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Only five days into the campaign for July 5 parliamentary elections, Macedonia has seen at least one violent incident per day between the main Albanian parties, DUI and DPA, causing concern that the country’s politicians will fail to live up to the promises of “fair and free’ elections they recently made in a written declaration sponsored by Macedonia’s international minders.

The internecine attacks, which have occurred throughout Albanian-populated towns including Struga, Gostivar, Tetovo, Slupcane and especially Saraj near Skopje, have ranged from pulling down party flags to brutal beatings and even the bulldozing of party offices.

US Ambassador Gillian Milovanovic and EU Special Representative Erwan FouˆšÃ‰Â¬Â©rˆšÃ‰Â¬Â© held a meeting on Tuesday, June 20 with the leadership of the main offenders, DPA and DUI, in which they cajoled Arben Xhaferi and Ali Ahmeti to play fair and desist from attacking one another. The meeting resulted in a carefully-worded statement that avoided mentioning the offenders by name. It read:

“The U.S. Ambassador and the EUSR/HoD express their grave concern over recent acts of violence directed against local party campaign headquarters. Such acts will have serious and damaging consequences for this country’s Euro-Atlantic membership aspirations and they must cease now.

The U.S. Ambassador and EUSR/HoD reiterate their call on all parties to work to ensure free, fair and peaceful elections. They call on all party leaders to fully implement the Code of Conduct they recently signed, in particular by publicly directing their supporters to refrain from provocative acts and acts designed to intimidate opponents, and by publicly condemning any use of violence against opponents during the campaign or on election day.”

The internecine tit-for-tat violence between the Albanian parties has been fiercest in the village of Saraj, on the western outskirts of Skopje. As provocations go, this DPA-dominated village has provided positively flamboyant results so far. To kick off the campaign, which officially began on June 15, local perpetrators drove into a DUI office with a bulldozer, reported A1 TV.

DUI chief Ali Ahmeti decided to visit the village anyway on Saturday, June 17, spending several hours there before continuing his campaign in Skopje. After he left, the DPA loyalist mayor of Saraj, Imer Selmani, was shot at by DUI supporters. The next day, two bombs were hurled at DUI’s office in Saraj, breaking the windows.

A report from Dnevnik on June 19 summed up more of the Albanian fireworks so far, including the attempted grenade attack on DUI’s office in Struga on June 17, and an attack on the party’s office in Gostivar early the same day. DUI supporters who survived a shooting in Tetovo told the newspaper that DPA Vice-president Menduh Thaci was orchestrating the violence.

However, DUI supporters have to a lesser extent attacked DPA, and due to the escalation of events, may well increase this turf war in the days to come. According to DPA, DUI is using its position in the government to organize sympathizers in the ranks of the police and secret services to do their dirty work, blaming DUI Vice-president Rafiz Aliti for attacks on their party.

The internecine Albanian violence has also provided fodder for Macedonian nationalists, most notably for the former prime minister, Ljubco Georgievski of VMRO-Narodna. In a recent comment, the former prime minister questioned whether two post-election report cards might have to be issued by the European Commission. According to A1 TV on June 17, Georgievski noted that:

“if with the Ohrid Agreement we became a country of [ethnic] communities, then we ask for two reports. We ask Brussels to prepare two reports after the elections, so as to locate precisely which are the communities that are for European integration, and which communities are stopping the process of Macedonian integration in the EU.”

All things considered, it was not an unreasonable request. Yet the EU Special Representative predictably enough dismissed Georgievski’s request out of hand.

While speculation has arisen as to why the Albanian parties are behaving so badly so early in the campaign, it seems most obvious that the struggle is an acknowledgement that these elections will increase dramatically the powers of Albanians in the government. The likely fractured vote between the Macedonian parties means that any winner of that bloc, probably a wide coalition led by Nikola Gruevski’s VMRO-DPMNE, will need a robust Albanian partner to form a government. The winning Albanian party will be rewarded with not only the usual ample number of ministerial and vice-ministerial posts, but also most likely with a ministry which it has not yet held- perhaps Defense or, even Foreign Affairs or Finance.

Further, developments in the future will make the 2006-2010 tenure in government especially enticing for the Albanian side. In 2008 under the law on territorial decentralization, Kicevo will become an Albanian-majority municipality, giving the Albanian parties almost total control of western Macedonia. Practical implementation of Ohrid Accord stipulations, such as Albanian-language sign creation and so on will be executed. Neighboring Kosovo will be independent and a major concern for Macedonian foreign policy.

There is also the sense that if DPA loses for a third time (the previous two losses came with the Sept. 2002 parliamentary elections and Mar. 2005 local elections) the party will be consigned to the political wilderness for a very long time to come. This could potentially start to eat away at the party’s “business’ control in Tetovo and most immediately its membership base. These are must-win elections for a party that went out of its way to not cooperate for most of 2005, after boycotting parliament following the local elections.

It is likely that the violent first five days of the campaign are just a sign of things to come. If they are anything to go by, these will be the worst elections in Macedonia’s history- and that’s saying something. However, considering the Euro-phobic mood among EU populations now, and the likelihood that such election violence would occur, it becomes clear that the EU and NATO stipulated a condition (“fair and free elections’) that they knew in advance to be unachievable, thus providing another pretext to deny Macedonia membership in the Western club. DUI and DPA are just faithfully playing their part in the great drama of supposed Balkan European integration.

By Ioannis Michaletos

Serbia, which once could claim to have the capital of the entire Balkans in Belgrade, is still in the process of recovering from the frustrating 1990′s and the major consequences of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, including the former embargo, the wreckage left by NATO’s 1999 bombing, and constant political pressure from the Hague over the war crimes issue. Yet even though for most international investors Serbia is not considered as a major destination, Greek businessmen have already seized the opportunity to firmly establish themselves in the center of the Balkans, which by definition is Serbia and its capital, Belgrade.

Following the 6^th Summit of Serbia and Montenegro that was held in Belgrade last month, three major issues that the country is facing were discussed, along with their consequences for Serbian economic stability.

First of all, the halting of the EU’s negotiations with Serbia due to the failure to catch General Ratko Mladic is a major drawback for Serbia’s path towards Europe, and its economic prosperity and stability. Secondly, the independence of Montenegro has had the consequence of increasing fears of instability which might, in combination with looming Kosovo independence, prove to be a factor that will lead to an introversion of the Serbian political and economic forces.

Kosovo by itself poses a great headache for Serbian politics, since it is the historical heartland of the Serbian nation, and any move towards independence will lead to internal strains and counter-accusations for years to come.

International investment houses and corporations weigh all of the aforementioned factors in their decision-making process. These factors thus continue to stall any massive injection of capital to Serbia. The consequence is that Greek companies have found virtually no serious competition in achieving their investment goals in Serbia and are actively pursuing a series of high stake investments. According to sources from the Hellenic Ministry of Economics, some 80 Greek businesses and 150 Greek-Serbian ones are currently operating within the country, with a total workforce of over 20,000. The direct Greek capital invested now is in excess of 1.2 billion euros, while the indirect investments amount to over 300 million Euros, thus making Greece the number one investor in Serbia.

The main reason for this substantial Greek investment is the firm belief that the Serbian economy, despite its current problems, will take off and provide large profits to the entrepreneurs that have already established themselves on the market. It is telling that Greek businessman have been traditionally accustomed to investing in troubled times, since Greece itself is a country that has witnessed a dozen major wars, a civil one and several national disasters during the past century- even though the economy has progressed spectacularly. The main dictum is that when the fundamentals are sound, then all other risks can be easily taken into account. In a nutshell, Serbia is viewed as an unexploited investor’s paradise by the Greeks, such as their own country was just a few decades before.

Two Major Greek Investments to Watch: Oil and Banking

The Hellenic Petroleum Company is a contender in the imminent privatization of the Serbian Petroleum Corporation-NIS. Hellenic’s CEO, Panagiotis Kavoulakos recently visited Belgrade and had extensive talks with the Serbian Minister of Economy. It is assumed that the Serbian government will sell 25 percent of NIS, plus management to a strategic investor, most probably during autumn.

The Hellenic Petroleum Company has also been in talks with the Austrian OMV and Hungary’s MOL, in order to make a joint offer. The successful bidder for NIS would have the obligation to restructure the company’s business model and offer capital for the upgrade of NIS installations, something that would be positive for the overall performance of Serbian industry.

A second investment on the horizon is the National Bank of Greece’s interest in the imminent privatization of Vojvodjanska Bank. The Greek chairman, Mr. Takis Arapoglou, was also recently spotted in Serbia having high-profile conversations with Serbian government officials. Should the investment go ahead, the NBG has earmarked around 700 million euros to buyout Vojvodjanska.

Appendix: Substantial Greek Investments in Serbia

The following list indicates the investments and their euro amount of 18 of the largest Greek investments in Serbia today.

Telecom Serbia: 370 million euros invested by the Greek telecom company

Jubanka: 152 million euros invested by the Greek bank Alpha Bank; 17 million euros by the Greek bank Alpha Bank IBP Beograd; 106 million euros by the Coca- Cola Hellenic Bottling Company

Yugopetrol Kotor (in Montenegro): 110 million euros invested by the Hellenic Petroleum Company

EKO Yu: 40 million euros invested by EKO Hellas

Post Banka: 30 million euros invested by Eurobank

EFG Eurobank: 20 million euros invested by Eurobank

National Stedionica: 80 million euros invested by Eurobank

Fabrika Cementa Kosjeric: 55 million euros invested by the Titan Cement Company

Secerana Zabalj: 9 million euros invested by the Hellenic Sugar Company

Deljug: 32 million euros invested by the DELTA foods company

Super Vero: 30 million euros invested by the Veropoulos super market chain

Atlas Bank: 29 million euros invested by the Bank of Piraeus

National Bank of Greece: 30 million euro self-investment

Metropol Hotel: 29 million euros invested by Grecotel

Alumil YU: 17 million euros invested by the Alumil Corporation

ASCO Vidac: 8 million euros invested by ASCO

Eurosoles: 6 million euros invested by Mamadas Bros. Eurosoles

Yugolot: 4 million euros invested by the Intralot Corporation

One of the most dramatic events in the modern Balkans may go down very soon. But will it be a success- and if so, for whom?

Hague Tribunal prosecutor Carla Del Ponte has been angered by Serbia’s failure to capture and extradite war crimes suspects Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic. This, compounded by the mysterious death of trophy captive Slobodan Milosevic in March, has put Del Ponte perilously close to being deprived of the glory she has sought for so long. For despite many convictions, the failure to get the “big two” (convicted in absentia, no trial required) is an open sore for the prosecution, which is living on borrowed time.

Numerous critics have called for the Hague to be reined in owing to its contradictory treatment of indictees (something that depends on their ethnicity and their political use value). And Russia is now putting increasing pressure on the tribunal to shut its doors for good.

However, it looks like the Hague and Carla are not going to go down without a fight. On June 8, the Jurist quoted an obviously disturbed Del Ponte as saying that she has “no choice but to seek from the [UN Security] Council the powers to arrest fugitives where ever they are and to allocate to my Office the necessary resources for this. Ultimately, I do not see any other way for the ICTY to fulfill its mandate and satisfy the legitimate expectations the victims placed into the United Nations.”

The comments had been made at a Security Council meeting one day earlier, Wednesday. However, a source with close connections to the Hague told Balkanalysis.com that this announced “request” was already by that time a done deal- one that had been decided several days earlier:

“In the last closed-door session, she requested extraordinary powers to arrest both Radovan and Ratko by the Tribunal itself. This means that she can go over the border into Serbia and Bosnia with a special team and physically arrest both, without the countries she enters being able to do anything.”

In her Wednesday speech, Del Ponte gave away what this is all really about when she said that any failure to capture the two suspects would “represent a terrible blow not only to the success or failure of the Tribunal, but to the future of international justice as a whole.”

Indeed. As anyone who has followed the Hague’s theatrics for any length of time can understand, the ongoing drama is not really about the specific deeds of the two fugitives, but about the concept of international justice- a concept that is inextricably intertwined with the future of international tribunals in general and indeed, of the United Nations itself. In reality, Karadzic and Mladic are bit pieces in a high-stakes game that involves billions of dollars in funding, career glorification, and international power politics.

Seeming as it did almost like a plea, Del Ponte’s “request” was cunningly made to conceal the fact that the operation had already been finalized and that everyone — including the Russians — had signed off on it. As our source notes, “she wouldn’t present a request if it wouldn’t have an excellent chance of making it. Nobody does that with the [Security Council]. Therefore the organization of such capturing has been prepared in advance.”

The only thing that had to be ironed out, apparently, was the issue of funding for the Hague’s personal paramilitary expedition. When funding was guaranteed by the Security Council, Del Ponte was given the all-clear for invading Serbia, Montenegro and the Republika Srpska.

It is not clear how large the commando force will be; Del Ponte, lawyer turned general, will probably decide this together with NATO and EU military officials, based on their perceived need. However, it is clear that Del Ponte, as the supreme guardian of the globalist system, will be able to select from a full arsenal of weaponry, and receive whatever manpower she desires. It pushes incredulity to think that Del Ponte has never dreamed of a finish like this.

Who will comprise the Hague’s A-Team? According to our source, “it’ll be a UN task force doing the arrest (from various nations). They are already lined up. They also know exactly where the two [Karadzic and Mladic] are.” However, the source would not specify further the location (or more probably, locations) of the two fugitives.

Montenegro, where Milo Djukanovic’s newly independent regime could be shaken unless the fugitive issue disappears may come under scrutiny. In a BBC report of Feb. 21, “recent intelligence reports” were cited as claiming that Karadzic can be found “in the remote mountains of northwest Montenegro, not far from his home town of Niksic.” However, today’s EU Observer article on Del Ponte’s request states simply that “Mr Karadzic is suspected of being in Bosnia and Mr Mladic is allegedly hiding in Serbia.”

However, it is not likely that things will go as easily as the Hague expects. Both men are being protected by a fiercely loyal network of armed guards, and have been sheltered by local populations hostile to Western interventionists and the war crimes tribunal. So while the Hague is apparently free to send in heavily-armed teams to capture the fugitives, they will also be risking casualties- soldiers who could be the first people to die in the jihad for international justice. “They died for the Hague’s budget,’ their tombs will no doubt read.

The showdown will likely come in remote, rugged terrain known far better by the defenders than by the attackers. Plus, the Hague cannot go and pull a Zarqawi by dropping bombs on “safe houses,’ because Del Ponte wants the men alive. Still, it is highly likely that in such a difficult operation she could wind up with three Milosevices — that is, two additional non-testifying corpses — which would be a rather deflating finale to the whole long ordeal at the Hague.

Nevertheless, our source believes that “Carla will do it, it will come as a complete surprise, the Serbs cannot and will not resist, neither will any private guards, and yes it will be successful.”

This prediction remains to be seen. For any number of reasons, the operation could be cancelled, postponed, sabotaged or so on. In the worst-case scenario, a heavy-handed UN/Hague mercenary force makes an overwhelming show of force, in the process killing innocent women and children. Such “collateral damage” in the hunt to see justice fulfilled through violence would be totally unjustifiable, and could in fact deliver the knockout blow to the Hague it has so badly needed for so long.

There are many explanations one can make for the unnecessary loss of life in a military engagement; defending one’s homeland, flag or family tend to be the easiest to accept. If innocent civilians die to satiate Carla Del Ponte’s bloodlust, on the other hand, the prosecutor’s prediction will be fulfilled. Because it will then become abundantly clear that, indeed, no one is safe from the fulfillment of international justice.

As a service to our readers, Balkanalysis.com is providing an exhaustive summary and lists of the major political actors involved in the imminent campaign for parliamentary elections in Macedonia, to be held on July 5. According to law, the campaign can begin 20 days before the voting. The deadline for submitting nominees was May 30. The deadline for the procedure of checking all candidates is 7 June.

According to Makfax, 33 lists of candidates (including 2 submitted by group of voters and 31 by political parties and coalitions) were lodged to the State Elections Commission (SEC) by midnight on May 30. Citing SEC Spokesman Zoran Tanevski, the news agency added that as many as 2,620 candidates would be in the running for Parliament’s 120 seats.

Tanevski added that a procedure to check candidates’ backgrounds is underway, to ensure that no candidate is either serving or has been sentenced to a prison term.

However, the spokesman chose to steer carefully around the controversy that has been generated by the appearance of the infamous Kondovo resident Agim Krasniqi on DPA’s list. “The provisions of the Electoral Code do not prohibit a person who is subject to an ongoing investigation or is subject to a warrant, to be placed on the lists,” Makfax quoted him as saying.

According to the SEC, the following parties and coalitions (listed along with their leaders) will run in the July 2006 elections. The first group of parties will run by themselves, whereas the second will run in various coalitions.

Parties Campaigning Alone

1. Party for Economy Development, Velija Ramkovski
2. Democratic Republican Union of Macedonia, Goran Rafajlovski
3. Secret Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (TMRO), Vanco Sehtanski
4. National Alternative, Harun Aliu
5. Center for Democratic Forces, Igor Trosanski
6. National Democratic Party, Xhezair Shaqiri
7. Democratic Party-Forward Macedonia-Forca, Blaze Mitrev
8. League for Democracy, Gjorgji Marjanovic
9. New Social Democratic Party (NSDP), Tito Petkovski
10. Macedonian Party, Todor Petrov
11. Communist Party of Macedonia, Todor Pelivanov
12. Democratic Development of Macedonia (DOM), Liljana Popovska
13. Agricultural People’s Party, Marjan Gjorcev
14. Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA), Arben Xhaferi
15. Party for a European Future, Fiat Asanoski
16. Union of Tito’s Leftist Forces, Slobodan Ugrinovski
17. Democratic Alternative, Vasil Tupurkovski
18. Social Democratic Party of Macedonia, Branko Janevski
19. Radical Party of Serbs in Macedonia, Dragisa Miletic
20. Democratic Party of Macedonia-Tetovo, Tomislav Stojanovski-Bombaj
21. VMRO People’s Party (VMRO Narodna), Vesna Janevska
22. TMRO VEP, Goce Delcev Todev
23. Party for a Democratic Future, Alajdin Demiri
24. VMRO Democratic Party, Vladimir Golubovski
25. Movement for National Unity of Turks, Sanela Ibraimova

Coalitions

1. SDSM (Vlado Buckovski), Liberal Democratic Party (Risto Penov), VMRO-Macedonia (Boris Stojmenov), Democratic Party of Serbs (Ivan Stoiljkovic).
2. VMRO-DPMNE (Nikola Gruevski), Socialist Party of Macedonia (Ljubisav Ivanov-Zingo), Democratic Alliance (Pavle Trajanov), Party of Turkish Movement of Macedonia (Kenan Hasipi), Party for Democratic Action of Macedonia (Avdija Pepic), Party of Vlachs (Mitko Kostov), People’s Movement of Macedonia (Toni Gicevski), Union of Romas in Macedonia, European Party of Macedonia, Green Party, Party of Democratic Forces of Romas, Party of Romas’ Integration.
3. New Democratic Forces (Hisni Shaqiri), Democratic Alliance of Albanians (Zenun Fejzula).
4.Macedonian United Forces, VMRO-United (Aleksandar Makedonski).
5. DUI (Ali Ahmeti), PDP (Abduladi Vejseli), League of Bosnians (Rafet Muminovic).
6. Party of Pensioners, Reformed Communistic Party of Macedonia, (Vanco Pesevski).

Electoral Districting: the original information can be found here. In Macedonia, parts of municipalities and cities are often ‘shared’ between different electoral districts, creating a situation that would appear incorrect at first glance.

Electoral district 1 includes the city of Skopje and other municipalities: Karpos, Centar, Kisela Voda, Cair, Aerodrom, Saraj, Makedonski Brod, Sopiste, and Studenicani.

Electoral district 2 (Kumanovo area) includes these municipalities: Gazi Baba, Gjorce Petrov, Cair, Suto Orizari, Butel, Aracinovo, Kumanovo, Lipkovo, Staro Nagoricane, Cucer Sandevo.

Electoral district 3 (Stip area) includes these municipalities: Berovo, Veles, Vinica, Gradsko, Delcevo, Zelenikovo, Zrnovci, Ilinden, Karbinci, Kocani, Kratovo, Kriva Palanka, Kumanovo, Lozovo, Makedonska Kamenica, Petrovec, Pehcevo, Probistip, Rankovce, Sveti Nikole, Caska, Cesinovo-Oblesevo, Stip.

Electoral district 4 (central-southern Macedonia) includes these municipalities: Bitola, Bogdanci, Bosilevo, Valandovo, Vasilevo, Gevgelija, Demir Kapija, Kavadarci, Konce, Krivogastani, Mogila, Negotino, Novaci, Novo Selo, Prilep, Radovis, Rosoman, Dojran, Strumica.

Electoral district 5 (Ohrid-Bitola area) including these municipalities: Debarca, Bitola, Vevcani, Vranestica, Demir Hisar, Dolneni, Drugovo, Kicevo, Krivogastani, Krusevo, Ohrid, Plasnica, Resen, and Struga.

Electoral district 6 (Tetovo area) includes these municipalities: Bogovinje, Brvenica, Vrapciste, Gostivar, Debar, Zelino, Zajas, Jegunovce, Mavrovo i Rostusa, Oslomej, Tearce, Tetovo, Center Zupa.

According to the State Election Committee, the leading candidates of the larger parties for each electoral district will be the following:

Electoral district 1:
Vlado Buckovski, SDSM
Gjorgji Orovcanec, VMRO Narodna
Velija Ramkovski, PEO
Liljana Popovska, DOM
Tito Petkovski, NSDP
Nikola Gruevski, VMRO-DPMNE
Menduh Thaci, DPA
Vasil Tupurkovski, DA
Rafiz Aliti, DUI

Electoral district 2:
Risto Penov, LDP
Vesna Janevska, VMRO Narodna
Trajko Slavevski, VMRO-DPMNE
Ljubco Nikolovski, DOM
Petar Bocvarov, PEO
Naser Ajdini, DPA
Jagnula Kunovska, NSDP
Sadula Duraku, DUI
Esma Rexhepova Teodosievska, DA

Electoral district 3:
Nikola Popovski, SDSM
Marjan Dodovski, VMRO Narodna
Vlatko Gjorcev, VMRO-DPMNE
Bojco Gjorgjiev, PEO
Vanco Stanev, DOM
Blagoj Zasev, NSDP
Rafet Muminovic, League of Bosnians
Ilas Memeti, DPA
Blagoj Sitnovski, DA

Electoral district 4:
Radmila Sekerinska, SDSM
Silvana Boeva, VMRO-DPMNE
Dan Doncev, VMRO Narodna
Zivko Jankulovski, NSDP
Orde Kostovski, PEO
Jordan Trajkov, DOM
Borko Andreev, DA
Electoral district 5:
Ljubco Georgievski, VMRO Narodna
Ljubisa Georgievski, VMRO-DPMNE
Ilinka Mitreva, SDSM
Pece Stefanovski, DOM
Krste Gjorsevski, PEO
Vele Mitanovski, NSDP
Fazli Veliu, DUI
Garip Kaba, DPA
Blagoj Corevski, DA

Electoral district 6:
Jani Makraduli, SDSM
Antonio Milosevski, VMRO-DPMNE
Gjorgji Trendafilov, VMRO Narodna
Predrag Sinadinovski, PEO
Ljubomir Kocevski, NSDP and DOM
Ali Ahmeti, DUI
Todor Jovanovski, DA
Arben Xhaferi, DPA

Due to incomplete data, we can only offer the following sampling of parties’ lists.

SDSM lists

Electoral district 1:
1. Vlado Buckovski, Prime Minister
2. Ivan Stoiljkovic, leader of Democratic Party of Serbs
3. Roza Topuzovska, Secretary General of the Liberal Democratic Party.
4. Esad Rahic, MP and Chairman of Committee for Defense and Security
5. Laze Kitanovski, Director of the Intelligence Agency
6. Karolina Ristova, MP
7. Stevce Jakimovski, Minister of Social Policy
8. Vlado Dimov, Minister of Health

Electoral district 2:
1. Risto Penov, President of LDP
2. Meri Mladenovska Georgievska, Minister of Justice
3. Oliver Spasovski, member of the Central Committee of SDSM
4. Boris Kondarko, Spokesman of the SDSM
5. Slavica Grkovska, MP

Electoral district 3:
1. Nikola Popovski, Minister of Finance
2. Jovan Manasijevski, Minister of Defense
3. Verica Filipova Gajdardziska
4. Marjan Nikolov
5. Nezdet Mustafa

Electoral District 4:
1. Radmila Sekerinska, Minister for European Integration
2. Nikola Curciev, General Secretary of SDSM
3. Ilija Gecev
4. Andrej Zernovski
5. Cvetanka Ivanova
6. Tale Geramitcioski
7. Igor Panovski

Electoral district 5:
1. Ilinka Mitreva, Minister of Foreign Affairs
2. Ilija Ilovski
3. Slobodan Najdovski
4. Vesna Bendevska

Electoral district 6:
1. Jani Makraduli
2. Kenan Hasipi
3. Magdica Nestorovska
4. Valentina Popovska
5. Ljatif Pajkovski

NDSP List

Electoral district 1:

1. Tito Petkovski
2. Goran Misovski
3. Liljana SterjoskaElectoral district 2:
1. Jagnula Kunovska
2. Ivan Anastasovski
3. Vera Rafajlovska

Electoral district 3:
1. Blagoj Zasov
2. Vancho Conev
3. Orhideja Naceva-Petrova

Electoral district 4:
1. Vele Mitanovski
2. Jovana Tutevska
3. Kirco Kozarov

Electoral district 5:
1. Zivko Jankulovski
2. Mirjana Sekulovska
3. Saso Vasilevski

Electoral district 6
1. Ljubomir Gocevski
2. Mukrem Sisulam
3. Snezana Stojanovska

VMRO Narodna list

Electoral district 1:
1. Gjorgji Orovcanec
2. Zarko Karadzoski
3. Blagica Novkovska
4. Jovan Andonovski
5. Aleksandar Gjorciev

Electoral district 2:
1. Vesna Jankovska
2. Spiro Ristovski
3. Mile Jakimovski
4. Borce Stefanovski

Electoral district 3:
1. Marjan Dodovski
2. Valentina Bozinovska
3. Marija Kojzekliska
4. Ilco Zahariev
5. Valentina Andreeva

Electoral district 4:
1. Dan Doncev
2. Spiro Mavrovski
3. Biljana Sopova Kosturcinova
4. Goce Mavcov
5. Igor Gievski

Electoral district 5:
1. Ljubco Georgievski
2. Ljubco Balkovski
3. Katerina Petreska
4. Vancho Kostovski
5. Nikola Jovanovski

Electoral district 6:
1. Gjorgji Trendafilov
2. Mare Serafimovska
3. Bajram Trebiski
4. Mirko Lazarevski
5. Svetlana Miljanovska

An indication of what lies ahead for the Balkans occurred recently in Novi Pazar, when Wahhabi fanatics successfully destroyed a concert held by a renowned Balkan ethno-music orchestra that appeals to people from many countries and ethnicities.

The violence was brazen and highly alarming, according to Belgrade’s B-92 which described the occurrence thus:

“ten young men donning long beards, short pants and white hats broke up a concert of the Balkanika orchestra. The hooligans were dressed like members of the vehabit [sic] movement. They climbed up onto the stage and threw around the instruments that were set up for the musicians to play. One of the young men took over the microphone and told those attending the concert: “Brothers, go home, they are working against Islam here. This is Satan’s work.’According to the news agency, police officers had to use force to remove the thugs. However, the show wasn’t over yet:

“about a half hour later, a group of about 50 Novi Pazar football supporters, upset over the team’s loss to Mladosti from Apatin, started throwing stones at the stage where the concert was supposed to be held. Earlier, the game was stopped for an hour after the Novi Pazar fans hit referee Nikola Maljkovic in the head with a rock.”

Average people were mystified by the Wahhabi rampage. “How someone like Balkanika could be offensive to anyone, let alone some Satanic thing, is unbelievable,” said one saddened Serbian music lover. “They [the Wahhabis] showed that they have no European culture- and no respect for the feeling of other people.”

A continuous stream of intelligence information that we have received over the past three years has indicated that regional and international security services have taken a keen interest in the progress of fundamentalist Islam in the Serbian region of Sandzak, where Novi Pazar is located, and that the threat level continues to rise.

In fact, Balkanalysis.com first reported on the heightened interest in the Sandzak way back on October 24, 2003. At approximately the same time, a detailed report from ISSA Director Gregory Copley noted that “Islamist activity is centering on the southern Serbian (Raska) city of Novi Pazar (literally “New Bazaar’). This city of some 30,000 people is approximately 80 percent Muslim. It has one of the most radical Islamist bookstores in the world, and the store is doing brisk business. Here, the principal business of the city is crime: illegal smuggling of consumer goods, heroin and weapons.”

A report from the infamous ICG two years later indicated that these warnings were justified- however, in the time-honored interests of international power politics, they have not been heeded. Warning of the dangers of Montenegrin independence in October 2003, Balkanalysis.com predicted that “any weakening of security services from Belgrade can only expedite the potential for Islamic terrorism from Bosnia and Kosovo- through a severed Sandzak. That is something for the Western policymakers to think about.”

However, they didn’t. Now, with Montenegrin’s independence on May 21, the damage has been done. Bosniak Muslims in the new country’s northern Sandjak border area, as well as Albanian Muslims elsewhere, voted strongly for independence, and now it is time for their wishes to be addressed. As with every place in the Balkans where an ethnic group is divided by an international border, trouble is likely to be just around the corner. The West’s foolish decision to grant Montenegro independence has just created a brand new strategic fault line which will prove a constant source of turbulence in coming years.

Indeed, since the Ottoman occupation it has been clear that Islam’s road to Europe runs through the Sandjak. As the 2004 Copley report states:

“Novi Pazar is the focus of the Islamist attempt to build a landbridge from Albania and Kosovo to Bosnia. Further to the East, in southern Serbia’s Raska Oblast, are three other concentrations of Muslims: Sjenica and Pester area (lightly populated but mostly Muslim), Prijepolje (some 50 percent Muslim) and very close to the Bosnia border where Republica Srpska controls the slender Gorazde corridor of Priboj (also some 50 percent Muslim).”

The strategy of the Wahhabis can be summed up as follows: lay low until you have sufficient numbers to change the society. This is why fundamentalist in, say, Macedonia are still relatively quiet, whereas ones in Bosnia make regular television appearances and have ushered in the large-scale presence of foreign Islamic states that wish to remake the country in their image. The difference is not qualitative; it is just a matter of time.

When they have achieved a sufficient presence, as we have seen in Novi Pazar, radical Islamists first seek to cow moderate Muslims into submission, make them follow austere customs, and generally refashion public life according to their own puerile vision. Then, once they have pacified their own, they turn to disrupting life for the larger community. Indeed, as the B-92 report sadly conceded, “the police have yet to comment on the two incidents, though further public concerts in the region will probably all be cancelled.” It is simple, yet true: if people give up on cultural life, the Wahhabis have won. Canceling a musical event just helps them make their ghetto bigger.

Nevertheless, cuckolding Western do-gooders such as the ICG, always there to lend a helping hand, believe that it is Belgrade that “should act against discrimination [against Muslims] and otherwise show both Serbs and Bosniaks it is sensitive to their concerns in order to keep the region peaceful.”

In general, terrorism can find incubation in any territory, or even just a city neighborhood, that has been made off-limits to open society by the entrenchment of fundamentalism. As it stands now, Novi Pazar is a hive of activity for fundamentalist Islamists from Muslim states, Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere in the Balkans. It is the center of a clash within civilizations, in which Islamists loyal to Bosnia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Iran are battling it out to see who will control this strategic piece of terrain, the bridge between three failing Islamic states, Bosnia, Albania and, soon, Kosovo. Unfortunately, it seems that the collateral damage in this doctrinal war is going to be open society itself. Europe may yet suffer the violent consequences of helping to expedite this process.