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Military Operations Macedonia (Part 1), From the Outbreak of War to the Spring of 1917

The Imperial War Museum and The Battery Press (1933, reprinted 1997), 409 pp., 8 appendices, 16 maps (including 1 fold-out) and 5 pictures

Rescuing long-forgotten details of the First World War in the Balkans, this official monograph of the British government (one part of an extensive series commissioned to document each theater of operations) is indispensable for historians, and indeed is fascinating reading for anyone interested in the Balkans during the Great War.

Drawing on an impressive range of primary sources, Military Operations Macedonia is a very able synthesis (if one affected by the Modernist sentiments of its day) of the political, logistic and strategic decisions that influenced the course of the campaign in the Balkans, and specifically in Aegean Macedonia, a triangular theater between Bitola and Dojran with its axis in Thessaloniki. Although obviously reflecting the British point of view and largely devoted to the British contributions to the war, Military Operations Macedonia analyzes throughout the moves and counter-moves of all the other players in the field, including the French, Italians, Greeks, Germans and Bulgarians.Although we tend to recommend most books that are reviewed, there is not enough that can be said about the present work. We give it a wholehearted two thumbs up and recommend it to any and all having an interest in the period.

An Impressive Range of Sources

With that classical erudition and precision that have always marked British scholarly ventures, the compiler of Military Operations Macedonia (the late Captain Cyril Falls) sets about his task by consulting British records and those of other combatant countries. These include official military histories of France, Germany and Austria, as well as other memoirs of active military men who took part in the operations. In addition to the 20 printed sources consulted, Falls also circulated drafts of the text among some 200 British officers who had taken part in the Macedonian campaign. This painstaking attention to detail paid dividends, as it allowed the author to provide a blow-by-blow account of the war from multiple perspectives, set firmly within the greater context of far-ranging events taking place simultaneously in other theaters.

Style and Synthesis

Indeed, despite the sheer mass of information considered, the narrative of Military Operations Macedonia is presented in a lucid, straightforward manner that succeeds in presenting and analyzing the decisions made by British combatants in the context of larger events, including the political and other constraints under which they labored. Thus to some extent the book is also interesting as a study of strategy and tactics. We should also remember that one of the reasons why the narrative is “light” in a certain sense is of course because for contemporary readers (that is, of 1933) the events of the “Great War” were only too recent and thus widely remembered. Thus a lot of events that are now forgotten or obscure are passed over in silence, but this should not prove a real hindrance to the attentive reader willing to do a little side research on peripheral events mentioned.

Obviously, this 72 year-old work is a tad dated, but in some of its presumptions this can seem amusing or even charming, depending on the reader’s point of view. The revealing opening description of the topography and place-names of northern Greece, highly reflective of the romantic Modernist view and almost aspiring to the poetic, has a lot to say about both the British mindset and the Macedonia that was then:

“…journeying by rail northward from Athens, the traveller is borne by Helicon, by Parnassos, through the vale of Tempe below the peak of Ossa, and along the shoreward flank of Olympos. He passes through the birthplace of the fairest and most splendid mythology ever conceived, the finest source of inspiration to the poetry of all ages. As he continues on his way, Olympos behind him, Greek names, lovely as music, still accompany him, and still lofty peaks and bold ridges, with pine-woods and flowering shrubs on their flanks and green valleys between, look down upon the bright waters of the Aegean. Names and scenery alike still seem to belong to Hellas and to accord with its legacy of history and myth.

Yet thenceforward even upon the shore west of the isle of Thasos, names like Olympos, Aponomi, Kassandra and Athos are mingled with those of the harsher Turkish tongue; east of Thasos the names are all Turkish. If he goes north from Salonika Slav names appear, holding divided sway with the Turkish, having driven out the Greek. He is reminded that Macedonia, not Greek in origin, has been mainly Slav under Turkish rule for hundreds of years” (p 1).

The Beginning of the Great War: Serbia

The book continues after its flowery introduction to consider briefly the events leading up to the allied occupation of Thessaloniki. Chief among these are the two Serbian-Austrian campaigns, the first of which saw Serbia humiliate and push back the Austrians with their characteristic Inat, the second of which saw bloody revenge that drove the Serbs to flee to the Adriatic and thence to Corfu where they regrouped before being sent to Thessaloniki the following spring.

The author marvels at the first stage of the war, which pitted the two armies against one another on the Drina in September 1914. In the course of 16 days, the Austrians suffered 30,000 casualties; “…there can have been few bloodier battles in the course of the war,” he concludes (p. 13). Indeed, today’s readers, sensitive to the sheer folly and waste of war, must be struck by the colossal casualties of the Great War – and at how this was a relative non-issue then. Now, in just over two years of fighting in Iraq, huge outcry has been generated by American losses of approximately 1,500 soldiers. Falls describes several battles in the Macedonian theater in which the same number of casualties occurred in only a day.

In his narrative, the author does do a considerable service in providing graphic reminders of the miseries of war and life in camp. We hear of everything from the usual bayonetings to gas attacks and malaria. Austrian soldiers in Serbia are described as being “bootless and in rags” (p. 16). British soldiers in the Strumica area, devastated by the cold, are outfitted in uniforms that are so frozen they “split like boards,” and have to stay walking all night just to stay alive (p. 64). Throughout, the sheer pointless of war is reiterated through detailed descriptions of battles in which a few feet of ground might be lost, retaken and lost again, all at the cost of hundreds or even thousands of casualties. The spectre of trench warfare is time and again blamed for the high casualty rates.

The second chapter, entitled “The Crushing of Serbia,” describes the successful Austrian-Bulgarian campaign that drove the Serbian Army to the Adriatic in November 1915. The protecting ranks were forced to leave behind “…the thousands of women and children who had accompanied them hitherto, but wh
o were now dying in great numbers and could go no further” (p. 34). The remainder of the chapter considers how the concomitant Bulgarian invasion of Macedonia swung British foreign policy, then concerned with Gallipoli and other frontiers, to send troops to Thessaloniki and nurse the Serbians back to health. And this discussion leads to the beginning of one of the books most vexing enduring themes – the relations of the Allied powers with Greece, then split between the Royalist factions answering to King Constantine and the liberals under the larger-than-life, Cretan-born Eletfherios Venezelos. This civil strife and resulting balancing act would prove one of the key influencing factors on the Allied campaign in Macedonia.

The Morass of Interventionism

Modern-day Western critics of Balkan designs on neighboring territories and intractable, age-old disputes would do well to consider their own legacy of feeding such discontent. An example is the brief account provided (on pp.24-26) of the overtures made to Bulgaria in 1914 to win its support for the Allies through vague future promises of mostly Macedonian territories that would, according to the plan, be extracted amicably from neighboring Greece, Serbia and Turkey after the dust had settled and the war been won. Having grown mistrustful of such empty promises from allies in the past, Bulgaria naturally enough chose to fatefully throw in its lot with the Central Powers. But the brazenness and desperation of the Allied overtures really come through, and serve as yet another proof of the long legacy of meddling that has characterized the sanctimonious Western powers in the Balkans. The book mentions several such examples throughout, closing on the most extreme of all, the forced abdication of the Greek King Constantine by the Allied powers in June 1917.

Today’s reader may also marvel at the perceived vitality of archaic events in supporting the Allied case for meddling in Greek affairs. Their case centered on the treaties of 1832 and 1863 that had established Britain, France and Russia as “Protecting Powers,” sworn to protect the nascent kingdom from any tyrannical tendencies of its monarch (pp. 219-22 and elsewhere). That such outdated agreements still held sway in 1915 – 83 years on – exemplifies once again the colonial presumptions underlying the First World War.

The Unpopularity of the Macedonian Front in Britain

Contemporary unease with interventionism in the Macedonian theater at the highest ranks of the British government is recounted throughout. By stating the other demands present on the British forces in December 1915, when the Gallipoli campaign had reached its nadir, when Sinai and Kut were under pressure, not to mention the whole escalating war in Western Europe, we understand why the prospect of getting bogged down on a Balkan front unlikely to lead a favorable result was so unappealing to the British. Indeed, from the moment when they agreed to the French plan for the defense of Thessaloniki, it became clear that Britain sought to maintain nothing more than a defensive posture, to avoid grand offensives far into Macedonia, and to get out as quickly as possible.

This attitude contrasted with the flamboyant spirit of the French, and especially their vivacious General Sarrail, who was in command of the general Allied forces in Macedonia and who would lobby for more vigorous actions. These diametrically opposed viewpoints would become a source of tension and confusion, as the book reveals, but never pushed relations to breaking point. The author argues at different points the relative merits and drawbacks both approaches had at different times, but in the end comes down in favor of British caution, which allowed the Allies to succeed in their main objective of holding the Bulgarian forces tight to their southern front while guaranteeing the safety of the crucial seaport of Thessaloniki, and with it the fledgling Venizelos government.

In essence, Falls’ argument is that the largely defensive operations of the Allies in Macedonia helped buy time and drain enemy resources, until such a time when external events such as the entry of Romania and, more importantly, the USA, into the war could make the abdication of King Constantine possible without a civil war. Thus the Greeks, whose Royalist supporters had strong Germanic sympathies, were finally officially brought on board in a peaceful manner and a real disaster averted for the Allies:

“…British hesitations were therefore in some sort justified, because they had delayed action until the best moment for action was come. That the British government had not followed this line of reasoning is true; nevertheless their scruples had had the same effect. Instinct, we say, luck, say our critics, has often served this country well in like cases” (p. 361).

Military and Logistical Detail

Despite being unpopular to the British, they had accepted the responsibility of supporting the French in Macedonia and doggedly stood by their duties. In Military Operations Macedonia, the reader gets extraordinarily detailed descriptions of every skirmish and battle that took place in this theater through June of 1917. The book excels in blow-by-blow descriptions that explain the exact munitions used, commanders, contingents and battalions involved, as well as precise casualty counts, and also provides operational timetables, often right down to the minute. Such detailed descriptions allow the author to indulge in a fair amount of tactical analysis that explains why successes and failures alike occurred and how situations could have turned out differently than they did.

A key influencing factor in this regard turns out to be logistical issues. Falls does an admirable job of describing how transportation and military outfitting were affected by shipping problems (for example, the high success rate of German submarines in the Aegean), the relative availability of mules, horses, train cars, etc., and the state of roads, wells and victuals relative to weather conditions. These limiting factors are described on almost every page that deals with military engagements, as well as in the detailed Chapter 12 (”The Working of the Machine).” Availability of food also turns out to have been a highly strategic factor, as in the case of the decision to requisition the Thessaly grain harvest of 1917, key to the fortunes of both the Royalist and Venizelist Greek factions, and therefore to the Allied powers themselves (p. 349).

Life in Macedonia: Diseases, Spies, Creature Comforts

The same chapter discusses a subject that recurs repeatedly and had a huge impact on the whole campaign: disease. Everything is mentioned, from sunstroke to venereal disease to the preponderance of mosquito-borne malaria that decimated the ranks on both sides. Malaria in fact became almost another enemy position that affected strategy, for example in May 1917, when British General Milne ordered his troops to fall back to a “summer line” away from the fetid River Struma, thereby giving up territory but also saving thousands of lives (p. 338). The previous summer had seen hospitalization rates of over 100 men per day – and this from a single battalion. On average, 1 percent of those infected would die that summer (though this rate was subsequently lowered in 1917 and 1918 to 0.3 percent through preventative tactics). Nevertheless, says the author, despite “…every known method of combating the breeding of mosquitoes being adopted,” still “…the work was in great part wasted” (p. 145):

“…Southern Macedonia is probably the most malarial country in Europe, and it is one in whi
ch, owing to the vast area of marsh and lake and the countless streams feeding the great rivers, such as the Vardar and Struma, a campaign against the mosquito is almost fruitless.”

Weather also forced illness and postponements, such as in Spring 1917 when the French campaign was slowed by snow (p. 340).

Yet it wasn’t all bad for the troops who were in the field and, in some cases, the towns. Thessaloniki is described as being a bustling and “tawdry” city (p. 105), Europe’s most overcrowded, “swarming with spies” (p. 99) and outfitted with two breweries for the provision of beer for the Allied forces. And then there were the city’s public houses, of which the author is rather dismissive:

“…there were several indifferent but lively music-halls, filled each night with an audience that kept up such a din as to make its title a mockery; and, for the officers especially, cafˆšÂ©s and restaurants, though the prices were exorbitant.

…In its tawdry fashion Salonika undoubtedly was gay, but the tawdriness was more notable than the gaiety; the very women of pleasure were the last reserves of the Army of Aphrodite” (p. 105).

Maybe he just didn’t know where to look. In any case, despite the later mention of venereal disease (though, humorously, not seen on the scale of for example the French theater), the author is quick here to add that “…the legend of the Salonika Army as an army sitting in cafˆšÂ©s is, however, ludicrously false… hard work and exposure to heat, dust, mosquitoes and flies, or to bitter cold and searching winds, according to the season; a sick-rate higher than in any other major theatre of the war; very little leave home; very poor prospects until the end of three long years of a decisive victory-these were the conditions of the Macedonian campaign, for which the attractions of an occasional visit to Salonika were no great recompense” (p. 105).

However, even despite these hardships, life in the field could be enjoyable. The author describes how British and French troops guarding Thessaly from a feared Royalist incursion “…procured sporting guns and enjoyed woodcock shooting such as Ireland at its best cannot match” (p. 229). How sporting!

Limitations: Maps and Names

All in all, there is very little criticism to be made of Military Operations Macedonia. The only problems that arise with following the well-documented action described have largely to do with the place-names employed and maps available. There is a great deal of confusion here because the maps in the book use a smattering of Turkish, Greek and Slavic toponyms, and most military strategic points are riotously described in French or English (”Grande Couronne,” “Kidney Hill,” etc.), or simply as coordinates (P1, P2, etc). This bewildering heterogeneity of nomenclature makes it very difficult to compare precisely, should one decide to do so, where events took place. Since many of the place-names have changed since the population exchanges of 1922, and the English and French ones were of course never recognized by anyone except the soldiers temporarily stationed there, it is necessary to laboriously compare to modern maps, which can be hard to find in the detail required.

When it was initially published Military Operations Macedonia included an extra volume of full-color maps. Cost considerations led to these not being included in the 1997 reprinting (though apparently they are still available on demand to anyone who writes the Imperial War Museum). The one fold-out map included is in black-and-white and in any case makes for very laborious examination: the letters are so small that it can’t be read without a magnifying glass, and in any case the blurring of thick black lines indicating mountains and prevalence of long-extinct Turkish place-names makes this map of very limited immediate value to the reader.

Fascinating Tidbits

Aside from its main strong points, Military Operations Macedonia also includes the inevitable unusual side details that pop up now and again and which pique the reader’s curiosity. Thus we hear of mules being imported from South America, of Senegalese and Indians conscripted into the imperial armies, and of the United States donating train cars to the beleaguered Serbs. We imagine the sight of Scottish bagpipers leading the charge in Macedonia, of French troops commandeering the Acropolis, of the deployment of soldiers on horseback simultaneously with the primitive aerial bombardments from “machines,” as the author calls airplanes.

Political changes also play a part. We learn of the “disintegrating and contagious influence of Bolshevism” in the Russian contingent under French command in May 1917, even as their home country was being swept by revolution, as well as the secret workings of the Black Hand in the Serbian ranks (p. 343), and come across what is said to be the first mention of Yugoslavia in military annals (p. 121).

All in all, the words and deeds described in the narrative largely bolster the existing stereotypes of European nations: we are given an impression of the grandiose French, with sweeping visions of conquest; the cynical, cautious Brits; the untrustworthy Italians, brave Bulgarians, efficient Germans and fractious Greeks. In exaggerated form, this gives some opportunity for comedy but also points to real differences that affected relations in complex ways.

Conclusion

Military Operations Macedonia was written as the first part of a two-volume series that describes the full British campaign in that theater during World War I. It leaves off with the abdication of Greek King Constantine in June 1917, in the process doing an admirable job of synthesizing, with much detail and analysis, the engagements and political machinations on the Macedonian front, within the larger context of the war.

Written in 1932 from original sources and interviews, the work both benefits from hindsight while also taking its testimony directly from those involved in the fighting. As such, it is a unique work of history, and also at times an entertaining read – an indispensable addition to the bookshelf of anyone interested in the history of the Balkans during the Great War.

Buy Military Operations Macedonia now!