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Balkanalysis.com Special Report: The ISIS Expansion in Libya and Threats to the Mediterranean and North Africa

By Chris Deliso, Ioannis Michaletos and Matteo Albertini

Summary

ISIS-affiliated militants’ recent attacks on oil fields in Libya, coupled with the gruesome murders of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians by terrorists there earlier, confirms that the terror group is expanding operations in a new theater, far from its home turf of Iraq and Syria; there it is under more concentrated attack from the Iraqi army, backed by Iran’s military and Shiite militias. After its rapid gains last summer, ISIS has been on the defensive following months of allied bombardment, and needs to expand to new theaters to sustain its momentum and perpetuate the apocalyptic theology that, as a recent study by Graeme Wood in The Atlantic revealed, comprises the ideological core of the whole ‘Islamic State’ project.

ISIS in Libya has also been depicted in some media as posing a new trans-Mediterranean terrorist threat to the West, particularly via Italy and Greece. This threat has fueled calls for a military intervention or at least a coastal blockade, the latter being more likely than the former. Yet it is not even necessary for ISIS to reach European shores to still pose a major new threat to Western interests, economy and regional stability.

Much still remains unknown about ISIS’ strategic intentions in Libya, and what kind of impact it will have on an already fluid situation marked by infighting between two rival governments. The group’s intentions and relative strength will be tested over the next 3-6 months; broadly speaking, the situation is likely to get worse before it gets better, especially if the recent comments attributed to Boko Haram leaders pledging allegiance to ISIS prove to be true.

So far, international diplomacy and efforts to train and supervise Libyan national authorities have proved ineffective and limited due to security realities. Very few foreigners remain in Libya, which is negatively impacting the reliability of information coming from the country. The internationally-recognized Libyan government’s desperate pleas for arms have been stymied by mandated policy prerequisites from the West. UN-sponsored negotiations between rival Libyan administrations began in 5 March in Morocco and are set to continue with the goal of forming a national unity government. Further, the issues of a possible liquidity crisis leading to loss of services and imports, or of elimination of the remaining gas and oil supply needed to generate electricity, are being highlighted by experts- both would lead to a situation of total chaos that groups like ISIS could exploit.

In the cumulative analysis, it is most likely that ISIS’ strategic goal is not to take over Libya as a functional state, but rather to destabilize it so much that neighboring states have to intervene more heavily than they have already. The terror group will thus use increased fighting with the neighboring Arab states as a means for attracting recruits to its cause, while trying to destabilize those countries (especially Egypt). This will be done partly to sustain jihad momentum, since ISIS faces eventual losses in Tikrit and Mosul as Iran becomes more seriously involved in taking care of business. The ultimate goal of ISIS may be to provoke destabilization in Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria, and eventually hook up via the Sahel with Boko Haram and other jihadist groups, creating a wide arc of instability spanning the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Red Seas. Even if this eventuality is highly unlikely to be realized, one thing is for sure: ISIS does not lack for ambition.

The following analysis, based on numerous interviews with security experts, institutional leaders and business figures, assesses the likely upcoming tactical decisions of Islamic State activity in Libya, its potential for further destabilization and acts of violence, and the effect that this presence can have on regional security and economy. This estimate also examines some potential scenarios related to possible terrorist events affecting international commerce and European security in general.

A Predictable Eventuality: Background on Libya, Syria and the Establishment of a ‘Two-Way Channel’

First, it must be noted that no one should be surprised by what is happening now. From the beginning of the so-called ‘Arab Spring,’ it was obvious that the overthrow of secular Arab dictators like Moammar Gadaffi would create a huge security vacuum, one that would eventually be filled the strongest and most violent actors.

While certain Western countries believed that their policy of ‘spreading democracy’ would work out, those security services in those countries closest to the action were more cautious. In March 2011, when the NATO bombing of the Gaddafi government was gearing up, Balkanalysis.com reported that “Greek security planners are preparing for other risks that could accompany a protracted conflict, including refugee crises, arms smuggling and other forms of organized crime.”

That report also cited Moammar Gaddafi’s second son, Saif Al-Islam, who presciently warned that Libya “could become a ‘second Somalia,’ afflicting the Mediterranean with the scourge of piracy and bringing more opportunities for terrorists to attack European targets.” This warning was largely disregarded because he was, after all, the son of the man NATO was trying to overthrow.

The Libya intervention fatally linked the destinies of both Libya and Iraq when some of the massive flow of arms sent by Qatar (and others), as well as North African jihadists, were channeled from Libya, with the blessings of certain Western governments, on to the new war in Syria against the Assad government. However, the lack of airstrikes and different geo-political situation of the Middle East meant that Assad has clung to power, while the divided opposition militias were eventually surpassed by ISIS – and its foreign fighters – who have operated with a brutality unprecedented in modern warfare.

The personnel flow from North Africa to Syria has meant that the original one-way channel has become a two-way one with the arrival of ISIS in Libya, with firm communications and logistics established. Further, the all-encompassing ideology of ISIS means that the idea of foreign fighters in leadership roles has been re-imported to Libya as a guiding concept. On 3 March, Newsweek cited Libyan government sources in claiming that over 5,000 foreign fighters have come to Libya amidst ongoing public calls from ISIS for new recruits.

“ISIS have allegedly appointed two emirs, both foreign nationals, to oversee both sides of the country,” the magazine reported. “The ‘Emir of Tripoli’, a Tunisian known as Abu Talha, controls the group’s operations in the west and a Yemeni national Abu al-Baraa el-Azdi [is] based in the town of Derna, which the group controls.”

After 2011, international media focus on Libya had moved away to follow the worsening Syrian civil war. Attention only briefly returned in a very specific context- with the now infamous 11 September 2012 Benghazi attack on a US diplomatic compound. The murky nature of the event sparked a firestorm of conservative criticism in the US over Hilary Clinton’s mishandling of the situation. (The event also made the late, great French adventurer/novelist Gérard DeVilliers look prophetic, or at least very well-informed in one of his last books, The Madmen of Benghazi).

However, the claim of an alleged cover-up by the Obama administration, with the memorable phrase, ‘Hilary lied, Americans died’ became essentially a matter for internal political discourse and did not lead to any serious public re-examination of the future of Libya. Indeed, it was not until January 2014 that the State Department designated Ansar Al-Shariah, the militia believed responsible for the Benghazi attacks, as a terror organization. And only relatively recently (in June 2014) did US Special Forces successfully capture the militia’s leader, Ahmed Abu Khattala in Libya.

With the extraordinary amount of media interest, Congressional committees, and constant rhetoric from Democrats and Republicans over Benghazi, it became clear that assessments of the event were ultimately more geared towards scoring political points and securing legacies than towards the status of Libya itself- a reality worsened by preparations for the midterm elections and concomitant politicization of events. It is impossible to know how much time and energy was misused because of the scandal, but it is likely that it was enormous and that it definitely contributed to a certain ‘Libya fatigue,’ in which events in the country were seen through the lens of the Benghazi attacks, or simply ignored altogether.

This slowly started to change with the sudden and violent arrival of ISIS in summer 2014 in Syria and Iraq. As has been shown, the group’s expansion into Libya was predictable; the fact that steps were not taken to neutralize the threat in a timely manner indicates a lack of preventive measures, and a failure on the policy level.

To appreciate the longer-term factors that allowed ISIS to emerge in the current period, it is also quite revealing to read this 2012 Italian Defense Ministry report by Arturo Varvelli; it concerns Libya’s future in the context of Italian national security. The report underlined the growing importance (already by 2012) of political Islam, and concludes that the failure of Islamists to take over government by that point had less to do with a supposed desire for Western freedoms than it did with the deep divisions within the Islamist electorate. By failing to recognize this in time, the West missed an early-warning sign. And the internal divisions within the Islamist bloc have indeed helped lead to the development of a more radical element now oriented towards ISIS’ ideology and practice.

The Clear and Present Danger: The Threat to Libya’s Oil Fields and Energy Infrastructure

A major and existential concern regarding ISIS in Libya is the group’s ability to disrupt energy production and supply which, if fully realized, could lead to total state collapse within three months. It is not expected that the group can easily achieve this militarily, or it is even in their own interest, but it is necessary to at least outline how it could happen.

Recent major media reports have concentrated on ISIS-affiliated militia’s attacks on oil fields in eastern Libya. An attack on the Mabruk field in February left a dozen people dead. All in all, the Associated Press reported on 5 March that 11 oil fields have become ‘non-operational’ after recent attacks, citing the National Oil Corporation. The NOC has invoked a force majeure clause, by which the state from contractual obligations due to forces beyond its control. All oil workers were removed from the targeted sites.

As with everything else, the situation is being complicated by the existence of two rival governments: the internationally-recognized authority, exiled to the far eastern city of Tobruk, and the Islamic-backed ‘Libya Dawn’ outfit that took over Tripoli last year. Both are increasingly accusing each other for Libya’s problems and continue to attack each other- a state of affairs that has helped to create a vacuum that Islamic State fighters are happy to fill.

The National Oil Corporation immediately blamed “Islamist-backed authorities in the capital Tripoli for failing to protect the oil fields.” According to an NOC statement, “theft, looting, sabotage and destruction” have recently increased at Libya’s oil installations. The National Oil Corporation warned that a continued deterioration might force it “to close all fields and ports, which will result in a total deficit in state revenues and directly impact people’s live, including with power outage.”

Damaging or taking over such energy infrastructure by ISIS replicates tactics used successfully in Iraq and Syria. In Libya, Islamic State-affiliated militants first targeted the oilfields at Bahi and Mabruk, using their base in the central city of Sirte to attack the Dhahra oilfield as well. In attacking the Dhahra oilfield, reported Time, ISIS fighters were seen “trading fire with guards and blowing up residential and administrative buildings before eventually retreating.” Evacuations were required and it is expected that ISIS will control this field too.

However, these fields had already been shut down for several weeks, which is why Libya expert John Hamilton does not believe the recent ISIS activities here will have a sudden or crippling effect on the economy. A London-based director at consultancy Cross Border Information, which produces an African energy sector newsletter for clients, Hamilton recently shared his thoughts with Balkanalysis.com on the oil field attacks and the general situation.

“The As Sidr and Ras Lanuf terminals have been under force majeure and closed since Christmas day,” he notes. “So there is not much damage to the industry. They haven’t been operating, and no one is going to start them anytime soon. As far as impact on revenues, this has no effect.”

These terminals are set along the coastal road southeast of Sirte, ISIS’ current stronghold. Noting that the militants targeted the northwestern corridor of the Sirte basin, Hamilton points out that “it is obvious that these fields were attacked since they are the closest fields to where the ISIS, former Ansar Al-Shariah forces, are located.” If the current trend continues, he notes, the geographically contiguous fields “are next to be attacked, as these are the most strategically exposed- these are very strategically set places, as they supply Tobruk.”

Here it is important to note that the major fields attacked (Dahra, Bahi and Mabruk- and now, al-Ghani) are actually the closest to Sirte; they lie at the northwestern edge of a vast arcing basin that passes southeast, under the gulf dividing Sirte from Benghazi, and ends with a handful of fields directly linked to Tobruk to the north. (See this oil company website for a detailed map). Should it get far enough inland, ISIS could thus attempt to choke off the supply of fuel to the internationally-supported government. However, Hamilton notes that “in order to get them, they would have to cross areas controlled by groups loyal to the government in Tobruk.”

Implications of Energy-Sector Attacks on ISIS’ Geographical Focus

While Sirte is on Libya’s central coast, the Dahra fields are considerably further south (170km inland). And the previously-attacked Bahi oil field is over 250km from Sirte. Again, it should be remembered that these are the closest of more than 20 oil fields that sprawl southeast towards the Egyptian border, in a very large country.

The major issue for assessing ISIS short-term tactical goals is to identify whether the group will continue to concentrate on energy disruption, or on other goals and locations. This will have an effect on its geographical presence, and potential to come into conflict with rival militias, should it try to spread out along the coast or down towards the desert. In comments for Balkanalysis.com, Ludovico Carlino, MENA Analyst at IHS Country Risk, states that ISIS most probably “will try to press southward and increase cross-border attacks, to draw in regional powers.”

On the other hand, were ISIS to try and fight its way along the coast, it would meet with “constraints… as two actors are already fighting for control of this asset. The biggest risk would be to unify enemies against you,” notes Carlino, who also considers that ISIS may want to explore possible “Sub-Saharan linkages” with established hiadist groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali, and ultimately even Boko Haram in Nigeria. Even previous to the latter’s recent purported pledge of allegiance to ISIS, more sophisticated media usage was linked to a deepening connection between ISIS and Boko Haram by experts such as Rukmini Callimachi, an expert on the latter group and West African correspondent for the New York Times.

In any case, the Italian analyst believes that “since the situation in Libya is really unstable, this will weaken effects to stop ISIS, and in six months they may well be stronger. But they will face a challenge to expand, since they don’t have all the actors on their side, and if they try the same approach as in Syria, it won’t work.”

If the territorial strategy of ISIS is indeed designed to damage the energy infrastructure, this means that other major cities will be relatively safe for now from direct military attacks, though they remain susceptible to coordinated terrorist attacks. In the east, ISIS’ notable possession currently is parts of Derna, the latter of which Egypt bombed in retaliation for the murder of Coptic Christians. It is likely that Egypt will bomb this port city again, and that Western naval authorities will continue monitoring maritime traffic there heavily. This is a key port for illicit vessels trying to access Greek waters.

Despite the relatively small territorial area under its control, ISIS has succeeded in carrying out suicide bombings elsewhere in the country, such as January’s deadly attack on a Tripoli luxury hotel popular with foreigners. And the eastern town of Qubba was the scene of another suicide bombing that killed 40 people in late February. This indicates again that destabilization of the state – and, indeed both rival governments – through energy control and scattered terrorist attacks may indeed be ISIS’ strategic goal in Libya, as a means to other ends.

Scenario for State Failure: Energy and Liquidity Crises

According to recent comments from Libya’s oil minister, Mashallah al-Zewi, national oil production is now less than 500,000 barrels a day (a quarter of ‘normal’ production). The Libyan economy has gradually adapted to shortfalls, though for how long remains a big question. John Hamilton, who traveled to Libya frequently between 2007 and 2013, underscores the significance of the National Oil Corporation’s recent warning. If ISIS attacks continue, the government “might be forced to shut down oil production, having a negative effect on electricity and fuel. Then Libya is completely screwed.” Without fuel to create electricity, civil infrastructure would cease operating- causing a humanitarian crisis that would dramatically increase the flow of refugees to neighboring states and by sea to Europe, and likely lead to a chaotic situation favorable to armed terrorists like ISIS.

In this context, Hamilton adds that an ENI representative recently told him that gas operations are continuing normally from the Italian company’s holdings, near the western border with Algeria. Regarding the two self-declared governments and their militias, he notes that “neither side has yet targeted gas production. That is the difference between ISIS and everybody else. Everybody else is fighting for Libya, so they’re not going to do anything as stupid [as cutting off gas supply]. ISIS is fighting for a beachhead to attack the West, to attack Egypt and to connect with Boko Haram.”

Nevertheless, he says, “I don’t believe that ISIS is strong enough to defeat the forces arrayed against them.” However, he adds that by putting itself in the middle of the standoff between Tripoli and Tobruk, ISIS “could split Misraha off from the people in Tripoli by continuing to attack oil fields.”

In addition to the danger of an energy cut-off, Hamilton makes an interesting point about a less discussed subject: a possible public-sector liquidity crisis. “The great unknown question is whether the social fabric is will hold out” in that case. “It is very difficult to get a clear picture [of the government’s holdings]. Some say Libya will not exhaust reserves for at least 18 months, others say sooner. The truth is that Libya has a large amount of currency, but a high proportion of it is not liquid. They need to be sold to convert- importing fuel, wheat and medicine is getting increasingly complicated. It requires paperwork. You can’t pay an oil dealer with US Treasury bills, after all. So every month as they spend more of their reserves, the available currency for importing wheat, diesel and medicine is diminishing. They’re having to cut already- there have been massive power shortages because they haven’t got fuel to generate enough electricity.”

The British energy consultant is careful to distinguish state reserves from the holdings of the private sector. “There is a massive amount of cash in Libya in the private sector redistributed through militias. Increasingly people will use those resources to survive. That is not going to solve the problem, though- militias will not import diesel tankers, after all.”

In such an eventuality, it is likely that civilians will become even more dependent on the militias to provide basic services than they already are. This is the kind of situation which ISIS has successfully exploited in Iraq and Syria.

“If I was advising Western governments I wouldn’t tell them to give up negotiations [between the rival factions], but I would also be telling them to prepare for a humanitarian crisis, to prepare to send food, blankets and emergency equipment.”

According to Libyan businessman Tarek Alwan, owner of London-based independent consultancy SOC Libya Ltd, the private sector is also looking to safeguard its options. “The great majority of potential investors have already pulled out of country,” he said for Balkanalysis.com. “I have not seen any Western investors entering the market, though there are some businesses from risk-taking countries that are perhaps thinking of entering. Some Libyan businessmen have already taken the necessary steps to face such a terrible situation, by either moving some of their assets or cash abroad.”

While the European Union and member states, particularly Greece, Malta and Italy, have been taking some measures, in the event of a large-scale humanitarian crisis it is unlikely that they would have the capability to organize and execute such a mission alone- particularly if aid workers were to come under fire from jihadists on the ground. The result would be a mass exodus of impoverished people in all directions, and a chaotic internal situation.

Oil, Antiquities and other Assets: Further Opportunities for Terrorist Expansion

Whether or not Libya faces an imminent collapse due to the general infighting and violent arrival of ISIS, it is obvious that the terror group will attempt to profit from its presence in the country in both financial and ideological ways. This is where its activities intersect with transnational organized crime.

First of all, regarding oil, it would be much more difficult for ISIS to monetize energy supplies in Libya than it has in Iraq and Syria. The same conditions do not exist in Libya as did in ISIS’ original theater, where oil smuggling across the Turkish border became for a while a source of generous revenue. For example, Jason Pack, a Cambridge researcher on Libya, recently told Time that “there’s no way to smuggle oil in Libya… the difference from a place like Iraq is Iraq has a long tradition of oil from the Kurdish region going in trucks to Turkey. Libya has no such tradition.”

However, the differences might also be more than just ‘tradition.’ In the case of Libya – which has different neighbors, and large areas of desert – the existent transport infrastructure and border security are also unique factors dictating where (and whether) contraband oil can be moved. Whereas Turkey was complicit for a number of years in jihadist penetration of Syria, and as a consequence did not suffer major reprisals from ISIS or Al Nusra, Algeria and Egypt – both of which have large and capable armies – are on continual high alert regarding Libya.

Any surreptitious fuel exports via Libya’s Mediterranean ports would be difficult as well; when some rebels tried to smuggle crude oil in March 2014, US Navy Seals quickly stopped the tanker south of Cyprus. According to the BBC, the deregistered, North Korea-flagged tanker had departed from the port of al-Sidra, near Sirte, the area ISIS now controls.

Another source of ISIS wealth in the Middle East has been antiquities smuggling. The terrorist group has used this for both financial and ideological gain. For example, while 2014 was full of stories about the group selling the most valuable movable historic items, they have shown the tendency to save non-movable ones for the propaganda value that comes when they film themselves destroying traces of ‘idolatrous’ non-Muslim civilization. This is an example of a current phenomenon which we could call ‘Selfie Jihad.’

Such attacks on sites have typically occurred when the group is on the verge of a military defeat, or is seeking to recover from one. The recent destruction of large items in the Mosul Museum, and the bulldozing of the ancient cities of Nemrut and Hatra were the most recent examples of this tactic. However, Western commentators (as with this CNN op-ed) have somewhat misunderstood ISIS’ driving purpose with such acts. While it may be true to call such destructive events as blows against common world culture, it is incorrect to remove these acts from the specifically Islamist nature of the ISIS quest. In their propaganda videos, these terrorists continually say that Allah is ordering them to erase non-Islamic sites, and this is considered a part of the ultimate narrative leading to the end of the world, and final victory of Islam, as explained the above article from The Atlantic.

Because of ISIS’ demonstrated activities in Syria and Iraq in accordance with this teleological perspective, it is expected that they will employ this tactic in any theater of operations- and will encourage supporters to destroy non-Muslim heritage markers anywhere in the world. In Libya, this means that several important ancient sites and museums are at risk, if the group strengthens its position in the country. However, if the current model is anything to by, any large-scale destruction will not occur (or, will not be broadcast to the world) unless the group needs a propaganda boost after a military defeat or needs to energize new recruits. For ISIS’ first priority will be establishing itself and fighting off rivals.

As Newsweek recently reported, the major possible targets in Libya are the ancient Theater at Sabratha in the far northwest, Leptis Magna between Tripoli and Misrata, and Cyrene on the east coast near Derna. Experts are so concerned, the magazine reveals, that Paul Bennett, chief of the UK-based Society for Libyan Studies, “wrote to Unesco’s director-general Irina Bokova, stating his ‘extreme concerns for the antiquities of Libya’ because of the very real threat of similar attacks by the terror group in the country.” Bokova’s only response has been to say that ‘we don’t have an army’- something that Libyan and foreign experts say is not a good excuse.

Libyan analyst Mohamed Eljarh confirmed this concern. “Given that a huge part of ISIS’s expansion strategy is their media exposure and propaganda, I fear that significant ancient sites such as the Roman ruins in Sabratha and Leptis Magna are the two sites with the highest risk of being targeted by ISIS militants,” said Eljarh for the magazine. “The group now has a presence in Sirte and Tripoli. This puts them in very close proximity to these two important sites of Libyan heritage.”

The brisk trade ISIS has done in Middle Eastern movable antiquities relies on well-established organized crime networks, because (as we have reported in the Balkan context in 2005) the major market for priceless ancient artefacts is in the West, at private auctions held discreetly for millionaires in law-abiding countries like Germany, Austria and Switzerland. The insidiousness of the symbiotic relationship between organized crime, terrorism and the ‘legitimate’ Western art buyer is seen in such cases.

Beyond Libya, ISIS has its sights set on Rome, and particularly the Vatican. Even well before the arrival of ISIS, the Holy See had been voicing concern over the threat to Christian art. In November 2012, powerful Gendarmerie chief Domenico Giani made a speech before Interpol’s General Assembly on this theme. Giani specifically pointed to the threat “in countries where revolts are under way or there are internal struggles fed by a hatred so strong that people try to destroy anything that represents ‘the enemy.’” Most recently, the Vatican’s security chief gave a rare interview in which he confirmed that the security services remain on ‘high alert’ regarding ISIS’ threats against the Vatican, made in the Libyan propaganda video depicting the murder of the Coptic Christians.

Egypt, in fact, is a target of similar value to ISIS in the long term. Aside from ransacking the country’s great museums and churches, there could be no more epic propaganda video for fundamentalist Islam than the destruction of the pyramids. In recent propaganda videos, ISIS has made allusions to President al-Sissi and the ancient “pharaoh.” The implication seems to be that the legacy of ancient Egypt and a modern secular democracy are indistinguishably evil, in that both are non-Islamic. While an attack on the pyramids is very unlikely to ever happen, ISIS’ past behavior and present rhetoric indicate clearly that a whole wider range of very vulnerable sites in the world may come under threat from ISIS or from individuals radicalized by it over the Internet.

Egypt has shown awareness of the problem of protecting the country’s ancient Christian heritage. Balkanalysis.com has received new intelligence regarding a recent foreign visit to St Catherine’s Monastery in south Sinai, a priceless ancient structure that provides considerable revenue for the local inhabitants. Since the overthrow of Mubarak, Greek and Cypriot diplomats have felt a particular responsibility towards the monastery’s welfare, and now the Egyptian government has provided the first full-time contingent of soldiers to guard it. The recent visit, which included foreign diplomats resident in Egypt, was made from the beach resort of Sharm-el-Sheikh, and was designed to convince the foreigners that the area is not dangerous to visit. The Egyptian government was thus trying to distinguish the present safety of south Sinai from the north of the peninsula, where it is fighting jihadists.

There are other issues as well. Libya is also awash in illegal arms. The substantial flow of contraband weapons is often facilitated by bogus maritime companies using old vessels, plying the routes between Ukraine, the Western Balkans, Syria, Lebanon and Turkey. The illicit weapons trade across the Sahara with groups like AQIM and Boko Haram also continues. Further, it is very well known that international private intelligence companies continue researching where all of Gaddafi’s money ended up, since billions of dollars remain unaccounted for. There are numerous scenarios in which private initiatives like these could employ misdirection deliberately, or else interfere by accident, in ways that are detrimental to the overall security situation of the country, though they would probably never be identified.

Human Trafficking and Political Debate over Libya in Italy

Beyond possible fuel, guns and antiquities smuggling, it is human trafficking from North Africa to Italy and Greece that Western security forces see as the single most important security issue on Europe’s southern flank. The potential for ISIS to infiltrate terrorists in with the undocumented migrant hordes on leaky barges is possible, and the idea received great media attention when London-based Quilliam Foundation predicted it in a report last month. Aside from the fleeing local civilians, and the report’s expectations that ISIS fighters from Syria and Iraq will also set sail from Libya, our present intelligence suggests that a large flow of Sudanese illegal immigrants are passing through Libya en route to Italy; however, many of these Sudanese, are actually Somalis, and it is almost certain that Al Shabaab members are also among them.

On a daily basis, numerous small and even larger craft are available and setting sail from Libya towards Greece and Italy, where organized crime operations control parts of important ports. Does this mean a symbiosis between terrorists and European crime bosses?

“To my knowledge, if you want to have some kind of human trafficking business you need some connections with mafia and criminal gangs,” notes the IHS analyst, Ludovico Carlino. “This means people in the south of Italy pay a fee to the mafia. In this case the mafia is engaged in more profitable ventures.”

The massive effect of illegal immigration on Italian society and politics is fueling calls for a military intervention. “The parties on the right are really pushing for a different solution, but the flow of migrants is not going to stop anytime soon,” Carlino adds. “Renzi said we cannot go completely from caring to doing, and that an intervention will only cause more problems, as you have to decide who to support in a complex situation with multiple actors. And, while most of the tribes are in central and south Libya, the biggest tribes are not involved directly in the current conflict.”

Other Italian analysts agree with the non-intervention view. A 20 February article by Giorgio Cuscito in the analytical magazine Limes discussed the risks related to a possible armed intervention there. Without a plan to restore political stability in the African country, the author argues, a military attack to counter militias affiliated to ISIS would be “counterproductive.” The perception, shared by many Italian politicians, is that another large-scale international military mission could “fuel the jihadist threat without resolving the current crisis,” and lead to a further risk of terrorism.

Most recently, the Italian daily Corriere della Sera published in interview with UN Libya envoy Bernardino Leon, in which he called for an EU-led coastal blockade of Libyan ports. “There’s a measure that the European Union can take right away: Come out in force to guard the seas off Libya. Italy can’t do it alone. It needs help,” Leon was reported as saying. However, the EU is risk-averse by nature, and as will be discussed below, has not succeeded in its own (soon-expiring) mandate of training Libya’s coast guard.

One clear example would be when ABC quoted EU foreign policy chief Mogherini’s latest comments on ongoing efforts with the UN to resolve Libya’s problems. Predictably for an EU official, she said that “this could mean also some naval presence, but we are in a far too early stage now to get into the details. We are discussing that internally, with the U.N., and we hope to be able to discuss that with the Libyan authorities soon in the future.” Virtually all Italians and Greeks would argue that it is, in fact, far too late to be still deciding what to do about the situation.

Piracy, Refugee Boats and Trans-Med Terrorism Threats

In our view, the most interesting and still undetermined aspect of Libya is not what could happen within it, but rather what could happen off of it.

North Africa’s Mediterranean coast has a historic affiliation with maritime piracy. The so-called ‘Barbary pirates’ of North Africa operated during the Ottoman period and, because of this political reality, contemporaneous Western accounts tended to describe all such swashbucklers as ‘Turks,’ though the pirate gangs included primarily North African Muslims (and sometimes non-Muslims) in their crews. Incredibly enough, these pirates raided as far north as Iceland, as one report from 1627 indicated. Christian captives were resold in the slave markets of North Africa, and the Italian coast and Greek islands were particularly hard-hit on a regular basis. Well over one million Europeans were enslaved by these Muslim pirates over the course of three centuries.

Indeed, it is no accident that the iconic villages in Greek islands tend to be situated high above the sea, sometimes in semi-fortified positions, owing to the chronic fear of piracy. Very specific cases remain attesting to this past, as in the tiny village of Sykia (near the southern tip of Halkidiki’s Sithonian Peninsula, in the north of Greece), where local residents have a genetic prevalence for a kind of anemia more common to North African Arabs. (Neighboring villagers refer to Sykies as ‘Little Texas;’ perhaps the good-old pirate spirit carries over generations too).

So, are the halcyon days of maritime piracy returning with Libya’s descent into chaos? Before addressing this, it must first be acknowledged just how busy the Mediterranean Sea is. Websites like VesselFinder.com and MarineTraffic.com use AIS data and Google Maps to show the exact location, identity and destination of all (trackable) ships worldwide, in real time. Viewing such websites indicates the density and preferred routes of cargo ships, tankers ferries and other craft. Even a cursory view shows how congested the Mediterranean actually is. On any given day, there are plenty of targets for a determined terrorist or pirate craft to hit. However, unlike places like Somalia, the Mediterranean is well-policed by Greek and Italian navies and coast guards, and there are major NATO bases near Naples and on the island of Crete.

A Greek executive at a top merchant maritime company in Athens tells Balkanalysis.com that “our biggest fear is attacks against ships such as oil tankers while they are docked in ports in Libya. For example, an attack with explosives, or abduction of the crew. In such cases despite vigilance, there is little that can be done, unless all ships have on board armed guards.”

However, terrorists would be less effective at large-scale piracy or attacks while on the high seas. “On a tactical level, should a crisis with ISIS emerge, the coast guards and navies of Greece and Italy, plus France and Spain are more than capable of dealing with them,” states an Italian FRONTEX officer for Balkanalysis.com.

The officer, who has more than 20 years of experience in homeland maritime security, adds that the terrorists “don’t have a navy, and cannot have one. Moreover, NATO patrols in the Mediterranean, which include the US 6th Fleet, is an added factor in the game. They will annihilate ISIS should they attempt piracy.”

The Greek marine executive agrees. “On a wider scale attacks by ISIS in order to disrupt sea lanes in the midst of the Mediterranean would be far more difficult on an operational level. Due to the ongoing illegal immigration flow, there are quite a few air and sea patrols by both FRONTEX and the Italian Navy. Also the Greek naval forces could be re-deployed on 8-12 hours’ notice from the Aegean to the region south of Crete. And air support can be achieved even quicker. Therefore ISIS would stand no chance against organized and heavily armed naval forces.”

Considering the formidable might of the European navies, and the previously stated likelihood that ISIS will concentrate on expanding inland along the oil route, maritime piracy or terrorism can occur in only two ways: via infiltration of immigrant ships; or via commandeering of small craft for incognito attacks against ports in Libya and possibly neighboring states.

This leads to different challenges. First, it may affect the conduct of the daily rescue missions carried out by the Greek and Italian maritime forces. A 16 February Huffington Post interview with Italian Guard Coast Admiral Felicio Angrisano revealed that present immigrant-smugglers are becoming increasingly dangerous. And “new rules of engagement” may be implemented in Italian maritime rescue operations. While the first priority remains “to rescue migrants in distress,” the Italian admiral said, the fact that a Coast Guard unit recently was threatened by smugglers with Kalashnikovs, on a refugee boat 50 miles from the Libyan coast, means that protective measures may have to be taken. This escalation could mean further delays in implementing a coordinated policy, because of long-standing divergent views over rules of engagement and use of force between EU, UN and individual state authorities.

And these will not be the only actors. There is a high likelihood that, as the situation worsens, Libya’s neighbors will take the initiative if the West fails to do so. “On a strategic level, a destabilization process in the Mediterranean that will lead to further inflows of illegal immigrants will surely have societal effects for neighboring countries, plus any terrorist attempts,” adds the FRONTEX official. “But the EU and NATO have the necessary resources to deal with that in the long-term. Let’s not forget that countries like Algeria, Egypt and Israel most probably will also act against ISIS if it attempts to destabilize the maritime region. Therefore, the impact of ISIS’ potential actions will be minimized.”

All of these considerations affect the possible operational tactics and capabilities of ISIS on the Mediterranean. Given the constant surveillance and naval presence of NATO, Italy and Greece, it is most likely that terrorists could succeed by commandeering small craft that either do not show up on the radar or that seem ‘legitimate.’ This would be similar to the Mumbai attacks, in which Pakistani terrorists were able to infiltrate the city undetected after commandeering a normal-looking Indian fishing boat. The 2000 attack on the USS Cole, carried out by a suicide bomber piloting a small craft, comes to mind as another example. It might be remembered that following that attack, terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden called on Muslims to carry out similar ones.

This tactic would be easiest to execute if targeting Libyan or neighboring North African ports. It would also be technically possible, if much more difficult, to target Gavdos (a Greek island south of Crete, and the southernmost point in Europe) or Lampedusa, though neither are strategic military targets. High-value military targets like NATO’s bases near Naples and Souda Bay near Chania on Crete are probably too distant for a successful attack.

However, it must be remembered that migrant boats, at least, constantly target the region. In summer 2011, while the NATO bombing of Libya was raging, local authorities in Palaeohora in southern Crete noted that a small migrant vessel had crashed on the rocks east of the town. That is a considerable distance for the typical old wrecks used by immigrant-smugglers. It is not inconceivable that a well-funded terrorist entity like ISIS could acquire speedier small craft. The question just remains whether they perceive any European target in striking distance.

Philip Ingram is a former military intelligence officer who served for 27 years in the British military, and now works as a journalist and managing director of Security Media Publishing. He recently spoke with Balkanalysis.com on a wide range of security issues related to Libya. According to Ingram, “the scenario is possible but there are no reports that have been brought to my attention suggesting it is currently being planned.  However, the same people smuggling groups that moved the likes of the IS Mufti from Turkey to Libya are the ones filling old freighters with refugees and sending them to the Italian coastline with no crew on board. There has been unconfirmed chatter about the potential for people infected with ebola to be sent [to Europe in] this way.  So the militants are thinking about it but they have other priorities at the moment.”

A high-profile recent piece in the Wall Street Journal called ‘When ISIS Starts Hitting Ships’ also pointed out the danger of terrorist beachheads in Libya’s port towns. “ISIS’s prospects for significant naval power are remote,” read the article, which comes to a similar conclusion as the experts quoted presently. “But small boats, fishing vessels, smugglers, and merchant craft that carry concealed weapons could hijack, sink, or rake commercial shipping including cruise liners in the central Mediterranean. This would divide the eastern part of the inland sea from its west and expose Europe’s southern littoral to attacks and kidnappings.”

There is worse, however. According to Philip Ingram, ISIS terrorists may have the capability already to use a radioactive ‘dirty bomb’ to incapacitate a port. Among Ingram’s research partners is Global Risk Awareness, a cyber-intelligence company that uses sophisticated software to index and track terrorists’ Dark Web activity, and can thus follow organizations in closed social media circles- often getting information directly from the jihadists and their supporters themselves. (The company will soon launch a new database and mobile app for intelligence clients).

“There has been a specific threat in the past month from Islamic State to use medical-grade radio isotopes as part of a dirty bomb,” says the former military intelligence officer. “Around the time of the threat, they mentioned a number of European cities and US cities. Radioactive substances used in hospitals, universities or industrial complexes are almost certainly in the hands of IS.”

Further, he adds, “a relatively small amount could be used to ‘contaminate’ a conventional explosive device, spreading radioactive contamination over a wide area. In a city or port this would be extremely difficult to clean up. It is certain IS and their associates have the capability and have very recently expressed an intent to use this type of device.”

In this light, it becomes clear that ISIS does not require any particularly large or mobile craft- it does not need a navy to cause havoc as such isotopes, viruses, guns and other materiel are carried by individuals, making any refugee boat or small craft capable of presenting a massive security threat. The question thus becomes not capability, but intent. It remains to be seen how ISIS chooses to define its ‘Mediterranean strategy.’

Whether or not the terrorist group does anything serious, the simple threat of it is already spooking global business. After the publication of the Wall Street Journal article on ISIS targeting shipping, maritime insurers in the US took note. One internal communiqué from a top maritime insurance firm, obtained by the authors, notes that the prospect of piracy or terrorism off Libya “bears watching since if it happens it will happen without notice and since there are no War Watch Rates- our response might be individually by carrier rather than Industry Standard.”

Another US-based maritime insurance executive adds that, in the case of piracy, “the call as to whether any action would be considered a war action or that of a terrorist depends a lot on where the event occurs and who are the principal insurers. The reason that it could be important to insurers is that not always do the same companies write War Risk vs. ‘every day’ loss.”

In the case of Libya, the insurers would be in London- and most likely, insurance giant Lloyd’s (a request for clarification to this company was not immediately returned). The British energy consultant, John Hamilton, confirms that “the insurance companies will be first to wake up to this [possibility of piracy].” In other words, we should watch any moves made by maritime insurance companies to get a better estimate of the accuracy of a threat since, after all, estimating maritime risk is their bottom line.

“A lot of this insurance is regulated by Lloyd’s- they have a Joint War Committee that decides if places are going to be classified as war zones. Right now, Libyan ports do come under that category, and any vessel to those ports is obliged to inform its insurers and to negotiate special premiums not covered,” he adds.

The worst-case scenario for not only Libya, but for all international commerce and transport, is if ISIS is able to act in a way that scares the market into hiking prices at a significantly further distance north of the African continent. “The key question is whether the insurance market is going to extend the zone out into the Mediterranean, and how far,” says Hamilton. “Cruise ships might be able to skirt the area. But Libya is having to pay more to get vessels, and if this [high-priced insurance coverage zone] extends into the Mediterranean, you’re talking about a total state breakdown, even further than it is right now- areas of the Mediterranean could become treated like Somalia.”

Western Diplomatic and Training Programs in Retreat, as Negotiations Continue

The West is pinning hopes on the outcome of UN-sponsored negotiations launched in Morocco from 5-7 March. The negotiations, which marked the first time the two factions sat down together, seek to reach any kind of deal between the rival governments in Tripoli and Tobruk. The latter’s recent appointment of Khalifa Haftar as military chief, however, has somewhat alienated Tripoli as he has targeted Islamist militias in previous battles. Nevertheless, Deutsche Welle has now reported that international officials signaled the two sides may be able to achieve a unity government, specifically because of the new urgency presented by ISIS.

Until the two sides can come together, however, international activity will continue to be restricted. Concerns over foreign diplomatic safety in Libya were visible even before the infamous 2012 Benghazi attack and have only grown worse since. Italy was the last Western state to leave, early this year, while the US has been operating from Malta. A senior British official with broad regional authority told Balkanalysis.com that the UK has “an embassy-in-exile” in Tunis, but that other than observing the situation, the remit at present is limited to “consular management issues,” which are chiefly “legacy issues involving Brits that have remained in Libya.”

According to the official, it is hard to know for sure how many British citizens are still in Libya as they are no longer required to register. But he estimates that there are “around 50 Brits still Libya, mainly dual nationals. There may be a few diehards working as private security contractors but they are low. Oil workers are still there but likely to be protected behind hired security and local militias.”

Most significantly, from the institutional perspective, is that the European Union’s mission for training Libyan border guards (EUBAM) is now on death’s door as well. An officer involved in that mission, which has also migrated to Tunisia due to safety concerns, recently told Balkanalysis.com that the EU’s Libya mission “is on shut-down mode, and most of us have finished with the mission until it restarts- which is unlikely.”

When it set up shop in Tripoli in May 2013, EUBAM was given a two-year mandate to advise the post-war state on land, air and sea border security. According to the official European External Action Service information (.PDF), the mission moved to Tunisia in August 2014, “due to the political and security situation in Libya.” Thus while the mission had worked with ‘hundreds’ of relevant Libyan officials until then, whatever gains it may have achieved are no longer relevant. It is not clear why the mission was mandated specifically for two years in the first place, and whether its non-continuation now is an admission that no further improvements can be expected (EEAS Communications did not reply to a clarification request in time for this publication).

However, an EU official based in Brussels and specialized in domestic security and counterterrorism tells Balkanalysis.com that the bloc is taking increased measures against the possibility of both terrorism infiltration of migrant boats, and reining in foreign fighters. “We have been working on this issue since June 2013, and the European Council… has put in place different measures.” (These measures are outlined in the official factsheet on foreign fighters).

Regarding the possibility of terrorists infiltrating Libyan migrant ships, the EU official adds that “I have not seen any evidence about this, and to my knowledge this is not discussed here for the moment. We already have in place all the security checks for third-country nationals, and when refugees arrive, the member states have to identify them. Frontex and Europol are helping on this. In addition, national law enforcement agencies have also access to the fingerprints according to the new Eurodac regulation.”

Regarding the possible threat of general ISIS attacks in the Mediterranean, the counter-terrorism official adds that “it is difficult for us to assess it. This is more a question for the member states, as they have intelligence information on this. We are not operational so we cannot assess the threat…. we are now more focused on the EU citizens fighting in Syria and returning to the EU, as they are a bit more complicated to detect when they come back- and that’s why we are now trying to improve the checks at the external borders of the Schengen area.”

Looking Ahead: International Operations and Libyan Security

However, from the policy perspective, it is likely that the disagreements over competencies and degree of intervention will continue to divide not only the member states from the European bloc, but also the political parties within the member states themselves. Previous to the February elections in Greece, which brought into power a coalition led by left-wing Syriza, a party advisor told Balkanalysis.com that the new Greek government would push for a revision to the Dublin Accords that stipulate member state responsibilities for immigrants, and call for it “within six months of taking office.” This has not happened yet, but it is clear that the southern European states most affected by mass migration have a very different orientation towards the problem than do the other, more distant European states.

At the same time, whatever political or military solutions are agreed to the Libya problem, the security services of the front-line countries – and especially Greece, Italy and Spain – will prove instrumental to meeting the threat posed by ISIS in the Mediterranean theater. Their local knowledge of the maritime environment, and their previous experience with migrant patterns and behavior, may make or break Europe’s capacity to neutralize the threat. However, as said, the situation in Libya is likely to get worse before it gets better, and will require increasing monitoring and attention for the foreseeable future.

The 2014 Greek Protests over Syrian Chemical Weapons Destruction and their Political Impact, with Complete Timeline of Events

By Chris Deliso

The internationally-negotiated decision that saw the Syrian government’s chemical weapons stock neutralized by hydrolysis in the Mediterranean Sea in August 2014 caused widespread public anger in Greece and Italy, from the moment it was announced several months earlier. However, under strong pressure from the Samaras government, major domestic media were discouraged from reporting about it. The issue was also relatively underreported in the international mass media, as well, particularly in the crucial early months before the event became a fait accompli.

Given the media’s relative indifference, the issue was kept alive, and did receive considerable public attention, primarily through the work of grassroots activists. The Greek popular outcry took the form of public protests and criticisms from everyone including common citizens, fisherman, marine biologists, politicians and other public figures. The protests peaked in July and August, when the actual operation was carried out on the US Navy vessel MV Cape Ray, in an area southwest of the island of Crete, in international waters between Greece and Italy.

At the time, the controversial nature of the mission was exacerbated by the US military’s acknowledgement that since such a process had never been attempted, an ideal result could not be guaranteed- though everything would ‘probably’ end safely. Greeks and Italians, particularly those who live near the southern coasts, considered this plan irresponsible at best and demanded their governments cancel a project they believed to be dangerous to the environment and to their livelihoods.

A Political Issue during the Political Off-Season

During the politically-slow summer months, the chemical weapons issue was one of the few major points of criticism (other than the ruling coalition’s tax and economic policies) targeting the Samaras government. However, after the US Navy and Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons announced on 13 August that the mission had gone according to plan, with no apparent environmental damage, the issue was quickly forgotten and disappeared from the media altogether.

Nevertheless, despite the disappearance of the issue from daily politics after the summer recess, the following previously-unpublished list of all Greek protests and similar actions against the chemical weapons destruction policy indicates that the organized resistance did have a sustained and significant role in increasing latent mistrust of the unpopular Samaras government, which is now facing forced elections on 25 January.

Therefore, while Greek activists were in the end unable to change their government’s sponsorship of the hydrolysis plan, the nationwide publicity that their public protests and social media campaigns generated indeed helped bring together a wider range of citizens to the side of the opposition SYRIZA, which jumped ahead in the polls after European Parliamentary elections of early summer.

Thus, in the cumulative analysis, the opposition-led protests and public actions seem to have helped in sustaining support for SYRIZA, and even winning it new voters, during the typically slow summer months, when opinion polls were put on hold. One result of this was that Samaras and his team received a rude shock when, returning from vacation in early September, they were confronted with new data that put SYRIZA even further ahead of the Nea Dimokratia-PASOK coalition.

The Chemical Weapons Issue and Larger Perception Shifts

The prime minister, fearing further protests over his unpopular economic and financial agreements with international creditors, was forced to move Troika talks to Paris; immediately after this came the spectacle of police in riot gear shutting down large parts of Thessaloniki, ostensibly to safeguard Nea Dimokratia luminaries who came to speak indoors to their own staged audience, at the annual HELEXPO opening in September, despite a lack of any significant protesters on the streets outside. Such activities indicated the kind of paranoia gripping the government.

Samaras’ decision to offer up Greece as the willing recipient of toxic chemicals became a self-serving stratagem: he used it to project an image of Greece (and his government in particular) as being a ‘key NATO ally.’ However, this decision was also made at a time of general pressure on the country due to the slow pace of mandated economic reforms and privatizations. Therefore, the same economic predicament that Greece found itself in at the time eliminated any leverage the government might have had to prevent the operation from occurring. As such, the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons off of Greek shores indicated the government’s relative weakness, not strength.

Institutional Arrogance and the Further Politicization of the Issue

Interestingly enough, however, even though the reportedly successful naval hydrolysis operation had been forgotten by media by November 2014, Foreign Minister Venizelos went out of his way to bring it up again in an op-ed for the pro-government Kathimerini (republished on the Foreign Affairs Ministry website here).

In the 2 November piece, the widely despised politican pontificates on ‘national consensus on foreign policy’ and the meaning of ‘true patriotism,’ tacitly denigrating SYRIZA (and the many ordinary citizens who shared their environmental concerns in the hydrolysis matter). After citing examples of what he considers cases of positive national consensus in action, Venizelos specifies the chemical weapons concerns as a contrasting one:

“…the reckless public debate carried out a few months ago regarding the supposed environmental hazards in the Mediterranean from the operation for the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal, under the control of the UN itself and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons – an operation that was accomplished in complete safety – is a reverse example.”

The total condescension evident in this statement indicates again why so many Greeks have had enough of their current leaders and their mindset of unquestioned superiority over their citizens. It should be remembered that while many people who protested or expressed concerns about the chemical weapons plan were not members of SYRIZA, the party is set to win many more votes than otherwise might be the case, and especially in Crete and the Peloponnese, specifically because of the government’s inability, or disinterest, to understand that this was an issue that motivated even apolitical Greeks to act.

An ‘Atmosphere of Distrust’

The most widespread public concerns over the Samaras government’s plan were felt in the area closest to the destruction: Crete. This large and independent-minded island has historically always demonstrated a mistrust of authority, whether it was the Venetians, Ottomans or today’s government in Athens. The chemical weapons affair only drove the island more towards the opposition. But environmental concerns were felt elsewhere in Greece as well, and helped form international alliances with communities sharing their concerns, particularly in southern Italy. Indeed, the Italian (along with the Spanish) left has become one of SYRIZA’s key allies, and in 2014 the chemical weapons issue was one of those that had an effect on increasing their mutual cooperation.

Primarily, as sources indicate, a large part of the damage the Greek government sustained was unnecessarily self-inflicted. The problem was the perceived absence of participatory democracy- something further enhanced by Venizelos’ definition of public debate as ‘reckless.’

Indeed, one senior SYRIZA foreign policy advisor told Balkanalysis.com recently that “the local community was not consulted or informed about the chemical weapons decision- they were entirely marginalized in the process. This includes not only the local political leaders, but also regular citizens, fishermen whose livelihoods depend on the sea, people in the tourism business, environmentalists and others. This lack of consultation created an atmosphere of distrust of the Samaras government.”

The SYRIZA advisor further characterized the hydrolysis imbroglio as a ‘tactical defeat’ but one with positive effects for party activity, especially in Crete. “While the public’s opposition did not lead to a change in the government’s policy,” noted the advisor, “it did increase the existing widespread public distrust of the Samaras government, and the desire for a different kind of leadership.”

SYRIZA has put an emphasis on local activism and maintains an image of listening to local population’s needs, something that the aloof incumbent government is often criticized for not doing. The fact that the chemical weapons issue had such a strong local focus made it one that was ideal for political strategists to use, to emphasize the differences in approach between the ruling and opposition parties.

Activists Achieve a Measure of Success, Despite a Lack of Media Exposure

As the following previously unpublished list of public activities surrounding the chemical weapons issue reveals, there was a steady and sustained stream of events that had an effect on changing opinions, from Crete to Brussels to Italy. However, the result could have been much greater, activists believe, had the mainstream media covered the issue more seriously. The suspicion that the government through the first half of 2014 influenced media to downplay the dangers of the operation, or not to report on it altogether, was widespread. One dispatch from Cretan activists in July, made available to Balkanalysis.com, indicated what they felt this meant for the national awareness of the issue:

“People in Crete thought that the Greek mass media would be sensitive to such a serious issue and give publicity to it, but the mass media did not. In many places in Greece, people do not know about the hydrolysis in the Mediterranean Sea, even though it affects them too. The news reported on TV does not cover the gatherings in Crete. As a result, people in other places in Greece have no idea about the issue.”

Activists at the time stated that the Greek government had quietly but forcefully urged the media to not report on the issue. By July 2014, the situation had become farcical: locals pointed out that even at a moment when an unprecedented international military operation was about to take place near their island, the most widely-reported news story from Crete concerned a missing pet crocodile that turned up in a lake.

This offbeat (and irrelevant) story was breathlessly reported in several major international media bodies, as well as in the Greek ones. Nevertheless, despite the relative lack of media coverage in Greece (and in the rest of the world), the following list does attest to the fact that a significant and sustained campaign of activities did occur in 2014, and that it did have a galvanizing effect on local political activism as well.

Whether or not the currently opposition SYRIZA prevails in this month’s elections, it is certain that the drama over chemical weapons destruction has had an important, if underreported, role in bolstering their voter base in specific areas of Greece and among specific electorates

Full List of March-July 2014 Events and Activities in Greece against the Chemical Weapons Destruction Plan (in reverse chronological order)

28/7/2014: A press conference is held to present the review of the activists’ movement with the three boats which had gone to find the US Naval vessel transporting the chemicals in the Mediterranean Sea, south of Crete.

27/7/2014: The three boats that had gone to find the US Naval vessel transporting the chemicals arrive back at the old port of Chania.

26/7/2014: Two of the three following boats reach a point at sea of 120 miles west of Crete.

26/7/2014: The boat called Agios Nikolaos returns to Palaeohora because of bad weather.

25/7/2014: Two boats leave from the old port of Chania (in northwest Crete) while another one, Agios Nikolaos, leaves from Palaiohora (in southwest Crete). All of them go to find the US Naval vessel transporting the chemicals to be destroyed by hydrolysis. Many people come to the ports to support the movement.

22/7/2014: At an open assembly in the Labor Centre of Chania, local people decide on the details about sending three small boats, manned by local Greeks, to try and locate the large US Navy vessel transporting the Syrian chemicals, as a symbolic show of opposition. The assembly nominates a group of people who will be responsible for the communication with the people on the boats and for dealing with any problems that might arise.

20/7/2014: For a second day, local people block the entrance to the NATO naval base at Souda Bay, near Chania.

19/7/2014: Demonstrators congregate in the center of Chania, at the agora, and from there are transported to Akrotiri and the NATO base at Souda Bay. A symbolic blockade of the naval bases starts.

17/7/2014: The group of people who are leaders of the whole movements against the hydrolysis of Syria’s chemicals visit the Russian and the American Embassies in Athens.

11/7/2014: A demonstration is held in Syntagma Square in central Athens.

28/6/2014: Greek mayors send a letter to the US president, expressing their concerns about the chemical weapons destruction program.

25/6/2014: A benefit concert is held in Heraklio, Crete for financial support of the movement against the destruction of chemical weapons off the Cretan southwestern coast.

21/6/2014: Greenpeace and the WWF Hellas communicate with OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemicals Weapons) in order to be informed by OPCW about the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons at sea.

The representatives of WWF underline the following four concerns.

  1. No estimation of hypothetical environmental danger has been made regarding the scenario that the hydrolysis of chemicals weapons at sea goes wrong. No estimate has been made concerning whether the operation could have any adverse consequences for the environment.
  2. There is a general absence of legislation concerning this operation.
  3. There is serious danger of an accident, disorder in the operation and environmental dangers for the Mediterranean Sea as a result of this operation.
  4. There is a need for much more information about the operation’s progress. There has been a demonstrated lack of negotiations with local authorities and local institutions.

Further, representatives of Greenpeace from Greece and Italy underlined the security measures for the operation that should be taken. They have sent a letter to OPCW regarding this. They also underline the need for early and valid information about the operation.

Representatives of both Greenpeace and WWF Hellas underline that the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs must take responsibility, and must disclose the relevant information. These representatives state their opposition to any operation that would have environmental dangers. They ask OPCW to give information to the public about the operation and to act with transparency, according to the relevant international treaties.

17/6/2014: Konstantinos Pylarinos, head of the Association of Former Members of the Hellenic and of the European Parliaments, has a meeting with Karolos Papoulias, President of Greece. Two days before, Pylarinos and this Association had passed a resolution declaring that the operation of hydrolysis of chemicals weapons would be in violation of Greek and international law. It noted that the Greek government is also responsible for this case.

10/6/2014: An event titled, “the impacts of chemicals weapons on people’s health” is held at the College/association of Doctors in Crete’s capital, Heraklio. The event has been organized by the Heraklio movement against the destruction of Syria’s chemicals weapons and by the Maragopoulou Institute for Human Rights.

10/6/2014: The mayor of San Ferdinando, an Italian town in Italy near the port of Gioia Tauro where the Syrian chemicals had been held, announces his opposition to the destruction of chemicals weapons at sea, and his comments are noted in Greece.

8/6/2014: A group of protesters assemble in the port of Heraklio, Crete. It is organized by the student body of the local sailing team, the 47th open sea school of Heraklio.

6/6/2014: A major movement “Zakynthos renaissance” supports people from Crete who protest against the hydrolysis plan for destroying the Syrian chemical weapons.

5/6/2014: A protest is held in Gythio port by the Association of Fishermen from East Mani (southern Peloponnese).

5/6/2014: A mass congregation of thousands of local people opposed to the hydrolysis operation gathers in Chania.

5/6/2014: An Italian group named “Mesogeios SOS” (or Mediterranean SOS), based in San Ferdinando, in Calabria connects with Greek citizens to protest against the misinformation being given to them about the danger of hydrolysis.

011/5/2014: An open discussion is held in San Ferdinando, Italy about the planned programmed for destroying Syria’s chemicals weapons in the sea between Greece and Italy. Vangelis Pissias, a Greek candidate for MEP from the Green Party, takes part in this discussion through an internet feed. The coordinator is journalist Alfredo Cosco.

10/5/2014: An educational event is held in Gythio port in the south Peloponnese. People from Lakonia who are against the hydrolysis of chemicals weapons encourage the fishermen of the region to take an energetic part in the movement.

9/5/2014: A group of 50 SYRIZA parliamentarians in the Greek Parliament the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Environment, Energy and Climate change and the Minister of National Defense the following questions:

  1. Has the maritime region of the Eastern Mediterranean in fact been chosen for the hydrolysis of Syria’s chemicals weapons? Where exactly and when is hydrolysis planned to occur?
  2. Does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plan to officially and completely inform the opposition, the other parties and the relevant commissions, and if so, when?
  3. Which measures have the Ministry of Foreign Affairs taken for the dangerous operation of hydrolysis, especially now that Greece is holding the EU presidency? Have coordinated movements with other Mediterranean countries been organized in order to prevent the hydrolysis? Has the Ministry of Foreign Affairs taken any initiatives, and how is it planning to make the best of Greece’s EU presidency as far as the hydrolysis issue is concerned? Does the ministry have the intention, even at the last moment, to take action in order to prevent the hydrolysis operation?
  4. Why is the destruction of chemical weapons not to be held in a country with the relevant technology and the technical know-how to execute it? How dangerous is hydrolysis to the maritime environment?
  5. Why is the destruction of these chemical weapons not going to happen in the country where these weapons are produced or in a country which sells them? Or, why will the hydrolysis not happen in the maritime space of countries which have the relevant technical know-how, if the operation is as sensitive as is being said?
  6. How many total tons of chemical gas are going to be destroyed?
  7. What is the constituent and predominant content of these chemical weapons? What is the amount of this content? How is this content going to be destroyed, since some of this content cannot be destroyed by hydrolysis?

 

4/5/2014: In a four-day event in Rethymno (north-central coast of Crete). Informational material on the chemical weapons issue is distributed in many languages.

3/5/2014: Citizens meet Ms Vlahou, a lawyer and prosecutor. They seek a judgment to research if the Greek government has penal responsibilities for the outcome of the hydrolysis operation, or if there is a legal government exemption.

29/4/2014: A report on the hydrolosis issue, which has been presented to the Areios Pagos (Greece’s Supreme Court), is given to the public prosecutor of East Crete in Heraklio.

27/4/2014: A congregation of citizens concerned about the possible hydrolysis program meets in Hora Sfakion, on the southern coast of Crete.

24/4/2014: A letter by Maria Damanaki, Greek commissioner in the European Commission for maritime affairs, questions the proposed chemical weapons destruction plan.

11/4/2014: A group of commissioners from Crete gives a report to Areios Pagos. The Greek Supreme Court. This report concerns the transportation, the temporary containment and the management of Syria’s chemicals weapons. It is also about the specifications of the operation of the ship in which the hydrolysis operation will be conducted.

This group of Cretan commissioners, after the meeting in Areios Pagos, goes to the Parliament. The group had asked Greek political parties to meet them and discuss the hydrolysis issue before the question of a SYRIZA MP in parliament. However, the only parties who accept to meet this group are SYRIZA and the Anexartiti Hellines (Independent Greeks). The ruling Nea Dimokratia and PASOK refuse to meet the concerned citizens.

After the official discussion in Parliament about the question SYRIZA’s MP had made, the group of Cretan commissioners asked to see the undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He accepted but he did not give to them any specific or solid answers to their questions. The group insisted it be given a responsible answer regarding why the hydrolysis should be conducted in this way (in Mediterranean Sea), and what the official opinion of the Greek government about the issue was. The only answer the undersecretary gave them was that the Greek government would closely oversea the whole operation.

10/4/2014: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), in cooperation with the Spanish government, organizes an informative event on the US Navy vessel Cape Ray, which is in the Spanish naval base in Rota. It is announced that the hydrolysis of Syria’s chemicals weapons is going to be done on this ship.

23/3/2014: More than 10,000 people take part in a mass gathering in historic Arkadi Monastery in Crete. Groups representing the local authorities, universities, church, scientists, political parties, labor organizations, activist movements take part in this event.

9/3/2014: The first mass gathering occurs near the NATO base in Souda Bay near Chania, Crete.

Southeast Europe 2014: Emerging Security Threats

By Ioannis Michaletos

2013 has been a year of global “transition.” It represents a later stage in the post-recession and upheaval era since 2008, in which major geostrategic shifts of power took place, in the midst of revolutions, destabilization and economic downturn nearby.

Southeast Europe was a relatively stable region during that period when compared to the neighboring Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Nevertheless, a set of emerging security threats looms across the Balkans and mainly derive from the aftermath of the aforementioned global developments.

Below is a brief summary of emerging security threats in and involving the region. The threats described are hypothetical examples of how situation could unfold in the Balkans based on several present day indicators. The summaries are provided for forward planning only, but are based on a large and complex set of analyzed data.

In addition to the three threats discussed below could be added the lingering threat of ethnic nationalism and its effects on politics in most Balkan states, the rise of cyber-crime, cyber-espionage and challenges to states by tech-savvy young generation of commercially and sometimes politically-minded activists, with anonymous internet commerce and cryptocurrencies usage increasing, in line with global trends that rapidly developed in 2013; there will be an increasing divide between the technological ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ which crosses generational and establishment lines, and represents a more pronounced gap than in Western countries where educational levels are higher (at least in the focus on technology).

1.)    The Syrian Connection

“European jihadists” who traveled from Western and Northern Europe, generally via Turkey, to fight in Syria on the side of the Al-Nusra Front and other Islamist militias will eventually leave the area, in larger and larger numbers. Many are likely to get “trapped” in the Balkans on their way back from the Syrian battlefront, as they make illegal crossings via land and sea as they will be wary of flying home.

French, British, Belgian, Dutch and similar authorities will likely not permit them back and/or revoke their passports. Thus they will be forced to remain in limbo on their transit routes. Yet, whatever their ethnic origin, those jihadis who hail from Western Europe do not fit the description of typical illegal immigrants- hence, they will not want to work manual labor or settle down in areas where large numbers of immigrants currently settle, such as Athens.

In this state, and given their socio-religious orientation, we might find such persons utilizing the same networks of sympathetic jihad supporters from the Balkans, some of whom they have met in the field. Indeed, over the past two years Western security agencies have become increasingly concerned as the number of Balkan Muslims from all EU candidate countries in Syria has risen.

Following the established routes, we can expect these persons to find shelter in Bosnia, as well as Albania and Kosovo, and perhaps the Sandzak region of Serbia and Montenegro. Here they could certainly stir up trouble. Already well-established Salafi-Wahhabi infrastructure in the Western Balkans has been in place for years and links have been maintained with Western-based “brethren” through joint links in cities such as Vienna and Milano.

Since 2011, more than 2,000 EU citizens ventured into Syria and security agencies estimate that 400-700 Balkan Islamists joined them as well.

In general, the number of Jihadists fighting presently (December 2013) in Syria is estimated at 100,000 people, out of which 30,000 is the “hardcore nucleus.” This is going to be increasingly supplemented by “leftover” jihadists from Libya and perhaps radicalized individuals from Egypt.

Fighters have come from at least 75 different countries across the five inhabited continents in the largest and most diverse congregation of mujahideen the world has experienced.

2.)    The long Eastern caravan

More traditional forms of illegal immigration into Greece and other Balkan transit routes will continue to rise as Syria’s humanitarian worsens. Already more than 1 million Syrian citizens are in transit through Turkey to the EU, moving across the Balkans. Border controls are not able to withstand such pressure which comes both via land routes and sea routes. At the same time and in conjunction with the previous threat, an unknown number of jihadists from the Middle East enter the Balkans “hidden” within the refugee caravans.

In general, there are at least 400,000 Syrian refugees presently (December 2013) in transit in Turkey from Syria without access to housing, jobs or medical insurance. Furthermore another 1 million of internally displaced Syrian citizens is close to the borders with Turkey and may become refugees seeking an entrance to Europe.

3.)    Cheap weapons, anyone?

The Libyan black market in second-hand small arms will see massive sales to the Balkan organized crime syndicates, due to the ending of fighting in Syria. A rapid decrease in wholesale prices of weapons such as automatic weapons, anti-aircraft missiles and plastic explosives will expedite this.

These shipments will enter the Western Balkans and assist in fuelling a resurgence of paramilitary groups, hyper-nationalistic networks, criminal enterprises, and terrorist groups. Arms profits will also result in more official corruption as organized crime gains more leverage. In the face of this, and with the continuation of existing pressures, ordinary citizens will also be more likely to arm themselves and be ready to protect themselves from perceived threats in countries like Greece.

In general, more than 70 state armament warehouses have been looted since the ousting of Libya’s Col. Gadhafi from power at the end of 2011. The weapons missing could arm a regular force of more than 20,000 men, according to some estimates. On top of that are the large amounts of weaponry donated by Qatar to Islamist militias in Libya, which no longer needed are finding their way to hotspots in Africa, Yemen and (by sea) to Greece and Italy.

At sea, it is estimated that at least 100 maritime vessels have been engaged for years in cross-Mediterranean arms contraband along with at least 1,000 intermediate companies and individuals. Intelligence indicates that a complex network of front companies expedites this illegal trade, with international and local networks also involving Southeast Europe. The world’s illicit arms market is estimated at 32 billion USD per annum.

Left-wing Terrorist Attacks and Organized Violence in Greece, 2008-2012

By Ioannis Michaletos

Greece has a colorful history of domestic terrorism and urban guerrilla warfare, going back to the early 1970’s. This period has seen a multitude of groups active, most of them with leftist or anarchist ties and typically known for small-scale bombings and shootings against international companies, public infrastructure, political parties and the police.

Historically, the deadliest of these was the Revolutionary Organization 17 November. This far-left group founded in 1975 had a reputation for secrecy and internal discipline-indeed, it was disbanded by police only in 2002. Among its 103 attacks, the group was most infamous for high-profile assassinations of foreign officials, including a CIA station chief in Athens, US Army, Navy and Air Force officers and a British diplomat.

Since 2008, regular terrorist attacks, shootings and other acts of organized political violence have occurred, drawing on a reservoir of hostility that the ongoing financial crisis has created, particularly against government, state security and foreign firms.

The following study presents a chronology of 85 attacks from 2008 through 2012, including both those in which the perpetrators are known and unknown. First, however, is an assessment based on the cumulative data and basic information about the major groups behind these attacks.

Numerical Personnel Estimates and Linkages

The number of “radicalized” persons belonging to far-Leftist groups in Greece is estimated at 3,000 people, most of them fairly young, and concentrated in Athens and Thessaloniki. Out of these, 350 to 500 are suspected by the local authorities to have taken part either directly or indirectly in urban guerrilla-style attacks.

A hardcore nucleus of 50 people (still at-large) is suspected of being regular and full-time operatives for terrorist groups. Another 44 have been arrested over the past four years and are either incarcerated or pending trial.

According to information provided by the Greek Police, the Italian police and Europol, Greek extremists have ties with similar groups in Italy, Spain and France and have also been in irregular contact with German and Dutch networks. Moreover unconfirmed reports by Greek press have noted connections with Lebanese figures who have provided training paramilitary facilities.

Operational Capacities and Arms Sources

The operational capabilities of left-wing terrorist groups in Greece tend to fluctuate from month to month depending on arrests made or changes within the inner ranks of these extremist networks, as well as finances and access to arms. The disbanding of 17 November dealt a major blow to the most infamous such group, however, it is believed that some N17 members or sympathizers have simply become involved with the newer groups behind today’s attacks.

It is also known that Greek and Balkan organized crime figures are in contact with Greek terrorists, helping to arm the latter with weaponry (mostly AK-47, grenades, Scorpio semi-automatic and Beretta pistols). Police sources also indicate that multinational organized crime involved with drugs trafficking and human trafficking of illegal immigrants from Muslim countries, with ties to Islamist networks are getting weapons from the latter. It should be remembered that far-left groups have traditionally seen a common cause with immigrants, both for ideological reasons and because the arch-enemy (that is, Greek far-right groups) are violently opposed to illegal immigrants. The latter thus sometimes become ‘fodder’ in internal urban warfare between Greek left- and right-wing extremists.

Data on Left-wing Groups and Activity

The following groups have become most prominent in the last few years. Their actual involvement is probably much higher than the official figures given here, considering that the perpetrators of many of the 85 attacks remain unknown, or will become known soon following various investigations and trials.

Name of Group: Conspiracy of Cells of Fire (also called ‘Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei’); in Greek, Synomisia Pyrinon Tis Fotias (SPF)

Leader: Unknown; non-hierarchical group

Structure: Autonomous cells

Active from: 2008

Ideology: Radical Anarchism, Neo-Nihilism

Number of Attacks carried out 2008-2012: 12 (pending trials, actual number may be significantly higher)

Percentage of total attacks in this period: approx. 14%

Name of Group: Revolutionary Struggle; in Greek, Epanastatikos Agonas (EA)

Leader: Nikos Maziotis (suspected)

Structure: Close-knit group

Active from: 2003

Ideology: Anti-Capitalist; Radical Anarchism

Number of attacks carried out 2008-2012: 10

Percentage of total attacks in this period: approx. 11.5%

Name of group: Revolutionary Sect (also called ‘Sect of Revolutionaries’); in Greek, Sekta Epanastaton

Leader: Unknown

Structure: Paramilitary combat structure

Active from: 2009

Ideology: Anti-Capitalist; Radical Anarchism, Neo-Nihilistic

Number of attacks carried out 2008-2012: 4

Percentage of total attacks in this period: approx. 3.5%

General Notes

Note (1): The review does not include committed or suspected robberies by leftist terrorists group or any other illegal action made simply to raise funds for their actual operational aim.

Note (2): Although the majority of arson attacks since 2008 are widely attributed to the group “Conspiracy of Cells of Fire (SPF)”, trials have not been concluded yet as of February 2013, so the final actual numbers may differ.

Note (3): Incidents regarding arrests of suspected terrorists which involved violence are not mentioned. Neither are various routine or irregular searches of police forces or discoveries of weapon caches and hideouts mentioned.

2008

January 21: A series of arson attacks against bank branches and parked luxury cars in several locations in Athens. Conspiracy of Cells of Fire

October 31: A series of arson attacks against banks, the offices of the New Democracy party and luxury cars. Perpetrators unknown

November 10: Small-scale bombing of the office of New Democracy in a suburb of Athens. Perpetrators unknown

November 13: A series of small-scale bombings in banks in the city of Thessaloniki. Perpetrators unknown

December 13: Small-scale bombing of the French press agency in the center of Athens. Perpetrators unknown

December 7-14: Large-scale riots with significant damage to public and private buildings during the demonstrations over a police killing of a 16 year old-student the previous night in Athens. Several extremist groups participated, including incoming Albanian, Romanian, German, Spanish and Italian “comrades.” Along with the rioters resident illegal immigrants from Pakistan, Algeria and Afghanistan participated in lootings that occurred with an estimated damage of 250 million euros.

Police sources noted that based on evidence, at least 1.5 million euros were “invested” for the purpose of recruitment and ‘armaments’; bombs were mostly Molotov cocktails. A typical “asymmetrical threat.” Around 300 persons were arrested, belonging to various groups.

December 20: A series of attacks with arson material in stores in the center of Athens. Perpetrators unknown

December 21: A small-scale bomb attack in the office of the financial police in Athens, and against two banks and a luxury car dealership. Perpetrators unknown

December 23: Attack with AK-47 against a police bus. Revolutionary Struggle

December 25: Arson attacks against stores in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

2009

January 5: Attempted AK-47 attack on a police officer in Athens. Revolutionary Struggle

January 9: Violent demonstration in the center of Athens, dozens of arrests made of persons from different groups

January 29: BMW dealership in Athens hit by arson attack. Perpetrators unknown

February 3: AK-47 and grenade attack against a police station in Athens. Revolutionary Sect

February 5: Arson attack against the office of the alternate Minister for Public Order. Perpetrators unknown

February 12: A series of arson attacks against offices of magistrates in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

February 17: Arson attack against Greek TV station Alter. Revolutionary Sect

February 18: Large-scale bombing of Citibank branch in Athens. Revolutionary Struggle

March 3: Arson attack against a railway wagon in a suburb of Athens. Perpetrators Unknown

March 19: Bomb attack against a public real estate company. Popular Will

March 25: Arson attacks against banks and a telephone company in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

March 30: Arson attacks against offices of New Democracy, banks and a luxury yacht office. Perpetrators unknown

March 31: Arson attacks against banks and luxury cars in Athens.Perpetrators unknown

April 9: Arson attacks against a church in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

April 13: Arson attacks against randomly selected cars in Athens and Thessaloniki. Perpetrators unknown

May 12: Small-scale bombing at a bank branch. Revolutionary Struggle

May 18: An arson attack against a parked police motorcycle in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

May 20: Bomb attack against offices of private company in Athens. Popular Will

June 2: Arson attack against the building of the general secretary of media and public information in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

June 4: Arson attack against a police station in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

June 17: Assassination of an anti-terrorist police officer in Athens. Revolutionary Sect

July 3: Arson attack against the private office of an ex-public order minister in Athens. Conspiracy of Cells of Fire

July 3: Arson attack against a McDonald’s in Athens. Revolutionary Struggle

July 4: Arson attack against building of the Ministry of interior in Athens. Conspiracy of Cells of Fire

July 11: Arson attack against the house of ex-alternate Minister of interior. Conspiracy of Cells of Fire

July 28: Series of arson attacks against office of New Democracy, PASOK and LAOS political parties in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

July 26: Small-scale bombings in municipal police buildings in Thessaloniki. Perpetrators unknown

September 2: Large-scale bombing against the stock market in Athens and the Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace building in Thessaloniki, with no casualties. Revolutionary Struggle (suspected)

October 28: Attack with AK-47 and grenades against a police station in Athens, leaving six officers wounded. Proletarian People’s Self-defense

October 30: Bomb attack against the house of a former education minister in Athens. Conspiracy of Cells of Fire

November 5: Arson attack in vehicles in center of Athens. Perpetrators unknown

November 14: Bomb attack against the house of a PASOK MP. Conspiracy of Cells of Fire

November 20: Arson attack against municipal police building in suburb of Athens. Perpetrators unknown

November 30: A series of arson attacks in public building and banks in Thessaloniki. Perpetrators unknown

December 5: Small-scale bombing in magistrate building in the city of Heraklio, Crete. Perpetrators unknown

December 6: Arson attacks in the center of Athens against cars. Perpetrators unknown

December 28: Large-scale bomb attack (no casualties) in the offices of the National Insurance Company in Athens. Conspiracy of Cells of Fire

2010

January 9: Small-scale bomb attack near national parliament. Conspiracy of Cells of Fire

January 28: Arson attack against the private office of a former Greek Prime Minister. Perpetrators unknown

February 11: Attack with stones-rocks against passing police officers in the center of Athens. Local anarchist group

February 16: Bomb explosion outside of a JP Morgan Bank in Athens. Revolutionary Struggle (suspected)

February 28: Stoning of passing police officers in the center of Athens. Local anarchist group

March 18: A series of arson attacks in several vehicles in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

March 22: A series of bomb attacks against the offices of the Golden Dawn party, a police station and the house of the vice-president of the Pakistani community in Athens. Conspiracy of Cells of Fire

April 14: A series of arson attacks in two offices of MP’s in Thessaloniki. Perpetrators unknown

April 14: Arson attack against office of a PASOK MP in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

May 5: Arson attack during a public demonstration against a bank branch in the center of Athens, with three employees killed. Radical anarchist network suspected after police investigation in late 2012

May 13: Bomb attack near Athens central correctional facilities, one civilian wounded. Revolutionary Struggle

May 14: Bomb attack against a Thessaloniki magistrate building. Revolutionary Struggle

June 24: Parcel bomb explosion in the Ministry of Public Order, killing a police officer who was assistant to the minister. Revolutionary Struggle suspected

July 19: Assassination of a Greek investigative journalist. Revolutionary Sect

November 1-4: Parcel bombing in a series of attempts to send bombs via international and local mail to multiple targets, including embassies in Athens, the governments of France and Germany, Europol headquarters and others. Conspiracy of Cells of Fire

December 30: Athens courthouse bombed. Conspiracy of Cells of Fire

2011

January 12: Small-scale bomb attack against office of the LAOS political party in Thessaloniki and another one against the office of the union of retired political officers. Perpetrators unknown

January 16: Series of arson attacks against banks and PASOK offices in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

January 25: Small-scale bombing of the offices of the judges’ union in Thessaloniki. Perpetrators unknown

February 16: Arson attack in a university building in center of Athens. Perpetrators unknown

March 18: Small-scale bombing in the private office of the minister of health in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

April 17: Series of arson attacks in public building and vehicles in Athens and the island of Salamina. Perpetrators unknown

April 18: Small-scale bomb in the political offices of New Democracy and PASOK MP’s in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

April 19: Arson attacks against buildings of the Metro railway system in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

December 13: Small-scale bombing of the private office of a PASOK MP in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

2012

January 21: Arson attack against offices of the Ministry of Culture in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

January 31: Small-scale bomb attack against a supermarket in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

February 13: Arson attacks against two cinemas in the center of Athens during a violent public demonstration in Athens. Local anarchist networks (suspected)

February 27: Arson attack against a wagon in the metro rail system in Athens. Urban guerrilla group

April 3: Small-scale bombing in the private office of a former Greek prime minister in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

April 19: Arson attack against randomly-selected vehicles in the center of Athens. Perpetrators unknown

June 27: Large-scale arson attack against the offices of Microsoft in Athens. International Revolutionary Front

September 2: Small-scale bombing of a municipal police building in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

October 8: Arson attack against wagon of tram network in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

November 26: Arson attack against the house of former general secretary of ministry of public works in Athens. Minority Struggle

December 7: Small-scale bombing in the house of former finance minister in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

December 8: Large-scale bombing of an office of the Golden Dawn party in the outskirts of Athens. Informal Anarchist Federation (FAI)

December 30: Small-scale bombing in a local magistrate’s office in Athens. Perpetrators unknown

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Emerging Water Industries in Greece

By Ioannis Michaletos in Athens

Water management is attracting the attention of businessmen in Greece, especially when it is related to the water cycle and energy production. Dams, water transmission pipelines, water depots, and seawater desalination plants are all included in the five-year plan that the Karamanlis administration has relayed recently to the press, as a plan to develop this very lucrative sector.

Greece‘ss national plan was drafted by the Ministry of Public Works, along with the national Directorate of Hydro-management and the Athens National Technical University.

This national program includes both large and small hydro-projects, since Greece has significant hydrodynamic potential, most of which is concentrated in the western and northern sections of the country, where major rivers such as the Acheloos, Arachthos, Aoos, Haliakmon, Stymonas and Nestos flow. At the same time, Greece makes excessive use of electricity, almost 40% more than any of its Balkan neighbors. Greece also imports substantial amounts of electricity per annum, especially from Bulgaria.

Most European countries have reached the highest potential of their hydrodynamic reserves. Greece is an exception; only one-third of the economically exploitable hydrodynamic resources are being exploited. Therefore, the country has significant unused domestic reserves, and can thus create a long-term strategy in this field.

The National Program Management and Protection of Water Resources includes measures for better distribution of water in the 14 designated water departments in the country, which, as announced by Minister George Souflias, include large and small projects for water diversions or transfers and for electricity production. These projects include around 22 large hydroelectric structures and about 300 small hydropower ones.

In order to meet the needs of the more arid regions of the country, a system of small and large dams along the rivers and pipelines transporting water from one water compartment to another will be constructed. For coastal areas and islands, seawater desalination plants have already started to be built, some of them using hybrid technology, meaning they are powered by renewable energy resources such as solar and wind power.

These major projects will be designed so as not to disturb the water balance areas. Yet all the evidence suggests that this is inevitable, as water in the coming years will become a more precious and expensive commodity than oil.

The diversion of the Acheloos River to the Thessaly region has almost been completed, at a cost of over 700 million euros. As a consequence Thessaly’ss farmers will enjoy a significant boost in their production (mostly wheat, corn, potato and cotton), with a 300 MW electricity production facility.

The water department with the largest surplus is West Central Greece, while the deficit is evident in Thessaly. Other departments with water deficit are the Eastern Peloponnese and the Aegean islands.

With Greece’ss current pace of growth, it is calculated that by 2030 the northern Peloponnese, eastern and central Greece, Attica, central Macedonia and Thrace will start facing problems, if the government’ss envisioned plans are not implemented. For the time being, the wet winter of 2008-09 has resulted in a spectacular increase in water reserves to such an extent that there are plans to export water to the Middle East. Last year Greece exported water to Cyprus when the latter faced a drought.

Today, the main issues associated with water management in Greece are:

-unequal distribution of water resources in western Greece due to heavy rainfall in comparison with the eastern parts;

-the uneven seasonal distribution of water resources, winter being the only significant rainy period;

unequal distribution of water demand in the country, with Attica, Thessaloniki and Patras requiring most of the resources during winter, in addition to the most visited tourist islands of the Aegean in the summer;

-leaks in water distribution networks, affecting up to 20% of pipeline networks, pose an additional problem and require new pipeline infrastructure.

Already, Greece has reached scientific and bi-governmental agreements with the EU countries plus Iceland in order to import much needed know-how regarding water management issues.

It is telling that the country is ranked in the last place among 24 European and Mediterranean countries, having at present only 46 large dams. Spain (ranked 1st) has 1196, followed by Turkey with 625, France with 569, and Italy with 524.

The Greek government moreover is now geared to privatize segments of the hydro-infrastructure. The water and sewerage companies in both Athens and Thessaloniki are high on the list next to privatization.

The Ministry of Finance seems to be planning a gradual reduction in the percentage held and in the state companies EYDAP (Athens) and EYATH (Thessaloniki). Currently, the government holds 70% of the share capital of EYDAP (60% government and 10% of the ATE state bank) and over 70% of EYATH. According to all available information those percentages will fall to 40% by next year. The capitalization of the former is around 400 million euros, and of EYATH, around 200 million euros.

Already, French multinational Suez Environment has expressed keen interest to invest in Greek companies. Since both of them hold significant real estate along the two biggest Greek cities, there are ample opportunities for investing in the sewage management sector, the next big thing in the contemporary “Green business” trend. Certainly, the water business is going to become a well known feature in Greece and elsewhere in the Balkans, as major investors start to move into an emerging and very lucrative sector.

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Bio-fuel Business Catching On in Greece

By Ioannis Michaletos in Athens

Greek businesses today are increasingly looking into the prospects of further investments into waste management and possible applications for the bio-fuels industry. Already, some of the bigger companies are making plans for incorporating bio-fuel production into their portfolios, and the general trend towards renewable energy sources and the generous state and European support towards that aim also add to the appeal in this sector.

The current turnover of the waste management market, according to reports from the Ministry of Development in Athens, is around 100 million Euros. Within the next 3-5 years, estimates are that it will grow to 300 million. Over the next 7-9 years, this figure is estimated to have soared to 700-800 million Euros annually. Overall, this means that at least 25 new recycling units must be constructed in the short term, and there are serious considerations calling for the investments to proceed.

The EU has repeatedly fined Greece for its inability to draft a conclusive plan regarding garbage recycling, and according to Giorgo Angelli, a journalist covering environmental issues, “that provides a strong impetus for great investments and assistance by the state in the near future for this sector.”

The Greek state has already started forming public tenders for the new waste processing installations that will be built using Private-Public-Consortiums- whereby private companies will construct the plants, and then be able to exploit them under a leasing agreement with the state.

The necessary funds for this work will derive in most respects from the EU’s 4th Assistance Package, which describes a broad array of handouts from Brussels to Greece within the period 2009-2014. Furthermore, as Christos Ioannou, an independent business consultant notes, “it is more than certain that Greek corporations will seek the collaboration of experienced foreign multinationals, since this industry is rather new to the country and the know-how deemed essential is still limited.”

The Players

The current market structure is composed of the big players in Greece, which will most certainly strive to acquire larger market shares in the future as well. The first such company, Helector, is a part of the Ellaktor construction group, which is active in multiple locations in Greece, the Balkans and the Middle East.

Another involved business, Helesi, operates a recycling plant in Northern Greece which specializes in motor tire process. Its shares are listed in the AIM stock index in London.

Third is Lobbe-Tzilalis, which constitutes a joint venture between the German group and a Greek representative that specializes in hospital waste management in Athens.

Further, the Greek construction group Hellenic Technodomiki, itself a Ellaktor affiliate, operates a household recycling plant near Athens- the first of its kind in the region. It also has a similar one in the Trier -Mertesdorf area of Germany. Recently it established a power station operating with biogas in Northern Greece. According to its press office “the company is interested in promoting this power generating technology in the country and in other markets abroad.”

Bio-Power on the Rise

The energy derived from biomass in Greece has also ignited a series of investments in the biofuel sector. Since mid-2006, the state has provided substantial subsidies of up to 50 percent of an investment, in order for plants to be created that will produce biofuel.

According to the 2003/30 EU Directive on the Promotion of the Use of Biofuels and other Renewable Fuels for Transport, Greece should conform by increasing biodiesel consumption to 5.75 percent by 2010, and 10 percent by 2020 of the total transport consumption. Currently, it is estimated at only 3 percent.

The decline of the oil price index has already cast a shadow on the viability of a multitude of investments-to-be that had at inception calculated a different price range for their bio-fuel product.

Therefore, as chemical engineer Ioannis Papamichail notes, “the annual diesel consumption in the country is approximately 2.7 million tones per annum, whilst the interest of constructing new plants will lead in theory into the production of more than 3 million tones of biodiesel. For 2008 biodiesel production was 100,000 tones so it’s far from the expectations of many prospective investors.”

It is understood that most plans will not proceed at all in the foreseeable future. If one wants to predict how the market will develop, it’s best to look at the already established businesses that have rooted themselves in the market and, in theory, can thus fend off the potential competition.

The first such company, Agroinvest, owns a plant with a maximum production capability of 252,000 tones a year. Further, the Pettas Company operates a factory in southern Greece with a total capacity of 60,000 tones. The Hellenic Biodiesel company owns an installation with a total 40,000-ton production capability in Northern Greece. Lastly, Vert Oil recently established a 44,000-ton plant suitable for such industry.

All of the above companies are Greek-owned and are likely going to be hotly pursued by larger investors which seek an entrance into the market, but do not want to establish new plants due to the limited profit margins related to the oil price decrease. An example is the joint venture named Biodiesel-Greece, created by Hellenic Petroleum and Viohalco Holdings, two of the top Greek multinationals.

Another potential strong player is the Elin Biodiesel Corporation that belongs to an energy group linked with influential Greek shipping interests. Both of them have relayed to the local press that they will proceed with investment plans that include market entrance through the already established players, and in the mid-term complete their own installations in Greece and in the neighboring Balkan countries.

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Remnants of Byzantium in London

Editor’s note: this special report comes to us from Dr. Jonathan Harris of Royal Holloway, University of London. It recounts the proceedings of an absorbing workshop recently held at London’s Hellenic Centre, which brought members of the general public into contact with some of the world’s leading experts on Byzantium- this time, in the unique context of its little-known, but lengthy relationship with the British capital. Photos appear courtesy of the author.

…………………

By Dr. Jonathan Harris

On Saturday, February 28, a special public seminar was held at the Hellenic Centre. Attended by some forty people, the workshop aimed to explore the links between Byzantium and London by investigating the ways in which the two societies interacted in the past and by exploring the reminders, remnants and reflections of Byzantium that can be found in London today.

balkanalysis-christchurch-brixtonroad-london4

Christchurch, on London

The five talks delivered during the day approached that task from different angles.

Anthea Harris of the University of Birmingham looked at Byzantine artefacts that have been found in datable contexts in London and the Thames valley.

While the evidence from London itself is sparse, finds from burials both to the north and south of the Thames suggest that Byzantine luxury objects were reaching Britain during the so-called Dark Ages (c.450-c.650).

Silver spoons and bronze bowls of Constantinopolitan manufacture have been found interred in high-status graves, probably those of chiefs or kings.

balkanalysis-byzantinespoon-england1

Byzantine spoon from an Anglo-Saxon burial site in Prittlewell, Essex

For his part, Scot McKendrick, Head of Western Manuscripts at the British Library, described some of the Byzantine manuscripts in the library’s collection and how they came to be there.

He ended with a description of the BL’s Codex Sinaiticus online project, which is making the text of the oldest complete copy of the New Testament available on the internet.

In the afternoon, Geoff Egan of the Museum of London’s archaeological service recounted how an excavation on the foreshore of the River Thames had revealed some unexpected finds: Byzantine coins and lead seals.

balkanalysis-codexsinaiticus2

The Codex Sinaiticus

When these were sent to experts for identification, they proved to be of eleventh-century date. One of the seals bore the Greek word €šÃ„òGenikon,’s suggesting that it was once attached to a document issued by the imperial treasury in Constantinople.

The presence of these objects in London might have been connected with the recruitment of English mercenaries for the Byzantine army, and the famous Varangian guard.

Eugenia Russell, who recently completed a doctorate at Royal Holloway, University of London, looked at Andronicus Kallistos, a Byzantine scholar who died in London in 1476 in circumstances that are slightly obscure. His lonely end is almost foreshadowed in a lament that he wrote for the fall of Constantinople in 1453, and which highlights the themes of exile and dislocation.

Finally, George Manginis of the Archaeological Museum in Ioannina looked at neo-Byzantine architecture in London. As well as discussing the well-known monuments such as Westminster Cathedral and St Sophia in Bayswater, he showed pictures of obscure buildings such as a Primitive Methodist chapel that show a pronounced Byzantine influence. His presentation left the audience eager to learn more about London’s neo-Byzantine survivals.

Among the many satisfied participants at the event was Londoner Martin Hall, currently embarking on a post-retirement MA in Crusader Studies at Royal Holloway. Mr. Hall says that he was “particularly impressed” by George Manginis’s discussion of Byzantine remnants in London, considering it “a highly professional presentation which caused you to look at London buildings in a new light and with a new understanding.”

balkanalysis-primitivemethodistchurch-caledonianroad-london3

This Primitive Methodist Church on Caledonian Road in London boasts Neo-Byzantine windows

The workshop was funded by the London Centre for the Arts and Cultural Enterprise and by the Hellenic Centre, and organised by the Hellenic Institute, Royal Holloway, University of London.

The Lucrative Electricity Trade in Greece: Profits and Problems

By Ioannis Michaletos in Athens

The electricity sector in Greece has expanded recently, and remains characterized by substantial profits made by companies due to the high system marginal prices. Currently there are several companies active in electricity trade in the country that mainly deal in imports of electricity from the Balkans and Italy to Greece. The country has an actual production capacity of around 10,100MW but its needs during the burdened summer season exceed 10,800MW. Recently, the issue has risen to the attention of the public because of losses caused to the Greek power corporation.

A Trader’s Paradise

Haris Floudopoulos, an energy analyst has assessed that energy trading is a ‘very profitable business in the country and many of the companies involved actually employ just a few managers, in some cases not more than two or three people, based in small premises in the center of Athens.’ Thus with a minimum investment, higher return is assured.

The difference between the Greek market in terms of system marginal price (SMP) and that of Scandinavia, for example, is significant. For 2007 in the Scandinavian countries, SMP was at 34.53 Euros/MWh whereas in Greece it reached 78.36 Euros/MWh according to information put forth by the Greek power company. In Spain, the price was 61.38 Euros/MWh, while in Germany it was 58.5/MWh, and in France 64.71/MWh.

Moreover, there has been a trend over the past four years of increase in the Greek SMP. In 2005 it was at 43.14 Euros/MWh, but had jumped in 2008 to almost 90 Euros/MWh- more than a 100 percent increase, representing a unique case in Europe.

The Greek network manager, Hellenic Transmission Systems Operator (DESMIE), has informed that according to its database, ‘the Greek market currently operates the most expensive electricity system in the EU, although household prices are much lower than the rest of EU countries bar Portugal.’

The reason for this is that ‘the SMP increase correlates with the electricity production deficit in the country, along with the rising demand.’

Another issue is the rule made by the Greek regulatory authority (RAE) that sets a limit of up to 150 Euros/MWh for the marginal price a trader can gain. Since the peak periods are limited to just a few days a year, there are considerable gains to be made by exploiting cracks in the production system of the Greek power corporation.

Although it cannot be verified for the moment, there were cases over the summer of 2008 in which it appeared that trade companies managed to extract the maximum marginal price. The regulatory authority has stated that, ‘presently there is no trend concerning the exploitation of the maximum set price, although that cannot be excluded for the coming season.’

Problems for the Greek Power Company

The electricity production deficit in the country, in combination with the decreasing production capacity of the power stations that operate using lignite, has made it possible for trading companies to exploit their opportunities to make profits unimaginable in other markets.

The Greek power company which controls almost 93 percent of the domestic market has delayed plans to modernize its plants or construct new ones. Further, private enterprises have also stalled their own investment plans, due to political or financial reasons. On the other hand, a 4 billion Euro investment plan by the power company that calls for the construction of new natural gas sites and the expansion of renewable energy systems will reduce dependence on energy traders (along with their fat profits). Yet this will not be achievable before 2015.

According to public statements by Chris Poseidon, a senior manager in the semi-state Greek power corporation, ‘in Greece, electricity bills are regulated by the state, whereas the trading corporations operate liberally. Thus the Greek power company is obliged in many cases to buy electricity at much higher prices than it actually sells to its customers.’

The Greek power company increased its bills for household users by 9.5 percent in July 2008, and is petitioning the government to proceed with another 5-7 percent hike from 2009 onwards. For the moment, the troubles of the company have grasped the attention of the media, since it is losing tens of million of euros per month, a windfall now ending up in the pockets of trading companies.

The whole issue has steadily become a political hot potato for the Greek administration. On November 3, 2008, some 34 MP’s from the Socialist opposition requested an official response from the minister of development, presenting data for the first quarter of 2008 showing that the Greek power company had paid 461.4 million Euros in order to cover its electricity balance.

A sure prediction for the near future is that the activities of trading companies will come further to light and become part of a public discourse on the issue. It is more than certain that they have been able to exploit liberalization of the market better than either the government or the Greek power corporation and will continue to do so for the coming years.

The Main Players

In total there are 21 active traders, holding licenses of around 4,150 MW.

Mytilineos (Greek). Trading license of 310MW

ATEL Hellas (Swiss-Greek). Trading license of 300MW, and has reserved 50MW capacity in the Greek-Italian cable, through an auction by the Italian network manager TERNA.

VERBUND-APT (Austrian-Greek).300MW

Edison Trading (Italian). 300MW. Has reserved a 10MW capacity in the Greek-Italian cable.

ENEL Trading (Italian). 250MW

EDF Trading (French). 243MW. Has reserved a 10MW capacity in the Greek-Italian cable

NECO (Greek-Bulgarian owned). 200MW, and has reserved 30MW capacity in the Greek-Italian cable.

EGL Hellas (Swiss). 200MW, and has reserved 5MW in the Greek-Italian cable, and another 5MW in the Greek-Bulgarian one.

Hellenic Petroleum (Greek).200MW

EFT Hellas (British-Greek).150MW and has reserved a 5MW capacity in the Greek-Italian cable.

Other companies that have trading licenses but average low or minimal trade are: RWE (350MW), Eon (350MW), Cinergy (200MW), Entrade (200MW), Danske Commodities (100MW), Ezpada (200MW), Terna Energy (100mw), TCB Energy (80MW), ITA Energy (50mw), Ener Greece (50MW) and Athens International Airport (25MW).

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Population Exchange in Greek Macedonia: the Rural Settlement of Refugees 1922-1930

Population Exchange in Greek Macedonia: the Rural Settlement of Refugees 1922-1930

By Elisabeth Kontogiorgi

Clarendon Press (Oxford) 2006

Reviewed by Melina Grizo*

Over a decade ago, an anthropological study of Greek Macedonia conducted by scholar Anastasia Karakasidou resulted in violent reactions from Greek nationalists, and also generated great interest among the community of Balkan researchers. In her book, Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia 1870-1990 (University of Chicago Press, 1997), Karakasidou pursued an inquiry into the ethnological origin of certain rural inhabitants in Greek Macedonian and challenged the myth of the Greek national homogeneity of the region.

Elisabeth Kontogiorgi centers her analysis a bit differently. She is concerned specifically with the issue of Greek refugee settlement in post-Ottoman Macedonia, but unlike near-contemporary presentations she considers the political and the diplomatic intricacies of the time merely as one of many other significant factors at work. (Some of these useful contemporary works include: Stephen P. Ladas’s The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1932; E.G. Mears’s Greece Today: The Aftermath of the Refugee Impact, Stanford, Calif. and London, 1929; and Henry Morgenthau’s I Was Sent to Athens, New York, 1929).

Nevertheless, she does show how European diplomats considered the compulsory exchange of population as the only way to maintain a lasting peace between Greece and Turkey. Despite the grandiose rhetoric with regard to minority issues that prevailed in the 1920s, the European Great Powers thus permitted a process that was tragic or at least traumatic for most of those affected.

For Kontogiorgi, the work of the Refugee Settlement Commission and the national governments which were involved is but a part of the question. Her main contribution lays in her efforts to pursue a detailed inquiry of the multiple aspects of the settlement, with research supported by numerous statistics from various sources.

A number of archival sources are cited in the book, most from the Greek archive collections, but also others from the Public Records Office in London, the League of Nations Archives and the US State Department. The author’s research also draws on varying historical sources, such as the writings of diplomats, administrators and members of the Refugee Settlement Commission, as well as the contemporary media.

This research is largely based on English and Greek sources; the bibliographies available in other regional languages are not represented. However, the material from the Greek archives and Greek historiography in general make this study valuable for the diverse community of Balkan historians who do not read Greek and who thus do not have access to sources not translated from that language.

Elisabeth Kontogiorgi begins her book by introducing the reader to the geography of Macedonia, its economy and history, and the various people who lived there (Part I). After explaining the political and diplomatic background of the issue, she moves with ease among varying aspects of the problem, pursuing an inquiry into the work of the Refugee Settlement Commission, the history of land ownership in Macedonia, (Part II) the social, political and ethnological impact of the migration (Part III) and its economic aspects (Part IV).

Population Exchange in Greek Macedonia would have probably benefited had the author dedicated more space to a general analysis of the minority problems in the period after World War I in regards to their regulation under different international treaties. Still, she makes an effort to explain the role of the League of Nations, which undertook the responsibility of planning and undertaking the resettlements, but left its financing to governments, banks and individual economic organizations, on an ad hoc basis.

The main value of the book lies in the detailed analysis of the less obviously political aspects of the problem. A separate heading is dedicated to the refugees, who came to Greece in large numbers from different parts of Turkey, with a varying professional and cultural background and who even spoke varying dialects of the Greek language. Their misery upon arrival is well illustrated by the accounts of all sorts of witnesses, diplomats, journalists and politicians.

For example, Ernest Hemingway wrote on their exodus in October 1922, describing the long trail of refugees as comprising “twenty miles of carts drawn by cows, bullocks and muddy-flanked water buffalo, with exhausted, staggering men, women and children, blankets over their heads, walking blindly along the rain beside their worldly goods” (p. 56).

The second part of Population Exchange in Greek Macedonia concerns the land reforms in Greek Macedonia in the years after the Greek-Turkish War. It begins by providing insight into the Ottoman system of land tenure and continues with an analysis of the Greek postwar legislation on the land reform, the partitioning of the big estates and their redistribution to the refugees under the patronage of the Refugee Settlement Commission.

One interesting section in this part is the chapter on the migration’s demographic aspects. In 1912, the Greek population of Macedonia was recorded as being 42.6 percent. With the expulsion of Turks and Slavs, in 1926 it amounted to 88.8 percent (p. 100). The region’s general demographic growth was equally dramatic; due to the wars and general instability, Macedonia had become sparsely populated, and the arrival of the refugees was generally beneficial, according to the author.

However, there seemed to be another reason for this rapid growth. Namely, as the legal regulation of the land reform stated that only married couples could obtain land, the rate of marriage in Macedonia rose extremely fast. Contemporary sources claimed that Greece, otherwise a country with one of the lowest birthrates in Europe, had obtained a high fertility due to the ‘superior biological characteristics’ of the refugee population. Still, after the process of land distribution ended, the levels of marriages and fertility fell.

The third, and probably most intriguing part of Population Exchange in Greek Macedonia is dedicated to the social, political and ethnological impact of the refugee resettlement process. The author pays special attention here to the issue of political and national considerations. She explains the place of land reform in Macedonia in the general agenda of the Greek state, and its efforts to solve problems related to agriculture through it.

After analyzing the work of the Commission entrusted with refugee resettlement, and its diplomatic, political and financial aspects, she moves to a consideration of resettlement’s social impact. Kontogiorgi offers numerous examples of friction between Macedonia’s poor pre-existing inhabitants, and the even poorer refugees who were resettled there. Further on, she continues with an analysis of the Greek state’s motivations and strong efforts to populate its northern borders with Greek-speaking refugees. This was intended, she upholds, partially for security reasons, as these parts of Macedonia were a frequent target of the IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) bands, and a potential source of dispute with Greece’s northern neighbors.

Equally interesting is the author’s account of the kind of political propaganda carried out in Greek Macedonia during the refugee resettlement period. Here she explains how the Agricultural Party, as well as the Communists, failed to attract sufficient supporters, and how the Venizelist and Anti-Venizelist camps skillfully exploited the conflicts between the old inhabitants and the newcomers.

Interestingly, although the Convention for the exchange of the population was signed by Eleftherios Venizelos himself, he was not held responsible for its tragic results in the eyes of the refugees. Thus, they regularly supported him in the elections. The anti-Venizelist camp sought to stir up the pre-existing population by darkly insinuating the alleged perils of the ‘refugee dictatorship’ and advocated an interruption of the payment of grants. Their press described the refugees as lazy and unproductive.

Still more interesting perhaps is the author’s analysis of how the settlement of Greek-speaking refugees impacted the nation-building process conducted by the Greek state in the region of Macedonia, which it had acquired less then a decade before their arrival (in 1913). The Turks from the newly Greek areas moved to Turkey and the ‘Slavophones’ (as Kontogiorgi calls them), especially those from eastern Macedonia, largely moved to Bulgaria.

The Greek government thus was presented with a unique opportunity to settle the Greek-speaking refugees on the lands vacated by these prior inhabitants. The new ethnological map of Macedonia which emerged encompassed Greeks from all four major regions of origin: Asia Minor, the Pontus, eastern Thrace and the Caucasus. It was simply a matter of time before all of these people acquired a clear Greek national identity.

The fourth and final part of Population Exchange in Greek Macedonia is dedicated to infrastructure and logistics. It shows how the rural settlement was planned by the state and how the former Turkish chifliks were populated. The health services, animal husbandry and land use were organized. The names of the villages and rivers were exchanged for Greek ones (p. 293).

Population Exchange in Greek Macedonia makes for a worthwhile read for those interested in Balkan history in general, as well as for specialists in migration studies and issues of nationalism. As the Conventions for the exchange of population have been largely considered from the point of view of political and diplomatic history, this book offers fresh insight from another perspective. It considers the consequences of a purely political inter-state agreement in the context of issues of land law, demography, nation-building and infrastructure development.

Readers of Balkan history accustomed to simple political accounts may find it somewhat bewildering to read about topics like the impact of the refugee resettlement on agriculture and animal husbandry. However, this embodies the main quality of the work, as it shows lesser-known aspects of the forced migration and its impact on the land where the refugees were settled.

Nevertheless, Population Exchange in Greek Macedonia would have been more complete if the author had dedicated more space to those who were obliged by the Greek government to leave the region. Despite its title, the work merely mentions the Neuilly Treaty and the Convention which arranged for the exchange of population between Greece and Bulgaria. Other exoduses are left unmentioned.

The demographic change which occurred in Greek Macedonia became possible due to the legally voluntary, but in practice obligatory removal of the Slavic population from that region. The author does not deal either with the complicated issue of the nationality of this population – merely calling it ‘Slavophone,’ in the best tradition of Greek nationalist historiography.

In short, this book draws a portrait of Macedonia, its sad history and the refugees who settled it. It is a book that studies an episode of unparalleled suffering, even measured by the standards of Balkan history. It shows how the landscape of Macedonia was allowed to change, with the League of Nations’s approval of the forced migrations, the determination of the Greek state to encompass the refugees in their own nation-building processes on the northern frontier, and the conduct of the political parties. The reader obtains a thorough insight into the problem, starting from the consideration of the diplomatic cabinets to the ordinary people’s struggle for daily survival.

…………………………………….

Balkanalysis.com guest reviewer Melina Grizo,  PhD, is an Assistant Professor at the Law Faculty Justinianus I in Skopje, Macedonia, and concentrates on diplomatic history and EU law. She also holds a  postgraduate degree in EU law from the University of Oxford.

Snow Descends on the Balkans, to the Relief of Ski Resorts

(Balkanalysis.com Research Service)- The first New Year’s gift of 2009 to the citizens of many Balkan countries has come in the form of the season’s first significant snowfall, blanketing large areas in Macedonia, northern Greece, Serbia, Kosovo, Bulgaria and Albania.

In the Macedonian capital of Skopje, some 16cm of snow has accumulated in the past three days- posing a challenge for motorists as city officials, caught dozing by the holidays and an insufficiency of snowplows, have been unable to clear major central streets. In Sofia, Bulgaria, similar conditions have been encountered, but authorities have a more formidable fleet of snowplows (137, to be exact) at their disposal.

Despite a handful of minor accidents, however, Macedonian citizens have generally been enjoying this unusual chance to sled in the center and to see the giant faux Christmas tree in the square, distastefully topped by a giant pink T (a gesture to likely sponsor T-Mobile), adorned by actual snow. Forecasts call for snow to continue falling until Tuesday, and resume later in the week.

Snowfall has been enabled by freezing temperatures across the region. So far, the standard has been set in ever-chilly Erzurum, Turkey. This eastern Anatolian town recently recorded temperatures of minus 36 Celsius.

Snow has also made things interesting in northern Greece, where officials have called on drivers to use chains amidst freezing temperatures as low as minus 13 Celsius and snowfall of up to 25cm across Epiros and the province of Macedonia.

Aerial footage from northern Albania shown earlier this week showed the mountainous region completely snowed under. Already hard enough to navigate in the best of times, this sparsely populated area has become inaccessible in large parts due to snowfall of up to half a meter.

Nevertheless, the sudden snowfall has also meant relief for some ski areas that had until now been hit hard by the lack of snowfall. In Serbia, the snowfall has been a boon for ski areas such as Mt Kopaonik, currently full of skiers and with 45cm of snow coverage.

Macedonia’s main ski area, Mavrovo in the west, was bare until a few days ago, causing concern among company officials. One official stated last week that since snow-making equipment was too expensive, they have been left at the mercy of the elements- which had been proving uncooperative, until this week. Now, however, the center reports over 40cm of snow coverage, many visitors, and predicts that the snow will remain for the duration of the season.

Macedonia’s other major ski center, Ski Centar Kozuf on the Greek border, did not open earlier due to cold temperatures, a company representative stated on December 30, adding that the resort would be opening soon. This new operation claims to have the most modern equipment in the Balkans, including artificial snowmaking guns and a state-of-the-art, six-person German-made lift.

Still a work in progress, the resort which opened just last year has yet to finish paving the 30km-long access road from Gevgelija, let alone to finish construct all of the facilities (though all of the allocated space for ski lodges has long since sold out). Here, the goal is to make an environmentally- and aesthetically-friendly resort; for example, while there will be a movie theater, it will be built underground.

The previous lack of snow, coupled with the general global economic downturn, have meant ski resorts in the region have been late to open or are seeing lessened demand. In Bulgaria’s leading resort area of Bansko, for example, there were still plenty of reservations available during the usually packed holiday period. The reduced number of skiers thus far has also meant declining profits for travel agencies booking tours and local hoteliers. Other, smaller Bulgarian resorts include Chepelare in the Rodopi Mountains (set to open on Jan. 7), are less hectic and cheaper as well- good for bargain-seekers.

Indeed, with no end in sight to the economic recession, regional ski centers can only adjust prices and hope that the skies at least will cooperate for the remainder of the winter season. However, the strange weather patterns of the past few years, perhaps caused by global warming, mean that nothing can be taken for granted and skiers should enjoy the conditions while they have them.

Top Balkan Ski Resorts

Want to make use of the good weather? The following Balkan ski resorts can be found online here.

Bulgaria

(See here)

Bosnia

Bjelasnica

Serbia

Kopaonik

Macedonia

Mavrovo

Ski Centar Kozuf

Greece

(See here)

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