs and narcotics,’ Italian Interior Minister Giuseppe Pisanu said in a statement.”

First of all, 2005 saw 129 new articles published on Balkanalysis.com- in addition to several hundred others added to our back archive on the Central and Eastern European Online Library (CEEOL), which resulted in greatly increased attention from large institutions, research libraries and other purchasers of these vital texts. Second, and equally importantly, we published works from around 10 new writers, thus providing our audience with an expanded range of opinions, insights and points of view from writers hailing from several different Balkan (and outside) states.

And, as usual, our international readership continued to be diverse yet specific. Readers continue to come from institutions including research libraries, universities, think-tanks, financial institutions, embassies and NGOs, as well as the military and other security-oriented bodies, along with a fair share of Balkan-interest laymen and diaspora folks.

An unfortunate byproduct of this growing interest was noted near the end of the year, when we successfully defended ourselves from crass plagiarism by the mass media in the court of moral authority. Another two similar case were swiftly resolved in our favor but not reported.

Finally, we also saw improved success with affiliate programs such as Google Ads, Ebay and Amazon, which provide readers with specifically tailored information and items pertaining to the Balkans and adjacent areas.

Now, what does all this tell us about the future?

First of all, we will continue providing regular analysis of major trends in the Balkans, as well as controversial exposes, exclusive interviews and coverage of events on the local level that cannot be found elsewhere. And we will continue to replenish the archive on CEEOL, where some of the content will continue to include articles not found on our website’s archive.

Second of all, we will continue to provide opportunities for new writers, something which will benefit everyone and present a more cosmpolitan viewpoint representing a wider range of voices. Prospective writers, as well as book reviewers, should read the About Us section for details.

Finally, in regards to naughty publishers who decide to bend the rules by not citing or even plagiarizing our texts when they use them, we will, as W. so eloquently said, “smoke them out of their holes”- whatever that means.

Above all we would like to thank our loyal readers for their continued support and interest. Note that we enjoy hearing from you, whether or not you have something nice to say. All feedback is helpful to us as we try to serve you better.

But don’t forget that supporting us by passing on the word about the website, patronizing our advertisers, or even donating is very much appreciated.

With best wishes for 2006,

Christopher Deliso, Director

Balkanalysis.com