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Archive for August, 2006

Looking to Chechnya for Answers: How Abkhazia and Georgia Can Learn from Russian Lessons

By Alisa Voznaya

The wars of independence in the de facto breakaway regions of Georgia’s Abkhazia and Russia’s Chechnya in the early 1990’s resulted in parallel discourses of defiance and searches for independence. Yet recently the paths of these Caucasian neighbors have begun to diverge dramatically. The Georgian government’s three-day military campaign in the Kodori Gorge in late July signified the desire to restore Georgian central authority, long rejected by an elected Abkhaz government. Alternatively, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin had recently held a meeting with his ministers to discuss the forthcoming normalization of relations with Chechnya.

Although both Russia and Georgia espouse the ideals of territorial integrity, which is the core issue behind objections to the secession of either Chechnya or Abkhazia, it appears that the Russian government, after years of empty resolutions, has found a feasible approach to assure Chechnya’s wavering loyalty to the center. The Georgian government, however, has begun to shift its operations from the political realm to the military one. The resolve to include and exclude Russia’s and Georgia’s respective secessionist regions is molding the diverging destinies of Chechnya and Abkhazia.

The two Caucasus republics share a similar history of Russian conquest and Soviet rule. Following the late 19^th-century Russian empire’s quest to acquire the Caucasus, both Abkhazia and Chechnya were subject to demographic manipulation, first through initial settlement by Russians in Chechnya and Russians and Georgians in Abkhazia, and later, through the political machinations of Joseph Stalin, who deported massive numbers of native Chechens following the Second World War.

Stalin also stripped Abkhazia of its Union Republic status, replacing it with the status of autonomy within the Union Republic of Georgia. The inevitable disintegration of the Soviet Union led to heightened tensions between the central and regional governments. Fearing that an independent Georgia would eliminate the autonomous status of Abkhazia, the Abkhaz citizens demanded the status of a Union Republic within the Soviet Union in 1989. The final dissolution of the USSR and the subsequent declaration of Georgian independence resulted in a statement of secession from the Abkhaz government in July 1992, which led to a brief but bloody war between Georgia and Abkhazia. Chechnya, a voice of secession amongst many regions in post-Soviet Russia, was the only territory to weather a war as a result. Russian territorial integrity was under threat following President Boris Yeltsin’s exclamations over the “parade of sovereignties” and the Russian government set to use Chechnya as an example of what would happen to defiant regions. Thus, both Abkhazia and Chechnya stepped into the post-Soviet era as challengers to their respective central governments.

However, the events of the past year indicate that the parallels between the two may be disappearing. Over the last two years, the Kremlin has been tightening its ties with the ruling government in Chechnya through Alu Alkhanov, a president who is widely believed to have been installed rather than elected in office in August 2004, and Ramzan Kadyrov, the prime minister, who is known for a shady past. Despite Kadyrov’s questionable background and Alkhanov’s controversial rise to power, the cooperative efforts to normalize Chechnya have been stepped up at an unprecedented rate, with investments to rebuild the Grozny airport, and with funding to reconstruct the homes destroyed during the two wars.

Unfortunately, out of the $2 billion dispensed for Chechen projects since 2000, only $350 million was spent as intended. However, on August 2, Russian media reported the plan of Putin’s ministers to see the completion of Chechnya’s reconstruction by 2010. The massive project will involve the infusion of five billion rubles, five times the amount issued in 2004, which will be used to repair roads, rebuild health clinics, hospitals and schools, and to revive agriculture.

Such increased confidence may come from the recent operations that have resulted in the deaths of the two most notorious Chechen rebel leaders, Shamil Basayev and Abdal-Khalim Sadulayev, who were the symbolic figures of Chechen rebel resistance. In its hopes that the elimination of the movement’s leaders will lead to a possible dissolution of the movement itself, the Russian Federal Security Service has called on illegal armed formations in the North Caucasus to lay down their arms in exchange for amnesty. So far, almost a hundred rebels have surrendered, among them the brother of the current leader of the resistance movement, Doku Umarov.

There is good reason to believe that Chechnya is indeed on a path to reconstruction and stabilization. Not only has the republic received assured support from the federal center, it has also received foreign offers of investment. In fact, the Chinese State Development Bank signed an agreement with Alkhanov to establish a system for financing investment in Chechnya, particularly in housing construction and infrastructure, automobile production, and the oil industry. The influx of investment from foreign sources signifies Chechnya’s first step towards economic autonomy. During the past decade, Chechnya has been heavily reliant upon federal subsidies. Hopefully, with the improvement of the political situation, and a decreased risk of terrorist insurgencies, other investors will take notice of Chechnya.

While Chechnya was experiencing rejuvenated interest from its federal authority, however, Abkhazia was witnessed a progression from stagnating relations to military engagement. The latest events at the Kodori Gorge indicate that the Georgian government is eager to reassert control over Abkhazia. The matter is intensified by the fact that the Abkhaz government is supported politically and militarily by Russia, which sees potential for its own gains within the region.

Upon a declaration of its independence, which was not officially recognized by any country in the world, Abkhazia nevertheless received strong support from Russia, which supplied significant military and financial aid to the separatist side. In fact, the continued presence of CIS peacekeepers, primarily made up of Russian troops in Abkhazia was used as one of the provocations for the Kodori operation. The Georgian government then displayed its military might before the potential protectors of the Abkhaz region.

Things took a turn for the worse for Abkhazia after its Foreign Minister, Sergei Shamba, announced in early June that Abkhaz authorities will never abandon the objective of creating an independent state in response to Georgia’s plan to make Georgia a federal state, which would offer broad autonomy and provide aid to develop Abkhazia’s economy.

Following this exchange, Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili reshuffled his cabinet on July 21, removing the state minister for conflict resolution, Giorgi Khaindrava. Khaindrava was the top official dealing with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This dismissal was preceded by the unexpected appointment in early June of Irakli Alasania, President Saakashvili’s special representative for the Abkhaz conflict, as Georgia’s new ambassador to the UN. It was largely due to Alasania’s efforts that the Abkhaz and Georgian sides agreed earlier this year to resume sessions, suspended in January 2002, of the Coordinating Council established under UN auspices. With the two remaining “doves” ousted from government, Georgia, under the direction of Defence Minister Irakli Okruashvili, began its preparations for military operations.Recent events may elucidate the ongoing conflict, yet they are incapable of highlighting the underlying causes of such cool relations between Abkhazia and Georgia. It is true that Georgia does not possess the same luxury of installing its own leaders, as Russia does in Chechnya, who could then implement reform under the guise of autonomous reconstruction. Yet the efforts to stabilize and improve the political and economic situation in Abkhazia have been overshadowed by the drive for the ever-elusive territorial integrity.

Unfortunately, Georgia has taken few steps to improve the economic prosperity of the breakaway region. The continued impoverishment of Abkhazia and its loss of economic opportunities mainly originated with Georgia’s reluctance to provide incentives to resolve the lack of economic progress. Often, the Georgian government uses the ongoing conflict as an excuse for its failure to solve economic problems.

However, unlike Russia and Chechnya, it is Georgia that stands to lose more from ignoring potential economic opportunities in Abkhazia. Georgia loses customs revenues from goods imported to Abkhazia which are then smuggled into Georgia. Furthermore, the strong potential for the Abkhaz per capita income, from mass tourism and high-quality agriculture, may be capable of outstripping the Georgian per capita income in the future. Thus, in a purely economic way, Georgia is hurting its own economic potential more than it is hurting the Abkhaz economy.

Yet, it would be unfair to lay all the blame on the Georgian government, however belligerent it has been in the last few months. The continued claims for sovereignty from Abkhazia are strengthened by the solid support provided by the Russian government. Practical support, in the form of pensions, railway infrastructure, and the provision of Russian passports to over 80 percent of Abkhaz residents, is enhanced by a growing economic dependency.

The Abkhaz economy is tied directly to the Russian economy and its trade is conducted in Russian rubles. Russia claims to act only as an arbitrator between the two factions, yet, its territorial interests are exposed through the amount of assistance it continues to provide to Abkhazia. Evidently, the Georgian leadership then not only faces the secessionist leadership, but also the Russian state, which has lately been reasserting its dominance in the CIS space. The internationalization of the internal conflict has decreased the negotiation space between the central and the regional leaderships.

Despite the similarity between their original goals and motives, Abkhazia and Chechnya are moving further apart in their dialogues with their respective governments. The deaths of two Chechen rebel leaders, compounded by a strong cooperation between the regional government and the federal center has provided Chechnya with an opportunity to rebuild its shattered territory. The economic boost, both from the Russian government and foreign investors, also works as an incentive for citizens of Chechnya who have been impoverished by the consequences of the two wars.

Alternatively, Abkhazia, supported by the meddling Russian Federation, still cannot agree on a feasible solution of its rights with the aggravated Georgian government. Unable to look past the argument of territorial integrity, Georgia continues to isolate Abkhazia. Of course, Georgia has less financial ability to offer the same kind of incentives to Abkhazia as does oil-rich Russia. Nevertheless, actions like the recent invasion into the Kodori Gorge hardly promote a spirit of cooperation between regions. The lack of economic integration only promotes the groomed closeness between Abkhazia and Russia. It would be a shame to see Abkhazia go through the same tragedy of violence and destitution as Chechnya before the Georgian government realizes that the way to negotiation is through incentives and not force.

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Kazakhstan native Alisa Voznaya is an analyst of political and security developments in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Alisa, who is part Russian, Ukrainian and Armenian is currently undertaking an M.Phil in Russian and East European Studies at Oxford University, and is associate editor there of St Antony College’s International Review. Alisa also holds a BA in Political Science from Simon Fraser University. She plans to continue working within academia while also working with news agencies reporting on Russia and the North Caucasus.

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Economic Growth, Strategic Importance Predicted for Azerbaijan with Oil Production Increase

By Christopher Deliso

The coveted Caucasus nation of Azerbaijan is enjoying increased oil revenues on the back of rising prices and larger production, along with some of the political advantages that come with it. According to respected economic forecaster the Economist Intelligence Unit, Azerbaijan is set in 2006 for an astonishing 27.5 percent growth in GDP, following a just slightly lower growth result (24 percent) registered in 2005. A recent article from the Power & Interest News Report added, “Baku expects 2006 oil revenues of $650 million or more, a figure that is predicted to reach $15 billion annually and reach $160 billion by 2025.”

This surge is helping towards financial independence as well. Azerbaijan plans to repay all of the $150 million it owes the IMF next year, the Azeri APA News Agency stated recently.

On August 8, Russia’s Interfax reported that oil exports from Azerbaijan from January- July 2006 had registered a year-on-year increase of 65.3 percent, amounting to 11,085 million tons. The exploitation of the Caspian Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oil fields has helped to shape a leading role for Azerbaijan, with the creation of the 1,768-kilometer-long BTC oil pipeline, which stretches from the Caspian Sea to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, via Georgia (the first 443 kilometers of the pipeline lies in Azerbaijan). By 2008, the pipeline is envisioned to reach its daily capacity of 1 million barrels. The pipeline commenced operations in May, with an inauguration ceremony held in Ceyhan on July 13- to coincide with the arrival of the first pumped oil in Italy, PINR noted.

The pipeline, which cost $4 billion (over a billion more than had been originally planned) was financed by a consortium of 15 international commercial banks (led by ABN Amro, Citigroup, Mizuho and Societe Generale), export credit agencies and political risk insurance companies, as well as the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The leading stakeholder, with 30.1 percent, is British Petroleum. Other major players involved include state oil company SOCAR, Unocal, Chevron, Statoil of Norway, Turkey’s national oil company and Italy’s Eni SpA.

In the early 1990’s, the BTC pipeline was purposefully envisioned by the Clinton administration to bypass Iran- even though it meant taking a longer and costlier route, westward through Georgia. Now that the Bush administration is taking a hard line with Teheran over its nuclear program, the decision to keep Iran out of the pipeline seems to have justified itself for the project’s Western sponsors.

Indeed, Azerbaijan’s priceless location between east and west and on the energy resource-rich Caspian has won it many a suitor among international oil companies and governments. Part of this has had to do with the West’s antipathy to reliance on Russian energy exports; now, other proposed pipeline projects, Baku is set to benefit from the larger political machinations involving the US, EU, China and Russia.

“The BTC is now a serious option for numerous Caspian oilfields seeking an exit to market,” says Scottish oil and gas industry consultant Paddy Docherty, recently surveyed by Balkanalysis.com. “With the South Caucasus Pipeline due to add a sizeable gas export capacity, Azerbaijan is very well placed to become the key regional oil & gas entrepôt as well as a major producer. Politically, this bolsters the country against regional rivals, and guarantees the continuing interest and support of outside powers such as the US.”

As the recent PINR report notes, other oil and gas projects intended to subvert Russian influence are in development. “The Nabucco pipeline, a major part of the European Union’s diversification strategy, will carry natural gas from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran to Austria and Western Europe. Construction is slated to begin in 2008 and conclude in 2011; Nabucco is expected to achieve a maximum transport of 30 billion cubic meters of gas per year.”

The construction of the BTC pipeline, meant to solve certain geopolitical problems, has only increased others. The question of possible new interconnections to the pipeline, the direction of oil flow and the security of the pipeline through certain areas of low-intensity conflicts are all hypotheticals that have numerous possible outcomes- with greater or lesser advantages for various parties.

“With the BTC now in operation, Caspian exports have been transformed at the strategic level,” says Paddy Docherty. “Since it offers new options for crude exports from elsewhere in the region, through connecting pipelines across the Caspian, the export dilemma for neighboring producers becomes more complex, especially Kazakhstan.”

Enormous Kazakhstan, on the other side of the Caspian from Azerbaijan, anticipates its annual oil output at 100-110 million tons by 2010, and 150-160 million tons by 2015 and thereafter, reported the Jamestown Foundation on August 3. Its Kashagan oilfields, three in number, were discovered in 2000 and 2001. They are believed to hold between 9-13 billion barrels of oil, according to the US Energy Information Administration.

The West has several potential pipeline ideas for moving Kazakh oil into Europe. One, the Constanta-Trieste route, would contact the Romanian Black Sea port of Constanta with Italy’s Adriatic port of Trieste, via Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia. Along with the other potential Balkan pipelines (AMBO, Bourgas-Alexandroupolis) and the Turkish Samsun-Ceyhan project, “these projects rely largely on Kazakhstani oil arriving from Novorossiysk and other Russian Black Sea ports and heading for the open seas,” states the Jamestown report.

How exactly will Azerbaijan, as a transit route to the West, be affected by high-stakes politicking over the Kashagan development and export routes? “One of the big questions is over the exit of Kashagan output when it begins production in 2008,” says Docherty. “Since a link to the BTC is a possibility, the issue has the potential to lead to a US-Chinese struggle over access to this crude: will it go east or west?”

The Kashagan fields are operated today by a largely Western consortium, led by Eni SpA, Total, Shell and ExxonMobil. So it would seem that Azerbaijan’s future profits, in terms of transit revenues from Kazakh crude, are decided. However, despite the Western composition of the consortium, Docherty believes, “that doesn’t necessarily mean that they’ll sell it west. Oil companies are interested in profits not national loyalties, and in any case the decision for large projects such as a new pipeline involves the highest level of government.”

Indeed, as the Scottish analyst reminds, a pipeline linking Kazakhstan to China has been substantially finished. It was constructed by joining existing lines with new pieces, and built by KazMunaiGaz and CNPC. “This doesn’t mean it’ll carry Kashagan output, but of course the former has a small interest in Kashagan… the question of how Kashagan production will get out has not been settled, and it seems that it could still go either way. Since full production won’t be reached until 2016, there’s still some time to settle it.”

With important issues such as this one still up in the air, Azerbaijan is taking steps to improve its energy sector elsewhere as well. The country plans to improve its power generating capacity with several new stations. Together with Iranian experts, a commission recently met in Tabriz to plan for building two 36-megawatt hydroelectric power stations on the Araks River. According to a press release from JSC Azerenerji electricity company, this project involves a dual agreement: “under the terms of agreement, Azerbaijan will build the first station in Ordubad province, while Iran will build the second in Maraza province.”

The country also plans to repay, in kind, its close ally Turkey for electricity supply given in the 1990’s to the vulnerable Azeri province of Nakhchivan — isolated within the territory of Armenia. The construction of new power plants in this enclave, aided by growing natural gas supply, will enable Nakhchivan to pay the debt back in electrical energy, APA recently reported.

Another new investment in this strategic though economically needy area of the country has been announced. According to the Trend News Agency on August 8th, China’s fourth-largest auto maker, Lifan, plans to begin construction next month on a car factory in Nakchivan- an enclave of Azerbaijan that is not territorially contiguous with the rest of the country, but actually isolated within Armenia. The Chinese investment will help to improve the local economy of an Azeri island which is for that very reason of strategic value to Baku.

Chechen Refugees Choose Resettlement over Integration

By Ana Toklikishvili*

Almost 4,000 Chechens who fled from their country following the outbreak of war in 1999 have been granted prima facie refugee status by the Georgian government. As of April 2004, the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation has registered 3,856 Chechen refugees. However, since then the number seems to have decreased to 2.600. Aside from hosting these refugees, most of who reside in the Pankisi Valley of north-central Georgia, there are currently 16 individually recognized refugees and 22 asylum-seekers in Georgia. The latest statistics will become known by the end of September this year, as the 2006 re-registration exercise is already nearing completion.

The refugees from Chechnya in the Pankisi Valley have been the neighbors of the local population there for more than six years. During this time, these refugees have continually competed for the meager social services available; this dynamic has led to the development of a tense situation between the various communities living in the Pankisi Gorge. In 2002, the Bush Administration claimed that the Gorge was hosting small numbers of al Qaeda fighters from across the border, and in fact used this claim as partial justification for sending American military trainers for the Georgian army.

Although the increase in the number of refugees has become more and more widely recognized as a pressing issue in Georgian society in recent years, the issue remains beyond the Georgian government’s agenda, especially considering the emerging political situation, reflected by the tense relationship with Russia and still unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. Aside from this, the Georgian government has made a priority of alleviating the plight of some 220,000 internally displaced persons, and 50,000 returnees to the Gali District. However, the relatively cool attitude of the government in regards to the problem, and the rushed pace of life nowadays, have not deterred a slew of local civil society organizations and individuals from working to solve this crisis, and so to assist these refugees in seeking durable solutions to their precarious current status.

Today, there are three accepted durable solutions being considered: integration, resettlement, and repatriation. The one solution that is most often cited when talking about the Chechen refuges in Georgia is the first, “integration.’ Last year the United Nations Association of Georgia (UNAG) decided to respond to this persistent problem by introducing a project that applies the durable solution of integrating these refugees directly into Georgian society. The project focused on issues of compliance with local and international legal frameworks, fostering effective cooperation with NGOs and governmental agencies alike, and also stressed the need to overcome ethnic and religious prejudices. Indeed, a prerequisite for the success of this initiative is the involvement of the Georgian government, the NGO sector in the country and other international institutions.

During September-October 2005 a survey was conducted, with the goal of finding out the level of public awareness regarding integration issues among Chechen refugees residing in the Pankisi Valley. A total of 201 respondents holding refugee status, including 110 Kists and 91 Chechens were questioned. The survey revealed a rather low level of awareness on integration issues among refugees in the Pankisi Gorge.

After being informed about the essence of integration, only a relatively small numbers of Chechens expressed their support for this solution, since they felt skeptical and disappointed about ongoing governmental initiatives. The majority of Chechen and Kist refugees would instead welcome resettlement to a third country. Yet if integration is mandated as the only lasting solution, both ethnic groups would be willing to acquire a legal status, which would provide for the right to temporarily live and work in Georgia. Interestingly, Kists would prefer the Pankisi Valley as a place of residence, whereas Chechens would primarily rather live in other regions of Georgia, especially in Tbilisi.

In a continued effort to support refugees, embrace their plight and make them feel that they are an integral part of Georgian society, Georgia responded to a worldwide call from the UN General Assembly of 2000 to commemorate World Refugee Day on June 20. This year “Hope” was the theme chosen for World Refugee Day, in order to pay tribute to the unwavering hope of the world’s refugees and displaced persons, who have overcome enormous loss and hardship to start anew.

Such events have been taking place for five years now in Georgia and will continue for the years ahead, until we have to host the refugees. On June 19, Chechen refugees from Duisi Public Center enjoyed an opportunity to exhibit and sell flat handicrafts in Shardin Street in Tbilisi. The event was organized by UNHCR and its partner, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). The Minister of Refugees and Accommodation, Giorgi Kheviashvili and the Resident Representative of UNHCR, Naveed Hussein attended the event. The Day was marked in the Tskhinvali region of South Ossetia as well. The day was celebrated through a series of artistic and cultural events taking place on the ruins of the ancient Duisi outdoor amphitheatre, surrounded by beautiful mountainous scenery. Most of the performances were done by children, either dancers from the ballroom dancing troupe who came from the nearby village of Akhmeta, either singers from local choirs, or refugee children reciting poems in Georgian or performing national dances and theatrical plays. The ceremony was closed by the awarding of prizes to the winners of sports competitions which had taken place during the previous days.

The Minister of Refugees and Accommodation, together with the Resident Representative of UNHCR, warmly greeted refugees and guests before stressing the importance of celebrating this day together with refugees. “The meaning of celebrating such a day is that many people, who had to flee their country and cannot return to their homelands due to religious, political and other reasons, need all the support we can give to them” commented Naveed Hussein.

In the meantime, the UNHCR continues to render every effort to bring the plight of the refugees to the attention of the local as well as international community. The UNHCR also tries to persuade the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation to become more positive regarding refugee status determination and assigning procedures, where the issue remains open. Neither does the government voice its future plans with regards to refugees. Probably this is part of still unfolding national and international politics.

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*Ana Toklikishvili is presently the Public Information Officer at the United Nations Association of Georgia. Her three years of professional experience in the field of communications and public relations have included work with the World Bank Georgia Country Office and the BTC Co.-Cultural Heritage Project (Center for Archeological Studies). Ana holds a master’s degree in Public Administration from the Georgian Institute of Public Affairs, and a BA in English Language and Literature from Tbilisi State University

Interview: Scott Taylor on the Rise of Azerbaijan

In another exclusive interview with Balkanalysis.com director Christopher Deliso, Canadian journalist and publisher Scott Taylor shares his insights on the current situation in the strategic Caucasus republic of Azerbaijan, from where he recently reported.

Christopher Deliso: We understand that you have just returned from your first trip to Azerbaijan. So, how is it that you went there? How long did you stay?

Scott Taylor: The trip came about as the result of an invitation from the Azeri embassy in Ottawa. They were aware of my extensive coverage of the Middle East –Iraq in particular, and they felt I might wish to broaden my scope a little. By happenstance I had some previous business arrangements lined up in Turkey at that juncture, so I was “in the neighborhood’ anyway so to speak. I was able to spend a week in Azerbaijan, met a lot of senior officials and generals and managed to get outside of Baku on one field trip into the south.

CD: Did you have some older, pre-existing idea about visiting the Caucasus? Or was this something out of the blue? How do you see Azerbaijan as fitting into the general network of places which you more regularly cover?

ST: To be honest, before going I had no real in-depth appreciation for the complex strategic, economic and political issues that envelop this former Soviet Republic. However, the Azeris are actually a Turkic people, and therefore historically connected to my old friends –the Turkmen of Iraq. So in reality, this was a natural extension of my journalistic “trap-line’ as opposed to a leap into a totally unrelated theatre.

CD: For readers to get some background on your trip, we add the link to your long article that appeared last week in the Canadian press, but we would still like to get any extra stories you may have left out of this piece here. Azerbaijan today is, like some of the Balkan countries you have covered in the past, not a war zone but a site of a frozen conflict. You spoke with refugees and regular people- so to what degree did you get the sense that the conflict is still close to the surface?

ST: Our field trip included visits to the refugee camps, and we were able to see firsthand a tiny fraction of the nearly 800,000 Azeris who were displaced during the Armenian offensives into Nagorno-Karabakh from 1992-1994. As long as there is no effort made to permanently resettle these people, they are being used as political pawns to keep international pressure on the Armenians to withdraw from the occupied territories.

However, as it has been over a dozen years and no one has made any real attempt to enforce the UN Resolutions (which call upon Armenia to pull out their troops), the Azeris have upped the ante. Azerbaijan’s army has sat in trenches surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh all this time, but now, as the oil boom kicks in and the economy starts to explode, the Azeris are starting to pump money into military hardware. I’m not sure how close the army is to mounting an offensive, but given the huge disparity in relative economies and population, this military buildup is bound to alarm the Armenians. As of next year, the Azeris will be spending as much simply on defense as the entire Armenian national budget!

CD: In your article, you spoke about the latest peace proposals from the Minsk Group about Nagorno-Karabakh. There have been many peace proposals over the years, so many that one gets the sense that few believe in even the possibility of a breakthrough plan anymore. What about this time? Did you sense any popularity or expectations among the people?

ST: After 12 years of ceasefire and zero progress towards a settlement, the expectation of a negotiated agreement is about zilch. The Nagorno-Karabakh issue was a tremendous blow to Azeri nationalist pride, and now that their country is expanding their economy so quickly, the young people want to see some results militarily. It is a dangerous combination when you fuel injured pride with huge oil profits being used to bolster a one-sided regional arms race.

CD: How important is an initial Armenian troop pullout for the Azeri side, as a show of good faith in advance of any final solution?

ST: I think the very first step to any resolution is the pullout of Armenian troops from at least the seven occupied Azeri provinces which surround the Nagorno-Karabakh region. After Armenian troops had secured the disputed territory in 1992 and expelled the 40,000 ethnic Azeris, they continued to clear a large buffer zone. In the process of establishing this occupied defensive perimeter, approximately 800,000 Azeris were ethnically cleansed out of areas in which they constituted the overwhelming majority. So even if a final resolution on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh remains elusive, the Azeris want those seven occupied provinces returned immediately.

CD: From the people you spoke with in, specifically, the government, what was their sense that a real breakthrough on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue might be in the offing? What would it take?

ST: I think that a military option is something which the Azeri government is trying desperately to add to the bargaining equation. Their military commanders warn of losing their patience and top politicians brag about their huge new defence budget. Foreign diplomats based in Baku are not alarmed at this stage as they see the Azeri arms buildup as mostly bluff. “When they start buying helicopter gunships we’ll know they [the Azeris] are getting serious” is what one US spokesman explained to me.

However, now that the government has signed that huge “Deal of the Century’ oil contract with British Petroleum, and opened the strategically important Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, I think the political worm is turning in favour of the Azeris. It may be the hollow threat of renewed military action which causes Azerbaijan’s new found strategic “friends’ to exert the necessary pressure on Armenia to begin a withdrawal.

CD: You mention the cult of personality of the former leader, Haydar Aliyev. Is this something that could be compared with, say, Tito in Yugoslavia? To what extent do you think that it is something spontaneously sustained, from the hearts of the people, or to what extent do you see it as a ploy of Aliyev’s son (the current ruler) to retain power? Or is it none of the above?

ST: I think it is more in the Azeris’ desire to create a Kemal Ataturk figure as a national symbol, who would stand above day-to-day politics and corruption. Once such individuals are immortalized in such a mythical manner, their legend only continues to grow. For Ilham Aliyev it is both a blessing and a curse, as he will always rule in his father’s “larger-than-life’ shadow.

CD: There is also a tight bond between the Azeris and their “big brothers” in Turkey. To what extent did you notice this? Turkey has not opened the border with Armenia because of the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Would Turkey come to the direct military assistance of Baku in case of new fighting?

ST: During the heavy fighting in 1992-1994 there were Turkish advisors on the ground assisting the Azeris. In the early stages of that fighting, Azerbaijan got thumped pretty good by a Russian-backed Armenian defence force. However, by 1994 the regrouped Azeris (with Turkish help) had begun to turn the tide.

Azerbaijan’s army is rapidly trying to bring itself up to NATO standard, and the Turks have been instrumental in overseeing this transition. I think the only time that Turkey would intervene directly against Armenia would be if the isolated Azeri province of Netchevan was threatened. This tiny region is administered by Baku, is populated entirely by ethnic Azeris, borders on Turkey but sits surrounded by Armenian-controlled territory. In 1992-1994, the Turks made it clear to Armenia that this was a no-go zone- or else “big brother’ Turkey would jump into the fray with both feet.

CD: One of the things that comes across in your article is the whole “Star Wars’ nature of the lifestyle for expatriate oil workers/mercenaries/etc. Share with us some colorful stories about the characters you encountered. Who are these people? I imagine that most of those men must have had some form of previous military training?

ST: Chris, I don’t scare easily, but some of these characters were downright frightening. Most of the oil workers are former British soldiers…. mostly special forces or paras, and invariably they had seen real combat in either the Falklands, Northern Ireland or in either of the last two rounds of the Gulf Wars.

There were also a number of serving SAS types frequenting the Baku bars, and one quickly knows enough not to ask them why they’re in town. Although I suppose that some of them are also keenly interested in keeping an eye on Azerbaijan’s southern neighbor, Iran.

Such individuals naturally attract the attentions of certain classes of women anxious to, er, milk their own share of the oil boom. In some of the ex-pat bars you could find a bizarre collection of these “ladies’ from all over the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia. Alcohol is a huge part of the oil workers’ routine, and between that and the hard living they’ve endured, these guys age fast. Some of them in their mid-forties looked at least 70….but still frightening, mind you.

CD: Russian President Vladimir Putin has stated that Kosovo independence for the Albanians would mean universal principles for self-determination across the board- including in places like the Caucasus. Did you get any sense of Russian involvement or potential involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue on behalf of Armenia, if Kosovo becomes independent and they are able to push the precedent?

ST: The Russians are not too pleased with Azerbaijan for selling off shared Caspian Sea oil rights to BP, and for opening the BTC pipeline. This now constitutes a conduit whereby the Central Asian petroleum resources do not have to transit to Europe via Russia. Consequently, Russia’s support for Armenia is not entirely selfless. Furthermore, as the US-allied Georgians continue to push local Russian military bases out, Armenia offers a solution to Moscow for maintaining a military footprint on this strategic fault-line.

CD: That said, in a world where sudden new challenges in the Middle East are now manifesting, has the danger of future conflict in Azerbaijan (or around it) now been heightened or lessened? Is it a case of the country wanting to be on its best behavior to keep the West happy, or is it perhaps an “anything goes’ situation, now that everyone is so preoccupied with Iran and Lebanon?

ST: The Iran issue is the most pressing one, in that approximately 17 million ethnic Azeris live inside the Iranian border. The territory of Azerbaijan was originally divided by Tsarist Russia and Persia back in 1828. The 8.5 million Azeris residing in the independent former Soviet Republic are just the tip of a big iceberg. I have been told that the CIA is hoping to use Azerbaijan’s newfound prosperity and freedoms to incite Azeri nationalism south of their border. Constituting one-third of Iran’s population, any separatist movement on the part of the Azeris would deeply destabilize the Tehran regime. Not that America ever plays such games, of course…

CD: Finally, considering that you were visiting Azerbaijan as part of a press junket, do you feel that you were presented with the real situation completely? Are there aspects of the Armenian issue that may have been overlooked, or that you might like to put caveats around until you can see the situation from their point of view?

ST: It is never possible to see a “complete’ picture from only one vantage point. Unlike many of our media colleagues who thump their chests and claim to “know’ an issue, I always present my findings as what they are…..one piece of the puzzle. I look forward to getting more acquainted with the Armenian side of the conflict, and I can’t wait to actually visit the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh to see things for myself in the near future.

The North Caucasus Knot: Adygeya’s and Ingushetia’s Struggle for Autonomy

By Alisa Voznaya*

On the eve of the G8 Summit in St. Petersburg, Russian authorities hailed the operation that lay to rest Russia’s most infamous terrorist, Shamil Basayev, as the beginning of the end of uncertainty in the North Caucasus. With slow but steady economic growth registered in Chechnya and Dagestan, and a continued display of support for the pro-Kremlin leaders in those republics, one could finally envision stability within a formerly volatile and unpredictable region.

However, the Russian Federation is far from declaring the North Caucasus a non-problematic district. Recent events in Adygeya and Ingushetia, two of the smallest republics in the North Caucasus, demonstrate that much work is to be done to normalize the region. In early April of this year, Khazret Sovmen, Adygeya’s president since 2002, issued an emotional resignation during a heated session of parliament. It was quickly retracted after a conversation with the Kremlin.

However, the dark underbelly of the Adygeyan internal conflict has been brought to light. Dmitrii Kozak, Vladimir Putin’s envoy to the Southern Federal Okrug (District), which incorporates the North Caucasus, has recently made formal proposals to the Russian president’s office to unify Krasnodar Krai (a large federal unit in the Southern Federal Okrug that envelops Adygeya) with the Republic of Adygeya. Sovmen’s reaction in parliament was a protest against such plans.

There is good reason for suggesting an amalgamation of the two regions. Adygeya is entirely surrounded by the territory of the Krasnodar Krai, and some 68 percent of its population are ethnic Russians (versus 22 percent ethnic Adyges) who are open to the idea of unification. Further, a history of peaceful co-existence already exists.

However, the rationale behind the merger is first and foremost economic, or so the Russian officials say. Krasnodar has largely been touted as an economic success story, with a well-developed Black Sea coast tourism industry and fertile soil, despite the fact that regional variation is stark; other less fortunate districts are impoverished and suffer from high unemployment. Adygeya, by contrast, is the fifteenth-most subsidised federal unit with 58.1 percent of its internal budget coming direct from Moscow’s coffers.

If Adygeya were to be absorbed into Krasnodar Krai, it would cease to function as an independent administrative unit and would most likely act as an autonomous oblast within the Krai, very much like the previous arrangement prior to the 1991 declaration of independence by Adygeya. Yet this is unlikely to happen, at least not in the near future. Sovmen’s resignation incited instant support from the two major Adygei/Cherkess organizations (Cherkess Congress and Adyge Khase), and the Adyge population warn that ethnic conflict would be inevitable if the merger were to become reality.

Their opponents, the Union of Slavs of Adygeya (SSA), argue for the merger on the basis of political factors, including alleged discrimination against ethnic Slavs. Despite the fact that the Adyges make up less than a third of the population, the SSA argues, the titular nationality has taken control over policy, the economy and culture in the republic.

The Slavic nationalists have certainly taken this issue seriously and brought a draft law before Adygeya’s lower chamber of parliament in February on referenda that would, if enacted, have constituted the legal basis for a republic-wide vote on the merger, in which the Slav majority could easily force a victory. This law was voted down this time, but there is no telling whether it will not make a new appearance in the near future. However, whether or not threats of ethnic conflict and ill internal relations from the Adygei organizations are substantiated, the federal centre is hardly interested in taking a risk of destabilizing another part of the North Caucasus.

Although Adygeya may have withstood forces from both within and without in the most recent attempt to merge it with Krasnodar Krai, its battle for autonomy may not yet be over. The new Adygei parliament, elected on March 12, has only one chamber, unlike the previous legislative body. This means that it could be much easier to push through the referendum law. Additionally, Sovmen’s open threat to resign may have undermined his future negotiations with the Kremlin, which often dislikes independent regional political figures and prefers to install its supporters in regional positions of power. Thus, the prospect of Adygei autonomy is still under threat.

Whilst the leaders of Adygeya face a controversial internal and external threat of absorption, another North Caucasian republic has come under the spotlight of threatened autonomy in recent months. Ingushetia, a small republic wedged between North Ossetia and Chechnya, has recently experienced a surge of violence and continued territorial pressure from its two neighbours. In recent years the Chechen conflict has spilled over into Ingushetia, with many terrorist attacks having been planned from this republic. In fact, it is widely believed that Ingush rebels were responsible for the execution of the Beslan siege in 2004.

As recently as May, Dukvakha Abdurakhmanov, the speaker of the lower house of the Chechen parliament and a close associate of Chechen Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov, advocated a reunification of the two republics. Amicably split in 1992, following the collapse of the USSR, the proposition was met with a wave of approval in Chechnya and an overwhelmingly negative response from the Ingush. Ingushetia, the most mono-ethnic territory of Russia, with 77 percent of population being native Ingush, is currently a home to close to 100,000 Chechens- that is, 20 percent of the population. However, 99 percent of the Chechens claim that they will return to Chechnya as soon as the situation stabilizes there. Thus, Ingushetia has assumed a pivotal, yet vulnerable position, serving as a haven for displaced Chechens who not only want to return to their homes in Chechnya, but who also want to see the reunification of the two republics.

Alternatively, relations with North Ossetia have been sour since the renewed Ingush claims for Prigorodny Raion, a district that was a part of Ingushetia prior to the Chechen and Ingush Soviet-era deportation in 1944, when it was transferred to North Ossetia. The continued clash, albeit bloodless this time, with North Ossetia regarding the disputed territory has resulted in numerous failed attempts at diplomacy. In fact, legal approaches have accomplished little in reclaiming the territory, with the issue of borders of Ingushetia and North Ossetia dragged out in postponed federal legislation on municipal government. Due to its small size and proximity to conflicting territories, Ingushetia has become extremely vulnerable to external pressures from its larger neighbours.

In order to retain its autonomy and to negotiate its borders peacefully, the Ingush government has appealed to the federal government in Moscow. Yet Ingushetia also has often felt politically abandoned by the Russian government. The reason for feeling ostracized from the center may stem from the recent proposals by both Chechen officials and the presidential envoy to the region, Dmitrii Kozak, to reunify Chechnya and Ingushetia, despite vehement protests, both from the Ingush government and opposition.

Additionally, the federal government and Kozak specifically failed to obtain the much-needed signature of then-president of North Ossetia, Aleksandr Dzasokhov, for “urgent joint actions on the normalisation of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict of October-November 1992″ during the 2005 negotiations.

One might speculate that such a turn of events stems from the regional importance of North Ossetia as a republic that could potentially (though this is not discussed publicly) merge with the self-proclaimed republic of South Ossetia within Georgia. Many South Ossetians have resettled in North Ossetia since the beginning of the conflict with Georgia, thus creating further ties between the two regions. The Russian federal government supports Ossetian independence, which could result in the expansion of Russian borders. It thus usually abstains from making any hasty decisions regarding the dispute between North Ossetia and Ingushetia.

In June, the Ingush parliament adopted an appeal to the Russian president, prime minister and the presidential envoy to resolve the dispute with Ingushetia by awarding Prigorodny Raion to Ingushetia. The sheer failure of the federal government to have dealt with the problem of territorial jurisdiction demonstrates unwillingness or an inherent inability to resolve disputes among its federation members. Unfortunately, the more time passes before a solution is discovered, the likelihood of instability increases in Ingushetia.

Ironically, the federal government employs contradictory approaches to deal with the problem of autonomy in both Adygeya and Ingushetia. In Adygeya, the federal center, through the machinations of the presidential envoy, invokes sentiment for Slav reunification within Adygeya and Krasnodar Krai. In fact, the merger is still an active policy. In Ingushetia, on the other hand, the federal government attempts to abstain from intra-regional affairs, thus, removing the objective force in settling regional conflict. Although Ingushetia, with a population that closely relates to its Chechen neighbours, could potentially profit economically from a merger with Chechnya, a reunification would mean that the Ingush would have to stop lobbying for border reconsideration with North Ossetia and Prigorodny Raion.

Why does the government employ such varying methods in addressing the issue of North Caucasian autonomy? Securing Adygeya within the borders of a prosperous and politically stable region like the Krasnodar Krai would limit the possibility of conflict within Adygeya itself. Additionally, the large Slav majority in Adygeya could merge with its neighbours in the Krai.

Ingushetia, however, offers little prospect of immediate policy success. It is an impoverished and volatile region, whose negotiations with North Ossetia have dragged on for over a decade with no resolution, as neither party is willing to budge. Its proximity to Chechnya has been largely a negative factor, with a registered decline in economic and political terms having been witnessed. Nevertheless, it is Ingushetia that requires the most active federal involvement to solve its pressing problems.

At this moment, the likelihood of Adygei sovereignty is quite feasible, whereas Ingushetia remains much more of a question mark. However, it is in the interest of the Russian federal government to maintain the autonomous rights of the two republics, at least for now. The central priority in the North Caucasus is stabilization and regional mergers evidently hinder this process, as nationals begin to concentrate on issues of ethnicity and border redrawing, as opposed economic and political reform. To regain and retain stability in the region, the Russian government might want to reconsider its policy of territorial negotiation.

…

Kazakhstan native Alisa Voznaya is an analyst of political and security developments in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Alisa, who is part Russian, Ukrainian and Armenian is currently undertaking an M.Phil in Russian and East European Studies at Oxford University, and is associate editor there of St Antony College’s International Review. Alisa also holds a BA in Political Science from Simon Fraser University. She plans to continue working within academia while also working with news agencies reporting on Russia and the North Caucasus.

Balkanalysis.com Presents: Spotlight on the Caucasus Week

Every day this week, Balkanalysis.com will publish a new article on the fascinating and complex region of the Caucasus. Topics will range from security to politics and economics, and cover the major countries of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, as well as cross-border issues in the North Caucasus and first-hand testimony of the situation on the ground.

The week kicks off tomorrow with an analysis of the political dynamic in the little-understood North Caucasus Russian republics of Adygeya and Ingushetia, by Kazakhstan native and Oxford scholar Alisa Voznaya.

On Wednesday, we present an exclusive interview with the venerable Canadian journalist and publisher, Scott Taylor, who offers his insights on Azerbaijan’s new militaristic confidence following a recent trip to Baku.

Thursday the series continues with a detailed overview of the refugee situation in Georgia, presented by Ana Toklikishvili, Public Information Officer at the United Nations Association of Georgia.

Friday, we present a short analysis on the Azeri oil industry- and what it might mean for the future of energy transit.
We hope that readers enjoy this special presentation, which features several different perspectives on one of the key regions in today’s world.

Photo of the Week

Major Economic Developments in Greece, with Regional Implications

By Ioannis Michaletos
Even though it has been a member of the European Union since 1981 and has been accepted in all major transnational organizations, Greece has yet to really enjoy the economic boom of which many feel it is capable. Until now, it has not proven as competitive on the world economic stage as it [...]