Analysis: American Interests Vs. Turkey’s EU Membership
November 3, 2005
By Mehmet Kalyoncu
This provocative argument for why America supports Turkish EU membership, even though it is in some respects counter to its own interests, comes to us from Mehmet Kalyoncu, a Graduate Student at Georgetown University’s Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.
“The US favors Turkey’s EU membership because it considers that it could exploit an EU-member Turkey as a “Trojan horse,’ through which it could occasionally stir things up in the Union.”
This argument is relatively widely accepted, especially in circles that oppose Turkey’s EU membership. Yet it is a misleading one, and amounts to nothing more than mere conspiracy theorizing. Actually, American interests are not dramatically benefited by Turkey’s EU membership; in fact, on several critical issues they are even threatened.Nevertheless, the US still favors Turkey’s EU membership because first, clear opposition would put it at odds with both Turkey and the EU member countries; and second, impeding Turkey’s official attainment of Western ‘status’ would undermine its efforts towards the democratization of the broader Muslim world. Therefore, the US favors Turkey’s EU membership, but only because it is less detrimental to its interests to have strong ally Turkey in the Western bloc than otherwise.
Yet at the same time, American interests are not only challenged but also endangered on two grounds. First of all, with a more powerful and self-sustained European Union, the US will be challenged on issues ranging from military power projection to trade capability. Second, as the former US Ambassador to Turkey Morton Abramowitz implies, the US may lose yet another ally to the opposition side on the international criminal court issue.
Furthermore, Turkey may have to adopt a more European, and hence more critical stand vis-a-vis Israel in terms of handling the Palestine conflict. Above all, a nice and smooth transition of Turkey from longtime US ally status to a more or less European ally, even if these two are not dichotomous to each other, would send to the other states in the international system, be they Muslim or not, the message that they are not confined to side themselves with the world’s reigning superpower, and that there could be other appealing regional or continental alternatives to the alliance.
Based on the assumption that the EU with Turkey would be stronger militarily, politically, and economically, the US interests on each ground will be threatened. In terms of military technology transfer and arms sales, just like with other member countries, a Unionized Turkey will have to constrain its military spending in accordance with the EU’s budgetary policies. Moreover, it will most likely be required to buy its military hardware from suppliers within the European Union. This will automatically lead to a decline in the lucrative Turkish-American military equipment trade.
Similarly, Turkey will be asked to develop better relations with Airbus S.A.S. for airline technology and purchasing, to the detriment of its long-time relations with the Boeing Company. Added to that, such a redirecting from US suppliers to European one will entail accordingly a shift in terms of services and training.
As argued in the Van Oudenaren Report on EU expansion “The Changing Face of Europe: EU Enlargement and Implications for Transatlantic Relations,” EU expansion poses threats to the US interests in the fields of both agriculture and investment. It is more so with Turkey’s EU membership, given that its huge population and developing economy makes Turkey appealing for potential American investors and exporters.
The report suggests that enlargement could cause an increase in agricultural protectionism and a further loss for US agricultural exports, since the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) puts a limit on them. In addition, the CAP could require Turkey as well as other accession countries to apply the EU’s ban on certain US products. Given the importance that the EU puts on Turkey’s adoption of the Common Agricultural Policy, it is thus highly likely that the US interests will be affected.
Similarly, in terms of investment, certain changes are due. No doubt, EU membership will reduce business bureaucracy, corruption, and other impediments for American and other investors in Turkey. However, EU membership may force Turkey to consolidate its trade agreements with European member states, and favor European investors as opposed to US investors. Again, an expanded EU trade zone would strengthen the euro vis-a-vis the dollar in the international trade system.
Turkey’s EU membership poses challenges to US interests in terms of political relations and security issues as well. The Van Oudenaren report suggests that EU enlargement will affect American interests in two critical areas: NATO and the US defense role in Europe; and global issues such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Landmine Treaty, and the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions.
First, the enlargement will require new member states to align themselves more with Brussels than with Washington on international issues. It also requires them to support the European Security and Defense Policy, even when it conflicts with US Security priorities. Given that, Turkey as an EU member state will have to follow the pack, again to the detriment of US interests.
Moreover, on various international issues Turkey may have to position itself against the US, just as current EU member states do. The immediate examples of these issues include the Kyoto Protocol which the US has refused to sign so far, and the International Criminal Court. As Morton Abramowitz suggests, Turkey has already demonstrated an inclination towards ratifying the Rome Statute which established the International Criminal Court. Unless Turkey negotiates with the EU for the exclusive exemption of American citizens from being judged at the ICC, such ratifications would severely restrain the US-Turkish relations to the detriment of both sides’ interests. In addition, EU membership may lead Turkey to take a more critical (i.e., European) stance on Israel’s handling of the Palestine issue, as well as a friendlier stance on Iran’s aspirations. Ankara would thus end up conflicting with Washington on both issues.
Given all these possible challenges, why then does the US still support Turkey’s EU membership?
First of all, any clear and direct opposition to Turkey’s EU membership would not help American interests. Second, supposing that Turkey does enter the Union someday, it is better for the US to have Turkey in the EU as a close ally than to have it as an alienated, former ally. The US can and should reap benefits from a Turkish EU membership by seeking to create a second close EU ally alongside Great Britain. Turkey after all could be an EU member, and yet remain closer to the US, just like the UK, on many issues.
Besides, Turkish society has always had strong affinity for the US and American values, compared to the European ones. In 2005, this is still so to a great extent, despite the provocations still being made by marginal groups in Turkey such as militant secularists and religious fundamentalists. The US should take advantage of that affinity and further develop its cultural ties with Turkey, in order to have a strong ally in the EU.
Note: a slightly different version of this article was originally published by Zaman US.
Balkanalysis on Amazon Kindle