Balkanalysis.com

By David Binder

Could Kosovo, as a newly independent state in the middle of the Balkan Peninsula, become a second Israel? A thorny question: Merely linking Kosovo and Israel in the same sentence could invite accusations of anti-Zionism on the one hand or anti Illyrianism on the other. Yet there are some historic parallels.

I do not propose to evaluate the parallels in terms of good or bad, but rather to explore the question of what happens when great powers try to resolve ethnic and territorial disputes by authorizing a new national state. A basic question poses itself: whether the creation of an Israel or a Kosovo is a factor fostering stability in its region, or fostering strife.

Since its birth Israel has fought five wars as well as engaging in numerous lesser combat actions. In modern times, Kosovo has been the scene of major battles at the end of World War II and again in 1999. The foundation of the State of Israel began with the partition 60 years ago of what had been the British Mandate of Palestine into separate homelands for Jews and for Palestinians.

The UN General Assembly approved the United Nations Partition Plan with a two-thirds majority. In May 1948, a provisional government announced the creation of the State of Israel. US President Harry Truman, who had previously been skeptical about the viability of an independent Jewish entity, swiftly declared de facto recognition of Israel (de jure recognition followed in 1949).

While American political support for Israel was strong and steady, substantial financial assistance was slower in coming. It started with a $100 million loan in 1949, but now amounts to nearly $3 billion in annual grants.

Kosovo became a ward of the United States in a similarly stumbling fashion. In late December 1992 – eight months into the Bosnian civil war – President George H.W. Bush sent a letter to President Slobodan Milosevic declaring: “in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.”

At that time there was no physical conflict whatsoever in Kosovo. So the Bush message struck the Serbian leadership like a bolt out of the blue. But the marker was set and the warning was repeated later by the Clinton Administration. The US finally implemented it in March 1999 with heavy air attacks.

Then, as soon as Serbian forces withdrew, President Clinton dumped Kosovo into the hands of the United Nations. Since it was taken over by the UN, Kosovo, the eternal economic basket case, has received more than $500 million from the United States and $3 billion from the European Union.

In the case of Israel, foreshadowing its creation was the Nazi genocide, which provided surviving European Jews and their supporters with a powerful argument for establishment of a Jewish homeland. In addition, from World War I on there was also a strongly articulated contention that nations had the right to self-determination. In the case of Jews that was the starting point of the Zionist cause in the late 19th century. In the argumentation of Albanians, Kosovo was the scene of genocidal actions by Serbs -although they do not dare to compare it to the fate of European Jews in World War II. (Their contentions were also weakened by the Albanians’ savage treatment of Kosovo Serbs).

Rather, the most vehement Albanian demands are framed in terms of the right of self-determination. For a long time they have been staunchly backed by the United States. As Condoleezza Rice stated on May 15: “it is important now to recognize that Kosovo will never again be part of Serbia.”

As it enters its seventh decade, Israel appears to be a fairly secure entity, despite being surrounded by hostile neighbors. The Zionist dream of Greater Israel (Eretz Yisrael Hashlemah) – including biting off big chunks of its neighbors – has been reduced to nibbles by militant settlers in West Bank lands. Yet Israel for all its extraordinary accomplishments remains a factor of great instability, not only in its immediate vicinity but well beyond. Now here is Kosovo on the eve of possible independence -no longer as a ward of the UN, but of the European Union. What are its prospects? Given the ambitions of the more militant elements among the Albanians — including fanatical elements in the diaspora – one wonders whether an independent state of Kosovo will contribute to stability in the region. (Stability, we must keep in mind, is the declared policy goal of the United States and of the European Union in the Balkans.)

As with the Zionists of yore harkening back to Biblical times, contemporary Albanians cultivate myths of Illyrian ancestry which would make them coeval with classical Greeks, and of an ancient “Dardania,” encompassing Kosovo, southern Serbia, western Macedonia and northern Albania. (Some chauvinistic elements toy with the idea of renaming the province “Dardania”.) Myths are harmless if they are confined to books and songs. For a dozen years Illyria Newspaper, published in the Bronx, carried a map of the “Greater Albania” encompassing pieces of Macedonia, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro. But the Illyria-Dardania myths have also inspired forays by armed Albanian militants into places like western Macedonia and southern Serbia, as well as irredentist threats to southern Montenegro (“Malesia”) and northwestern Greece (to Albanians, “Chameria”).

Could a new State of Kosovo with its barely tested government and security forces, made up in large part by former Kosovo Liberation Army fighters, cope with such elements? Could the European Union and the remains of KFOR still posted in the region contain Kosovo?

*David Binder (born 1931) was a correspondent for The New York Times from 1961 until 2004. He specialized in coverage of central and eastern Europe, based in Berlin, Belgrade and Bonn. The current piece was published in Belgrade‘s Politika on May 25, 2007.

By Ioannis Michaletos and Christopher Deliso

Strategic Geography: an Overview

Greece‘s northeastern province of Thrace has historically played a very significant strategic role in terms of economy and defense. The great Roman trade route, the Via Egnatia, spanning the southern Balkans from east to west, passed across it; for the Byzantines and later the Ottomans, Thrace was the gateway to Constantinople, to be defended at all costs. The extensive and fertile Thracian plains, most of which are now concentrated in Turkish Thrace, were known as “the breadbasket of Constantinople‘ for the grains crops they supplied to the capital.

From the perspective of modern Greece, looking from the other direction of course, Thrace is strategically significant as the only land route through which Turkey could attack with infantry in the case of an invasion. During Communism, Greece also had to keep a wary eye on Bulgaria, which lies to the north and also possesses a portion of the geographical region of Thrace. However, with the end of the Soviet threat and the absorption of Bulgaria into the European Union, that threat has evaporated and Greece no longer has to look to secure its northern flank (save for possible infiltration from human traffickers and so on).

In some ways, this strategic geography of Greek Thrace makes it easier to defend, since forces are now concentrated on the eastern front at the long Turkish border, which generally hugs the River Evros. To the north, the rolling Rhodope Mountains make up most of the natural border with Bulgaria. To the south is the north Aegean Sea; south and southwest in this sea lie the strategic islands of Samothraki, Thasos and, further on, Limnos, which has a major military presence. In the west Thrace borders on the Greek province of Macedonia.

Thus while command-and-control and military intelligence operations are staggered throughout western, central and eastern Thrace, the largest concentration of Greek land forces and military equipment are located in the Evros prefecture. Along with the Evros river system and the Arda River, running southwest through Kastanies, and the Erythropotamos, 39 km south and running southwest through the major military town of Didymoteihon. The landscape of Evros consists of rolling hills and plains, much like the Turkish side, and is complemented by a vast swamp — the Evros River Delta — that is a protected environmental refuge for birds, as well as a buffer with Turkey, east of Alexandroupolis and south of Feres. An appreciation of this geography helps to understand the factors at play in any future military confrontation between the two Balkan rivals.

Tensions Rising

At the moment, the perennial tensions between Greece and Turkey have been rising over Turkish opposition to offshore oil drilling in the divided island of Cyprus, a major ally of Greece. In April, Balkanalysis.com reported that the Greek military was preparing for possible Turkish provocations in the eastern Aegean, most probably involving the violation of what Greece perceives to be its airspace, by Turkish fighter jets. The projections then indicated a likely timeframe of May 20-July 20 for such incidents to occur.

New information recently received from Greek sources also attests that the Greek services, particularly signals intelligence, have been working “round the clock to predict the Turkish military’s next move. While much of the government’s attention is obviously being focused on the eastern Aegean islands bordering Anatolia, troops in Thrace have gone on “high alert,” with the usual 30,000-strong troop number having been buttressed by as many as 30,000 additional soldiers, according to one high-level source.

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By Jan Buruma

Almost two decades after the fall of communism, Bulgarians are still wrestling with their totalitarian past. They do not yet have complete access to the files of the communist-era secret service (Darzhavna Sigurnost), but that is about to change. In June 2006, a legal deadline to open the files expired. But only in April 2007 has Bulgaria appointed a parliamentary commission to work on the topic.

The Bulgarian secret service was formally abolished in 1990, just after dictator Todor Zhivkov was forced to resign. Despite public pressure to open its archives like in other post-Soviet countries, in January 1990 most of the files were destroyed – those listing 46 percent of the secret services’ collaborators, 30 percent of those citizens who had been placed under surveillance and 91 percent of those who let facilities to the police.

The most high-profile case was the disappearance of the Georgi Markov file. Markov was a dissident writer and journalist who was famously killed in 1978 in London by a poisoned umbrella. KGB officers revealed in the 1990′s that they had cooperated on that case with their Bulgarian counterparts.

Bulgarian investigative journalist Hristo Hristov wrote the bestseller Kill the Tramp about the Bulgarian and British policy in the Markov case. The book was launched in June 2005, just before the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) was expected to win the parliamentary elections. Hristov’s book got a lot of publicity abroad, though not in Bulgaria itself. It is typical that only almost two decades after the fall of communism such a book could be published. In the early 1990′s the Bulgarians still feared the ghost of the formerly all-powerful DS. The publication of this groundbreaking work came only after the 1997 Velvet Revolution, when Bulgaria moved towards the West, joining NATO in 2004 and the EU at the beginning of this year.

However, the Balkan country still remains the only former Soviet satellite that has not yet given complete access to its secret files. Hristov wrote about his difficulties to get access to some documents. In May 2006 a 15-year legal deadline on confidential information expired, and the government announced it would gradually make public over 250,000 documents. However, all personal details were to be erased from the files, neutralising much of their effect.

Ever since 1989 Bulgarians have been discussing this controversial topic. In 1993, the right-wing Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) tried to pass a law to open the secret files, but this initiative was amongst others blocked by Ahmed Dogan, the leader of the ethnic Turkish party (DPS). In 1997, the SDS managed to pass the law. It could have led to the implication of about 150 ministers and members of parliament, as well as numerous presidential and parliamentary candidates, as agents and collaborators of the secret services. However, the Constitutional Court ruled that names listed on documents from destroyed files could be manipulated and therefore should not be revealed. SDS-leader Kostov admitted that some files could have been destroyed by his own party’s sympathisers, although he refused to reveal any names. Some names though, were made public, the most high-profile being Ahmed Dogan. He had served from 1974 till 1988 as DS-agent, but was prosecuted by the same organization from 1988, and therefore survived the ensuing public outrage.

In June 2006 the renewed debate took a presidential turn, as both current socialist President Georgi Parvanov and his right-wing predecessor (and current SDS-leader) Petar Stoyanov became involved. Parvanov admitted that he knew that a file on him existed under the name Gotse, but denied that he had actually worked for the secret services. Parvanov blamed Kostov for revealing the information. The latter admitted that he had known about the Gotse file back in 1997 when, as prime minister, he had set up a commission to investigate accusations.

However, not only the current president was accused. An internet forum posting claimed that Stoyanov had a file under the covert name Victor. Stoyanov immediately denied this, explaining that he and his family had been persecuted by the communist authorities before 1989. The SDS-leader called upon Interior Minister Rumen Petkov to investigate the claim and make a public statement declaring that they were not true, and threatened to cause an international scandal if he would not do so. Petkov denied that there was any information proving Stoyanov worked for the state security service, although the Interior Minister admitted that the secret service had followed Stoyanov because of his family’s background.

The political controversies were not limited to Bulgaria. It affected relations between Bulgaria, on the one hand, and NATO and the EU on the other. Dutch MEP Mrs. Els de Groen, who is a member of the delegation to the EU-Bulgaria Joint Parliamentary Committee, has been lobbying for complete access to all secret files. According to Mrs. De Groen, Bulgaria must be completely frank about its communist past in order to be a democratic and transparent EU-member. Therefore, she organised in July 2006 an international conference on the secret files.

Meanwhile, Greens in the European parliament warned that the continued existence of the secret files could lead to corruption and blackmail. In 2000 a parliamentary commission had started to work on the opening of the secret files. However, in 2002 it was closed by Prime Minister Simeon Saxecoburggotski. Metodi Andreev, the then-chairman of the commission, said it is a public secret that there are links between former secret service generals and organised crime. The EU is deeply concerned about the level of organised crime in Bulgaria, and there is speculation that the remaining files may contain revelations of links between prominent Bulgarians and organised crime groups. Therefore, as a brand new EU-member, Bulgaria will remain fir another three years under the strict control of Brussels.

In December 2006, Bulgaria’s parliament finally adopted several highly controversial amendments to not make public the files of those former agents when either their lives or national security could be endangered. Further, all documents would only be made public with the personal approval of the parliamentary commission’s chairman. Right-wing MP’s disapproved completely, claiming the decisions were made under pressure of the left-wing President Parvanov.

Nevertheless, it took the Bulgarians another four months to set up the commission, chaired by left-wing MP Evtim Kostadinov. SDS and the nationalistic party Ataka boycotted the 6 April 2007 vote on the commission, because they have no representative. The National Investigative Service denied SDS-candidate Georgi Kostantinov access to confidential information. He had allegedly masterminded the blowing up of a foreign diplomat’s apartment in order to hamper ties between Bulgaria and the United Kingdom. However, and likely of greater importance, Konstantinov was persecuted by the communist regime and spent ten years in Bulgarian prisons. In 1973, he fled Bulgaria and sought political asylum in France.

Progress thus remains slow. Stoyanov said the SDS was not going to put forward another candidate, because he very much doubts the commission will perform its duties properly. For his part, Kostadinov announced at a press conference on April 6, 2007 that his commission will start to check the past of the Bulgarian candidate-MEP’s, as elections for the 18 Bulgarian members of the European Parliament will be held on 20 May 2007.

By Mehmet Efe BiresselioˆšÃ‘Ÿlu

Today, Europe is a net importer of gas. Natural gas accounts for 25% of the European Union’s total energy consumption. The Union currently imports more then 40% of its natural gas needs, with the major suppliers being Russia, Norway and Algeria. It is expected by the European Commission that the EU’s dependency will rapidly increase in the coming decades. This import dependency will rise from 40% to 55% in 2010, to 67% in 2020, and to 81% in 2030, according to the Europe Energy Outlook 2020.ⁱ

The European Union is currently in need of diversifying its import dependency. Russia has the biggest stake in the imported natural gas consumption of Europe. Currently, however, Russia is not a reliable source for import as it has difficulties of various sorts with several former Soviet countries, as well as a rapidly growing domestic need for natural gas. Nevertheless, Russia will remain the prime supplier of the European Union as it has already existing deals and pipeline connections with the EUⁱⁱ, even though it faces difficulties in export due to the constraints in the region.

Norway is the second major supplier for the European Union. It produces natural gas from indigenous North Sea resources, but the gradual exhaustion of these resources means that Europe is increasingly looking for alternative ways to import natural gas.

Algeria is the third major supplier of natural gas to the European Union. Natural gas which is imported from Algeria is in LNG format. The North African country is one of the major supplies for the Mediterranean and Atlantic coast of Europe. The LNG format of natural gas from Algeria is currently lacking markets in Central and Eastern Europe, however. It is also expensive to export LNG format due to the transportation costs for vessels, and its transformation process. It has relatively high costs when compared with piped gas.

The most popular perspective in the modern energy sector considers diversification of the sources and the security of supply. According to the new policies that the European Union is implementing, this perspective would be the benchmark for the future natural gas balance of Europe.

The construction of new pipelines utilizing the same sources has nothing to do with the perspective of diversification of sources. For example, currently a Russia-Germany natural gas pipeline is under construction (via Ukraine and Poland). The pipeline will run from Babayevo to the Russian coast at Vyborg, before going under the Baltic Sea to the town of Greifswald in north-eastern Germany. It is basically the construction of a pipeline from a usual source, Russia. It does not particularly help the European Union’s policy of diversification of resources, however, even though Alexey Miller, the chairman of Russian giant GazProm stated that “we have launched a great European project… This is a new export route that will increase Europe’s energy security”ⁱⁱⁱ.

Currently, the problem in the EU is the lack of common energy policies. When it comes to energy, member countries cannot implement the same policies, as they tend to regard energy narrowly as a problem of national interest first and foremost. Therefore, new pipelines and routes from different sources should be taken into account in order to capture the real spirit of Europe-wide security of supply and diversification of sources.

One of the major alternatives for the European Union is to import gas from the Central Asian and Caspian Sea Region countries. The vast energy potential of these regions has refocused the EU’s attention. The demise of the Soviet Union has also increased the number of countries through which pipeline must transit.

In order to import natural gas from these regions, The EU has two choices. The first one is to increase the import dependency on Russia, by importing the regions’ natural gas via the Russian pipeline system. The second and more effective choice would be through the new route from the Caucasus and Turkey. With this second option, the EU could have the possibility of importing natural gas from Turkey via Greece.

A new South Caucasus gas pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, will be operational soon in order to connect the vast natural gas resources of the regions to the Turkish natural gas pipeline network.

The EU is currently taking a number of efforts to strengthen its diversification of natural gas need. Creating trans-European energy networks is the major policy for the EU. It is focusing on regional formations, such as the South European Gas Ring involving Turkey and Greece- thus bringing Caspian and Central Asian natural gas West via an alternate route.

Turkey’s Role as a Supplier

Turkey is currently transforming itself from a transit country to a major energy supplier and an energy hub. It has a major role in the East-West energy corridor, according to current trends in world energy consumption and production. Turkey is the major conduit for primary markets like the EU from production regions such as Central Asia and the Caspian. Currently, there are no physical natural gas pipeline connections between Europe and Turkey. It thus becomes important to connect the European continent to Turkey in order for the former to import natural gas from Caspian and Central Asian Region via an alternative and reliable route.

The first step for the European Union to benefit from existing Turkish pipeline networks is the Turkey-Greece interconnector. The regional framework for this connection is the South European Gas Ring. Turkish-Greek collaboration is strongly supported by the EU in order to realize this project. The feasibility of the project is supported by funds from the Trans-European Networks^iv. With the financial support of the EU, the construction of a Turkey-Greece interconnector started in July 2005 and is expected to finish in the first half of 2007. This is only the first part of the project, however. The second part will be to connect Greece to Italy via an undersea pipeline between northwestern Greece and Otranto, Italy.

The first part of the project comprises the construction of a 286 km pipeline between Karacabey, Turkey and Komotini, Greece. It will begin by carrying 0.75 bcm/y and will reach its potential to 11 bcm/y in 2011^v. It will carry the natural gas of Azerbaijan to Europe, via the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline. Turkey and Azerbaijan have already signed an agreement on the sale of gas to Turkey with a clause on re-sale option. Kazakhstan is currently trying to break the Russian dominance on its natural gas export, and in the future it can export its natural gas via the BTE natural gas pipeline through Turkey, and thereafter the European Union. Also, with the possible Trans-Caspian pipeline, Turkmenistan would be in a position to export its vast natural gas resources to Europe via Turkey. This is one of the first steps for Turkey to become a major supplier for Europe’s natural gas needs, besides the projected Nabucco Pipeline and the existing Turkey-Tabriz Pipeline. Turkey is more likely to become a “fourth artery” of European natural gas imports with the pipelines which have been constructed, those which are under construction or are projected for the future.

Greece’s Role as a Transit Route

The major project which will connect the Caspian/Central Asian regions to the EU is starting with the South-European Gas project. Greece has a major role here, as this project is turning Greece into one of the major transit country for Caspian and Central Asian gas exported via Turkey.

Greece is in the process of transformation in the field of energy, just as Turkey is. With the developments of new pipeline networks, Greece will shift from energy consumer market to energy transport hub and an energy producer, with possible side deals for a re-sale option. Greece has already finished most of its interconnections of natural gas framework.

The South-European Gas Ring project is one of the major alternative for the EU for becoming less dependent on Russian gas. This process is starting with a pipeline which will connect Turkey’s domestic natural gas infrastructure with Greece. Turkey and Greece have already made agreements with Azerbaijan and Iran for the future sale to the EU. This is the first step in creating a southern gas route to the EU from the Caspian.

This connector has further significance for Turkey and Greece. This could be an important symbol for Turkish and Greek collaboration for the future. As Greek Premier Costas Karamanlis put it, “this pipeline is connecting two countries and two peoples.^vi” Thw project is also strongly supported by the US and the EU for the future of the eliminating the perennial Aegean rivalry between the two old adversaries.

The second step of this project is to connect Greece with Italy by a pipeline from northwestern Greece to Ontranto. It will comprise a 212km undersea stretch and its connection to the Turkey-Greece pipeline which will complete sometime in 2007. The Italy-Greece project can also be seen as a demonstration of the European Union’s will to reduce its Russian dependency.

Greece will import up to 11 bcm of natural gas via the new pipeline, of which it will export more then 8 bcm to Italy. The remainder will be for regional and domestic use. Greece has one advantage in this case. Natural gas accounts for only 10% of Greece’s energy consumption^vii. This means that Greece will be able to export a significant amount of natural gas to Western Europe.

Greece also has strong aspirations in the Balkans in the field of energy. It currently envisions exports to Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria, including all the signatories of the 2005 Energy Community treaty for Southeastern Europe, and all Russian clients.

In conclusions, the South European Gas Ring project is a real alternative for the European Union to diversify its natural gas supply. It is a positive project for the EU to assure its energy security in this way. In this sense, Turkey and Greece hold the main role in this project. The significance of Turkey as an alternative natural gas supplier to the European Union, and Greece as a transit point as an EU member, mean that this project will further help the collaboration between Turkey and Greece, despite the chronic disputes in the Aegean and over the island of Cyprus.

i The report can be found at; http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/figures_archive/energy_outlook_2020/index_en.htm

ii Clingendael International Energy Programme, Institute for International relations: “Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics-Final Report” January 2004

iii In his speech for the construction of Russian-German Natural Gas Link, 9 December 2005

iv More information about the Trans-European Network and its funds can be found at; http://ec.europa.eu/ten/transport/index_en.htm

v BOTAS, Turkey-Greece Natural Gas Pipeline Project, http://www.botas.gov.tr/eng/projects/allprojects/greece.asp

vi In his speech at the ceremony of Turkish-Greek Natural Gas Project, 3 July 2005, TekirdaˆšÃ‘Ÿ, Turkey

vii Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis-Greece, August 2006

By Mehmet Kalyoncu

Nowadays, amid the current presidential and nearing parliamentary elections, Ankara is preoccupied with the question of a cross-border operation against Kurdish PKK militants who have found refuge in northern Iraq. A provocative comment came from one of the Kurdish leaders in Iraq, Massoud Barzani: “if Turkey interferes with Kirkuk, then we will interfere with Diyarbakir.”1 Baghdad’s apparent tacit approval of his comments have strained nerves in Ankara more than ever as the Turkish military keeps a wary eye on developments in Northern Iraq.2

The provocative attitude of Barzani’s Kurdish Regional Government, and Baghdad’s failure to confront it, are also coinciding with heightened terrorist activities from the PKK in Turkey’s southeastern border area with Iraq. This has had the effect of blurring the distinction between the PKK threat to Turkey and Kurdish state formation in Northern Iraq, creating the impression that the two are naturally conducive to each other. In fact, they are not. The two are indeed interrelated, but will reinforce one another only if Ankara gets involved in northern Iraq militarily and isolates itself from the region economically and diplomatically.

The PKK threat is likely to be used by the Kurdish leaders as leverage against Ankara so long as it does not recognize the legitimacy of Kurdish state formation in northern Iraq. The PKK would seek to garner Kurdish popular support for the idea of the so called “Greater Kurdistan” in the southeastern Turkey as well as within the Kurdish Diaspora in the European capitals through alliances, with other diasporas traditionally not so friendly with Turkey.

The PKK threat is, however, destined to die out, provided that Ankara fully engages in diplomatic and economic relations with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad, tries to make sure that the KRG is not dominated by a particular clan or family but is controlled by alternating governments through democratic elections, and carries out multilateral but not unilateral military operations against the PKK camps in Northern Iraq. At the end of the day, the formation of a Kurdish political entity in Northern Iraq may even serve Turkey’s deliberate diffusion into the Middle East, if handled properly by Ankara.

A Hostile and Unpredictable Kurdish Government is a Threat- Not Kurdistan

A democratic Kurdistan on good terms with Turkey can be a reliable ally in the Middle East. As a matter of fact, for Turkey, which is now all for more involvement in the Middle East, Kurdistan with a democratic government could be even vital to Turkish interests, provided that its leadership is available and accountable to the average Kurd, and hence subject to alteration through a democratic election process. The real challenge seems to be securing the Kurdish Regional Government’s future against the absolute domination of a particular clan, which is the Barzani clan at the moment. This clan has traditionally proven unpredictable and exhibited a mostly confrontational behavioral pattern.

Ankara can never have a stable and predictable relationship with the Barzani leadership, at least so far as past experience would seem to indicate. The relations between the two have frequently swayed between cooperation and confrontation. Turkey provided a safe haven for some half a million Iraqi Kurds during the First Gulf War, in addition to 1.5 million Kurds escaping Saddam Hussein’s campaigns in the 1980s- most notably, the 1988 chemical attack in Halabja. In the early 1990s, Ankara granted the Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Massoud Barzani the right to seek refuge in Turkey, which it did not give to his rival, Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Nevertheless, the Ankara-Barzani alliance did not last.

According to Iraqi Kurdish writer Kamal Said Qadir, “switching alliances is part of the Barzani family political culture, intertwining survival and power with Kurdish nationalism. Between 1980 and 1988, Massoud Barzani allied himself with Iran in its fight against Saddam, even as the revolutionary authorities in Iran turned their guns on Iranian Kurds. After long hostility to Turkey, in 1992, he allied with Ankara in its fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerˆš„¢n Kurdistan, PKK); in 1996, he allied with Saddam Hussein against rival Kurdish leader (and current Iraqi president) Jalal Talabani. In the wake of Iraq’s liberation in 2003, Barzani has portrayed himself as a U.S. ally. For how long, though, remains unclear.”3 Barzani’s recently confrontational attitude toward Ankarawas thus not contrary to his attested behavioral pattern when he recently threatened to interfere with Diyarbakir, Turkey’s southeastern province, in case Turkey interferes with Kirkuk, which he claims to be a truly Kurdish city.

However, Opportunities Still Exist

Despite Ankara’s not so friendly experience with Massoud Barzani, Turkey and the Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq, be it defined as a state within clearly defined borders or an autonomous regional government, could develop mutually beneficial relationship in this chronically unstable region- so long as the Kurdish leadership turns truly democratic as opposed to being run by a dictatorship led by a particular family or clan. According to Richard Holbooke, a former US Ambassador to the UN, “despite their history, Turkeyand Iraqi Kurdistan need each other. Kurdistan could become a buffer between Turkey and the chaos to the south, while Turkey could become the protector of a Kurdistan that, though still technically part of Iraq, is effectively cut loose from a Baghdad government that may no longer function. In addition, Turkey has a major economic opportunity in northern Iraq; already, more than 300 Turkish companies and substantial investment are a primary engine of Kurdish growth.”4

Due to either this approach being favored by the United States, which has so far acted unilaterally in the region with almost no regard for Ankara’s concerns, or fearing possible nationalist unrest from the Turkish public, Ankara has so far reflexively disregarded the possibility of accommodating the process of Kurdish state formation in Northern Iraq. However, such a process, so long as it is guided by democratic values and remains somewhat predictable, may not be detrimental to Turkish national interests in the region after all.

Full engagement with the current Kurdish state-building process in Iraq from the very beginning would help Turkey gain confidence, not only in its own Kurds, but also in all Kurds of the region- the very constituency targeted by the PKK and other separatist entities. In so doing, Turkey can build leverage against the possibly hostile Kurdish government(s) now and then in Northern Iraq, and the central government in Baghdad. In this regard, Turkey should take the lead in the region by helping the Kurds of Northern Iraq to modernize their community, establish institutions and help democracy take root in the new Kurdish state entity.

Turkey’s support to the Iraqi Kurds should also aim to create a broad middle class which would also develop an economic interdependence between Turkey and the Kurdish Iraqi state. Economic engagement could start with taxing the already ongoing trade between Turkey’s southeastern cities and the cities in Northern Iraq. Such an engagement should also aim to carry Kirkuk oil to the global markets through Turkish pipelines. In addition to pursuing full diplomatic and economic relations with the new Kurdish state, Ankara should mobilize civil society organizations in Turkey to be proactive in the making of the new Kurdistan, so that the ties between the Turkish and Kurdish publics remain strong, even if disruptions may occur occasionally between the governments.

Is the Military Option a Viable One?

The option of a military operation against the PKK camps in Northern Iraq might seem tempting, but is in fact highly risky, not only for Turkey but also for regional stability. The military might of Ankara of course cannot be compared to that of the PKK rebels, or even its possible allies in Baghdad. Based on that comparison and the record of 16 successful cross-border operations, some may tend to think that it would take only hours to annihilate the PKK threat. However, it is no longer 1992, when the PKK was encircled by Barzani’s peshmerga units from the south, thereby helping the Turkish military to succeed quickly. Today, a military operation with some 40,000 troops against the PKK is no different from a scenario in which a conventional military power goes after a non-conventional enemy with high mobility, which would most probably retreat back and diffuse into the Kurdish civilian settlements. Once the Turkish military forces are tempted to chase the retreating fighters, it may be far too late for Ankara to realize just how far it has had to go into northern Iraq by the time the world media will have already condemned the operation as a Turkish invasion of Iraq.

The Last Thing Turkey Needs: A Hostile Kurdish Diaspora

Another risk associated with Ankara’s non-accommodating approach to the Kurdish state being formed in Northern Iraq is the likelihood that it would create a hostile Kurdish Diaspora in the Western capitals, and provide a medium for them to be lured by other anti-Turkish diasporas. Given Turkey’s bitter experience with the Armenian and Greek diasporas, the last thing Turkey needs is a hostile Kurdish Diaspora. However, the present attitude of Ankara toward the Kurdish state formation in a restructuring Iraq is likely to only create another hostile diaspora, this time a Kurdish one, mainly located in the European capitals.

It is to the best interest of Ankara to recognize that it cannot afford to ignore the ongoing modernization of Kurds in Western capitals and the expediting role of transportation and digital communication to help them organize. Most probably no later than a decade will proliferate Western educated Kurdish leaders who will be pursuing a Kurdish “independence” cause. A la Qubad Talabani who represents the Kurdish Regional Government in Washington, who is up for establishing a Kurdish Congressional Caucus and a Kurdish-American Business Council, and who interestingly called for an amnesty for the PKK, 6 which is listed as terrorist organization by the US State Department.

Similarly is it inevitable that there will grow a second- and third-generation European Kurdish community which will be attached to the imagined “Kurdistan.” It should not be difficult for Ankara to understand that such a flourishing diaspora would easily find financial and intellectual support in Europe, given certain European states’ certified support for the PKK. According to Soner Cagaptay of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, in the recent past Greece, Bulgaria and Russia, in addition to Syria, Iran and Israel have supported the PKK in one way or another.5 In addition, the Danish government has long turned a blind eye to the Kurdish Roj TV broadcasting from Denmark, despite Ankara’s concerns over the TV channel being used as an outlet for the PKK to convey its captured leader Abdullah Ocalan’s messages, and to instigate the Kurds in Turkey to make uprisings and provocations. Similarly, the Belgian government has long provided protection to Fehriye Erdal, a PKK member and the assassin of prominent Turkish businessman Ozdemir Sabanci, despite Ankara’s continuous efforts to bring her to justice.

After all, not only should Ankara avoid making foes of those who could be friends, but also recognize the opportunities attached to the challenges unfolding in Northern Iraq.

1 “Barzani haddini asti, bu sozlerin bedeli agir olur”, Zaman, April 10, 2007, available at http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?haberno=525763
2 “Barzani’ye destek Verdi: Karisanin elini keseriz”, Zaman, April 14, 2007, available at http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?haberno=527509

3 Kamal Said Qadir, “The Barzani Chameleon”, Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2007, available at http://www.meforum.org/article/1681

4 Richard Holbrooke, “Opportunity for Turks and Kurds?” Washington Post, February 12, 2007, p.17

5 “Dr. Cagaptay: ABD, Turkiye’nin K. Irak’ta kisa sureli operasyon yapmasina goz yumar”, Zaman Amerika, 12 Nisan 2007, p.3

6 “Qubad Talabani calls for amnesty for PKK,” Turkish Daily News, (KurdishMedia.com), June 14, 2006. See speech on “Amnesty for the PKK”<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p99AT2B00Bc>at the Center for Strategic and International Studies<http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Center_for_Strategic_and_International_Studies>(CSIS), June 13, 2006, cited at http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Qubad_al-Talabani