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The North Caucasus Knot: Adygeya’s and Ingushetia’s Struggle for Autonomy

By Alisa Voznaya*

On the eve of the G8 Summit in St. Petersburg, Russian authorities hailed the operation that lay to rest Russia’s most infamous terrorist, Shamil Basayev, as the beginning of the end of uncertainty in the North Caucasus. With slow but steady economic growth registered in Chechnya and Dagestan, and a continued display of support for the pro-Kremlin leaders in those republics, one could finally envision stability within a formerly volatile and unpredictable region.

However, the Russian Federation is far from declaring the North Caucasus a non-problematic district. Recent events in Adygeya and Ingushetia, two of the smallest republics in the North Caucasus, demonstrate that much work is to be done to normalize the region. In early April of this year, Khazret Sovmen, Adygeya’s president since 2002, issued an emotional resignation during a heated session of parliament. It was quickly retracted after a conversation with the Kremlin.

However, the dark underbelly of the Adygeyan internal conflict has been brought to light. Dmitrii Kozak, Vladimir Putin’s envoy to the Southern Federal Okrug (District), which incorporates the North Caucasus, has recently made formal proposals to the Russian president’s office to unify Krasnodar Krai (a large federal unit in the Southern Federal Okrug that envelops Adygeya) with the Republic of Adygeya. Sovmen’s reaction in parliament was a protest against such plans.

There is good reason for suggesting an amalgamation of the two regions. Adygeya is entirely surrounded by the territory of the Krasnodar Krai, and some 68 percent of its population are ethnic Russians (versus 22 percent ethnic Adyges) who are open to the idea of unification. Further, a history of peaceful co-existence already exists.

However, the rationale behind the merger is first and foremost economic, or so the Russian officials say. Krasnodar has largely been touted as an economic success story, with a well-developed Black Sea coast tourism industry and fertile soil, despite the fact that regional variation is stark; other less fortunate districts are impoverished and suffer from high unemployment. Adygeya, by contrast, is the fifteenth-most subsidised federal unit with 58.1 percent of its internal budget coming direct from Moscow’s coffers.

If Adygeya were to be absorbed into Krasnodar Krai, it would cease to function as an independent administrative unit and would most likely act as an autonomous oblast within the Krai, very much like the previous arrangement prior to the 1991 declaration of independence by Adygeya. Yet this is unlikely to happen, at least not in the near future. Sovmen’s resignation incited instant support from the two major Adygei/Cherkess organizations (Cherkess Congress and Adyge Khase), and the Adyge population warn that ethnic conflict would be inevitable if the merger were to become reality.

Their opponents, the Union of Slavs of Adygeya (SSA), argue for the merger on the basis of political factors, including alleged discrimination against ethnic Slavs. Despite the fact that the Adyges make up less than a third of the population, the SSA argues, the titular nationality has taken control over policy, the economy and culture in the republic.

The Slavic nationalists have certainly taken this issue seriously and brought a draft law before Adygeya’s lower chamber of parliament in February on referenda that would, if enacted, have constituted the legal basis for a republic-wide vote on the merger, in which the Slav majority could easily force a victory. This law was voted down this time, but there is no telling whether it will not make a new appearance in the near future. However, whether or not threats of ethnic conflict and ill internal relations from the Adygei organizations are substantiated, the federal centre is hardly interested in taking a risk of destabilizing another part of the North Caucasus.

Although Adygeya may have withstood forces from both within and without in the most recent attempt to merge it with Krasnodar Krai, its battle for autonomy may not yet be over. The new Adygei parliament, elected on March 12, has only one chamber, unlike the previous legislative body. This means that it could be much easier to push through the referendum law. Additionally, Sovmen’s open threat to resign may have undermined his future negotiations with the Kremlin, which often dislikes independent regional political figures and prefers to install its supporters in regional positions of power. Thus, the prospect of Adygei autonomy is still under threat.

Whilst the leaders of Adygeya face a controversial internal and external threat of absorption, another North Caucasian republic has come under the spotlight of threatened autonomy in recent months. Ingushetia, a small republic wedged between North Ossetia and Chechnya, has recently experienced a surge of violence and continued territorial pressure from its two neighbours. In recent years the Chechen conflict has spilled over into Ingushetia, with many terrorist attacks having been planned from this republic. In fact, it is widely believed that Ingush rebels were responsible for the execution of the Beslan siege in 2004.

As recently as May, Dukvakha Abdurakhmanov, the speaker of the lower house of the Chechen parliament and a close associate of Chechen Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov, advocated a reunification of the two republics. Amicably split in 1992, following the collapse of the USSR, the proposition was met with a wave of approval in Chechnya and an overwhelmingly negative response from the Ingush. Ingushetia, the most mono-ethnic territory of Russia, with 77 percent of population being native Ingush, is currently a home to close to 100,000 Chechens- that is, 20 percent of the population. However, 99 percent of the Chechens claim that they will return to Chechnya as soon as the situation stabilizes there. Thus, Ingushetia has assumed a pivotal, yet vulnerable position, serving as a haven for displaced Chechens who not only want to return to their homes in Chechnya, but who also want to see the reunification of the two republics.

Alternatively, relations with North Ossetia have been sour since the renewed Ingush claims for Prigorodny Raion, a district that was a part of Ingushetia prior to the Chechen and Ingush Soviet-era deportation in 1944, when it was transferred to North Ossetia. The continued clash, albeit bloodless this time, with North Ossetia regarding the disputed territory has resulted in numerous failed attempts at diplomacy. In fact, legal approaches have accomplished little in reclaiming the territory, with the issue of borders of Ingushetia and North Ossetia dragged out in postponed federal legislation on municipal government. Due to its small size and proximity to conflicting territories, Ingushetia has become extremely vulnerable to external pressures from its larger neighbours.

In order to retain its autonomy and to negotiate its borders peacefully, the Ingush government has appealed to the federal government in Moscow. Yet Ingushetia also has often felt politically abandoned by the Russian government. The reason for feeling ostracized from the center may stem from the recent proposals by both Chechen officials and the presidential envoy to the region, Dmitrii Kozak, to reunify Chechnya and Ingushetia, despite vehement protests, both from the Ingush government and opposition.

Additionally, the federal government and Kozak specifically failed to obtain the much-needed signature of then-president of North Ossetia, Aleksandr Dzasokhov, for “urgent joint actions on the normalisation of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict of October-November 1992″ during the 2005 negotiations.

One might speculate that such a turn of events stems from the regional importance of North Ossetia as a republic that could potentially (though this is not discussed publicly) merge with the self-proclaimed republic of South Ossetia within Georgia. Many South Ossetians have resettled in North Ossetia since the beginning of the conflict with Georgia, thus creating further ties between the two regions. The Russian federal government supports Ossetian independence, which could result in the expansion of Russian borders. It thus usually abstains from making any hasty decisions regarding the dispute between North Ossetia and Ingushetia.

In June, the Ingush parliament adopted an appeal to the Russian president, prime minister and the presidential envoy to resolve the dispute with Ingushetia by awarding Prigorodny Raion to Ingushetia. The sheer failure of the federal government to have dealt with the problem of territorial jurisdiction demonstrates unwillingness or an inherent inability to resolve disputes among its federation members. Unfortunately, the more time passes before a solution is discovered, the likelihood of instability increases in Ingushetia.

Ironically, the federal government employs contradictory approaches to deal with the problem of autonomy in both Adygeya and Ingushetia. In Adygeya, the federal center, through the machinations of the presidential envoy, invokes sentiment for Slav reunification within Adygeya and Krasnodar Krai. In fact, the merger is still an active policy. In Ingushetia, on the other hand, the federal government attempts to abstain from intra-regional affairs, thus, removing the objective force in settling regional conflict. Although Ingushetia, with a population that closely relates to its Chechen neighbours, could potentially profit economically from a merger with Chechnya, a reunification would mean that the Ingush would have to stop lobbying for border reconsideration with North Ossetia and Prigorodny Raion.

Why does the government employ such varying methods in addressing the issue of North Caucasian autonomy? Securing Adygeya within the borders of a prosperous and politically stable region like the Krasnodar Krai would limit the possibility of conflict within Adygeya itself. Additionally, the large Slav majority in Adygeya could merge with its neighbours in the Krai.

Ingushetia, however, offers little prospect of immediate policy success. It is an impoverished and volatile region, whose negotiations with North Ossetia have dragged on for over a decade with no resolution, as neither party is willing to budge. Its proximity to Chechnya has been largely a negative factor, with a registered decline in economic and political terms having been witnessed. Nevertheless, it is Ingushetia that requires the most active federal involvement to solve its pressing problems.

At this moment, the likelihood of Adygei sovereignty is quite feasible, whereas Ingushetia remains much more of a question mark. However, it is in the interest of the Russian federal government to maintain the autonomous rights of the two republics, at least for now. The central priority in the North Caucasus is stabilization and regional mergers evidently hinder this process, as nationals begin to concentrate on issues of ethnicity and border redrawing, as opposed economic and political reform. To regain and retain stability in the region, the Russian government might want to reconsider its policy of territorial negotiation.

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Kazakhstan native Alisa Voznaya is an analyst of political and security developments in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Alisa, who is part Russian, Ukrainian and Armenian is currently undertaking an M.Phil in Russian and East European Studies at Oxford University, and is associate editor there of St Antony College’s International Review. Alisa also holds a BA in Political Science from Simon Fraser University. She plans to continue working within academia while also working with news agencies reporting on Russia and the North Caucasus.