Balkanalysis.com

At a special press conference at 4pm today in Skopje, Macedonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonio Milososki announced that the government has opened a case against Greece at the International Court of Justice in the Hague. At issue is Greece’s blocking of Macedonian NATO membership at the alliance’s April summit, which occurred due to the unresolved name dispute between the two countries.

According to the foreign minister, this act of obstructionism violated the September 13, 1995 Interim Accord, in which Greece pledged not to block its smaller and weaker northern neighbor from joining international organizations under the name it had forced the country to adopt for UN usage (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).

There was no immediate Greek reaction to the announcement, which occurred just as Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski and President Branko Crvenkovski, frequently critical of each other’s diplomatic acumen, were supposed to meet to hammer out a common position on the name issue.

Indeed, at least as harmful as Greek intransigence for Macedonia’s predicament has been the chronic disunity of its political leadership- a situation that Athens has been skillfully manipulating for years. Predictably enough, the president reacted to the government’s announcement by claiming he had not been consulted on the issue, and declared that “€šÃ„¶the Prime Minister (Nikola Gruevski) and his government are completely taking over the responsibility for the UN talks as well as for our European Union and NATO integration,” reported Balkan Insight.

Crvenkovski, whose approval ratings domestically are so low that he has assured the citizenry of his desire to abdicate (in the form of not running again in the March 2009 elections), recently raised eyebrows when he fired the long-time negotiator on the name issue, Nikola Dimitrov. The president and his yes-men in the media, politics and academia are frequently depicted in pro-government and independent media, including satirical spots, as being exceptionally eager to satisfy Greece.

As if on cue, old Leftist ally Ljubomir Frckovski, a professor and former interior minister, reacted by condemning the government’s action on Kanal 5, claiming it would lead to Macedonia’s €šÃ„òinternational isolation€šÃ„ô- the favored threatening vocabulary of the Karamanlis regime. On the other hand, pro-government experts surveyed were quick to call the action a €šÃ„òhistoric decision€šÃ„ô that had been delayed far too long.

In fact, one of the first questions Minister Milososki received in his press conference was that of timing, or, why Macedonia had not raised this case in April, immediately after the Bucharest rejection. He replied by stating that even organizing the case was a process that took months, and required consulting numerous foreign legal advisors.

However, the verdict of the court case, which is expected to take from 2-3 years to be known, will not necessarily have any great effect. While a Macedonian victory at the Hague would certainly shame the Greeks, “the country’s decision on whether to comply with the court’s rulings or not is a political question,” stated Balkan Insight, quoting a court spokesman. If recent history is any indicator, few in Greece will lose sleep over the outside world’s opinion of them.

Further, Macedonia could not expect automatic NATO membership either, since there are any number of criteria which could be raised €šÃ„ì rightly or wrongly €šÃ„ì to keep it barred indefinitely.

In fact, there is growing talk in diplomatic circles in Skopje these days about some form of extra requirements being envisioned, or even sanctions that will be levied on Macedonia, should the name issue remain unresolved. Vexed about the chronic failure to resolve the dispute, the thinking goes, international diplomats are likely to take out their frustrations on the weakest party available- Macedonia.

If there are indeed any such extra reform stipulations raised, they will likely refer to an alleged lack of political maturity stemming from last June’s violence-plagued elections.

Considering that presidential and local elections are coming up €šÃ„ì on the Ides of March, of all days €šÃ„ì it is likely that any repeat of election-related violence will be immediately cited as a reason to keep Macedonia out of NATO, despite its major contributions to NATO missions and completed military reforms.

By Ioannis Michaletos and Christopher Deliso*

Over the past few weeks, Greece has been engrossed by an unfolding scandal involving a prominent monastery situated on isolated Mt Athos, the monastic community that makes up the third leg of the Halkidiki peninsula in northern Greece.

The monastery in question, Vatopedi, is possibly the richest and most prestigious and such institution on the “Holy Mountain,” which clings to Byzantine edicts and rituals that were introduced more than 1,000 years ago. The Athonite monks thus preserve some of the world’s most significant religious art and medieval manuscripts, in huge quantities built up in part by the generous endowments of Greek, Georgian, Bulgarian, Serbian, Romanian and Russian patrons in centuries past.

The Vatopedi story involves numerous powerful actors and financial interests. Since the story erupted some six weeks ago, a flood of information surpassing the ability of even the most attentive of readers has deluged the Greek media. Numerous media, and especially Alpha TV in Athens, have played a role in exposing the deals and creating a heavily politicized atmosphere around the case. Rather than exacerbate this proliferation of data, we will simply present a concise account here.

As one of the largest and wealthiest Athonite monasteries, Vatopedi commands a certain power within the hierarchy of monasteries here, and in the Orthodox world in general (see also Vatopedi’s official website). Also, being situated on the northeastern shore of the Athonite peninsula, near a sheltered harbor; it enjoys easy access by water, lying within close proximity to the nearest ports in the non-monastic portion of the peninsula.

This factor has made Vatopedi, in comparison to nearby inland monasteries or ones further down the coast, convenient and accessible for celebrities and the wealthy. Thus Vatopedi has acquired a reputation among a wide range of analysts, echoed by events, as becoming in recent years a communications and networking hub for British royalty, rich Greek ship-owners in London and Cyprus and, reportedly, now for Russian oligarchs as well.

The Holy Mountain’s strict procedures for entry (four-day maximum permits are issued for a limited number of pilgrims per day), and unique rules (women, for example, are not allowed to enter at all, due to an 11^th-century Byzantine edict) have lent goings-on there an air of mystery- ideal for fueling rumors and speculation. When Prince Charles pulled up by yacht at the monastery in 2004, for example, the British media noted that “€šÃ„¶the frequency of the prince’s visits had fuelled speculation among clerics in Greece that he is interested in converting to the religion.”

Although certain details about the latest saga have surfaced in the mainstream media, the question of how it was all made possible in the first place has still not been answered. One theory is that the convergence of powerful individuals around this monastery has relations to efforts being made by a small group of Orthodox high priests and officials in several countries, who aim to create a sort of €šÃ„òOrthodox Vatican,€šÃ„ô as will be discussed further below.

The essence of the alleged scandal is that some of Vatopedi’s monks deviously mishandled the real estate holdings of the monastery. As is well known, the Orthodox Church is the largest single landowner in Greece, and the Athonite monasteries are especially well endowed.

Vatopedi Monastery has traditionally held great estates all over Greece. Over the past decade, however, it has managed to swap some of these locations for other land €šÃ„ì in high-value places like Athens €šÃ„ì and then resell these acquisitions, making a tidy profit in the process.

Those accusing the monastery of illegitimate behavior are now arguing that the swaps, although made lawfully, constitute a scandal because the real estate value was calculated wrongly by the accountants and realtors involved. According to the New York Times, “€šÃ„¶the land deals began in 1999, under a Socialist government, but about 260 swaps were finalized after [Costas] Karamanlis’s center-right New Democracy Party took power in 2004.”

An unusual but important issue inherent to this case stems from the nebulous legal character of the semi-autonomous €šÃ„òmonastic republic.€šÃ„ô On the one hand, it is a part of the Greek state and the monks, regardless of their country of origin, must become Greek citizens. On the other hand, within the Orthodox hierarchy it is subordinate not to the archbishop of Athens (who commands the flock in the rest of Greece) but to the Ecumenical Patriarchy of Constantinople (Istanbul).

Much of the Athonite monasteries€šÃ„ô extensive landholdings and monastic dependencies long predate the modern borders of the Greek state. The Ottoman Turks let the monks preserve their traditions and their rites, but property was not guaranteed. And several wars and redrawn borders over the past 200 years have further confused the situation.

In this context it is remarkable €šÃ„ì though not very surprising €šÃ„ì to note that Vatopedi’s monks were able to acquire land, such as an area near the Vistonida Lake in Thrace, simply by presenting a Byzantine chrysovoulos (chrysobull), the mark of any specific emperor’s final judgment or endowment of authority. Medieval Western rulers were entranced by such displays of status that they famously adopted them on rare occasions, but today it is only in Greece, apparently, that people are still citing medieval Golden Bulls in any legally binding context.

In the Balkans, realty titles from historically distant times are sometimes recognized by the state, in acknowledgement of the turbulence of preceding periods. The issue remains, as elsewhere in the former Ottoman Balkans, one of legitimacy and legal right. In Greece, where the Orthodox Church has far greater influence than the church in any Western country, the Eastern Roman or Byzantine Empire is still considered by some the benchmark of prior stability and, importantly, cultural legitimacy, an edifice upon which the foundation of the modern order has been established.

Of course, the current scandal does not only involve churchmen. Leading political figures in Greece have maintained strong contacts with some Vatopedi monks, and there is speculation that they played a part in securing these suspicious real estate deals benefits for the monastery. Already a judicial inquiry has been ordered by the general prosecutor in Athens for this, but it is speculated that it will take years €šÃ„ì if ever €šÃ„ì for a decision to be reached.

The current imbroglio has been enlivened by the political brinkmanship witnessed between the recently resigned Press Minister and known €šÃ„òfriend of Vatopedi,€šÃ„ô Theodoros Roussopoulos, and certain leading Athenian journalists. Roussopoulos himself was originally a journalist, and became a very powerful figure in the space of just a few years of course, in the process he also alienated other powerful people, and allegedly displayed favoritism for his own group of friends, thus causing resentment among a wide range of interests in Greece. Roussopolis was the second Greek minister in a month to resign over the scandal; he was preceded by Merchant Marine Minister George Voulgarakis, who also insists he has done nothing illegal. Mr Voulgarakis€šÃ„ô wife, a lawyer, is accused of serving as a legal witness to the Thracian transactions.

In particular, Roussopolis€šÃ„ô friendship with the head monk at Vatopedi, the Greek Cypriot Archimandrite Ephraim, has provided a perfect opportunity for his enemies to attack, as they have done for the past few weeks in the press. The implication has been raised that Ephraim of Vatopedi seemed to have the ambition of becoming an important behind-the-scenes figure in an emerging €šÃ„òOrthodox Vatican€šÃ„ô centered around his own monastery. Its bank accounts were recently found to be in excess of 200 million euros, and the real estate fortune, possibly much more. According to the BBC, the Thracian deal alone drained the state of around 100 million euros.

Clearly, the monastery and its leader also have strong international ties that potentially mean the real estate saga is just a detail, relatively speaking. As the New York Times notes, Vatopedi “€šÃ„¶is the legal proprietor of a number of houses, hotels and mines and the owner of large pieces of land in Greece, Cyprus, the Balkans and Turkey.” And, as the Turkish Daily News noted:

“€šÃ„¶certainly the charismatic chief monk was capable enough to have created a rich network of valuable connections among politicians and business circles both in Greece and abroad; he even managed to attract enough international celebrities to the beautiful surrounding of Vatopedi, like Prince Charles of Wales, and the Russian president, Vladimir Putin.”

A final tantalizing thought arises from all this. By piecing together a variety of off-the-record diplomatic sources and anecdotal material, one can create a patchwork of activities for which the monastery, and the Holy Mountain in general, seem ideally suited.

These activities include major international business deals, high-level, third-party communications linkages, meetings of minds, political intriguing and even espionage. Indeed, rumors of intelligence agencies€šÃ„ô protected €šÃ„òsafe houses€šÃ„ô on the isolated shores of Athos persist and it would seem that the remote, well-regulated and controlled nature of the place would by nature make it ideal for any kind of activity requiring discretion and silence.

Of course, these very factors are probably part of the reason why €šÃ„òscandals€šÃ„ô involving the monasteries and the church in general seem to dependably spring forth every few months. There is much that will never be known. One-thousand-year-old walls, especially, don€šÃ„ôt tend to talk.

€šÃ„¶€šÃ„¶€šÃ„¶€šÃ„¶€šÃ„¶

*Frequent Balkanalysis.com contributor Ioannis Michaletos is a Balkan security analyst for the RIEAS Institute in Athens, Greece. He is also Southeastern European Coordinator and Editor for the World Security Network Foundation. Christopher Deliso is director of Balkanalysis.com. He writes about Mt Athos in the 2008 Lonely Planet Guide to Greece.

By Ioannis Michaletos and Christopher Deliso

A number of high-impact incidents over the past few months have revealed that the historic feuding of Turkey and Greece is not a thing of the past. Some of these have been well-known, and overtly demonstrated in political events. Others have however received little mention, leaving the public curious to know what is going on behind the scenes.

At the same time, procedural issues concerning the Turkish intelligence service’s jurisdiction and allowed methods have also been the subject of intense scrutiny among the Turkish public and media in recent weeks, raising dark memories of past indiscretions such as mass wiretapping scandals from an aggressive intelligence apparatus.

Most recently, Turkey has demonstrated political gamesmanship by blocking the direct cooperation of NATO with the EU’s justice and security advisory mission in Kosovo, EULEX, which hopes to take a larger role in the self-declared Balkan country since the enactment of a Kosovo constitution on June 15. The EU’s gain has come to the detriment of UNMIK, the UN’s nine-year-old mission in Kosovo, which has been restricted further in its mandate by these €šÃ„òfacts on the ground.€šÃ„ô The Turkish move comes as opposition to Cyprus, an EU but not NATO member: Turkey had already blocked the Greek Cypriots from sending peacekeepers to Kosovo. According to Deutsche Welle, “The move makes it unclear how the KFOR-EULEX relationship can now function on an official level.”

There are clear interrelations with other regional issues as well. France, notably, has supported Greece on the Macedonia name issue, with President Sarkozy’s avowed Hellenism perhaps bolstered by his country’s sale of billions in arms to Greece. The two countries held a joint military exercise in May. As Balkanalysis.com reported last year, France has also been keenly interested in reported oil deposits off the coast of Cyprus, which the country opened to foreign exploration last year- despite vociferous Turkish protests. At the same time, Israel is threatening war with Iran, something that would not fail to impact on both Turkey and Greece in different ways. It is abundantly clear that the present moment is a very complex and volatile one in the Balkans and East Mediterranean.

Turkey‘s modern intelligence service, MillˆšÃ† Æ’ˆžstihbarat Te‰ˆÃ¼kilˆšÂ¢tı (€šÃ„òNational Intelligence Organization,€šÃ„ô abbreviated MIT) was established by parliament on July 22, 1965, with Law no. 644. It was envisioned as being run by an undersecretary reporting to the prime minister. The body specifically replaced the Milli Emniyet Hizmeti (MAH). Earlier intelligence organizations dated back to the time of Ataturk, and before him, the Ottoman Empire. However, whereas Ataturk’s era led his developing country to emulate the leading European countries€šÃ„ô intelligence services, the Cold War reality of the 1960′s inspired key NATO ally Turkey to follow the American and NATO models especially. MIT headquarters today consists of a gardened compound in the suburbs of Ankara with a total surface area of more than 300 hectares, of course, very well secured.

The murky activities of the organization have fascinated the Turkish public for decades. On the domestic front, Turks in early June became transfixed by a legal battle over the MIT’s wiretapping rights and simultaneous claims from a political party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), that claimed a wiretapping operation had been carried out against it by the government. This claim appeared following the publication, in late May, of a transcript was published in the newspaper Vakit of a private meeting held between Secretary-General ˆšÃ±nder Sav and a guest in his office.

According to Turkish newspaper Zaman, the incident “struck a chord in the recent memory of the nation, which has seen many a wiretapping scandal in years past.” However, it was soon proven to be a false allegation, Vakit reported, as it turned out that Sav had simply forgotten to turn off his phone after speaking with a journalist. The intrepid reporter then simply proceeded to transcribe what he heard over the following 42 minutes of Sav’s meeting. Former Interior Minister Sadettin Tantan, who ironically was involved in earlier similar scandals, lamented that continual rumors of bugging will continue indefinitely, so long as the country continues to lack a proper legal apparatus. Tantan pointed out other cases, including one in Greece, in which the authorities were able to control indiscretions through the kind of proper legislation enforcement he believes is missing in Turkey. According to the article in Zaman, he stated:

“Intelligence services, institutions and even ordinary people have access to the possibilities of high-tech products. It is really difficult to struggle with these people under the article that defines the crimes committed through the overstepping of legal powers. There is no infrastructure in Turkey regarding this matter. The Turkish legal system has no security department. And this gap can be filled by national and foreign forces. We even don€šÃ„ôt know what foreign [intelligence] services have been wiretapping. When similar scandals broke out in Germany, Austria, England, France, Switzerland and Denmark, these countries took very serious steps with regard to communications security. It is evident that some officials in Turkey have been engaging in professional misconduct.”

After the exposure of a wiretapping scandal in 1996, parliamentarian Sabri ErgˆšÂºl and 19 other deputies from his CHP party deputies submitted a resolution demanding a parliamentary investigation. According to Zaman, ErgˆšÂºl recently stated that a “famous intelligence official” told the commission that “everybody was being wiretapped.” According to this officer’s secret testimony, “there were bugs in the houses of prime ministers, ministers, opposition leaders and that even opposition leaders had one another wiretapped.”

ErgˆšÂºl continued, noting the officer’s claims that “there was such fierce competition between intelligence services [in 1996]. That’s why they sometimes exposed their weak sides. For instance, a fight between the Police Department, the Gendarmerie Intelligence Organization [JITEM] and MIT came to light in those days. Those wiretapped before started having others wiretapped when they came to power. We even found out that directors of state institutions were wiretapping ministers. All of the bidding processes going on for public properties used to be wiretapped.”

Nevertheless, significant legal challenges have indeed been raised in recent weeks on the issue of wiretapping. On June 5, Hurriyet reported that Turkey’s Supreme Court overturned on appeals a decision of the High Criminal Court that had authorized the Turkish police (gendarmerie) with country-wide monitoring, “saying no institutions can be given an authority that covers monitoring in the entire country.” According to Justice Minister Mehmet Ali Sahin “the decision by the Supreme Court was quite extensive. My personal view is that the decision will cover the National Intelligence Organization and police, too.” The issue arose when the Justice Ministry objected to the criminal court’s authorization of the MIT and the gendarmerie to tap all phone, SMS and email traffic, citing potential abuse of authority and international human rights conventions.

Naturally, given a turbulent common history, the issue of Turkish intelligence methods and practices is also of interest to many Greeks, and the subject is the subject of periodic discussion in the Greek media. However, as is inevitable in such scenarios the testimony of genuine experts is often confounded by uninformed speculation and conjecture. As in Turkey, where the public has reacted at various levels of hysteria regarding the most recent wiretapping charges- which turned out to be false €šÃ„ì so it is in Greece that the public is prepared to expect the worst from its historic neighbor.

The role of Turkish intelligence in large-scale human trafficking has also captivated the Greek public in recent months. In the early morning hours of Friday, April 25, a Greek coast guard vessel in the Eastern Aegean captured a Turkish craft which was carrying illegal Asian immigrants, some 3.5 nautical miles off the island of Lesvos. Also in the boat was a 38-year-old Turkish Army officer, Serkan Kaya. According to EmprosNet and other Greek news reports citing Greek intelligence sources, Kaya is a special unit operator who was also involved with the Turkish MIT. These reports claimed that Kaya was involved in the human trafficking partially in order to launch an intelligence gathering activity in the Greek islands. Moreover the Turkish officer was carrying with him Army credentials and a special weapon “used only by secret services,” that identified him with the security apparatus of Turkey.

An interesting aspect of the role of the Turkish secret services in trafficking via the Aegean is illustrated by American demands, first made in 2006, to establish a customs control facility in Turkish port cities, beginning with Izmir. The request, so far stonewalled, is part of a program, the Customs Container Security Initiative, envisioned for over 30 foreign countries. In these countries, the US would like the ability to inspect all maritime traffic bound for American shores, to secure against nuclear components and other possible terrorist weapons.

While several other countries have gone along with the American initiative, Turket has not. In fact, it has been the MIT in particular that has refused the US demands, reports Zaman, “over concerns of the ramifications for Turkey’s sovereignty rights. In a letter sent to the Undersecretariat for Customs and Foreign Trade, MIT enumerated its concerns, saying such a system could turn into an environment for espionage activity€šÃ„¶ Although the number of containers shipped from Istanbul to the US is three times the number of containers shipped from Izmir, it is not known why the US wanted Izmir to be the first port for such a system.” Whether Greek lobbying or concerns raised by the Greek intelligence services in Washington had anything to do with this choice would be an interesting question for researchers to explore.

One recent claim that got attention in Athens was made by Greek journalist Aris Spinos, a well-known specialist in security matters. He spoke about the subject of Turkish intelligence practices in the first week of May 2008, on the late show of Greek nationwide television network, Extra Channel. Spinos claimed that certain private clinics in Ankara are actually owned by MIT, which uses them to perform plastic surgery on its best spies who are then sent €šÃ„òin disguise€šÃ„ô for missions abroad, something in line with the Soviet KGB model.

Greeks have also claimed in recent years that MIT agents persuaded tourists from other countries to spy for Turkey. Usually, cases were reported during tourist season, when tourists come back and forth between places such as Bodrum-Kos (2 miles apart), or between islands like Lesvos, Chios and Samos and their respective Turkish port destinations, to try to capture videos and photos with Greek military bases, in order to sell them to the Turks and receive payments- sometimes, allegedly, in the form of paid vacations. However, this sort of speculation is the least likely to be corroborated and the most prone to exaggeration and misuse.

Greek experts have also disclosed other aspects of the MIT’s believed operating habits. According to several articles in the Greek journal Stratigiki, the MIT has a special psy-ops unit, named TIB that has an extensive network in Europe and especially in Germany, where the largest Turkish diaspora in Europe resides. It is a large sector that employs academics, journalists and Turkish diaspora professionals, functioning broadly along the lines of Israel’s MOSSAD. Similarly, it is widely assumed that domestically the MIT maintains a very large network of civilian informants that span all levels of society and professional life in Turkey- something that goes back to the Cold War and likely even earlier.

Following the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the resulting anxiety for both Turkey and Greece, a €šÃ„òhot€šÃ„ô period ensued between 1989-1996, when a €šÃ„òsecret war€šÃ„ô erupted between Greek and Turkish intelligence services, that involved assassinations, arson, high-level psychological attacks, and heavy espionage activity. The Turks accused Greece on supporting the Kurdish PKK fighters (PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was later protected in Greece and Greek diplomatic installations until being kidnapped by the Turks in Kenya in 1998). The tensions escalated to the point of potential armed conflict over the contested islet of Imia near Kalymnos in early 1996.

Today, numerous unfolding events indicate that Greek and Turkish machinations are going to be amplified by the actions of larger powers. For example, Israel recently conducted a robust air force exercise over Greek waters, which American and other analysts interpreted as a warning of an impending strike against Iran. Turkey, on the other hand, has had to develop closer ties with Iranian security services, as both countries share the problem of Kurdish separatists. How the fortunes of Greece and Turkey would wax or wane in the event of an Israeli (and, potentially, American) war with Iran is just one of the many fascinating questions to emerge from this. Given the complexity and high stakes of international relations in the Balkans and Middle East today, it appears likely that the traditional war of one-upsmanship between Greece and Turkey will continue into the foreseeable future, and that their intelligence services will, as always, be at the forefront of this battle.

By Ioannis Michaletos

Greece and Turkey are historically known as traditional foes that accumulate vast military arsenals, preserving a delicate balance of power that breaks out occasionally with €šÃ„òhot€šÃ„ô incidents, inevitably involving the air force and the navy in the Eastern Aegean. Over the recent period, Greece has proceeded in acquiring new weaponry from international producers, while Turkey continues to pressure Greece on a variety of issues. One item of note is the heightened role being played by France as an arms-producing nation in equipping the Greek armed forces for their next-generation needs.

The most recent reports out of Athens indicate that the incumbent government is going to procure some 40 4^th generation fighter jets, with the Eurofighter Typhoon topping the list, and the French Rafale, manufactured by Dassault, also being looked at. Moreover, after 2012 Greece will order some 60 American Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) planes.

The total cost for the above is difficult to estimate due to the changing currency index and the variety of missiles and auxiliary systems that can be added; in total, however, costs should exceed 10 billion euro, a substantial amount that is more than the total defense budget of Greece for 2008.

Turkey, for its part, has already planned their procurement of 100 units of the superb F-35 Lighting II fighter jet from the US. This is in keeping with the strategic aim of the Turkish Air Force of becoming the strongest in the East Mediterranean region by 2020.

On the maritime front, the Greek Navy has ordered six frigates by autumn 2008, at a total cost of 2.8 billion euro. The French, according to all estimations, have gained the upper hand in offering the FREMM type vessel. The French are also likely to be commissioned for the modernization scheme of the Mirage-2000 fighter jets, costing probably in excess of 500 million euro, along with new weaponry such as precision guidance munitions and air-to-air missiles.

Greece already ordered 415 BMP-3 combat armored vehicles in early December 2007; they will be accompanied by another 81 as an offset, amounting to 1.3 billion euro. Most of these vehicles will arrive in Greece by early 2010. Moscow is also actively pursuing the sale to Greece of the BUK middle-range anti-aircraft system, at a cost of around 700 million euro. A decision on that is likely to be delayed until mid-2009, however.

An interesting aspect here is the willingness of the French to offer Greece the new Scalp-Naval surface-to-surface missiles with a maximum range of 1,000 kilometers, essentially a strategic weapon that will be deployed aboard the FREMM ships. In reality, this means that a Greek vessel could hit an enemy target in mainland Turkey while safely withdrawn in Southern Crete or even the Ionian Sea, far away from a potential theater of battle.

This particular weapon essentially replicates the abilities of the American-made Tomahawk missile, presently used only by the armed forces of the USA, UK and Israel. Already the Greek Air Force operates the Scalp Storm Shadow version with a 350km radius, which is classified as a sub-strategic weapon.

The main reason Paris is seeking to open up this export market, it seems, is the fierce antagonism between multiple high-tech weapons producers that have caused great losses to the French defense industry over the past decade. Greece, as a major European market, could assist the French into re-entering the market.

The French are also heavily promoting the Rafale fighter plane for export. Between the 12^th and 16^th of May, Greek and French pilots trained together with these fighters during the “Aegean Gust” exercise held in Greece. Five French planes faced five Greek F-16′s, engaging in battle simulation. The total French team sent to Greece numbered 45 personnel.

Officially, the exercise was a bilateral one conducted in order to further build bonds between the two nations; in reality, this was a high-level and high-cost marketing endeavor during which the Greek pilots and officers viewed under realistic conditions the real capabilities of the Rafale planes, and how they would operate under difficult circumstances against the American F-16′s, the main type of jet used by both Greeks and Turks at present.

In this light, it is not beyond the realm of speculation to conclude that, among other recent overtures, the French support for Greece during the controversial NATO Summit in April was meant to increase the likelihood of a sale that would be very lucrative for France.

By Ioannis Michaletos

The Chinese government recently announced that it has eliminated an Islamist terrorist cell composed of Uyghur Turks from Xinjiang Province in the west of the country. With security for the Olympics, which start in Beijing on August 8 at an all-time-high, China‘s concerns have reverberated as far as southeastern Europe, where on March 24 the Greek government will conduct the traditional lighting of the Olympic flame. Greece‘s security precautions for the event involve new techniques and technology in practice since Athens hosted the last Olympics, in 2004, and are being executed with an eye to possible threats from political opponents of the Chinese regime, including left-wing terrorist groups, the Uyghur Diaspora, Tibet activists and other potential troublemakers.

The most visible dissidents to China‘s political program, which are seeking to use the world spotlight cast on the world’s most populous country that the Games provide, are now the Tibetans. Following recent riots and continuing protests against Chinese rule in Tibet, and an outcry from Tibet activist groups outside the country, China is taking a great interest in identifying those involved. This interest has spread as far as the Peloponnesian home of the original Olympics, where on March 10 Chinese Embassy officials in Olympia filmed a group of Tibet activists concluding their own “Olympic flame” relay, a counter-action meant as a symbolic protest. This data will most certainly be shared with the Greek police, busy executing their final preparations for the March 24^th event.

Greek-Chinese Relations: Smooth Sailing

Bilateral relations between the two countries have greatly expanded over the past few years, facilitated by the expanding role of China in world markets and by the role of the Greek merchant marine, which now transfers the bulk of China‘s energy needs, especially its oil.

Diplomatic relations were formally established in 1972, during the time when Western policy formally opened up to Beijing as a counterweight to the then-Soviet Empire. According to information relayed by the Greek Foreign Ministry, “Greek-Chinese relations are excellentˆšÂ¢Â¬Ã„¦ China has a positive stance on the Cyprus issue and Greece supports the principle of One China.”

In the economic sphere, there is strong bilateral collaboration as well, especially in the shipping sector. The COSCO Group is willing to invest in Greek ports by buying controlling stakes, while the shipyards of China are filled with hundreds of orders from Greek ship owners rushing to take advantage of low-cost Chinese labor. In the tourism sector, Greece expects to accommodate some 300,000 Chinese visitors, a market recently making its entrance in Greece but with high potential due to explosive annual growth and high spending per capita.

Chinese Security Concerns

The Olympic Games 2008 will provide a unique opportunity for China to present its heightened role on the world stage. The security concerns of Beijing are mainly concentrated in the existence of minority groups, as now seen in Tibet, with communities scattered across the world that along with political demonstrations may attempt sabotage and even terrorist attacks on the Games themselves. Bloomberg reports that China is spending approximately $300 million on Olympic security (whereas the Greek government spent $1.5 billion to safeguard the 2004 Olympics). According to security expert and an official advisor to the Olympic Games, Dr. Darko Trifunovic, “China is paying considerable attention to terrorism assessment for the Olympic Games. It does not want the event to be associated with anything that can damage its reputation as a safe destination.”

Among the Chinese counterterrorist efforts is the participation of America nuclear experts in removing radioactive materials from the vicinity of Olympic sites, “part of a security sweep focusing on highly radioactive devices in hospitals and research labs” reported The Canadian Press. “The fear is they could be detonated using conventional explosives – effectively becoming a “dirty bomb’ that would spew radiation and sow panic at the global sporting spectacle set for August.” Charles Ferguson of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations described for the Canadian media the security operation as being “precautionary,” adding that “if terrorists were able to take explosives, let’s say, and target a radioactive source that’s located at or near an Olympic site venue and blow up that facilityˆšÂ¢Â¬Ã„¦ then that could be a huge international event.”

Chinese Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang has stated that “we face the challenges of terrorism, separatism and extremism.” Attesting to this concern, Beijing recently announced that it had foiled a plot devised by terrorists seeking to take over a passenger plane and crash it in a major city. According to Wang Lequan, the top Communist Party official in the western region of Xinjiang, there were plans “to sabotage the staging of the Beijing Olympics.” CNN reported that “two people were killed and 15 captured in the raid, along with weapons and extremist religious literature.”

Xinjiang province is home to the Uyghurs (also spelled Uighurs), a Turkic minority that has often clashed with the Chinese minority, motivated by dreams of independence, for a region it calls East Turkistan. During the 1990′s it collaborated with Islamic networks and Al Qaeda, and even with the Turkish state, which at the time was trying to expand its influence among the Turkic countries of Central Asia. Should the allegations prove to be correct, an initial serious security threat may have now been found. However, Western observers have also expressed skepticism over the veracity of the allegations, suspecting that China would like to voice security concerns to intimidate its restive minorities.

However, there are demonstrated links between a small number of Chinese Turks and international terrorist outfits. Dr. Trifunovic points out that “Uyghur trainers of Al Qaeda ended up in Guantanamo Bay [prison] in 2001. Six of them were released and they are presently in Albania.” The small Balkan country was the only one that would do the US a favor by accepting the men. A significant Uyghur community also resides in Munich, Germany, which would mean relatively easy access for any troublemakers looking to disrupt the Olympic flame lighting ceremony in Greece.

Another Chinese security concern which has implications for events in Greece next week is the Falun Gong religious sect, which has been in conflict with the Chinese government for years. Via its European representation, the group has made numerous connections in Greece, and developed a network of local supporters and collaborators, materializing in the past in the form of demonstrations in Athens. This activity has occasionally created slight strains in Athens-Beijing bilateral relations.

It is possible that the cult groups may try to hold demonstrations just before the lighting ceremony, in order to voice their public disapproval for the Chinese Olympic Games. It is notable to mention that in 2004 three members of that sect sued the Chinese government in a Greek court, claiming that it practices “genocide and torture” against minority members. Even though it cannot be estimated how many members of the sect reside in Greece, unofficial tallies suggest a community of approximately 1,000 members.

Lastly the ever-pressing issue of Tibet, one which has received much more popular support from Westerners, means another headache for Greek security tasked with safeguarding the lighting ceremony. On the 10th of March, a group of 10 Tibetans tried to enter the archeological site of Olympia in order to symbolically light up their own fire, using benzine, but were prohibited by the police, though no arrests were made. The arrival of a wave of tourists from China and various European countries for the ceremony has kept local authorities on alert, as they fear similar incidents might be attempted.

Greek Security Preparations for the Olympic Lighting Ceremony

The lighting ceremony will begin at noon on Monday, the 24th of March, at the home of the original Games, Olympia in the Peloponnese. As before every modern Olympics, the torch will then travel throughout Greece — some 1,528 km in all — passing through 43 cities and finally arriving at Panatheneum Stadium in central Athens on the 30th of March at 3PM. On the following day it will be flown to China. During the week-long ceremony, 605 people in all will be involved in handling the torch.

Dr. Trifunovic who has wide experience in security planning, notes that “preparation for mega-events such as the Olympics begins years in advance. All plans have to be flexible enough to accommodate changes and always be characterized by situational awareness. It requires continuous planning, from day one up until the end.”

Best practices as gleaned from the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens are going to be implemented in the torch ceremony, which the Greek Olympic Committee president Minos Kyriakou promises will be carried out in “immaculate” fashion. Using its accumulated experience, Greece will have an advantage in covering all the angles of this significant international event.

Numerous facets of the security operation are in place. An unspecified number of alert groups spread out across much of Greece‘s territory will be ready to respond immediately in the case of any problems, with a group of 10 helicopters at their disposal. Further, a total of 2,700 police officers will be on alert, covering the designated range of the torch’s path across the country; 600 of them will be deployed during the ceremony itself.

Further, all of the VIP guests participating in the ceremony and on the week-long travels of the torch will be monitored round the clock. Pedestrians, vehicles, machinery and buildings near the ceremony will be checked, and people will be prohibited from coming within close range of the event. Secure zones will thus be established.

Also, an unspecified number of plain-clothed screeners will monitor the crowd and look out for any suspicious movement. During the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens, such personnel appeared as athletes, journalists, volunteers and so on. Finally, the general security operation also depends on a smooth information flow between Interpol-Europol and Greek police, especially concerning border movements.

The above measures present a schematic array of best practices that were used in the field during the 2004 Games, and which were considered to have been successful, since no incidents occurred. Moreover, the security infrastructure has since then been upgraded, judging by the fact that according to the Greek press, the security services have procured high-tech equipment from Germany capable of monitoring thousands of phone calls and e-mails. Also, a law that was recently voted in the Parliament providing further powers to the Greek intelligence services, ostensibly for combating terrorism and asymmetrical threats, can also be applied in the case of Olympic events.

Other concerns for the Greek government which do not involve China-related troublemakers regarding the high-visibility torch ceremony include the existence of certain radical leftist groups, such as the Revolutionary Struggle. The latter was reportedly involved with staging an attack against the American Embassy in January 2007, and is considered to have a considerable arsenal of illegal weaponry, as well as relations with the contraband arms trade in the Balkans, and possibly even with organized crime networks operating in Kosovo; in 2007, Kathimerini reported that the missile launched against the American Embassy had been imported from Albania via the largely Albanian-populated secessionist province of Serbia.

Finally, the generally fragile situation in the Balkans may now be affected as the Greek police are forced to temporarily expend their efforts on the lighting ceremony, rather than on other regional security issues.

Controlling the Path of the Torch, and the Holiday

The path upon which the Olympic flame will pass is considered generally safe. It will follow national roads, which are easily monitored and secured. Nevertheless, the country will be on a heightened state of alert for other reasons as well. The 25th of March is also the national Day of Independence in Greece, traditionally marked by a military parade in Athens. This simultaneous event also means the activation of Greek military units, as Turkey by tradition honors the holiday by violating Greek airspace, as a form of minor psychological warfare. Thus the Greek air force, and the army and navy as well, will have to be on standby.

Route and Itinerary of the Olympic Torch, March 24-30, 2008

March 24: Ancient Olympia-Patra-Messologi (Stay overnight)

March 25: Agrinio-Arta-Ioannina (Stay overnight)

March 26: Metsovo-Grevena-Kozani-Veroia (Stay overnight)

March 27: Naoussa-Edessa-Ginniatsa-Ancient Pella-Thessaloniki (Stay overnight)

March 28: Larissa-Volos-Lamia (Stay overnight)

March 29: Kalamos-Marathonas-Rafina- Panellinios Stadium (2 km from the final destination) in central Athens (Stay overnight)

March 30: Delivery of the torch to Chinese Olympic officials at 3PM in Panatheneum stadium (close to the presidential palace, and the most secure area of Athens). The torch will be flown the same night or early the next morning for China.

Related Links

The world route of the Olympic flame, 2008

Greek Ministry of Public Order/ Directory for 2004 Olympic Games Security

Exclusive presentation of security standards for the 2004 Games from Athenian newspaper To Vima

Balkanalysis.com would like to announce that nine months’ worth of archived articles, many previously unavailable on the website, have now been uploaded to our page at the Central and Eastern European Online Library (CEEOL.com).

The articles in question number more than 50, and cover the months March-December 2006. They will be of interest to researchers of contemporary Balkan history. They complete the current archive of Balkanalysis.com articles, covering the period 2001-2006. These articles specifically include articles on Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo.

Over 220 instititutions from 21 countries currently offer access to articles in the Library. If you would like to access these articles, but your institution is not yet a member of the CEEOL.com program, please have your institution’s acquisitions or reference librarian contact CEEOL.com directly.

Sincerely,

Balkanalysis.com team

By Ioannis Michaletos and Christopher Deliso

The Greek parliament is currently debating a significant new law covering intelligence reform and modernization. The legislation, which would have applicability for both the Greek military intelligence service and the civilian National Intelligence Service (NIS), may be voted on as early as February 18. It is the first such law to be considered since the original 1986 act that provided the agency with its legal status.

The main points of the far-reaching new law concern both procedural reform and structural realignment, in light of new realizations of the strategic threats facing Greece from decentralized terrorist cells and organized crime groups, including cyber-crime rings.

While most of the proposed modifications have relatively little to inspire political controversy, a couple of them do have political overtones. One would be the addition of accountability safeguards, deemed to be lacking under the old law. A further departure from the past would give the agency the ability to screen and ask for information from the entire public sector; the original law specified the need for a series of requests, including judicial approval. The new law envisions a simplified procedure in which even low-ranking officials will be entitled to make such requests.

The proposed legislation was initially developed in 2005 by the conservative Nea Dimokratia government of sitting Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis, which cited problems in the functioning of the agency, including a prevailing mentality deemed outdated and out of touch with modern intelligence-gathering practices. The governing party and its ally, the far right-wing LAOS party, will vote in favor of the new law. However, the leftist parties are expected to vote against the law, which is nevertheless likely to pass.

These liberal opponents include Synaspismos and the Communist Party, which claim that the intelligence agency’s new powers will be used against those who voice criticism of government policy, while also increasing the likelihood of unwanted electronic surveillance of the public. The main left-wing opposition party, PASOK, is also expected to largely vote against the law, even though some PASOK parliamentarians may well abstain, mostly due to their opposition to party President Giorgos Papandreou. While PASOK complains that the law is inadequate, they also do not trust the government in general, and this is a tacit reason for opposition.

The fact that it has taken so long for this law to get to its final stages owes to scandals, intelligence-related and otherwise, that have plagued officials associated with it. The legislation was first prepared by the Public Order Ministry in 2005, but the resignations of its leading authors, Giorgos Voulgarakis (now Maritime Minister) and a current MP, Vyronas Polydoras, resulted in a lengthy delay.

The former was blamed in the infamous “Pakistani abduction case,” in which 28 Pakistani immigrants were allegedly kidnapped by intelligence agents in Athens. He claimed ignorance, attesting that the government did not engage in “James Bond’-style tactics. Voulgarakis’ involvement was revealed by the newspaper Proto Thema, which actually cited sources behind the revelations from within the intelligence agency. Proto Thema also disclosed the names of 15 alleged Greek agents and an MI6 spy chief allegedly involved with kidnapping and torturing the Pakistanis eight days after the London bombings of July 7, 2005.

Complicating things further, the newspaper’s owner is now entangled in an investigation. Themos Anastasiades, who owns 40 percent of the paper, is accused of receiving a sum of 5.5 million euros from an identified individual without reporting it to the tax service. He was also stopped on the Swiss-French border in October 2007 carrying unreported checks worth one million euros, which were then confiscated by the French customs. Nevertheless, it is widely believed that the main reason for the “Pakistani abductions” disclosure was the close ties that certain Greek politicians have cultivated with British officials (to the displeasure of the formers’ rivals). Moreover, the potential of a strong cooperation between NIS and MI6 might have alarmed other services in the murky world of international security and espionage. At the time, then-Minister Voulgarakis complained that the newspaper’s revelation had forced Greece to evacuate two agents from turbulent Kosovo- the very place where, in May of the same year, allegedly, the NIS station chief had been assassinated by members of an Albanian militant group.

Emerging Threats

Over the past two years, the Karamanlis administration has made great steps towards modernizing and refocusing the Greek intelligence apparatus, in light of changing security factors. Until now, the Greek intelligence community has in most respects remained focused on Cold War methods of operation, mainly orienting its operations towards traditional foe Turkey. While the transformation of the landscape by new asymmetrical threats, not the old state-centered ones, has forced a rethink, some officers still complain about an inability to get “official” Athens to implement more robust activity in the areas of Islamic terrorism and Balkan militancy.

Nevertheless, while it is coming slowly, change is coming to the Greek intelligence community. The continuingly unstable situation in the Balkans and the international war on terrorism constitute the major considerations for Greek security specialists today. In summer 2007, the enormously destructive wildfires that decimated large swathes of countryside emerged as a new menace- and one that may yet be repeated with even more brutal effect in the years ahead. Although arid, sun-baked Greece is a natural victim of forest fires, what happened last summer was without precedent and became for a time the chief priority for the intelligence services, in a country essentially under attack. Further, deliberate arson aimed at a country increasingly vulnerable to desertification and lacking sufficient water resources can have devastating long-term effects for actors with political or economic objectives in mind.

While everyone from rogue property developers and organized crime syndicates to anarchists and leftists have been blamed at one time or another for the many and widespread fires that gripped the country during the summer, another and even more disturbing possibility is that least some of the fires that occurred, and that are likely to occur in the future, can be attributed to Islamist networks. A recent report, citing US intelligence channels, claims that an Arabic-language jihad website has urged Muslims in Europe, America and Australia to use arson as a tool of terror. The website apparently cited imprisoned Al Qaeda “theorist” Abu Musab Al-Suri as the ideological progenitor of this plan. While Greece is not specified among the countries to be attacked, and while it is not a contributor of troops to the US-led coalition in Iraq, it has been vital to the war effort by allowing the Americans access to its island bases, transport and other logistical services.

Further evidence attests to a possible connection between Islamists and the forest fires in Greece. A type of improvised explosive device used in setting off the fires was ignited with a mobile phone. By calling the phone’s number, the device exploded, sparking a blaze that soon grew out of control. The advantage for the perpetrators is that this result can be achieved from a safe distance- even from abroad. Significantly, it is similar to one of the methods used in the Madrid bombing in March 2003.

Further, a ranking Greek intelligence officer, speaking on the condition of anonymity, states that during the height of the summer fires a Saudi national equipped with such a device was arrested by Greek border police in the north of Greece, in the company of several Kosovo Albanians. It is no secret that the latter consider Greeks to be an enemy, in light of the latter’s historic support for the Serbian point of view regarding the Kosovo issue. However, there is no way of confirming this claim, so it must remain a mystery, at least for now. Nevertheless, there is evidence, some of it gathered in an August 2007 Jamestown Foundation report, of Greece being used as a transit zone and even potential target for al Qaeda and related groups.

Further, the spread of organized crime originating from the Balkans, and Greece‘s delicate geopolitical placement between the Balkans, Turkey and the Middle East, all add increased urgency to the need for a significant upgrade and redirection of the country’s intelligence services in a rapidly changing and insecure era. Although the proposed law is not as extensive or complete as it could be, it is an improvement over the current situation of relative inertia and inefficiency. The major points of the bill will be discussed below, following mention of some reforms that have already started to come into practice.

Military Intelligence Modernization: the Move to Open Source

Greece‘s Military Intelligence service (DDSP) has developed a new focus on OSINT (Open Source Intelligence), just as its American counterparts are calling for increased exploitation of global Islamist websites, webcasts and other forms of easily acquired media. The Greek army’s global OSINT center (abbreviated ˆšÃ©Â¬Ã¶ˆšÃ©Â¬Ã¯ˆšÃ©  ˆšÃ©Â¬ÃµˆšÃ©Â¬Ã³/ˆšÃ©Â¬Ã¬ˆšÃ©Â¬Ã¯ˆšÃ©Â¬Â£) is meant to monitor all news, analysis, briefings, reports and information in general about global military affairs on a 24-hour basis. This includes a constant examination of information from the media, websites, web logs, think-tanks, public comments and other OSINT based information. The Center is headquartered in the Army’s J2 Staff Office.

According to the monthly defense journal Stratigiki (1), the OSINT center started operating on a pilot basis in October 2006 and became fully operational in May of 2007. It is composed of a group of men and women (officers and NCOs) selected on the basis of their knowledge of foreign languages, internet management and education on issues relevant to OSINT management and intelligence gathering. Moreover, most of the members of this unit underwent training in Greece and other NATO countries on the aforementioned subjects. Some of them also hold degrees in international relations, diplomatic studies and journalism. Another similar directorate, in existence since 2003, is subordinate to the Hellenic Joint Chief of Staff Headquarters. It is directed by a brigadier general on a rotating basis, taken in turn from the army, navy and air force. This sector is called the Military Intelligence Chiefs of Staff Directorate.

The weekly Greek newspaper Investors World (2) commented that this new army unit is the first of its kind in Southeastern Europe, and will play a decisive role in collecting the vital pieces of open-source intelligence that the military might need. Whether it is a flattering remark on Greece‘s field intelligence efforts or not, at least 90 percent of all information collected from the intelligence or security services currently comes from OSINT. This information is vital for discerning the “big picture” from the mass of seemingly insignificant data that comes in on a daily basis.

Further, the new OSINT center will also include a specialized team of officers tasked with monitoring the internet for potential attacks on the military’s networks and servers, and intentional or unintentional leak of sensitive documents and classified information (3). The team enacted its operation a few months ago and, according to several reports published in the Greek media, it has already uncovered six cases of leakages by military personnel who shared files or posted documents of sensitive nature onto the internet. In two instances, it was revealed that ex-military personnel exchanged files of a sensitive or even classified nature with foreigners via popular internet file-sharing systems.

This specialized team is also tasked with conducting inspections all along the spectrum of the military’s critical information infrastructure, in order to make sure safety rules are followed and that necessary adjustments can be proposed. The team members were selected due to their computer and high-tech skills and use advanced software platforms that operate constantly. They also cooperate closely with the Greek Special Police Unit on Electronic Crime that has functioned over the past decade (in this regard, it should be noted that the future authority and division of labor between these cooperating bodies is another controversial issue regarding the proposed intelligence reform bill).

In late July 2007, the Greek government resolved to form a platform of cooperation and interconnection between all organizations concerned with internet security, surveillance and telecommunications, even though no other details have surfaced in the press as to how this will affect the military infrastructure of the country in that field. Moreover, the Greek army’s OSINT center will have access to the Command Control and Information facilities of the army, navy and air force. Thus it will be capable of conducting wide range research across the country, and to speed up the “intelligence cycle” considerably.

Over the coming years, the Greek military aims to create an information structure that includes the use of satellites, AWACKS, OSINT centers, CCTV’s and electronic surveillance planes and ships, so as to reduce the costs of intelligence gathering- while also upgrading considerably its abilities to conduct intelligence management in the 21^st century (4). Further, the Center closely cooperates with the Greek police’s Electronic Crime Directory that is being supervised by the Security Command of the Attica Prefecture (5).

The importance of OSINT management has gained wide recognition all over the world. US intelligence figures have recently announced that they will increasingly monitor web logs and even YouTube videos as a mean of gaining a wide-angle view on societal developments internationally. In Greece, the new OSINT center has the potential and the legal framework, according to the Greek political review Diplomacy, even to recruit HUMINT assets, as well as to explore new means of acquiring essential intelligence by consulting specialized institutions, research centers, universities and the mass media (6).

To a large extent, however, the possibility of success depends on the ability of the Joint Chief of Staff’s intelligence center to develop a successful working relationship with the already existing J2 branches in the army, navy and air force; the latter tend to view the newest development from a conservative point of view, fearing that their role will be downgraded in the future as a result of “competition.’ The creation of a similar army OSINT Center has further indicated the continuing role of internal antagonisms, and in the future Greece may well have three OSINT centers, along with an overarching joint one.

Finally, on the more purely military side of things, a crucial addition to the Greek Air Force, in relation to the dynamics of the OSINT Center, is the 4 EMB-145H AWACS that are being constructed by a French-Brazilian-Swedish consortium for the military. For the first time in its air force’s history, Greece will acquire air radar capabilities with an average detection range of 350 km for enemy planes and 150 km for incoming cruise missiles. It is assumed that these four aircraft could fully meet the needs for defending the Northern Aegean archipelagos up to the central portion of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. The Greek army has already procured the French made Sprewer type UAV’s that will assist for real-time information, and which are expected to be deployed mostly on the eastern border with Turkey (7).

Civilian Intelligence Modernization and Restructuring

Greece‘s National Intelligence Service (NIS) is a part of the Ministry of Public Order, except for during times of war or national emergency, when it should answer to the Ministry of Defense. In mid-September 2007, right after the Greek general elections, however, a reshuffling and merger occurred between the Home Affairs Ministry and the Ministry of Public Order. Thereafter, the NIS became subject to the minister of the interior, who is also responsible for public administration.

The new law being debated now by the Greek parliament will transform the NIS‘ operability, reach and responsibilities, with an eye towards implementing more efficient administration and countering emerging security threats. The main points discussed that are applicable to this civilian agency include: the designation of an “in house” special judicial overview function, represented by the Greek equivalent of a District Attorney; the creation of a joint ministerial intelligence committee composed of officials from the eight most important ministries, and chaired by the interior minister; and the NIS’ heading of the national CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team), giving it the overruling authority for the security of critical networks and non-military state servers in the country.

Under the proposed law, the NIS would also be given the authority to ask any kind of information from public services and organizations in Greece about any individual, when dealing with a case. This controversial aspect of the law would oblige state bodies to hand out information whenever requested. However, as a sort of concession to the liberal critics of this practice, the new law proposes a check on the agency in the form of an annual review of the NIS‘s operations provided by the appropriate parliamentary committee.

Sources

(1) ” Army’s Information Unit”, News Briefs, Stratigiki, (Greece), Vol. 150, p. 33, March 2007

(2) Manos Iliades, “Army Creates Intelligence Center“, Investor’s World Newspaper (Greece), March 31, 2007

(3) “Army’s Intelligence Center“, News Briefs, Defense & Diplomacy Journal (Greece), Vol. 192, p. 184, April 2007

(4) “Greek Army Enacts OSINT Center“, Greek Information Section, Greek Defense & Security Journal (Greece) Vol. 14, p. 25, April 2007

(5) Ioannis Michaletos, “Greek Defense Developments”, Greek Studies Section, Research Institute on European & American Studies, www.rieas.gr, March 18, 2007

(6) “Army’s Intelligence Center“, op cit

(7) Makis Pollatos, “The Military Intelligence”, Diplomacy Journal (Greece), Vol. 27, February 2006

(8) Ioannis Michaletos, “Greek Defense Developments”, op cit

Relevant official websites

Greek Ministry of Defense: www.mod.gr

Greek Ministry of Public Order: www.ydt.gr

Greek Ministry of Interior : www.ypes.gr

National Intelligence Service: www.nis.gr

By Christopher Deliso

Greece’s most striking landscapes, it may well be argued, are to be found in the mountain fastnesses of Epiros, far in the country’s northwest; here is the fabled Zagorohoria, a group of 46 mountain hamlets attesting to the legacy of a spirited people determined to remain free and cling to their customs over the long centuries of Ottoman rule in Greece. Although most of the villages are sparsely populated now, with the few lingering locals making a living from tourism, they hold onto their magic and their secrets well; since the traditional Zagori architecture is hewn of stone, the centuries-old bridges, mansion houses and churches have all been built to last.

The Zagorohoria’s unique name comes from the fusion of the old Slavonic za Gora (€šÃ„òbehind the mountain€šÃ„ô), and the Greek word for villages (horia). The sprawling area lies in the north of the province of Epiros. The mixed tradition of the region also means that a notable part of the population has Vlach roots; indeed, you can still find the occasional nomadic Vlach shepherd bringing his sheep up and down from the mountains€šÃ„ô high places and meadows in time with the changing seasons.

Most visitors to Zagorohoria, foreigners especially, are firstly looking to €šÃ„òget away from it all,€šÃ„ô amidst the tranquility and astonishingly fresh air of the Pindos Mountains€šÃ„ô Vikos-Aoos National Park. Many of these travelers also come to test their trekking mettle, tramping along steep hiking trails and traversing the 12km length of the Vikos Gorge- said to be the world’s deepest.

The Zagorohoria is marked by its distinctive stone architecture (photo: Christopher Deliso)

The view into the gorge is particularly awesome from above. The whole area is rich in wild things (endemic fish, foxes, hawks, otters and bears, to name a few) and wildflowers, most abundant in spring, which bathe the inner valleys in a kaleidoscope of color. After a hot summer’s day of hiking, the hardiest visitors might seek the ultimate cathartic refreshment- a dip in one of the park’s two glacial €šÃ„òDragon Lakes.€šÃ„ô

The Zagorohoria is undeniably photogenic. Constantly shifting light plays across starkly variegated terrain, and the seasons, from blossoming summer to a long whitewashed winter, pass abruptly and always with a sense of loss. But through it all the stone houses with their long slate roofs remain, as do the gracefully arching bridges that dot the interior, both nearby civilization and sometimes, it would seem, precisely in the middle of nowhere, under a craggy cliff or off over a stream in a thicket.

Until the relatively recent creation of modern roads, these bridges were indispensable means of connection between the isolated villages. Even after wave upon wave of Ottoman invaders settled across Greece and the Balkans, the Sultan was never able to take real control of the Zagorohoria and its proud inhabitants. The Pindos range preserved them in a sort of natural fortress, and it was usually too much trouble (and too dangerous) for Turkish troops to make the ascent. And so, during times of trouble elsewhere, the Zagorohoria became a sanctuary for Greeks; in 1204, when the Latin Crusaders sacked Constantinople, and again in 1453, when the forces of Sultan Mehmet II overran the imperial city and destroyed the Byzantine Empire, wealthy Byzantine families undertook the long and dangerous journey to the safety of Epiros, where they could find shelter from the turbulence gripping their own homeland.

As a result, the Zagori villages came to be endowed with the largesse of wealthy arrivals, most evident in the lavish and sumptuously decorated stone churches they endowed. This patronage was considerably enhanced in later Ottoman centuries, when villagers left to make their fortunes abroad, usually in cities with sizable Greek emigrant populations such as Bucharest, Odessa or Alexandria in Egypt.

The dizzying view from above: Vikos Gorge at dusk (photo: Christopher Deliso)

The names and gifts of these patrons can still be found intact in the churches of Zagorohoria, whose vivid wall-to-wall frescoes and hand-carved wood iconostases have fared far better, thanks to their mountainous isolation, than have many churches in low-lying parts of Greece and other former Ottoman possessions.

What to see, where to stay

The Zagori villages are spread along the west and east of the Vikos Gorge, many being easily accessible by car. To give proper treatment to each one would mean a lengthy article indeed; here, therefore, are just a few of the most popular, which stretch along the west side of the gorge.

Long-haul hikers in the park have an assortment of mountain huts spread along the well-marked trail system to choose from. Even if you€šÃ„ôre not planning to go on extensive hikes, however, nothing beats the Zagorohoria for its utter tranquility (especially out of high season), wildlife and sense of being lost in another time. And there are an increasing number of places to stay. Over the past few years, numerous residents and former residents who€šÃ„ôve hung on to their ancestral homes in Zagori have gone into the B&B business, opening up guesthouses (xenones) full of charm and centuries-old character. The most impressive of these, the mansions (in Greek, arhontika), stand as the epic reminders to the wealthiest of the Zagorohorian families of yesteryear.

One of the best such places for serene escapism and marveling at old arhontika is the village of Dilofo, 32km from Epiros€šÃ„ô capital city of Ioannina. Located just before the entrance to the Vikos Gorge, Dilofo has taken much longer to get into the tourism game than the larger villages, meaning that it still has less than a handful of guest houses and restaurants concealed amidst its jumbled, slate-roofed houses, now mostly empty, though some former residents and their families do come back for summer idylls.

As in many other wisely situated Greek villages, an enormous, 400-year-old plane tree €šÃ„ì for town planners of old, always the most dependable sign that a water source could be found nearby €šÃ„ì stands in the middle of the village’s small central square, which also has a card telephone and taverna. In the upper part of town stands the Church of Koimisis Theotokou (Church of the Dormition of the Virgin) a thick stone structure with impressive icons and a hand-carved wooden iconostasis.

Slate rooftops predominate in the Zagorohoria (photo: Christopher Deliso)

The best place to stay here is the Arhontiko Dilofo, tucked unassumingly into a laneway leading up to the church. A double room including breakfast here will set you back €šÃ‡Â¨65. This 475-year-old mansion, lovingly restored by owner Giorgos Kontaxis, features unique rooms, all traditional but all slightly different, including one with a glass floor, under which can be seen original implements discovered during renovation. Other rooms are marked out by their traditional bedspreads, lovely rows of windows with painted shutters, and rustic furnishings. Giorgos is a mine of information on the house, its secrets and on Dilofo in and Epiros in general. If you stay, be sure to see his vast collection of nature photographs he’s taken in Zagorohoria over the years.

Further to the northwest are the most famous Zagori villages: Monodendri, Megalo Papingo and Mikro Papingo. The former is fairly heavily visited, thanks to its identity as the most popular starting point for the Vikos Gorge hike, and thus has more services for those needing slightly more civilization. The village lies 38km north of Ioannina, accessible from the main south-north Ioannina-Konitsa road. It boasts two churches worth seeing: the Monastery of Agias Paraskevis, a 15th-century structure built to celebrate a divine miracle, and the Church of Agiou Minas, near the square. From the former church there are awe-inspiring views down into the Vikos Gorge.

The ascent to Megalo Papingo and Mikro Papingo, further north, is one of most travelers€šÃ„ô most memorable Zagorohoria experiences: it involves navigating a succession of fifteen hairpin turns up and up, towards stark Mt Astraka, which looms over the Papingo villages. Excellent views of the Vikos Gorge down below can be had along the way. Megalo (€šÃ„òBig,€šÃ„ô in Greek) Papingo is a larger-than-life sort of place, backed by the €šÃ„òtowers€šÃ„ô- grand, almost anthropomorphic stone formations. Off of the short road connecting Megalo Papingo to Mikro (€šÃ„òSmall€šÃ„ô) Papingo, you will find several rock pools ideal for taking a quick swim on a hot day. In the latter village, which gets fewer visitors than its big brother, you will also find, in the former schoolhouse, a WWF information center that presents the park’s unique wildlife and fauna.

Rustic guest houses, such as the Arhontiko in Dilofo, pictured here, have driven and distinguished the area’s appeal for travelers (photo: Christopher Deliso)

Monodendri and the Papingo villages have a wider offering of places to stay. In Monodendri, the best budget accommodation can be found at the Archontiko Zarkada, where single rooms go for €šÃ‡Â¨25, and doubles for €šÃ‡Â¨35. Rooms have balconies with views overlooking the gorge, and some even have rejuvenating spa baths. Slightly more expensive, but with a central location near the lower village square and only 400m from the Vikos Gorge is the Xenos Vikos (+30 26530 71370), a well-kept guesthouse with a relaxing, leafy courtyard. Here, double rooms go from €šÃ‡Â¨45 to €šÃ‡Â¨60.

In Megalo Papingo, the Hotel Agriogido is set in a well-restored old Zagori family mansion, and maintains its atmospheric quality. Even more rustic is the recently opened Xenonas Mikro Papingo 1700 (+30 26530 41179) a small (only five rooms), but very appealing place loaded with traditional character. Rooms here range from €šÃ‡Â¨45 for a single to €šÃ‡Â¨60 for a double.

There are many other guesthouses to choose from which you will find in these villages and nearby ones such as Aristi and Ano Pedina; a useful website which contains listings of numerous places with photos and prices, as well as general Zagori information, is the official Agrotravel.gr website’s Zagorohoria page. Travelers also seeking to head out to Greece this spring and summer, and looking to tackle the Zagorohoria, can order Lonely Planet’s new guide to Greece to get all the necessary info on the best places to go and best things to see, with all of the usual logistical and historical detail that goes with it.

Rare frescoes and a gilded iconostasis greet the visitor at the Church of Agios Giorgos in Negades (photo: Christopher Deliso)

Getting to the Zagorohoria

As with other places offering Europe’s most scenic drives, going by car through Zagorohoria is the best way to see the huge area, offering freedom of movement and a chance to see places well off the beaten track. Visiting most of the area is not difficult, as all of the main roads are paved; however, if you want to get out into nature and visit some of the more outlying areas, it makes sense to rent a Jeep, Land Rover or other dependable four-wheel drive car.

Most travelers will at least be passing through Ioannina to get to the Zagori villages, as its the major city in Epiros and lies on the soon-to-be-called Egnatia Odos (liking Turkey with the Ionian Sea port of Igoumenitsa). However, Ioannina is an evocative and lively town in its own right, with a large student population and plenty of history, and well worth a few days’ sojourn.

If you will have to rely on public transport to reach the Zagorohoria, fear not, as buses are, if not frequent, at least regular, and the journey from Ioannina is not difficult. From Ioannina, buses ply the 1.5 hour route to Dilofo (€šÃ‡Â¨3.50) at 5.30am and 3.15pm on Monday, Wednesday and Friday.

Buses from Ioannina serve Megalo and Mikro Papingo twice daily on the same days, leaving at 6am and 3pm; the cost is €šÃ‡Â¨4.90, and the trip takes about two hours. All buses return to Ioannina immediately. Alternatively, you can take a taxi: the trip from Ioannina to Monodendri, for example, costs approximately €šÃ‡Â¨25-30.

One of the Zagorohoria’s celebrated stone bridges peeks through spring foliage (photo: Christopher Deliso)

Useful Links

Greek National Tourist Organization

The GNTO website- first stop for travelers looking for official tourism info in Greece

Pindos Trek

The best website for those interested in serious hikes, run by experienced guide Alex Danelas

Trekking Hellas

Another of the several companies offering tours and information for hikers

Anavasi

This leading Greek mapmaker’s Zagori 1:50,000 is the map you€šÃ„ôll want for the trip

By Ioannis Michaletos

Greece‘s unique geo-economic location between the energy producers of the Middle East, North Africa and the Caspian, as well as the vital transport routes of the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean, define it as an expanding energy hub between East and West. Several ongoing or new projects in the energy sphere attest to Athens€šÃ„ô commitment to developing the energy sector as something vital to both economic growth and national security. On the three major fronts of alternative energy, oil and gas Greece has made several initiatives, projects and proposed projects; the outcome of these efforts will determine Greece€šÃ„ô stature as an international energy power well into the 21^st century.

Alternative Energy

Currently Greece imports more than 70 percent of its energy needs. The only reliable domestic source is lignite, which accounts for some 85 percent of internal electricity production. Over the past few years, the incumbent administration has relayed plans for exploiting renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power, as the sunny, maritime country could excel in exploiting these abundant energy sources. The former is expected to draw investments worth 5 billion euros by 2020, according to information provided by the Ministry of Development. Foreign companies specialized in this field €šÃ„ì mostly from Germany €šÃ„ì have already set up offices in order to take advantage of the new market to be created.

On average, it is estimated that seven percent of the country’s electricity needs could be sustained over the next decade by this form of energy, though looking further into the future this percentage might exceed 30 percent eventually, due to Greece’s ample sunshine throughout the year. Wind energy can fulfill another 15 percent, and wind parks are already being constructed in various suitable location. If one adds biofuel, geothermic and wave energy to the equation, it becomes clear that Greece has the ability to become a fully independent energy producer by the mid-21st century and relieve itself from the strain of energy imports.

Still, the oil factor is a very important one, since it represents in Greece some 60 percent of yearly energy consumption and it is imported, bar some minimum amounts being produced in the Kavala offshore oil field in Northern Greece. Natural gas is a fast expanding commodity, albeit for the time being its contribution is a mere seven percent.

Oil

Currently, Greek oil production is just 6,500 barrels per day and consumption, some 450,000. It is thus impossible, regardless of any level of investment, to form a strategy that is going to be related with domestic production. Thus Greece has reached the point at which it needs to rely on ventures with foreign corporations and states so as to use its territory as a transit route for the emerging energy networks of the 21st century. The Burgas-Alexandroupoli pipeline agreement on the 15th of March was a first crucial step towards that aim. With a transport capacity of 30 million tons per annum (initially) reaching 50 million, this particular pipeline greatly elevates Greece‘s natural geoeconomic role in the wider Southeastern European region. Firstly, it effectively bypasses the Turkish Bosporus Straits and eases the exports of Eurasian oil to Western Europe. Therefore, through it Greece becomes an important country for European energy security, a factor that would seem to translate into some degree of political clout in the modern world. The Russian side, which owns 51 percent of pipeline shares through Lukoil, is interested in investing in refinery capabilities in Greece. Already it operates a similar facility in the Bulgarian port city of Burgas and, according to reports in the Greek press, has an interest in similar construction in the Greek northeastern Aegean port of Alexandroupoli, or buying a share in the Motor Oil industry which functions the second-largest refinery in Greece. In any case, the pipeline seems to ignite wider commercial interest in the Greek energy market, and consequently transforms the role of Greece from that of a sole importer to a regional energy point.

Recent developments regarding the B-A pipeline and its reception around European capitals show both progress and tension, however. The final agreement of the shareholders, signed by the trilateral committee of Russia-Bulgaria and Greece during Vladimir Putin’s visit to Sofia on the 18th of January 2008, stipulates the creation of a company to be based in the Netherlands that will seek funds from the international banking system. It is estimated that all technical and feasibility studies will be completed by the end of 2008, and the pipeline will begin its operations by late 2011.

It should be noted, however, that the EU seems to have different priorities in relation to the energy corridors of the Balkans region. According to recent report by the Bulgarian daily Standard, “among the EU priority energy projects are the Nabucco gas pipeline and the oil pipelines Constanta-Trieste and AMBO [Albania-Macedonia-Bulgaria], but not Burgas-Alexandroupolis.” The Bulgarian information service Focus added to this that “analysts say this means that Bulgaria, although a member of the EU, is still highly dependent on the Kremlin when it comes to energy supply and Burgas-Alexandroupolis project is a noose Russia tightens around the neck of the EU.” Indeed, a project as large and as complex as the B-A pipeline naturally stirs up tensions regarding the geopolitical balance in Europe, and it is likely that quite a few politically-charged comments will be made over the coming months by officials from both the supporting and opposing sides.

Another, smaller pipeline which is operational is the one transferring oil from Thessaloniki to the OKTA oil refinery in Skopje. The industry has been Greek-owned since a controversial privatization in 1999, and means the needs of the energy market in the country are largely met by Greece, which continues to view the proposed AMBO (Albania-Macedonia-Bulgaria Oil) pipeline as competitive with Burgas-Alexandroupoli and harmful to its geo-strategic interests.

Finally, and most recently, a Swiss corporation named EGL has drafted a plan for providing Iranian oil to Albania and Italy through Greece, with the Trans-Adriatic pipeline as it is termed. For the time being discussions are being held between all interested sides.

Natural Gas

Natural gas is another vital resource by which Greece is seeking to enhance its energy-supplier reputation. Currently, Greece import 80 percent of its natural gas from Russia and the rest from Algeria, through a series of bilateral agreements. Currently the Russian gas is being imported by Bulgaria, and the Algerian via LNG vessels. A recent development in that field was the beginning of operations of the Greek-Turkish gas pipeline that was inaugurated in late November 2007. It transports Turkish-owned gas with an initial capacity of 124 billion cubic feet, and has a total capability of some 406 billion cubic feet. A quarter of this amount will be available for the Greek market, whilst the rest will be exported to Italy via another underwater pipeline. The gas flowing through the pipeline will be bought by the Turkish BOTAS company and it is assumed that it will be a mixture of Azeri, Iranian and Russian gas. With this project, Greece will extend its geo-economic influence, albeit indirectly, across a wider geographical spectrum.

The South Stream agreement, signed in late June 2007, signals the culmination of a major political and economic process. The Russian Gazprom and the Italian ENI agreed to invest $15 billion in order to construct a pipeline stretching from the Russian Black Sea coast to Bulgaria, Greece and ending in Otranto, Italy. The pipeline should be constructed by 2011; however, as it will bypass certain countries leaning towards America, such as Ukraine, it may exacerbate the rift between American and Russian geopolitical interests. From a financial point of view, this investment seems very ambitious, in order to provide satisfactory returns to the investors. As far as Greece is concerned, a pipeline transferring gas that will meet Italian and European needs is another beneficial development since it will secure for decades to come a steady flow of gas to Greece, and it will add to the expanding energy prominence of the country.

Finally, a scheme which is under consideration by corporations and is supported by the Russian side is the connection between the Greek natural gas network and the exportation to Albania. The latter faces a severe energy deficiency, since no real investments have taken place over the past generation and it seems probable that it will confirm its objective of joining Greece‘s gas network over the coming year.

High Hopes

The optimism for Greece‘s energy-related future endeavors is surely being justified by the latest developments. Nevertheless, as has been noted, quite a few of these projects are inexorably related to wider geopolitical moves, and in particular are concentrated between the tripartite relations, and conflicts, between Russia, the USA and the Islamic world. The Greek Karamanlis administration has ample choices in exercising its influence between these major players, in order to extract benefits and at the same time assist towards ending Greece‘s foreign energy dependency. While the future seems bright, ensuring success through political initiatives that will secure the deals signed are seen as the uttermost priority for Greek diplomats. Their successes or failures will determine the country’s future role as a player in the Southeast European energy game.

The year 2007 was an eventful one in the Balkans, though several major trends remained underreported or were simply ignored. The Western media utilized most of its limited capacity to the political dimensions of the future status of Kosovo, choosing to tell and retell a tired story of good vs. bad (i.e., the West vs. Russia and Serbia), barely scratching the surface of what is if not necessarily the most important, at least the most hyped issue in the region.

Kosovo is however intimately tied to specific events and factors that, on the larger level, indicate an emerging strategic balance of power in the region, one that may not quite be what had been planned by the West, and thus which will likely leave a complicit media scrambling to find explanations for years to come. In this special retrospective report, Balkanalysis.com discusses a few of the major trends that have been identified in 2007 and which will likely help shape the Balkans in 2008.

The first major event has to be the growing power of Russia in the region and the future way in which this power, even if lessened, will be exerted. Less than a decade ago, the chief successor state to the USSR was grasping for economic stability and political respect on the global stage, with the nadir being reached in March 1999, when it proved powerless to stop NATO’s air war on Yugoslavia over Kosovo. This national humiliation was aggravated when the West failed to grant Russia equal partner status in keeping the peace in post-war Kosovo. Russia could only watch helplessly as half of Kosovo’s Serbian Orthodox population was driven out of the province by Albanian ethnic cleansers, with tacit Western approval.

From the ashes of this defeat arose Vladimir Putin, the ex-KGB officer determined to not let the national interest be trampled on again. In fact, Putin’s opportunity was created by the West in its reckless game in 1999. Until the question of changing Kosovo’s political status arose, Russia had not had a point of strategic leverage in the Balkans. For Putin, simply fomenting stubborn diplomatic opposition while an increasingly frantic West tries to appease the independence-minded Albanians has proven a very cost-effective and powerful strategy to contest Western ambitions and reassert his country’s role as a major power.

Nevertheless, the Western media has more often than not chosen to simply condemn these tactics rather than provide objective analysis, thus betraying their own sympathies with Western governments. Although there is little to be learned from boring invective, it would prove embarrassing to the powers that bombed Kosovo in 1999 for journalists to ask whether the intervention itself provided an opportunity for Russia to expand its sphere of influence, and precisely an opportunity that had simply not existed before. True, the US got its enormous military base in the heart of the Balkans with Camp Bondsteel €šÃ„ì now more than a liability than anything else €šÃ„ì but Russia has made major inroads on Balkan energy acquisitions, as well as buying considerable valuable seaside real estate in Montenegro, that former partner republic with Serbia whose independence, myopic and partisan Western diplomats still today maintain, is yet another well deserved punishment for the Serbs.

Reporting on the changing Russian role in the Balkans becomes even scantier in terms of its relation to the year’s second key trend, and perhaps the most astonishing- the diplomatic triumphs of Greece. A member of both the EU and NATO, Greece is a thoroughly Western country which has however sought to maintain its diverse relationships in nurturing national interests- in the process perhaps becoming guilty of wanting to have its cake and eat it too. While Greece’s major new alliance, with Russia, is more a harmonious convergence of certain interests than a deliberate planned partnership, it has been amply displayed and was singled out in a €šÃ„òpower audit€šÃ„ô by the new interventionist think-tank, the European Council on Foreign Relations, some of whose members are famous for their roles in the Kosovo war and peace.

Greece‘s convergence of interests with Russia owes primarily to two things; wariness over national security, vis-ˆš€ -vis perennial enemy Turkey, and its ambition to be a regional player in the energy sector. As with the Russian bear’s awakening over Kosovo, Greece determined these interests in the late 1990′s, in response to Turkey’s enhanced position globally. The first Greek concerns were registered with the Clinton administration’s determination to use the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan for the terminus of a new oil pipeline (the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, or BTC pipeline) that would bring Caspian oil to the West and bypass Russia in the process. Under such a scenario, it was only natural that both affronted parties would reach out to one another in the energy sector, as has been the case with both LUKoil’s acquisitions in Hellenic Petroleum and in the major efforts to hammer out a deal on the anticipated Burgas-Alexandroupoli Pipeline bringing Russian oil to the Aegean via Bulgaria.

Greece‘s second point of panic, though a far less reported one, came with the deepening alliance in the late 1990′s between Turkey and Israel. This first of all involved the transfer of lobbying know-how from the latter to the former in Washington, and soon developed into full-fledged intelligence cooperation, with one jarring result being the Turkish MIT’s kidnapping of Kurdish guerrilla leader Abdullah Ocalan, supposedly under Greek protection, in Nairobi. The Israelis had participated in gathering intelligence. It was a major embarrassment for Athens and a wild success for the Turkish government, by which it effectively ended the Kurdish insurrection, at least for a few years. Israeli-Turkish cooperation would strengthen and, with the victory of George W. Bush in 2000, catapult the neoconservatives, closely affiliated to both Israeli and Turkish lobby groups, into power in Washington.

Greece, like Russia a historic ally of Serbia, had also been less than thrilled about the NATO intervention of 1999, and chose not to participate in NATO air strikes; pivotally, however, it also chose not to veto the operation as Serbia had hoped. Alienated and insulted on all sides, Greece began to develop a parallel security infrastructure to that of NATO, turning to Russian expertise, most significantly in the advanced S-300 and TOR M-1 mobile anti-aircraft system which by virtue of its provenance was not supposed to be acquired by a NATO member. Intense interest in Greece’s air defense capacities from the Turks led, in May 2006, to a brief skirmish between Turkish and Greek fighter jets near the island of Karpathos, leading to the accidental death of a Greek pilot.

Aside from the defense sector, Greece’s budding partnership with Russia has also comprised energy diplomacy- the factor that will raise Greece’s political and economic stature as a transit corridor for oil, at a time of fierce competition between European countries desiring such a role. The expected Burgas-Alexandroupoli pipeline, in which Russia’s stake will be larger than either of the two countries through which the pipeline will actually go, is also seen by Athens as a defensive precaution against Turkey: it will hug the militarized eastern border in Evros, a tangible investment deterring any Turkish invasion. This factor was dramatically enhanced with the Greek Cypriot government’s decision, against Turkish protests, to drill for oil off of the island’s coast. Should multinational oil companies be active in Cypriot oil projects, the logic goes, Turkey will have to take a less bellicose stance towards Nicosia and, by extension, Athens.

The larger implications of Greece’s diplomatic success in 2004 in lobbying for Cyprus€šÃ„ô unconditional entry into the EU €šÃ„ì that is, with its membership not being contingent on the passage of the €šÃ„òAnnan Plan€šÃ„ô for unification €šÃ„ì have indeed registered this year, with the EU’s second Greek state ready to uphold Athens€šÃ„ô policies within the bloc, particularly on the Kosovo issue, thus relieving Greece of having to take the strongest stance possible against Kosovo independence. So long as Cyprus can be counted on to conduct an identical policy, Greece can desist and so appear more €šÃ„òaccommodating€šÃ„ô to Western interests- something that also buys it more political capital to expend on issues which are (erroneously, perhaps) equated with the national interest, such as trying to force the Republic of Macedonia to change its constitutional name. Despite increasing world sympathy for the Macedonian side, Greece has continued to prevent major EU powers from recognizing the country’s name, allegedly due to economic threats. At the same time, Greece is happy to let Turkey remain bogged down on its eastern front, embroiled in a war against Kurdish guerrillas that has now unwisely led it into northern Iraq.

That said, the major point of inquiry for journalists in 2008 has got to be the question of finding the source of Greek power. A NATO member that uses Russian military technology, opposes Kosovo independence, and that has threatened to torpedo NATO plans by vetoing Macedonian accession in April, Greece nevertheless continues to have its way with the West. Despite all of these apparent red flags, there has never been a detailed media investigation into precisely how Greece wields its economic and diplomatic clout to extract results that diverge wildly from those of its allies.

This brings us to the third major issue in the Balkans this year, though before considering it we must acknowledge that for the Greeks, success may be coming at a price: the massive summer fires, which blazed along fronts of up to 70km in width and which reached urban Athens, while decimating large stretches of the Peloponnese, can be considered the greatest threat to national security, and we expect that they will be happen again this coming summer.

While some fires occurred due to natural causes amidst parched, hot natural conditions, the majority occurred due to human involvement. Everyone from arsonists to property developers to Kosovo Albanians have been blamed, all with different alleged motives. While the last of these propositions has been derided as conspiracy-theorizing, it is clear that for irredentists with no chance of undertaking military action against much stronger state forces, the only other possibility for pressuring Greek policy is by causing widespread material destruction through fires or other terrorist acts. However, the Western press by and large chose not to look at the situation from this strategic aspect.

The third major underreported issue of the year in the Balkans has been the intrinsic connections and future possibilities of the major international bodies€šÃ„ô self-created problems in the region. The issue of Kosovo, Western governments have continuously maintained, is one that cannot be considered a precedent for any other of the numerous self-determination struggles across the globe- even as the representatives of these independence movements continue to remind that no, in fact Kosovo is being perceived as a precedent for them.

The possibility that Kosovo could be partitioned, anathema to the West as potentially having the capacity to set off a chain reaction in the Balkans, has ironically been given precedent due to the admission of a divided Cyprus into the EU in 2004. In that case, both the UN and EU were unable, or unwilling, to force Greek and Turkish Cypriots to settle their differences and enter as one nation, thus exacerbating the existing political animosities between Greece and Turkey. Whatever the reason for Cyprus entering the EU divided may have been, it is clear now that the whole thing has proven an embarrassment for the credibility of the supranational world bodies.

Since the UN could not force the non-warring Greeks and Turks of Cyprus to come together in 2004, it should be no surprise that the UN is now saying it can€šÃ„ôt do anything more to solve the Kosovo conundrum, and will hand it off to the EU to figure out. This is another blow to the credibility of the alleged global peacekeeper, and will be perceived by potential secessionists around the world as evidence that the UN has no ability to curtail their future ambitions.

For its part, the EU has enough of a headache dealing with embarrassments more recent than the Cyprus fiasco. The two countries that made headlines on Jan 1 by joining the bloc, Bulgaria and Romania, did so on condition of implementing further reforms in the future. European diplomats state that by the end of 2006, the whole train of EU enlargement had built up such momentum that it could not be stopped; and, had everything gone according to plan with the Romanians and Bulgarians, the EU might be more confident now of its future enlargement. However, the complacency that has been shown by the new members €šÃ„ì disinterested in finishing reforms, safe in knowing that they are finally in the club €šÃ„ì is making Brussels much more circumspect about further Balkan enlargement. While the value of Croatia’s tourism industry and its relatively homogenous Christian society could indeed keep it on track for membership, Macedonia, Bosnia, Albania and Serbia could find themselves out in the cold, stymied both by the cancerous presence of Kosovo in the middle and the recent legacy of less-than-honest candidate countries.

For 2008 at least, therefore, events in the Balkans should continue to outstrip the control of supranational institutions, and perhaps at an accelerated pace. While this is not necessarily a recipe for war, it does mean that the demonstrated trends in the region towards the bold and unpredictable unilateralism of the pre-WWII alliance systems will intensify. To paraphrase the friendly Chinese curse, we are indeed living in interesting times.

Finally, another emerging trend in the Balkans to watch during 2008 will be the activities of Islamic extremist groups in the region. Although their activities in 2007 were reported mostly in the local medias, the international press took interest as well when Serbian police in March broke up a Wahhabi training camp in the mountains of Novi Pazar, in the southwest Sandzak region; recently, from the other side of the border, Montenegro’s intelligence chief attested that the fundamentalists inhabited camps in Montenegrin Sandzak, while also masquerading their activities in NGOs and youth groups. Also in 2007 Macedonian special police carried out an action against an Albanian irredentist group near the Kosovo border, killing at least one known Islamic extremist in the process. And failed jihadi plots against the US Embassy in Vienna and Ft. Dix in New Jersey both had clear connections with the Balkans. These are only a few of the stories that emerged this year, indicating activity that we believe will increase in the year ahead. The fact that certain Western countries and Israel are starting to take a closer look at the phenomenon of Islamic extremism in the Balkans provides further indications that it remains one of the major, if more underreported, issues affecting regional security.