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Archive for 'Armenia' CategoryPost-Soviet NATO, or the Rebirth of the Warsaw Pact?21 February 2009By Anahit Shirinyan* On February 4, 2009, the presidents of the seven member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, signed an agreement in Moscow during a session of the Collective Security Council to set up a rapid response force. In the past the CSTO had such a rapid deployment force consisting of 3,000 troops however, as noted by Russian Federation President Dmitry Medvedyev, all this merely existed on paper. The new agreement envisages increasing the number of troops to 10,000. Each of the member states will allocate one battalion to the rapid reaction force. Each nation’s battalion will be stationed on its own soil and under its command. Will Armenian forces fight against the Taliban? The signing of the agreement has lead analysts to conclude that Moscow wishes to bring the Warsaw Pact back to life and that the new agreement is nothing less than a challenge to Washington and its NATO allies. In particular it was Russian President Medvedyev who gave rise to such conclusions when he declared that the force to be created would be combat ready, armed with the latest military technology and on a par with NATO forces in terms of overall military resources. Medvedyev also noted that the CSTO and EurAsEC (Eurasian Economic Community) summits signal new qualitative Russian relations with the member states of these organizations both on a multilateral and bilateral level. According to official information, The officials at various levels enumerated possible missions such as: deterring and repelling aggression by conventional military forces; defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the organization’s member countries; conducting “special operations”; and dealing with asymmetrical threats and challenges, including international terrorism, radical Islam, and other forms of “violent extremism,” trans-border organized crime and drug trafficking, and even natural or technological disasters. These challenges, by the way, are mostly hanging over the head of the central Asian republics and their source is to be found in neighboring Afghanistan. As expressed by Sergei Prikhodko, the Russian President’s Foreign Policy Advisor, Afghanistan is the primary threat to the organization in terms of security. “The CSTO summit and its decisions are the joint response to those threats arising from its southern borders – the activities of the Taliban, the situation in Afghanistan and, to a large degree, in Palestine,” he stated. Collective disagreement The signing of the agreement, however, wasn’t unanimously accepted by all member states of the organization. Ukraine signed on with certain reservations, agreeing to the deployment of its forces to individual missions rather than on a permanent basis. The agreement led to widespread displeasure in Belarus. The political opposition there charged Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenka with violating the country’s constitution because it prohibits the deployment of Belarus armed forces outside its state borders. In addition, the Belarus Constitution notes that the Belarus strives to be a neutral nation. Nevertheless, a spokesperson for the country’s ministry of foreign affairs publicly declared that the Belarus army cannot be stationed in post-Soviet hot spots, in conflict zones, given that the country’s constitution doesn’t allow it. Perhaps what is noteworthy is that the CSTO member states are either not buoyed by the prospect of the application of collective forces in general or either each of them regards that new mechanisms are more beneficial. In addition, some of the CSTO member states are on friendly terms with one another. In the estimation of analysts, the new agreement is most beneficial for Russia. As noted by Kremlin advisor Gleb Pavlovsky, the CSTO is of prime significance to Russia “in opposition to Georgia, a vengeful aggressor state that seeks to revise borders”. Experts are of the opinion that the most important program in the back of Moscow’s mind is to employ CSTO forces as a peacekeeping detachment across the post-Soviet expanse. Aleksei Maleshenko, a resident scholar at the Moscow office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, views the new agreement as the latest step by Moscow to strengthen its influence in former Soviet countries. Nevertheless, Mr. Maleshenko doesn’t think that the CSTO will begin to play an active role in regional security issues. “I cannot picture the CSTO taking any real action. For example, it will not fight against NATO in Abkhazia or within the borders of Georgia. In the same manner, it will not come to the rescue of any of the presidents in the case of an Islamic-inspired uprising,” notes Mr. Maleshenko. “In a more tangible sense than other CSTO countries, Armenia regards this arrangement as beneficial to itself. Yerevan welcomes the February 4 decision to create a rapid response force in Yerevan’s own frame of reference,” writes the Eurasia Daily Monitor, alluding to the Karabakh conflict. “Armenia views the CSTO primarily as a conventional military actor as well as a framework for Russian protection of Armenian territorial gains against Azerbaijan. This traditional view contrasts with that of Central Asian governments, which expect the CSTO to deal with asymmetrical threats and challenges, such as those associated with terrorism, from non-state sources”. The prime targets of the CSTO, terrorism, Islamic extremism, narco-trafficking, etc, are truly the most vexing problems confronting Central Asia. However, these countries however aren’t all that disposed to deploying there forces in other locations. In addition, conflicts amongst these countries on a host of issues (water resources, ethnic problems) continue till today and securing cooperation amongst them is a complex task indeed. What is most important, however, is that for Russia the central Asian countries aren’t the most reliable of partners. It was only after Russia agreed to give Kyrgyzstan a financial package of $300 million in cash (in addition to $1.7 billion investment and $180 million in debt relief) to close the American military base at Manas. In the words of Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev the reason for the move is because the rent being paid by the United States wasn’t sufficient as well as the fact that a negative backlash had taken hold in Kyrgyz society regarding the activities of the American forces. The Manas military base, established in 2001, plays an important role in the U.S.-led war against terrorism in Afghanistan. The possibility that the Kyrgyz authorities will back down from their ultimatum to close the base if the U.S. agrees to a rent increase, cannot be ruled out. At the same time, Tajikistan announced on February 6 that it was ready to allow its airspace to be used by non-military NATO aircraft for the transfer of materials to Afghanistan. According to other news in circulation, Uzbekistan still holds out hope of mending fences with the West, particularly the United States. One of the rumors is that Uzbekistan might soon possibly pull out of the CSTO all together as it did once before in 1999. Due to their natural resources and military strategic position, the nations of Central Asia have found themselves at the center of conflicting interest amongst global geo-political forces. For this reason they are attempting to reap benefits by cooperating with all parties. This factor makes them unreliable partners for Russia. A scarecrow for NATO In the opinion of political scientist Sergei Kiselyov, the attempt by the Russian authorities to erect a scarecrow for NATO is perhaps doomed to failure. In Mr. Kiselyov’s view what awaits Russia is the fate of the useless CIS and the never realized Russia-Belarus union state. In such conditions, when the CSTO has practically no possibility of becoming a political-military alliance on an equal footing with NATO, representing the common interest of the member states, the question arises as to why the need for the “improved” alliance in the first place. Perhaps, the Russian program to transform the CSTO into a competing military-political alliance vis-à-vis NATO seeks to create an illusion, rather than a reality. Russia will not be capable of ensuring cooperation amongst the “allies” in emergency situations. Instead, Russia will be able to create conditions where the West will pay it more importance and will more frequently enter into cooperation with it regarding pressing international and regional problems. It is by no means coincidental that the CSTO confirmed Afghanistan as the prime target for joint action. Medvedyev declared that the CSTO is ready to cooperate with the United States in the war against terrorism in Central Asia. And all this comes at a time when NATO intends to intensify its anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. ……………… *Anahit Shirinyan is an investigative journalist with Hetq Online, based in Yerevan, Armenia. She holds a master’s degree in international relations from Yerevan State University. Her articles mainly focus on Caucasian regional issues, Post-Soviet developments and Armenian-Turkish relations. She has published several articles in the South Caucasus Regional Analytical Journal of the Caucasus Journalists Network. The Hetq Online website has been operating since 2001, when it began as an initiative of the Armenian Association of Investigative Journalists. Today, Hetq Online is the leading voice for independent journalism and analysis in the country. The present article on Balkanalysis.com was originally published by Hetq Online on February 16, 2009. By Anahit Shirinyan* In the past the CSTO had such [...] The End of an Era in the Armenian Genocide Debate: Will Recognition Lead to a Turkish Policy Transformation?5 February 2007If Turkey gives up its opposition to potential US recognition of the atrocities between Turks and Armenians that took place during World War One as α “genocide,” will its diplomatic hand ultimately be strengthened? The following article argues that this just might be the case. The Assassination of Hrant Dink: Another Deadly Incident Destined to Remain Unsolved?22 January 2007By Mehmet Kalyoncu The assassination of Hrant Dink, one of the most prominent Turkish Armenians and the editor-in-chief of bilingual Turkish-Armenian weekly newspaper Agos outside his newspaper’s office was a deplorable act by any definition. Yet it was not an unexpected one, given the selection of the target and its expected/actual impact on Turkish society and on Turkey’s position vis-Ã -vis the issue of the “Armenian genocide’ that has taken on new proportions internationally of late, with the US Congress weighing a resolution on the issue. Ankara has already warned about the implications of American genocide recognition for bilateral relations. This is at least the thesis of a good percentage of the population in Turkey, where all too often such murky crimes are blamed ultimately on malevolent and all-powerful outside forces- with the result that it is rare that full investigations are ever executed. The Turkish police caught Mr. Dink’s assassin in just 32 hours, something which the government took great pride in noting. Yet has the problem been solved with the simple arrest of a 17-year-old gunman? Was he the ultimate and sole perpetrator of the killing? Just as with other recent violent events in Turkey, such as with the 16-year-old who killed a Catholic priest in Trabzon last year, the murder of the Turkish-Armenian journalist has been added to the pile of unsolved or semi-solved incidents that have been planned against the peace and stability of Turkey by the so-called “dark hands.” This expression — karanlik eller in the Turkish — is the metaphor mostly used to refer to what the public views as the sinister masterminds behind the scenes. It is used in general to refer to those who allegedly always wanted to stir things up in Turkey. Even officials have used the “dark hands” metaphor after unsolved assassinations, bombings and the like. And there have been more than a few over the past year or so. Fortunately, it seems like the killing did not breed the expected conflict between the Turkish Armenians and the Turks, mostly due to the fact that both sides are more aware than ever of the detrimental results that possible provocations could cause. Regarding the killing of Mr. Dink, the Turkish Armenian Patriarch Mesrob II noted, “[t]his assassination is a deplorable act that targets our country’s stability and its international relations.”[1] Moreover, regardless of their ethnic background, thousands took the street and protested the Dink killing by shouting “We are all Hrant, We are all Armenian!” Further, the fact that the killer was identified and reported to the police by his very own father suffices to suggest that the Dink killing has so far failed to cause social conflict between ethnic Armenian Turks and the Turks. Nevertheless, it is imperative for the AK Party government to not let the Dink case go unresolved, or be left semi-resolved as were three other infamous recent incidents: the bookstore bombing in the southeastern Kurdish-inhabited town of Semdinli, the aforementioned killing of the Catholic priest, and the murder of Supreme Court magistrate Mustafa Yucel Ozbilgin in May of last year. On November 9, 2005, a bookstore (Umut Kitabevi) in Semdinli, near Hakkari, the most notable town in the southeast of Turkey, was bombed, killing two and injuring fourteen. The local people nearby managed to apprehend the suspected bomber and two other men allegedly involved with the bombing. In the alleged suspects’ automobile were discovered AK-47 assault rifles, Semdinli area maps, a name list of the political opposition leaders, and a document consisting of information about certain individuals in Semdinli. Interestingly, two of the three alleged perpetrators were identified to be gendarmerie intelligence officers (JITEM) and one, a PKK [the armed Kurdish separatist group] informant. More interestingly, one of the JITEM officers was allegedly linked to then-Commander of Land Forces General Yasar Buyukanit, who is now the Chief of General Staff and whose relationship was never officially denied. Immediately after the bombing, despite the call for calm by Kurdish community leaders and the officials, about a thousand people took to the streets and put the police checkpoint under fire.[2] The AK Party government assured the public that those responsible would be brought to justice shortly, and immediately established an investigation committee. The committee still continues its inquiry today, and the three alleged perpetrators were sentenced. However, the public is hardly convinced that the three men sentenced were the masterminds behind the Semdinli bombing. The Semdinli bombing took place during a period when the military-civilian relationship was being scrutinized and it was argued that the civilian administration should have higher control over the military- to keep in line with EU requirements. The Killing of Catholic Priest Andrea Santoro On February 5, 2006, Priest Andrea Santoro of Italian Sancta Maria Catholic Church in Trabzon, who ministered to Turkey’s small Catholic population in this northeastern Black Sea town, was murdered by a 16-year-old boy. The killer reportedly had a personal problem with the priest, rather than a religious or ideological one.[3] However, before the investigation was even completed, the European press in general and the Italian press in particular had been quick to link the killing to the Prophet Mohammed cartoon crisis in Denmark and elsewhere. The Italian press thus portrayed the incident as an indication of religious fanaticism in Turkey- whose European Union bid has always been clouded in many Europeans’ eyes by the religious make-up of the country. Indeed, a Corriere Della Sera article reported that the killer shouted “Allahu-Akbar” before killing the priest, thereby sufficing it to seem an act motivated by religious fanaticism.[4] Similarly another Italian newpaper, La Repubblica, reported that the killer interrupted the service, approached Priest Santoro and shot him after screaming “Allah Akbar”.[5] La Republica also reported that there hade been similar attacks in Beirut as well on the same day due to the Denmark-sparked cartoon crisis. The investigation started immediately after the killing and identified other suspects involved with the killing of the priest. The prolonged judicial process, focusing exclusively on the 16-year-old gunman, ended after the 9th court trial, with an 18-year sentence imposed.[6] Yet was the whole case really solved? The Turkish public still hardly believes that it was. Again the familiar reference to “Dark Hands” manipulating the killing from offstage was made. Priest Santoro’s killing also took place right after Turkey started EU accession negotiations with the European Union in October 3, 2005. The Killing of the Supreme Court Magistrate On May 17, 2006, Mustafa Yucel Ozbilgin, a Turkish Supreme Court Magistrate, was shot dead by a young attorney Alparslan Arslan. The immediate news reports noted that the assailant screamed “We are Allah’s soldiers. Allahu Akbar” while shooting Ozbilgin, a claim which was, later on, disputed.[7] Certain ultra-secular groups allegedly related the killing with the Supreme Court’s ban on the headscarf, and sought to send a warning to the AK Party government which was seeking a formula to resolve the headscarf problem. The family members and immediate friends of the assailant denied that he was even a practicing Muslim let alone a fanatic who would perpetrate such a killing due to religious motivations. As of today, the Alparslan Aslan court trial still continues. Will the case be solved when he is sentenced? It may seem so, but it is still hard for the Turkish public to believe that he was the mastermind of the killing. Finally, Hrant Dink: The Latest, but Unlikely to be the Last The assassination of Hrant Dink has come during a time when the Armenian Diaspora is preparing to wage full battle against Turkey. On February 8, 2007, a resolution that recognizes the Armenian genocide and foresees certain sanctions on Turkey will be voted on in the U.S. House of Representatives, where long-time supporter of the so-called resolution Nancy Pelosi of California is the incoming Speaker. Bolstering the correlation of the timing of the Dink killing with the upcoming voting on the resolution, Aram Hamparian, Executive Director of ANCA (Armenian National Committee of America) noted, “Hrant Dink’s murder is tragic proof that the Turkish government –through its campaign of denial, threats and intimidation against the recognition of the Armenian Genocide — continues to fuel the same hatred and intolerance that initially led to this crime against humanity more than 90 years ago.”[8] Ironically, however, as Turkish Armenian Patriarch Mesrob II noted, Hrant Dink was known as the foremost Armenian Turkish intellectual, and one disliked by the Armenian Diaspora due to his efforts to promote dialogue between Turkey and Armenia, and settle the conflict over historical disputes through open intellectual exchanges. Nevertheless, Dink’s death presents a matchless opportunity for the Armenian Diaspora to exploit against Turkey at this crucial time. Again, another mysterious death at a politically sensitive moment for Turkey- the fourth in just 15 months. The real challenge for the AK Party government now is less finding the assailant of the Dink killing but more pursuing the very investigation, wherever it may lead, to find the mastermind(s). The Turkish authorities and population have proven indulgent in the past about blaming such attacks on abstract external powers, or the so-called “dark hands.” From top government officials to prominent intellectuals, almost everyone refers to the so-called “dark hands” that target the peace and stability of Turkey and try to drag the country into chaos. Given the fact that in 2007 will be held two critical elections, presidential and parliamentary, in which chaos in Turkey hampers the political process and the government’s abilities to cope with ever-more complex situation, there is no reason to not expect such random assassinations as that of Hrant Dink in the days and weeks ahead. Nevertheless, popular acceptance of the so-called “dark hands” phenomenon would be an easy way out and would hinder the AK government’s ability to investigate the assassination and bring those really responsible to justice. Referring to the assassination as a mere provocation attempt Prime Minister Erdogan recently noted, “we know that those who shot him (Mr. Dink) have in fact shot Turkey. Our solidarity, democracy, freedom of thought, peace and stability was the target.”[9] Similarly, the intelligence officers cited, the strategists and commentators, have in the immediate aftermath so far followed the course and attributed the latest killing to the so-called “external powers.”[10] Most importantly, they have all drawed attention to the correlation between the timing of the Dink assassination and the upcoming discussion of the Armenian genocide in the U.S. House of Representatives. The argument is that certain interest groups should have wanted to bolster the Armenian Diaspora’s hand as it prepares to pass resolution in the U.S. Congress to recognize the Armenian genocide. Former MIT (Turkish National Intelligence Service) officer Mahir Kaynak suggests, “[H]rant Dink’s killing would benefit the Armenian Diaspora in the United States. He was the right choice to start a long-term campaign against Turkey”. Similarly, former Chief of Intelligence Bulent Orakoglu stresses that the assassination of Dink is a signal for similar future killings: “such assassinations were already expected starting in early 2007. Creating chaos is the strategy of certain powers.” Along similar lines, Retired Lt. General Edip Baser, Special Coordinator for Terrorism, views the killing as a deliberate effort to divert the AK Party government’s attention away from the situation in Northern Iraq. Certainly the failure to bring the mastermind(s) of Hrant Dink assassination to justice will weaken the AK Party government’s public image as it nears the presidential and parliamentary election domestically and Turkey’s position vis-Ã -vis the genocide allegations internationally. Perhaps it was such a motivation that led the so-called “dark hands” to kill this prominent Turkish Armenian journalist- if they actually did, of course. If history is any judge, we may never know. [1][1] “Mutafyan: Saldiri ulkemizdeki huzur ortamini hedefleyen igrenc bir suikasttir”, Zaman 19.01.2007 at http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?haberno=490232 [2] “Provakatorler Semdinli’de sahnede”, Zaman 11.11.2005 at http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?haberno=227927 [3] “Trabzon’da Katolik Kilisesi’nin papazi olduruldu olduruldu”, Zaman 06.02.2005 at http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?haberno=253613&keyfield=6B61746F6C696B207261686970 [4] ““Turchia: ucciso un prete cattolico italiano”, Corriere Della Sera 02.06.2006 at http://www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Esteri/2006/02_Febbraio/05/turchia.shtml [5] “Turchia, sacerdote italiano cattolico ucciso in chiesa mentre pregava”, La Repubblica 5 febbrario 2006 at http://www.repubblica.it/2006/b/sezioni/esteri/moriente30/preteucciso/preteucciso.html [6] “Rahip cinayeti davasinda temyize gidildi”, Zaman 30.10.2006 at http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?haberno=445458&keyfield=6B61746F6C696B207261686970 [7] “Danistaya hain saldiri”, Zaman 05.18.2006 at http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?haberno=286041&keyfield=616C706172736C616E2061736C616E [8] Press Release “Anca Condems Murder of Hrant Dink”, available at http://www.anca.org/press_releases/press_releases.php?prid=1059 [9] “Hain bir provakasyonla karsi karsiyayiz”, Zaman 01.20.2007 at http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?haberno=490465 [10] “Turkiye’ye yonelik bir operasyonun isaret fisegi — Signal Bullet of an Operation against Turkey“, Zaman 01.20.2007 at http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?haberno=490332 By Mehmet Kalyoncu Why the EU Needs a Strategy for the Black Sea Region3 January 2007By Lara Scarpitta* It is old news that geography matters in foreign policy. A dormant EC/EU had to learn this vital lesson in 1989, when communism crumbled behind its safe walls. Faced with the sudden prospect of bordering poor, unpredictable and unstable neighbours, it responded by anchoring the former soviet satellites of Central Europe with the offer of EU membership. But now that a new enlargement has been completed, geography matters even more. With the accession of Romania and Bulgaria on the 1st of January, the EU’s new eastern border has moved south, to the shore of the Black Sea. Across its waters, however, lies one of the most unstable and conflict-prone regions of post-Soviet Eurasia. For centuries, the Black Sea region has been a theatre of violent conflicts and power struggles, due primarily to its geographical location and character as a transit route. During the Cold War, all Black Sea states (except Turkey) were within the Soviet sphere of influence and at the periphery of international strategic interests. But as the Soviet Union began to break down in 1991, the Black Sea region plunged into chaos, torn apart by several ethnic and separatist conflicts. The end of the Cold War’s artificial stability freed long concealed (and suppressed) historical grievances and a number of new independent states such as Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan emerged from the ashes of the Soviet Empire. Nevertheless, most of them are still very weak democracies, facing territorial separatism, ethnic tensions, undemocratic trends in domestic politics, slow economic progress, environmental degradation and endemic corruption of public officials. The long years of armed conflicts have caused disruption to trade and damaged infrastructure. Due to its potential for conflict, the region has attracted relatively little foreign investment and most such countries are still today heavily dependent on the Russian economy. Unemployment rates are generally very high, with almost all states suffer from a hemorrhagic migration abroad of a consistent percentage of the working-age population. Today the Black Sea region is also a major source and transit area of several security threats, from terrorism to international organised crime as well as arms and human trafficking. It is home to four so-called “frozen” conflicts — Transnistria, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia – the unresolved separatist issues which followed the breakdown of the USSR. Despite years of diplomacy and talks, hopes for finding a peaceful and long-standing resolution for these conflicts remain bleak. Apart from fuelling bilateral tensions, these “frozen’ conflicts have been a bane for the region’s democratic and economic development, breeding instability and corruption and favouring the proliferation of organised crime. Uncontrolled territories in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh, for example, have become safe havens for the activities of powerful organised criminal groups involved in people smuggling, human trafficking as well as goods and arms trafficking. The phenomenon of arms trafficking is widespread in the region and much of the large weapons stockpiles abandoned by Russia in the early 1990s have ended up on the grey and black markets. The region is also a major source of drug production and a trafficking route for drugs coming from Central Asia and the Middle East (especially Afghanistan) into Europe. Large profits are also being made from smuggling people across the region with a promise of a better life in the West, and there is evidence that these profits are being reinvested into drugs and arms trafficking, as well as financing terrorist activities, as a recent Europol report highlighted. This situation carries significant implications for EU security. A power vacuum in the region can potentially result in a security vacuum with consequences which are self-evident yet highly unpredictable. Because of its sudden and new geographical proximity to the wider Black Sea states, the EU will no longer be immune from the backlashes of instability and conflicts in the region, but rather will be directly exposed to a whole range of security threats, from organised crime to drugs and arms trafficking, as well as refugee and illegal migration pressures. Aside from these security concerns, however, the Black Sea region offers many positive opportunities. The most obvious is in the field of energy. Thanks to its proximity to the oil-rich Caspian Sea and its vast energy resources, the Black Sea region can play a major role for the EU’s energy strategy, to secure alternatives to Russian energy supply. Many ambitious pipeline projects were launched in the 1990s to guarantee direct access to Caspian oil via the Black Sea. These include the U.S. East-West Energy Corridor and the EU Traceca project (Transit Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia). Although these failed to materialise when conflicts erupted in the Balkans and in the South Caucasus in the 1990s, it is in the interests of the EU that these projects be reinvigorated to ensure greater Western access to Caspian energy resources. Perhaps most importantly, the Black Sea region matters for its strategic importance, owing to its proximity to the Middle East. Since 9/11, the US has played an active role in the region to safeguard its vast security and economic interests, especially access to Caspian oil and gas reserves. American “pipeline politics’ has gone hand in hand with its war on terror and the U.S. administration has been keen to support the NATO aspirations of some Black Sea countries. Yet is the EU ready take up these challenges with similar energy? Can it exploit the region’s huge and lucrative potentials and prevent the Black Sea from becoming a permanent source of security threats? Most likely, it will only be able to do so partially. The reasons are multiple. First, the EU does not have a Black Sea policy, or at least not a coherent strategy as such. It has opted instead for a patchwork of policies and approaches: enlargement to South-eastern Europe and Turkey, the “European Neighbourhood” policy and a structured cooperation with the South Caucasus states. Indeed, therein lays part of the problem. While the EU enlargement policy – with its strict conditionality and convergence to EU norms and standards – has (at least so far) been relatively a success story, other policies failed to deliver the expected results. Bilateral cooperation with post-Soviet Eastern neighbours like Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, as well as with the South Caucasus states (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan), put in place since the mid-1990s hardly proved a recipe for stabilisation and prosperity. The over 3 billion euros from the EU’s TACIS funds allocated in the last ten years have failed to convince reluctant post-Soviet governments to introduce sound democratic and market-based economic reforms. Part of the problem is that the EU lacks sufficient leverage to push for such reforms. This is hardly a surprise if one considers that most of these states are still heavily under Russia’s influence. The 2006 energy crisis in Ukraine and Moldova, as well as Russian import bans on Moldovan and Georgian wines and water are a stark remainder of Russia’s economic power over its neighbours. The EU, by contrast, continues to have a limited impact on the region. But the EU “stabilisation’ policy has also been too weak in its incentives to push for reforms. The so-called Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PACs), lacked not only a prospect for membership but also a strict conditionality and were based primarily on a multidimensional cooperation on economic and cultural questions and a political dialogue on issues concerning minorities, human rights and security in Europe. The “European Neighbourhood” policy, launched officially on the eve of the 2004 “big bang’ enlargement, was aimed at addressing some of these problems. But judging by the results so far, the innovative offer of “everything except institutions,” has not been the trump card the EU was looking for as an alternative to enlargement. The colour revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia have not given way to the expected substantial democratic reforms. Moldova continues to struggle to control its separatist region of Transnistria and there are no signs of Belarus abandoning its totalitarian regime. Little progress has been made in fulfilling the various Action Plans, the EU’s own financial commitment for the region for 2007-2013 has increased but remains marginal and the EU has continued to politely dismiss the long-term membership aspirations of some of its pro-Western neighbours. Paradoxically, with these differentiated approaches towards its neighbours the EU has in fact achieved the rather unexpected results of widening the economic, political and social gap between them. While in Romania and Bulgaria the EU accession process has arguably ensured the successful creation of sound democratic institutions and fast economic growth, the EU’s eastern neighbours have witnessed a halt or reversal of their democratic process, as highlighted by the 2005 Freedom House Report, with most struggling with macroeconomic and structural difficulties and declining standards of living. So what should the EU do? For a start, think strategically. After the 2007 enlargement and with the accession negotiations already underway with Turkey, the EU has already become an actor in the Black Sea region. Developing a coherent and well articulated Black Sea policy to protect EU economic and strategic interests has therefore become imperative. No doubt, anchoring the countries of the Black Sea region is not going to be easy, not least of all because without a realistic prospect of EU membership for most of these states, the EU lacks its most powerful point of leverage. On the positive side, however, the EU is now in a far better position to develop an ambitious and realistic policy for the region than it was some years ago. It can now draw on its expertise and the instruments developed in the past decade, by abandoning rhetoric and reinforcing its concrete actions. The coming months may be crucial for the development of a coherent EU Black Sea strategy. German Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier made it clear that Germany intends to achieve concrete results in Black Sea Region during its presidency by examining the effectiveness of the European Neighbourhood policy. Still, by itself this policy is not sufficient. The stability of the region requires political courage and long-term strategic thinking. The EU should certainly put “some meat on the bone’ on its neighbourhood policy, by offering to its neighbours concrete and lucrative economic incentives in exchange for serious and tangible commitments to democratic and market-based reforms and the protection of human rights. But a credible EU Black Sea policy also needs to demonstrate that the EU is serious about the resolution of all the “frozen’ conflicts in the region. The support for the EU Border Assistance Mission between Ukraine and Moldova and the appointment of a EU Special Representative for Moldova in 2005 is a positive sign that EU commitment heads in this direction. However, concrete steps must be taken at regional and bilateral levels to find durable peaceful solutions. In this respect Brussels must also find the political courage and determination to take the initiative diplomatically with Russia. Unfortunately, EU reactions to Russia’s allegedly “imperialist’ policy to its near abroad have remained weak and not much more has been done beyond expressing disappointment. Finally the EU needs to step in with greater support and financial involvement to support regional cooperation efforts. So far the EU has paid lip service to regional cooperation preferring to focus instead on bilateral relations. As active regional partners and new EU members, Romania and Bulgaria are likely to play an active role in this respect. Romanian President Traian Basescu has made it clear on several occasions that Romania intends to promote more assertively the idea of a strategic vision for the Black Sea region and a greater involvement in regional dynamics. Black Sea economic cooperation in particular can offer the EU an ideal forum for promoting projects in the field of energy as well as non economic areas, such as the protection of the environment, controlling immigration and fighting arms and human trafficking. Ultimately, the extent to which the EU will be able to secure its immediate and distant neighbours in the Black Sea region will depend on its ability to increase its role and impact on the region and become a pulling factor for democratic change. A democratic and fully integrated Turkey will be crucial in this respect. The benefits of a coherent, realistic and forward-looking strategy towards the Black Sea region are enormous. If the EU’s “close’ and “distant’ neighbours can successfully complete their economic and political transition, security threats will be weakened. Similarly, the creation of stable democratic institutions, functioning economic structures and vibrant civil societies will undermine the operation of criminal groups. To achieve this long-term objective all EU instruments and forces should be mobilised. Otherwise, the region may well plunge once again into chaos. However, this time EU citizens many not be immune.
*Lara Scarpitta is a PhD candidate at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies of the University of Birmingham. Before embarking on a PhD, Lara worked in Holland, Italy and recently in Brussels where she worked as an intern in the Cabinet of Vice President of the European Commission Franco Frattini, EU Commissioner for Freedom, Security and Justice. By Lara Scarpitta* Balkanalysis.com Presents: Spotlight on the Caucasus Week7 August 2006Every day this week, Balkanalysis.com will publish a new article on the fascinating and complex region of the Caucasus. Topics will range from security to politics and economics, and cover the major countries of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, as well as cross-border issues in the North Caucasus and first-hand testimony of the situation on the ground. The week kicks off tomorrow with an analysis of the political dynamic in the little-understood North Caucasus Russian republics of Adygeya and Ingushetia, by Kazakhstan native and Oxford scholar Alisa Voznaya. On Wednesday, we present an exclusive interview with the venerable Canadian journalist and publisher, Scott Taylor, who offers his insights on Azerbaijan’s new militaristic confidence following a recent trip to Baku. Thursday the series continues with a detailed overview of the refugee situation in Georgia, presented by Ana Toklikishvili, Public Information Officer at the United Nations Association of Georgia. Friday, we present a short analysis on the Azeri oil industry- and what it might mean for the future of energy transit. Every day this week, Balkanalysis.com will publish a new article on the fascinating and complex region of the Caucasus. Topics will range from security to politics and economics, and cover the major countries of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, as well as cross-border issues in the North Caucasus and first-hand testimony of the situation on the [...] Armenian-Iranian Alliance Just Part of Complex Equation16 February 2006The steadily warming relationship between Armenia and Iran is a revealing, but not surprising, result of the perceived isolation both have felt, in different ways and for different reasons, from the West. Yet what the affiliation will mean for a peaceful solution to the region’s frozen conflicts following any American strike on the latter is something much less clear. Complementary Objectives Although it might at first seem strange that Christian Armenia and the Islamic Republic could seek to move closer together, the underlying complexities of their respective situations indicate precisely why they are forging closer ties.For Iran, currently under immense international pressure over its nuclear program, making itself indispensable to neighboring states is smart policy. Recognizing energy-starved Armenia’s need for natural gas, Tehran is seeking to develop pipeline and perhaps railway infrastructure to its western neighbor. It recognizes that the more critical infrastructure it can provide to its neighbors, the more clout it will have on the international political scene. For Armenia, the key issues involve securing a dependable energy supply and developing the nation’s economic prospective. The poor state of the economy has led since the downfall of the USSR to widespread emigration, something which is threatening its future. Another crucial issue is the unresolved state of Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous area theoretically part of Azerbaijan but ruled de facto by the ethnically Armenian majority following a brief war in the early 1990’s. Negotiations continue under the guidance of the OSCE’s Minsk Group, an entity led by today’s Great Powers, including the US, France and Russia. In his official visit to Armenia this week, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki stated that the two countries are “building multi-faceted relations… [and] trying to ensure that they have a regional significance,” reported Emil Danielyan for ArmeniaLiberty.org. His Armenian counterpart Vartan Oskanian added, “our bilateral relations with Iran are developing pretty fast, becoming more comprehensive and deeper… they are transcending the bilateral framework and taking on a regional significance.” Claiming that the two countries’ improved relations possessed a “regional significance” the emissaries spoke of a common focus on constructing a natural gas pipeline to bring Iranian natural gas to Armenia, as well as a possible railway, a project that “would require hundreds of millions of dollars in funding.” America is uneasy about the budding friendship. While he was careful to state that the pipeline initiative did not represent a transgression of US sanctions on the Islamic Republic, US Ambassador to Armenia John Evans disclosed that he has warned Armenian officials “to be sure that they are watching this question so as not to bring the American legislation [against Iran] into effect,” according to Danielyan’s report. The foreign ministers’ press conference was also attended by a US embassy official. The energy cooperation was not however disconcerting only for the US. According to UPI, “there were some initial Russian worries that the nearly 100-mile pipeline could undercut its control of Armenia’s energy supply.” The mysterious Jan. 22 pipeline blast in North Ossetia wreaked havoc on energy supply in the region and for some seemed to warn against depending too heavily on Russian gas transiting the volatile North Caucasus (though American ally Georgia, at least, seems to have weaned itself of its temporary Iranian habit rather quickly). Iran the Peacemaker? Contrary to its current reputation as a belligerent, Tehran also sees itself as a potential peacemaker in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. It has the advantage of religious solidarity with the majority Shiite Muslim Azeri population, and friendly ties with Armenia. Officials have stated that Iran would like to play a part in securing a peaceful settlement to the thorny issue. Yet this will only complicate matters in terms of relations with Turkey, traditional supporter of the Azeris and rival of Armenia, as well as with the EU, which has its own aspirations for peacemaking glory. The Turkish-Armenian border has been closed since 1991 as a form of protest by the former over the Nagorno-Karabakh occupation and the Armenian Genocide claims. This blockade has been crippling for the landlocked nation. An Armenian diplomat reiterated this week for the EUobserver that “we just want to open our road and rail route with Turkey. It is our main link to the outside world and it is blocked.” The EU is increasingly interested in resolving the frozen crises of the Caucasus, including Abkhazia and Ossetia in Georgia and the Nagorno-Karabakh one, as it considers a peaceful region key to a stable energy supply, the report adds. This week, the bloc dispatched its external relations commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, for an official visit to the region. Azeri EU envoy Aris Mamedov stated that “there is a lot of European interest in trans-Caspian oil pipelines. This is something for the European agenda in the future.” Nevertheless, as UPI’s Martin Walker put it, the optimistic mission is fraught with peril: “the European Union is heading daringly back into the minefield of Caucasus politics, driven by its new concerns about reliable and diversified energy supplies after the sudden interruptions caused by the row over natural gas supplies and pipelines between Russia and Ukraine.” However, “as Russia’s biggest customer for energy, and also as Russia’s main supplier of foreign investment, the EU countries have mixed feelings about pursuing too aggressive a policy in the Caucasus.” Indeed, while the Europeans may redouble diplomatic efforts out of a desire to secure their energy future, this does not mean that their influence in conflict resolution will also increase. There is nothing to suggest that going down the usual diplomatic avenues will yield up any significant new developments. A Feb. 10 summit in Rambouillet, France held under the auspices of the Minsk Group resulted in no breakthroughs. The dialogue will shift to Washington early next month, though no one is expecting the intractable 18-year dispute to be resolved then. Indeed, as a Russian analyst recently quipped, “believe me, we will not in our living days see anybody getting a Nobel Prize for making peace in Karabakh.” So perhaps it is time to inject some fresh blood into the process. But with the US, EU and their allies struggling to come up with a “common position” on Iran’s nuclear program – in other words, to find a way to shut the country out of all international relevance – is it even likely that Tehran would be allowed to participate in brokering an Armenian-Azeri rapprochement? Even in the most pessimistic case, Iran doesn’t actually need to do anything to present itself as a positive force for regional development. Simply by raising the possibility of its cooperation, Tehran invites further serious contemplation. Any military assault on the country by the US would negatively impact on the region in manifold ways. It would hamper the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, and escalate the “Kurdish question,” while intensifying internal pressures and anti-Americanism in neighboring Turkey. It would throw vital issues of energy control and international demarcation of the Caspian Sea into doubt, and would actually increase Russia’s control over Caucasus energy supplies, should Iran be crippled by war and thus unable to meet its international obligations. These are merely the regional dangers posed by military action- the effect on the Iraq insurgency, Israel and the wider Muslim word go without saying. In the end, Iran may not be the most vital key to peace in the Caucasus, but if the EU and US think they reach it without its input, they are deluded. This is part of the reason why Russia, which has numerous interests in the region – its own backyard, after all – has taken the pragmatic approach of engaging Iran rather than alienating it. Iran, which also must live with or at least close to the source of the problems, also has a vested interest in peace. The West, on the other hand, merely seeks to keep its citizens warm in the winter. It is situated far from the region whose citizens are directly affected by any outbreak of violence. If it were possible to keep its citizens warm in the winter without having to thaw the region’s frozen conflicts at the same time, the West would surely spare itself the trouble- democracy and human rights be damned.
The steadily warming relationship between Armenia and Iran is a revealing, but not surprising, result of the perceived isolation both have felt, in different ways and for different reasons, from the West. Yet what the affiliation will mean for a peaceful solution to the region’s frozen conflicts following any American [...] Balkanalysis.com: A Look Back on 2005 and News for the Future4 January 2006As 2006 dawns, let’s take a moment to look back on the year 2005 and note some salient details about this website’s performance. First of all, 2005 saw 129 new articles published on Balkanalysis.com- in addition to several hundred others added to our back archive on the Central and Eastern European Online Library (CEEOL), which resulted in greatly increased attention from large institutions, research libraries and other purchasers of these vital texts. Second, and equally importantly, we published works from around 10 new writers, thus providing our audience with an expanded range of opinions, insights and points of view from writers hailing from several different Balkan (and outside) states. And, as usual, our international readership continued to be diverse yet specific. Readers continue to come from institutions including research libraries, universities, think-tanks, financial institutions, embassies and NGOs, as well as the military and other security-oriented bodies, along with a fair share of Balkan-interest laymen and diaspora folks. An unfortunate byproduct of this growing interest was noted near the end of the year, when we successfully defended ourselves from crass plagiarism by the mass media in the court of moral authority. Another two similar case were swiftly resolved in our favor but not reported. Finally, we also saw improved success with affiliate programs such as Google Ads, Ebay and Amazon, which provide readers with specifically tailored information and items pertaining to the Balkans and adjacent areas. Now, what does all this tell us about the future? First of all, we will continue providing regular analysis of major trends in the Balkans, as well as controversial exposes, exclusive interviews and coverage of events on the local level that cannot be found elsewhere. And we will continue to replenish the archive on CEEOL, where some of the content will continue to include articles not found on our website’s archive. Second of all, we will continue to provide opportunities for new writers, something which will benefit everyone and present a more cosmpolitan viewpoint representing a wider range of voices. Prospective writers, as well as book reviewers, should read the About Us section for details. Finally, in regards to naughty publishers who decide to bend the rules by not citing or even plagiarizing our texts when they use them, we will, as W. so eloquently said, “smoke them out of their holes”- whatever that means. Above all we would like to thank our loyal readers for their continued support and interest. Note that we enjoy hearing from you, whether or not you have something nice to say. All feedback is helpful to us as we try to serve you better. But don’t forget that supporting us by passing on the word about the website, patronizing our advertisers, or even donating is very much appreciated. With best wishes for 2006, Christopher Deliso, Director Balkanalysis.com
As 2006 dawns, let’s take a moment to look back on the year 2005 and note some salient details about this website’s performance. Balkanalysis.com Announces Winter Break and Final 2005 CEEOL Uploads23 December 2005Balkanalysis.com would like to take this opportunity to announce a short winter break, from the period of Dec. 23-Jan. 3. While new articles will not be posted during this period, readers will be able to take the opportunity to peruse the archives at their leisure. We would also like to announce that final uploads of outstanding 2005 archival material on our page at the Central and Eastern European Online Library (CEEOL) will be uploaded by the end of December. Some are in the process already. These archives cover the period June-December 2005 and, as is the case with the earlier archived material, contain compelling and exclusive articles that cannot be found anywhere else. Joining CEEOL is easy and readers will be spoiled for choice, able to select from a reading list of thousands of articles from over 200 publishers in the humanities fields, from all over the Balkans and Central Europe. When we return on January 4, it will be with a whole host of provocative new articles, reviews and interviews that already indicate that 2006 will be our best year yet- even if it looks likely to be a pretty dangerous one for whole swathes of the Balkans. The Balkanalysis.com team would like to wish readers a very merry holiday season and happy new year. Balkanalysis.com would like to take this opportunity to announce a short winter break, from the period of Dec. 23-Jan. 3. Classic Balkanalysis: Another Side of the Georgian-Russian Conflict28 October 2005Exactly one year ago, this exclusive report from the top of the Caucasus Mountains was published on Antiwar.com . The beautiful pictures and testimony from ordinary civilians trapped by political interests makes for compelling and provocative reading. When it comes to coverage of the ongoing feud between Georgia and Russia, the Western mass media have a tendency to draw their testimony from “official” sources – political leaders, think tank analysts and the representatives of semi-political organizations such as the OSCE and Western-funded NGOs. However, with only a few exceptions, the voice of the common people is rarely heard. This tacit media complicity all too often invalidates the viewpoint of regular Georgians or Russians as being irrelevant, while it ends up bolstering the policies of their increasingly bellicose governments or blessing the programs of allegedly populist organizations supported from without.Further, media articles featuring miniature maps of the Caucasus tend to be political too. That is, while they reveal the jagged borders of far-flung territories unknown to most outsiders, and the locations of various cities therein, they tend to pay less heed to the geographical realities – something which is unfortunate, considering that the history of the entire Caucasus region has always been shaped by the exigencies of its rugged, mountainous terrain. Having had an interest in the country and its key problems for several years, I endeavored on my latest trip to Georgia to visit other parts of the country, and get a mixture of opinions that would include the testimonies of non-official people whose lives are being affected by the decisions of their increasingly rash leaders. Into the Mountains It is less than a four-hour drive north to reach the Russian border from Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi. But the road is winding and difficult, as it cuts through mountains that reach their peak in Mt. Kazbek (16,558 feet). Known as the Georgian Military Highway, this historically strategic route is marred with crater-sized potholes and disintegrates completely into dirt and rocks at its summit, the Jvari Pass. At many points, the road is carved out of sheer cliff faces and contains numerous built-in tunneled underpasses on the sides – a necessity, owing to the massive snowfall this area gets in winter. Needless to say, the views are magnificent throughout. I negotiated this route after enlisting the services of one Tariel Tabashidze, a 40-year-old agronomist by training who now works as a translator for German and U.S. companies and individuals. Since the journey is definitely too challenging for the average car, we took his brother’s trusty white Lada Niva – the Russian answer to a Jeep. Along the way, Tabashidze proudly recounted how the very same vehicle had been hired out a decade ago to BBC reporter Andrew Harding for his forays into neighboring Chechnya. Unlike that volatile region, Georgia’s Kazbegi region is a sparsely-populated oasis of tranquility, featuring abundant wildlife and medieval stone churches, sprinkled with tiny villages that culminate in the small town of Kazbegi itself, just a few miles from Russia. The proximity of the border means that the dilapidated shops in Kazbegi and its outlying villages are filled with Russian goods. Georgian farmers also send the majority of their produce north for export. Unlike claims of allegiance with Russia voiced by secessionists in Georgia’s South Ossetian and Abkhazian provinces, Kazbegi’s Russian relationship has nothing to do with politics. Rather, the greater distance and geographical difficulties of communicating with Tbilisi – especially in winter, when the whole area is snowed under – mean that the locals must rely on their connections with their much closer neighbors to the north, and especially the regional center of Vladikavkaz. The Border Swings Shut However, these connections were instantly severed by the tragedy of Beslan on Sept. 1. In the wake of this deadly terrorist attack, Russian President Putin ordered the closure of Russia’s border with the south as a security measure. Yet by early October, when I visited, the Kazbegi border (known as the Upper Lars crossing) was still closed. Any security risks (had there really been any) were long ended. There was another factor to consider here. Almost exactly two years before, I had traveled via helicopter to another border point – Shatili – which sits snug on the Chechen part of the Russian border. Here, young OSCE monitors had, two days earlier, been stopped in a remote place by a dozen heavily armed Chechens. Luckily for them, the monitors were released, but with the following warning: “We know all about your little camp. So if you tell the Russians about us before two days have passed, we will destroy it.” From this and many other accounts, it thus seemed that Russian charges are justified. At least on their part of the border, Chechen terrorists did occasionally slip in and out of the Georgian wilds. However, it was also hard to believe that any such individual would be found standing in line, waiting to be processed at an official border checkpoint. Whether or not the Russians decided to close the border at Kazbegi would thus mean little for state security. And so even if initially understandable, the Russian border closure simply made no sense. And, as I found, it has meant trouble for both local Georgians and travelers trying to pass through. Elderly Makhvala Sargishvili owns a kiosk located (literally) in a hole in the wall running outside her tiny mountain village. Crammed inside the shop window were dusty boxes of outdated Russian provisions. Almost all of her products came from Russia, but with the blockage at the border she was faced with a real problem. “Life is not so bad, but not so good, either. This problem with the border is really difficult for us.” These comments were shared by three farmers, Giorgi, Emzar, and Vano, pitching hay in the idyllic mountain village of Kobi. Tomorrow would be dog-fighting day in the village, they announced; there was simply nothing else to do for entertainment. “There’s no TV,” said Giorgi, “and nobody has enough money to get married. There are now 59 couples from these villages waiting to have a wedding someday.” Agriculture is the only source of income for these villagers, and a very seasonal one. Within a few weeks after my visit, they predicted, the snow would start falling. Now, with the Russian border closed, “we can neither get goods we need nor export our produce,” lamented Vano. Geography, not politics or ethnicity, had forced these Georgians to throw in their lot with the Russian Ossetian population to the north. The Stranded Armenians However difficult the border closure was for ordinary Georgian villagers, those most affected at the time were 25 Armenians who’d had the bad luck of reaching the border just as the carnage in Beslan was unfolding. Some were trying to go to Russia for work, others to return to their adopted homes in Vladikavkaz. None of them were prepared for the ordeal that would leave them trapped at the border for almost two months. “We feel like animals,” growled Isak Ogosian, the group’s bearded spokesman. “We have been stuck here for 32 days. We have to sleep sitting up in the bus. And, despite our pleas, nobody helps us.” Among the disconsolate bunch were old ladies, young mothers and small children. They had little remaining money and supplies, and subsisted only due to the help of the already impoverished locals. While Georgian media had paid them a visit early on in the saga, nothing substantial had been done to ameliorate their situation. The mountain chasms falling into the river – in any other situation, hopelessly breathtaking – had become a sort of prison. Indeed, life seemed pretty unhappy for the stranded Armenians. Some people slept in the rusty old bus, while one old woman prepared some variety of borscht in a metal pan. A little boy kicked one of the many crushed cans littering the ground as if it were a soccer ball. Off to one side, a young man snoring in a sleeping bag competed with a mangy, dozing dog. When they couldn’t get him to wake up, Isak formed the shape of a cross on his back with some grass, sending the rest into hysterics. It was a rare uproarious moment for a dejected and powerless group of forgotten travelers. “Nobody gets to go through [the border] except important people,” charged Elizabeta Abramovna, a retired doctor who moved to Vladikavkaz 37 years ago with her late husband, then an official in the Soviet government. “Because of my complaining, everyone knows about me now, the governments and media. But still nobody helps us.” According to her, the official response to the travelers’ requests was a perfect example of passing the buck: since the Georgian side gave them permission to exit Georgia, it was no longer their problem when the Russians denied them entry. The Armenian officials they had consulted said there was nothing they could do either. For a month the Armenians had lived with the vague promise that the border would soon be open. Nevertheless, this endless waiting had caused some to give up hope. “About 12 of them want to just forget it and go back to Armenia [190 km/118 mi. to the south], where they have family,” revealed Isak. “All we need is about $100 to hire a minibus. This situation is hard, especially for the children,” he said, nodding at 3-year-old Angelina, an adorable and shy little girl hiding behind her mother, Anna. “All we want is to go back to Armenia, just to get at least to the [Armenian] border,” said Anna. “After that we can find a way, somehow.” And that is how we left them, in the chilly afternoon preceding yet another spectacular Caucasus sunset. Yet the saga continued. Only on Oct. 22 was the border finally reopened. Armenian President Robert Kocharian “hailed” the event as “evidence that tension in North Ossetia is subsiding after the Beslan events.” In other words, not only did his government fail to help his own stranded citizens, but the president went out of his way to toe the Kremlin’s official line on the reason for the border having been closed in the first place. For his part, Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili, appearing together with Kocharian, could only grumble that the border closure “has reminded us once again that sales markets should be looked for not only in Russia.” Wonderful. Yet unless Saakashvili proposes to detonate hundreds of miles of mountain range, it doesn’t seem likely that the north Georgians of Kazbegi will change their habits. The Ossetian Question And why should they? “We have no problem with the Ossetian people,” said my earnest guide, Mr. Tabashidze. “It is the politicians who create these conflicts.” His opinion was echoed by villagers we surveyed. “For us, it should not be a problem to visit a doctor, say, or go in the Russian shops there [in Vladikavkaz],” said Giorgi the farmer from Kobi. “This is our normal life.” Indeed, though the South Ossetian “government” desires to join up with its kin on the other side of the border – Russia’s North Ossetia, where the Beslan saga unfolded – there is no wide-ranging ethnic hostility as has been the case in the Balkans, for instance. The Georgians of Kazbegi, at least, have long been trading with and visiting the Ossetians just over the border, and vice versa. Hostilities often seem to be manipulated by the decisions of powerful leaders far above and far removed from the areas in question. Indeed, as a Georgian soldier unlucky enough to be serving in the South Ossetian “neutral zone” told one recent visitor, “this isn’t between us and the Ossetians. It’s between us and Russia.” Threats of War However, the continued brinkmanship between these two major players is having its predictable local effect. “We will not wait long,” threatened an unnamed local from the Georgian village of Abasheni, on the edge of the neutral zone. “We will wait two or three days and then we will also shoot at [the South Ossetian town of] Tskhinvali.” The threat follows weeks of agitation from Georgians who claim they are being targeted by Ossetian paramilitaries during overnight outbursts of violence. The Georgians blame the Ossetian side for provoking the attacks, while the Ossetians are equally adamant that it’s the Georgian army that is inciting them. For his part, the Russian major general heading the Joint Peacekeeping Force in South Ossetia told the protesting Georgians that he “cannot control everybody.” The Georgians question whether Russia is even interested in controlling their Ossetian charges. In this vacuum of responsibility, however, “both sides are laying mines despite the pleas of OSCE to stop,” and talk has again returned to war. As if to set an example, Interior Minister Irakli Okruashvili last week started a three-week military training course for army reservists. President Saakashvili – who wants to ban anyone who hasn’t undergone such training from taking up a civil post – sees the militarization of Georgian society as indispensable for proving the unity of the “Georgian nation.” These perhaps ominous developments occur at a time when the Georgian government is beefing up its military presence in the conflict area. The Ossetians are likewise digging in. It was the international shock over Beslan that seems to have hushed the Georgian government’s warmongering words in September. After all, the summer months had been “hot,” peaking in late August with Saakashvili’s memorable declaration that Georgians should prepare for imminent war with Russia. However, if these recent developments are any indicator, it appears that sufficient time has passed to allow for heated words to once again shape the political discourse. Unfortunately, this will also mean that foreign media coverage of Georgia remains obsessed with the breathless statements of officials – and not the common people they allegedly empowered with last year’s “Rose Revolution.” Exactly one year ago, this exclusive report from the top of the Caucasus Mountains was published on Antiwar.com . The beautiful pictures and testimony from ordinary civilians trapped by political interests makes for compelling and provocative reading. A Quiet Battle in the Caucasus: Georgia between Russia and NATO26 September 2001By Christopher Deliso Rising from the subtropical shores of the Black Sea to the majestic Caucasus mountains, Georgia is a rich and varied nation only now removing itself from the shadow of the Soviet Union. Indeed, for most of its long history Georgia has been the subject of attack and occupation by foreign countries — the Romans, Turks, Persians and Russians; it was also once a protectorate of Byzantium. Like everywhere in the Caucasus, it is home to a myriad of different peoples and languages, but this very fact, which makes Georgia an ethnographer’s dream, also makes it a security nightmare. Two major revolts and a civil war in the early 1990’s have left Georgia a weak and demoralized nation, and one that is seeking ardently to find balance between east and west. In the following analysis I show how the major economic and geostrategic factors that make Georgia so important have also made it an object of a new tug of war between Russia and NATO — one that has taken on greater urgency since the terrorist attacks in New York. Although it remains to be seen whether Georgia will be able to bargain the best deal for itself, one thing is certain — Georgia’s place in the Caucasus, and its relations with both Russia and the West, are entering a crucial new phase. Simply put, it’s make it or break it time for Georgia. A NOTE ON SOURCES Since this article utilizes a number of obscure and lengthy sources, I am using an endnote format (though initial links are provided). Information has been culled from Georgia’s Prime News Agency, Russian and other world media, the comprehensive reviews of Georgian military in 2000 collected in Army and Society in Georgia (published by the Center for Civic-Military Relations and Security Studies), and analysts like Stratfor. THE CRITICAL FACTORS Several specific factors have shaped Georgia’s relationships with Russia and the West. They are: the continuing Russian influence and military presence; Georgian governmental confusion and lack of clarity about policy; state financial weakness; corruption in government and organized crime in society; a failure to control borders; and, finally, Georgia’s strategic location for both parties. As we will see, these factors are all interrelated, and one cannot be detached from the others. The total situation is just as complex; we must approach it accordingly. RUSSIAN INFLUENCE: THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY BASES In many ways, Georgia’s difficulties stem from Russia’s confusion as to what its own priorities should be in the post-Soviet Caucasus. Yeltsin-administration advocates of a strong Russian military presence outside of Russia have largely been sacked, as Vladimir Putin seeks a more lithe and intelligence-oriented military. Among the victims of the purge was the “notorious” defense minister Pavel Grachev who “almost single-handedly shaped Russia’s position” in Caucasian affairs.1 Nevertheless, several Georgian bases remain in Russian hands. This is a major point of contention. On 22-23 December 2000 talks were held in Tbilisi over the fate of four Russian-held bases. It was agreed that the two countries would use the Vaziani base jointly, and would “transform the Gudauta base into a rehabilitation centre of the Russian peacekeeping troops.”2 An agreement on two other bases, in Batumi and Akhalkalaki, was put off until February 2001. In December 2000, Georgia did, however, take over seven military facilities from the Russians (in the regions of Tbilisi, Alekseevka, Marneuli, Manglisi, Kodjori and Kobuleti); the local press, however, dismissed their importance or usefulness.3 While some of the transitions went smoothly, the Russians stalled on exiting Gudauta in July, due to its strategic importance in the “breakaway republic” of Abkhazia (western Georgia). There are many reasons for Russian reticence. Georgian commentators aver: “Some political and military-forces of Russia believe that the Georgian state-building project opposes Russian national interests. They have leverage to intervene in Georgia’s policy even in a forceful way. Particularly, there are poorly controlled Russian troops and some local political groups, which favor restoration of a Russian protectorate in various forms. Russian military-political circles may well find supporters in Georgian force agencies. Russia has enough influence on the Georgian power supply system to provoke social unrest in the country. Besides, Georgian terrorists may have found shelter in Russia.”4 RUSSIAN INFLUENCE ON THE GEORGIAN ECONOMY Georgians lament the fact that their country, once the richest and most prosperous of Soviet nations, is now one of the poorest. After the Soviet breakup in 1992, Georgia’s economy, dominated by seasonal agriculture like fruit and tea and bolstered by Russian subsidies, went into steep decline. “When the Soviet Union fell apart, not only did the subsidies disappear, so did Georgia’s unrestricted access to 400 million Soviet consumers, leaving it with an internal market of less than 6 million.”5 If this was a bad start, things would only get worse in the first few years of Georgian independence, when the country was torn apart by civil war and rebellions in the Abkhazian and Ossetian regions. This upset Georgia’s traditional trade routes and access to some of its major ports. Economically, Russia’s great strength can be exerted in several ways. One of the least pleasant for Georgians has been the Russian tactic of cutting off the natural gas supply in the dead of winter, as it did on 1 January 2001. Georgian president Schevernadze did not appeal to Washington, or to the Russian gas company (Itera); rather, he appealed directly to Putin. And so “once it was clear to the world that Russia had made its point about who was truly in control, the gas once again flowed.”6 Despite this indignity, Russia is the major gas provider and Schevernadze “noted the need to consider” ITERA for the privatization of Georgia’s gas distribution network.7 A MAJOR HEADACHE FOR GEORGIA: ABKHAZIAN SEPARATISTS Russia’s reluctance to surrender the Gudauta base has to do primarily with its location in Abkhazia, the fractious “republic” in the western tip of Georgia. With the help of “covert Russian aid,” Abkhaz separatists launched a rebellion in 1992 that destabilized the Georgian government’s control of the region and ensured a Russian presence.8 Abkhazia is both a major headache for the Georgians and a strategic concern for the Russians. Georgia would understandably like its territory back, particularly given that Abkhazia’s “capital” on the Black Sea coast, Sukhumi, is a valuable port and trade route. For Russia, the issue is security on its southern flank and the control of smuggling, which it fears will be lost by withdrawing: “Abkhazia is the weakest link in Russia’s counter-terrorist, counter-narcotics program and a precarious ally. Russia’s withdrawal of forces and demobilization of its bases would create a security vacuum in Abkhazia, even if CIS peacekeepers remained on hand with minor coordination from Russia.”9 The Russians also fear a backlash from their Abkhazian suppliants if they withhold their “protection.” Besides a fear of enraging the Muslim Abkhaz people themselves, Russia fears that the hostile Chechens will penetrate northward from the Georgian front. There is no question that Abkhazia is a “dangerous and lawless” place. On 10 December 2000, two UN observers in the Kodori Valley region were abducted, marking the third occasion of kidnapping since 1998.10 The porous and wild border is hard to police, and drug and weapons smuggling is rampant. While the Georgians have historically, and with good reason, taken affront at Russia’s support for Abkhazian separatism, unfavorable new developments — the presence of Chechens — will encourage Russia to maintain its military presence in Abkhazia for as long as possible. In fact, the alleged Georgian position regarding the Chechens in Abkhazia, if it is true, would seem to border on the suicidal. It is alleged that these fighters are imported from Chechnya, through Georgia, to help the Georgian government fight the Russian-backed Abkhazians. The action has been heating up lately; Tbilisi’s Prime News reported on 18 September 2001 that “a unit of armed Chechen gunmen of up to 700 persons” was holed up in the area, ready to fight. As if to illustrate the suicidal nature of inviting Chechens to antagonize the Russians, the Georgian sources said, with enigmatic brevity, “the events may develop the way that Georgia will lose the Kodori Valley.”11 Three days later, the Abkhaz interior minister, Zurab Agumava, denied Russian reports that Chechens were being massed in west Georgia. The Georgian government officially denies such accusations, but the Russian reports were quite detailed: “According to Interfax with reference to the Russian sources, (field commander Ruslan) Gelaev’s detachment of 300-400 persons in number is concentrated in the west of Georgia in the village of Muzhava and Muzhava Cross, and ‘Chechen gunmen are ready to give Georgian structures support in putting pressure upon Sukhumi.’ According to (the) Russian side, Chechen gunmen ‘expect to receive admission from Georgian government to settle in vacant regions of Abkhazia.’”12 A MAJOR HEADACHE FOR RUSSIA: CHECHEN SEPARATISTS Tbilisi’s policy here would seem to be quite reckless, if one considers Russian animosity towards the Chechens. Although Georgia and Russia signed an agreement in January 2000 to fight terrorism, the acrimonious nature of the Abkhazia-Chechnya issue has forced both governments into a tense détente, in which neither side will make initial concessions. According to Russia, Georgia safeguards its vulnerabilities by allowing Chechen terrorists to find safety and even set up military bases in Georgia’s northern Pankisi Gorge. As Russia is by far the stronger power, they can and do intimidate Georgia, both economically (by turning off the gas symbolically) and militarily (by maintaining a presence and supporting the Abkhazians). By tolerating the presence of Chechens on its territory, Georgia has made a feeble attempt to use its leverage in the only way that has been available to it, but doing so it just reveals its weakness and potential foolhardiness. The prospects of another revolt (were the government to move forcibly against the Chechens) keep it from obeying Russia, but by doing so Georgia remains trapped. Having neither the economic nor military ability to extricate itself, it comes as no surprise, as we will see, that Georgia is looking to the West for help. GETTING TO THE BOTTOM OF THE PANKISI GORGE Across the immense and rugged Caucasus mountains lies the Pankisi Gorge, a Georgian region settled in the late 19th century by the Muslim Kisti group. Later the Kisti were joined by settlers from neighboring South Ossetia. This fractious population sparked Georgia’s first war in the early 1990’s, and as a result many Ossetians were forced to flee to “North Ossetia” across the Russian border. Nowadays there are few Georgians in the area, but about 8,000 Kisti. Since 1999, almost 8,000 Chechen refugees (rebel fighters, according to Moscow) have swollen the ranks of the Pankisi Gorge. Georgian commentators agree: “since not all of the refugees and their luggage were properly checked, a lot of arms might have been quite possibly smuggled into Georgia.”13 As with the Albanians in the Sar Planina mountains of Macedonia, Chechen rebels can easily navigate the inaccessible mountain passes and move freely between Russia and Georgia. The Pankisi Gorge is their prime staging-post. “Cross-border traffic increased substantially there in 1992, when the Georgian government was preoccupied with the problem of Abkhazia.” Georgian authorities lost control of the Gorge, and soon “…faced increasing Russian accusations that Chechen militants were able to set up their training and rehabilitation bases in the Gorge.” These charges have been confirmed by Tengiz Kitovani, former Georgian defense minister.14 In an attempt to improve the situation, the Georgian government sent 500 troops in November 2000 to patrol the Gorge. They set up checkpoints and bases across the Akhmeta district and Mtskheta-Mtianeti region. The government also exploded two roads to minimize evaders. But by and large it has avoided bearing down on the Pankisi Gorge with any real force: “the Georgian government fears that such an operation may turn the Gorge into a ’second Chechnya’ and cause immense problems to Georgia.”15 It is clear that the Georgians are, with reason, fearful of their “special guests” from the north. A Georgian citizen told me recently of atrocities committed by Chechens against Georgians (such as cutting off the ears of Georgian soldiers to wear as necklaces), and summarized Georgian feelings on the problem: “The local population (in Pankisi) is not happy to have Chechen refugees in the Gorge. Christians do not want Muslims on their territory. Another issue is that Georgians are very poor now and it is especially difficult for the country, with 300,000 internally-displaced persons (from Abkhazia), to take care of foreign refugees. These refugees receive international assistance and humanitarian aid. The local population of the Gorge is not happy with this, as the economical situation is difficult for everybody and sometimes locals are poorer than the refugees are. But we cannot do anything. There are negotiations with Russia, Turkey and some other donor countries but unsuccessfully — nobody wants them. Nobody wants an additional headache.”16 MYSTERIOUS KIDNAPPINGS IN THE ‘WILD EAST’ Like Kodori Valley in Abkhazia, the Pankisi Gorge has been an epicenter for abductions. Two Red Cross workers and two Spanish businessmen were kidnapped in November 2000 and taken to the Pankisi Gorge, apparently by Chechens. Unlike more unfortunate victims in Chechnya itself, who were beheaded in 1997, the Pankisi prisoners were all later released. Further details behind the story, however, show that the whole affair may just have been part of the job description for businessmen in the Caucasus’ “Wild East”: “… It is noteworthy that one of the two (abductees), Francisco Rodriguez, was involved in exports of timber and marble from Georgia. According to the newspaper, it is one of the most lucrative export businesses in Georgia nowadays and many criminal clans seek to control the field. Another hostage, Antonio Trinolios, was reported as a millionaire and owner of a network of jewelry shops in Spain. His interest in Georgia remains unclear, though one may assume that he might have been involved in export-import of jewelry in Georgia, another highly criminized [sic] sphere of Georgian life.”17 This report confirms the view that Georgian authorities are powerless to control the northern border, hampered by a lack of funds and the presence of rugged, inaccessible terrain. After an increase in violent crime, the exasperated locals were forced to take matters into their own hands: “…Georgian residents of the Akhmeta district blocked all roads in the area in protest against (the) deteriorating crime situation in the region. They accused Chechen refugees of kidnapping and stealing cattle and demanded the authorities to take prompt measures to clamp down on crime. On the whole, after more than 7000 Chechen refugees were allowed shelter in Pankisi, the region actually turned into a hub of illegal drug and weapon trafficking.”18 This upsurge of crime following the imposition of refugees on a weak country follows almost exactly the parallel of Macedonia in 1999, when hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians crippled the economy and strengthened criminal networks. As in Macedonia, one of the most devastating and most lucrative of such activities has been drug trafficking: “Drugs (mainly heroin) are produced at special plants in Chechnya and then smuggled into Georgia through cross-border mountain routes. Drug dealers sometimes offer drugs for free, especially to youngsters in Georgian villages in order to make them addicts.”19 Georgian authorities, underpaid and understaffed, have not only failed to control the heroin trade — they also sometimes profit from it: “Most of the drug dealers begin their usual route from Pankisi and move first to Akhmeta and then to Telavi. Their final destination is Tbilisi, the capital, and it seems that law enforcement authorities may have a share in this lucrative business.”20 We should also mention, however, that corruption is not limited to the local criminals and governments; there are allegations that foreign aid agencies and “humanitarian” organizations are just as corrupt. LOOMING RUSSIAN THREATS This inherent instability of Georgia’s northern border, and the threat Russia perceives in it, has led to strong reactions. In response to the Georgian failure to apprehend Chechen militants in Pankisi, Russia slapped a new visa requirement on Georgian civilians. Yet, at the same time, “it waived the visa for Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia, Georgia’s two rebellious minority provinces, thus indicating Moscow’s willingness to raise the issue of dismembering Georgia and creating new rump states out of these provinces.”21 In addition, Russia’s turning off of the gas in January 2001 was widely interpreted as a threat to Georgia regarding the Chechens. In the aftermath of the September 11th terrorism in the US, Russian commentators have been able to make great political capital out of comparing Russian and American experiences of terrorism. Especially this comparison has been used to try and win support for Russian operations on Georgian territory, or at least to gain joint Russian-Georgian patrols (something which Tbilisi has rejected in the past) to flush out Chechen rebels from the Pankisi Gorge. Some pundits have been rather robust. As one Russian commentator bluntly stated, “if Russia now wipes out the Chechen militants in the Pankisi Gorge, not a single soul in the world will be able to reproach us.” Georgia is quite clearly feeling the heat. A note of 18 September from the Russian foreign ministry to the Georgian government made dark reference to the fact that “despite the frequent appeals of the Russian side it has not received the hundreds of terrorists” hiding in the Pankisi Gorge. To the Georgians, “the document really looks like an ultimatum.” Russian newspaper Vremia Novostei implied that “considering the statements by American authorities who call for attack not just at terrorists, but also at those regimes which support them, the Russian note seems quite dangerous.”22 According to a recent report, Georgia’s commander of border troops, Valerii Chkhedze, invited Russian observers to join the OSCE and others to see for themselves whether there were Chechen fighters in the Pankisi area. The source worries that this might be encouraging new provocations from the Russians.23 AND SO, SINCE A TOTAL LACK OF CASH… A major reason that Georgia is suffering from the “severely stressed” state it now finds itself in is the country’s major financial hardship. A decade of financial mismanagement, corruption, loss of Soviet markets and internecine strife have left Georgia in a very weak position. Even if it wanted to crack down on Chechens in Pankisi, the country would be unable to do so. The military review for 2000 revealed that “the state treasury owes the military their salary for several months.” In November 2000 the Georgian Ministry of Defense revealed for the first time the extent of the military’s financial difficulties: “According to the MOD, servicemen were paid salary only five months in 2000 as the government cut down the state budget. In the words of Colonel Akia Barbakadze, the head of the logistical service of the armed forces, such products as meat, fish and milk have been long out of servicemen’s ration, while potatoes and cabbage have been in short supply. The servicemen’s menu is in fact limited to only bread, vegetable oil and macaroni.”24 After civil war, rebellions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and continuing unrest in the Kodori and Pankisi areas, the Georgian army may have become rich in military experience, but has also become exhausted and poor in material hardware. The Georgian defense budget was reduced by almost half (from $53.4 million to $21.3 million) between 1997 and 2000, and was again decreased by at the same rate (to about $10 million) by the end of 2000.25 This has affected the Georgian government’s ability to appease Moscow. After dismantling two checkpoints on the Chechen border, authorities announced that other cuts were likely, since the 2001 budget allocated only $4.5 million for frontier defense.26 Clearly, whatever failures can be assigned to Georgia in the Pankisi Gorge are, to a large extent, caused by the military’s sobering financial realities. LEADS TO A DEMORALIZED ARMY And so, the following unbelievable report attesting to Georgia’s beleaguered defense: “The Autumn 2000 draft of the Georgian Army followed the usual scheme, with conscripts being captured in the streets and public places, and driven to drafting offices by force, the Kviris Palitra (No. 46) reported. Small wonder most of the Georgian recruits think only (of) how to avoid the service and get back home as soon as possible.”27 In America, where the military is just another well-paying employer offering good benefits and little dangers, the thought of “conscripts being captured in the streets” seems utterly ludicrous. But with the all-too-real possibility of seeing actual fighting, and the meager pay scale (even the “elite” soldiers of the State Guard Service make only $40 a month), it is not hard to see why young Georgian men avoid conscription at all costs. Frequent closings and cutbacks hamper the military’s ability to do its job, and occasional disasters (such as last week’s crash of a fighter plane on a training mission) are seen as being just part of the trend. NATO MUST COME TO THE RESCUE Given the country’s continuing economic hardships, and its tortured relationship with Russia, it is not hard to understand why the West has become Georgia’s most promising suitor. But if NATO is going to become Georgia’s knight in shining armor, it will come about because of a failure to rectify the many local problems, and primarily the relationship with Russia. Elements of that country’s leadership are clear in their hostility to an independent or even Western-leaning Georgia. But if Russia continues to bully its southern neighbor, it will have no one else to blame if Georgia chooses to flee to the West. Under Schevernadze, pro-western tendencies have been in the ascendant. This has resulted in some significant modifications to Georgia’s foreign policy, and particularly in its attempts to appeal to American political sensibilities. So far, these overtures have not been entirely successful, and arguably reflect the confusion and lack of clear objective critics cite as endemic in Georgia’s own domestic policy. Where Georgia has so far been most successful, and most offensive to the Russians, is in its budding partnership with NATO. The recent culmination of this relationship was in June 2001: NATO’s Georgian operations conducted under the auspices of its “Partnership for Peace” program. This was hailed by Georgia’s defense minister, who announced it as “the first NATO/Partner’s full-scale field exercise in the South Caucasus.” These exercises were preceded by a planning meeting in Naples, Italy in November 2000. The costs here were levied out as with all programs conducted under the “Partnership for Peace” banner: “…NATO pays 80% of their participation in PfP exercises, while partner countries have to pay only the rest, 20%. However, according to the newspaper, due to Georgia’s extremely hard economic and financial situation, a delegation of the Georgian MOD was unable to pay even 20% of the fee for participation in the Naples conference and the money was provided by the USA.”28 American assistance to the Georgian military has not been limited to NATO activities. During the year 2000, there were several other such events. 70 American instructors led a $3 million, two-month operation in mine clearing. “After the exercise, the USA handed over all the equipment to the Georgian army.” In addition, the US presented a gift to the Georgian Coast Guard, in the form of a patrol boat, on 12 December.29 During the year 2000 the US also provided the Georgian army with 3,000 uniforms and trained 80 Georgian cadets for free in American military academies. When we consider how the same training service was formerly provided by Russia- at a high cost, which has resulted in a $22 million debt currently owed it — it is not hard to see why Georgia would prefer the free training provided it by the US (and other countries, like Germany, Turkey, Greece and the UK).30 SCHEVERNADZE’S OVERTURES, PART ONE: THE MOTIVATIONS ARE CLEAR, THE RESULTS, LESS SO President Schevernadze’s strategy with the West has been to emphasize apparent similarities between Georgian and Western experience, and then to play upon Georgia’s image as a weak and suppliant nation in need of help. This involves a lot of rhetoric about issues such as “human rights,” ethnic cleansing,” and “democracy,” followed by an attempt to link these abstract ideas to actual situations in Georgia where Western influence might help the country. Yet these “analogous” situations are frequently convoluted and not so analogous, which indicates a general confusion about what Georgia really wants or expects from the West. Two examples shall suffice. First we have NATO’s Kosovo adventure of 1999. Georgia, under Schevernadze’s lead, was one of NATO’s most ardent cheerleaders here, despite the fact that both Georgia and Serbia are Orthodox countries. Georgia’s support seems, in the cynical view, as merely reactionary and opportunistic. On the one hand, it opposed the Russian position, and on the other, it sought to win some advantage through brazen worship of Clinton’s wags. Even then, columnists warned of the potential dangers Georgia was getting itself into by taking a strong pro-Kosovo position. But more remarkable was Schevernadze’s equation of the Kosovar Albanians with his own people in Abkhazia. This would at first seem to make no sense. After all, in Abkhazia the “oppressors” should have been the Orthodox Georgian republic, clamping down on the “breakaway republic” of Muslim Abkhazia — just as with “oppressive” Orthodox Yugoslavia, and its own fractious Muslim minority. Schevernadze, however, made the case that the Georgians were, like the Kosovars, a persecuted and helpless minority. In neither case was the description entirely true, though it was more so in the case of the Georgians. Their president pointed to the “ethnic cleansing” of the Georgian population in Abkhazia, until recently 45% of the region’s population, before the war forced them to flee into central Georgia. The greatest resemblance between Georgian and Albanians (in Schevernadze’s view) was that both were minorities oppressed by large and powerful states. In other words, Schevernadze was subtly portraying Russia as the underlying enemy of Georgian statehood, insofar as it was supporting the Abkhaz revolt. This strategy has not been entirely successful, and partly because Georgia is guilty of playing the same game, by tolerating Chechen separatists threatening Russia on their other border. This has not stopped Schevernadze, however, from making the truly audacious request that NATO come in and stop the Abkhazians/Russians by force, like in Kosovo. Fortunately, it will probably be the entire region’s anonymity that saves it, at least on this occasion. After all, no one in the West has the foggiest idea about Georgians and Abkhazians, let alone Ossetians, Azeris and Chechens; and whatever “ethnic cleansing” was committed in Abkhazia happened years ago. Since we know from Kosovo that righteous intervention can only gain momentum from sensationalist photos and TV footage, it does not seem likely that Georgia will win calls for intervention — especially now that the terrorism in New York has overshadowed it in the world media. SCHEVERNADZE’S OVERTURES, PART TWO: CONFUSION ABOUNDS This, the Georgian reaction to the events of 11 September, is the second example of Georgia’s troubled policy. Right away, the country offered its help to the US. Then, on 18 September, Schevernadze announced that Georgia was prepared to give up its territory and airspace to US troops attacking Afghanistan.31 On the same day, Schevernadze used the tragedy to indirectly advance his line on Abkhazia intervention, by proposing the creation of an international anti-terrorist coalition. While they were at it, the UN could also “convene a summit to debate the fight against terrorism, genocide, ethnic cleansing, nationalism, and separatism, xenophobia, fanaticism, and hatred.” The report also noted that Georgia has still not succeeded in getting the Abkhaz leadership condemned for “genocide and ethnic cleansing against its Georgian population.”32 TOO MANY EGGS FOR THE BASKET But might he be waxing cynical? In aping what the Balkans wars have taught him to be “Western values,” Schevernadze is climbing an increasingly slippery slope by proposing such an all-encompassing “summit.” A man of his experience and stature must understand these rhetorical catchwords for what they are: that is, loaded phrases having to do with “humanitarian concerns” — and always, always only acted upon if it is in the direct concerns of the United States. In trying to equate the concerns of Georgia with those of the US, Schevernadze risks not only antagonizing Russia, but also setting his own spokesmen up for some embarrassing misstatements. While Russia has scrambled to use the “terrorism in America” card to impress on the US the validity of fighting Chechens, so too has Georgia sought to stress its own Abkhaz “terrorists.” The Georgian foreign ministry also lambasted Russia’s efforts to publicize its own “terrorist” problem in Chechnya as “an attempt to fulfill Moscow’s political goals in the region by means of force.” This was in reference to the prospect of Russian troops in Pankisi, and it elicited the following memorable statement: “Georgia will not allow any foreign state to use its territory for military operations.” Apparently this official had forgotten about Georgia’s open invitation to the US forces only a few days before. The statement drew immediate criticism from Russians on Georgia’s alleged “double standards” on terrorism. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GEORGIAN-RUSSIAN-NATO RELATIONSHIP The mutual animosity that has been fostered by Russia and Georgia, regarding the “terrorists” they allegedly unleash on one another, has been increasing now that the real terrorism in the US has brought such issues to the world’s undivided attention. And both sides are making the most of it, Georgia with its “ethnic cleansing”claims, and Russia with its Chechen “terrorists.” The latest reports seem to indicate a continuation of the same tensions; on 24 September the Georgian foreign ministry’s information officer, Kakha Sikharulidze, “criticized as “harsh violation of the mandate,” the Saturday travel of five (Russian) vehicles of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict zone peacekeeping forces outside of the mandate territory (in Georgia’s Zugdidi region).”33 Schevernadze has announced that he will take up the Russian problem with President Bush when he visits Washington on 5 October.34 Most likely, the issues of NATO expansion in the Caucasus (Azerbaijan too has signed up to host exercises in November), and the potential oil and gas pipelines through Georgia will be on the table, as well as Georgia’s role in US retaliatory strikes. In contrast to Russia, which expects the US to finally see things their way on Chechnya, Schevernadze will probably try and placate Washington in whatever way he can, in order to get a reward and alleviate some of the pressure coming from everyone around — Russians, Abkhazians and Chechens alike. Schevernadze undoubtedly knows that these issues will not matter to the US unless the uncertain Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is ever constructed — and so, once again, the rhetoric of “human rights” will only become a useful weapon if and when a vested American economic interest materializes. Until then, Georgia will most likely continue to hide, intimidated by its neighbors, and wait for its Western prince to show up. Jaba Devdariani, “Would Russia rethink its military presence?” Central Asia and Caucasus Analyst, 15 August 2001 From Nevasimaya Gazeta, no. 242, 22 December, 2000 (in “Georgian Press Reports,” Army & Society in Georgia, November-December 2000, p. 13 From Droni, no. 151, December 2000, in “Georgian Press Reports,” Army & Society in Georgia, pp. 17-18 David Darchiashvili, “Some considerations about the role of the Georgian armed forces in Post-Schevernadze Georgian policy,” in Army & Society in Georgia, p. 2 “Russia tightens grip on Georgia,” Stratfor report, 22 January 2001 Jaba Devdariani, “Would Russia rethink its military presence?” p. 2 “Russia still dragging its feet on Withdrawal from Abkhazia,” Stratfor report, 5 July 2001 “Russian Withdrawal Risks Warfare in Abkhazia,” Stratfor report, 31 October 2000 From Dilis Gazeti, no. 284 and 285, and Svobodnya Gruzia, no. 270, 11-14 December 2000, in “Georgian Press Reports,” Army & Society in Georgia, pp. 8-9) “Jaba Ioseliani: Kodori Valley is in threat of war,” Prime News Agency, Tbilisi, 18 September 2001 Russian intelligence reports on Chechen gunmen on the Abkhazian border denied in Sukhumi,” Prime News Agency, Tbilisi, 21 September 2001 Irakli Aladashvili, “The Pankisi Gorge problem,” in Army and Society in Georgia, pp. 6-7 Personal interview, 22 September 2001 From Dilis Gazeti, no. 284, 1 December 2000, in “Georgian Press Reports,” Army and Society in Georgia, p. 17 From collected Georgian newspaper sources, “Georgian Press Reports,” Army and Society in Georgia, p. 9 Irakli Aladashvili, “The Pankisi Gorge problem,” p. 7 Stephen Blank, “Is Georgia at risk?”, Central Asia and Caucasus Analyst, 28 March 2001 “Moscow expects Washington support in anti-Georgian campaign, Russian press claims,” Prime News Agency, Tbilisi, 19 September 2001 “Would Tbilisi condone a Russian strike against Chechens in Georgia?” RFE/RL Caucasus Report, 24 September 2001 Koba Liklikadze, “The lack of security and the lighthearted government,” in Army and Society in Georgia, p. 5 From Droni no. 149, 21 December 2000, in “Georgian Press Reports,” Army and Society in Georgia, p. 9 In “Georgian Press Reports,” Army and Society in Georgia, p. 16 From Droni, no. 138, in “Georgian Press Reports,” Army and Society in Georgia, p. 16 From Droni, no. 129, 2 November 2000, in “Georgian Press Reports,” Army and Society in Georgia, pp. 12-14 “Georgia ready to give its territory and airspace for American anti-terrorism operation,” Prime News Agency, Tbilisi, 18 September 2001 “Georgian President proposes antiterrorism coalition, UN summit,” RFE/RL Newsline, 19 September 2001 “Georgian foreign ministry criticizes Russian peacekeepers for violating the security zone borders,” Prime News Agency, Tbilisi, 24 September 2001 “President Schevernadze claims there are no barriers for his visit to the USA,” Prime News Agency, Tbilisi, 24 September 2001 By Christopher Deliso US and Russia Play a Dangerous Game in the Caucasus20 September 2001The terrorism in New York may have particularly dangerous effects for Russia, as it struggles to contain Chechen terrorism and control its Caspian territories. Russia is trying to equate the Chechen terrorism with the similar actions the US accuses bin Laden of having perpetrated in New York. However, it remains to be seen whether the US will enthusiastically back up Russia in the Caucasus, because there are far greater implications than merely the question of whether Chechnya is indicative of terrorism or ethnic rights. The US and the humanitarian organizations which it basically controls have been scathing in their criticisms of Russia’s operations in Chechnya. One would assume, therefore, that the fact that both the Chechens and Bin Laden are radical Islamic terror organizations would be enough to unite Washington and Moscow. But America-s verbal support for the Chechens has more to do with issues like oil and NATO expansion than it does with human rights. According to a Stratfor intelligence report of August 29, the bomb that ripped open the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline in the city of Achisu, on the Caspian Sea, has all the makings of further trouble for Russia: “the implications of a new Chechen strategy could be far-reaching. The Chechen capital of Grozny once housed the fourth-largest refinery network in the former Soviet Union; the Chechens know exactly where to hit oil infrastructure to maximize damage. That infrastructure is directly responsible for the petroleum revenues that fund more than half the Russian budget.” It is obvious that Chechen separatists, and the rebels they have placed in neighboring Dagestan (where Achisu is located), have an eye on the oil revenues that come from the Caspian. If they could block Russia-s access to the coast, they could block not only whatever Russia claims in the Caspian itself, but effectively control the pipelines- and profit themselves. While the many international oil companies involved also stand to be hurt by the same terrorism that affects Russia, there is a further reason that the US has not been particularly supportive of the Russian position. This has to do with the proposed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which has not been built yet, but is being pushed by the US as a means to bypass Russia. Leading analysts, such as Alec Rasizade (Contemporary Review, July, 2001) reveal that there have been criticisms raised about the feasiblity of this pipeline, from the very people who would fund it. “The problem has long been that few in the oil industry believed that that the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline was commerically viable. They have repeatedly pointed out that if this pipeline was commerically viable, then it would have already been built.” According to Rasizade, the backers of the pipeline have made their case based on some “questionable assumptions,” including a possible over-estimate of the Caspian-s oil potential, the need to isolate Russia, and the ability of Turkey-s economy to stabilize. In reality, the Turkish economy has been steadily weakening and some key members of the “sponsor group” (Exxon-Mobil, Russia-s Lukoil, and Pennzoil), have backed out. These companies had a 23% share in the consortium, and their bailing out has “adversely affected investment confidence, especially for international credit agencies that are skittish about Caspian oil reserves and the throughput sufficiency of the project. The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline needs a daily throughput of 1 million barrels to be economically justified.” We can see, therefore, how any terrorism that affects Russia-s ability to transfer oil would directly benefit those who support a plan such as Baku-Ceyhan, which would only be seen by oil companies as the best of a bad situation, were an easier and cheaper Russian alternative not available. This is part of what’s at stake if the US were to abandon its stance on Chechnya. Another alternative is Iran, which also has potential pipeline routes cheaper than the Baku-Ceyhan route. Traditional bad relations with the US had taken any Iranian plan out of consideration, but, Rasizade affirms, this might change under the current administration, because Vice President Cheney “has been an outspoken advocate of ending economic sanctions against Iran┘ as chief executive of Halliburton, a giant oil-services company, he believed that the Clinton strategy was wrong.” One suspects that an Iranian pipeline will be looked at more favorably by the US, when we also consider that Iran has announced its support for US attacks against Afghanistan. This is another possibility for an American “reward” at the detriment of Russia. Among the many supporters of American military intervention, we also must consider the case of Georgia, where Schevernadze recently announced that Georgia would be prepared to help the US in any way against the terrorists. NATO conducted exercises in Georgia in June, and was hailed by the Georgian defense minister as “the first NATO/Partner full-scale field exercises in the South Caucasus.” Now it has been announced by Azerbaijan that NATO exercises will soon be held, in November 2001, in that country. There is no doubt that NATO seeks to expand eastward at the expense of Russia, and perhaps may try to impose itself as the arbitrator of regional disputes, as it did in the Balkans. With Georgia blaming Russia for supporting Abkhazian separatists, and Russia blaming Georgia for not cracking down on Chechen terrorists in the Pankisi Gorge, an uneasy status quo is maintained. Will NATO eventually seek to disarm both rebels, to put both pipeline routes- Dagestan and Baku- under its jurisdiction? The terrorism in New York may have particularly dangerous effects for Russia, as it struggles to contain [...] |
