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Did Pentagon Reveal Name of Edmondsí ‘Semi-Legit’ Group?

The ongoing saga of FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds’ small war with the Department of Justice has garnered increasing media attention in recent weeks. However, this has almost entirely centered on free speech and legal issues: John Ashcroft’s gag order, Judge Reggie Walton’s dismissal of her case, and now, her open letter to the 9/11 Commission. Incredibly, the Commission’s final report failed to include her shocking testimony confirming crime, corruption and incompetence in the Federal Bureau of Investigation – a failing that greatly diminishes the credibility and trustworthiness of the Committee itself.

However, this is just one dimension of a very far-reaching story. For aside from Sibel Edmonds’ legal crusade is the issue of persons and organizations she encountered whose part-time activities touch on things from arms and drugs trafficking to espionage and even terrorism. Some of these figures (such as Can and Doug Dickerson) have been publicly named, but the Department of Justice gag order on Sibel has prevented her from doing anything more than alluding to the other, and presumably bigger fish involved.

That said, a previously unreleased document from September 2002 may contain a key to unraveling the mystery at the heart of the case: who or what are the “semi-legitimate organizations” that Edmonds has cryptically referred to as being the major players behind the major organized crime rings whom Edmonds charges with endangering American national security?

On 7 August 2002, Sibel Edmonds launched a complaint with the US Air Force over the suspected illegal activities of USAF Major Douglas Dickerson and his wife, Turkish-born FBI translator Melek Can Dickerson (more information on them here).

On 10 September, Colonel James N. Worth, the director of the Inquiries Directorate in the USAF Office of the Inspector General, sent an official reply. This letter assured Edmonds that the Air Force’s Office of Special Investigations (AFSOI) had “…conducted a complete and thorough review of her concerns,” and therefore the case was closed. Of course, this did not deter the indefatigable Edmonds, whose lawyers whipped off a letter challenging the validity and depth of the Air Force’s investigation – had one even taken place – on 19 September.

This 5-page challenge was addressed to Department of Defense Inspector General Joseph E. Schmitz, and copied to Senators Patrick Leahy and Charles Grassley, previous backers of Edmonds’ cause.

Earlier today, Sibel Edmonds told us that, “…nobody has mentioned the DOD angle [of her case] to this date.”

Therefore we thought it would be appropriate to publish this last letter in its entirety (see below).  According to Edmonds, the correspondence can be published because it “…was never classified… and their responses [were] sent via regular mail, thus, not classified either.”

While this letter mostly refers to long-known aspects of the case, there is one very striking reference which may shed light on a nagging mystery: who or what are the “semi-legitimate organizations” Edmonds has alluded to in the past?

According to the Edmonds team’s reply of 19 September, the USAF Inspector General’s letter had referred specifically to one American-Turkish Council, based in Washington, D.C., as being related to the Dickersons. For the Edmonds team, this was a very strange disclosure:

“…notably, in his letter of September 10^th, Col. Worth states that OSI’s investigation focused on ‘Major Dickerson’s relationship with the American-Turkish Council.’ This statement is very troubling for a number of reasons. First, Ms. Edmonds never even mentioned the name of this organization in any of her communications with the DOD, DOD IG, Department of the Air Force IG, and AFOSI, concerning this matter.”

We asked Sibel earlier today if the American-Turkish Council was in fact the name of the key “semi-legitimate organization” that had infiltrated the FBI during her time there. Because of the DOJ gag order she is currently under she could only say, “I cannot confirm that… they said it, we did not.”

Yet why would the Pentagon specifically name an organization, connecting it with the suspect in the case, if there was no relationship? And why would they bring it to the attention of exactly the people they would have wanted to conceal it from? Did they assume that the story would break, and therefore that it wasn’t worth concealing? Or was the whole thing merely a mistake, a misunderstanding, a typo? In any case, there are clearly suspicious shades of the old paradox, ‘are you still beating your wife?’ at work here.

Whatever it may or may not be, the American-Turkish Council is a Washington-based “…business association dedicated to friendship and the promotion of U.S.-Turkish commercial, defense and cultural relations.” Again according to the ATC website, its “…diverse membership includes Fortune 500 and Turkish companies, multinationals, non-profit organizations, enterprises and individuals with an interest in U.S.-Turkish relations.” It boasts a star-studded board of directors, including Chairman and Retired USAF Lt. General Brent Scowcroft; President and CEO G. Lincoln McCurdy; Executive Vice-President George H. Perlman of Lockheed Martin; and several other ranking figures from corporate America. Some of these as well as many other American and Turkish business heavyweights are also well-placed on the ATC Executive Committee (PDF).

Indeed, the ATC is clearly quite an important organization with the ability to bring together highly influential people. According to its website, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan addressed the organization’s “Golden Horn” members (i.e., those companies who cough up $9,500 annually) at a June event sponsored by Motorola, Raymond James, Boeing and Raytheon. In April, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard B. Myers addressed the group. Every major company known to man is either a member or a well-wisher. And so on and so forth.

However, scrutinizing the posted schedule covering the 244-day period of January through August 2004, one finds only 18 days that actually mention scheduled events. And there are no scheduled events at all for September through December (though they’re no doubt still being planned). So, unless the ATC is hurting for secretaries to put things down in writing, they don’t do too much meeting.

Now the 64 million dollar question remains that, if the TAC or another organization like it was in fact a “semi-legitimate” organization, would all of its board members and officials therefore be wise to the illicit activities going on behind the scenes? Or just a few unsavory characters?

We put this question to Sibel Edmonds today. It was understood that we were speaking here only in hypotheticals, since after all she has never mentioned any organization by name.

So would such a nefarious side-business involve everyone? “No, it does not,” Edmonds replied. “It does not involve all on [the] board- b
ut quite a few.”

Yet this is only the case in regard to board members of the largest such organizations, however: “with the smaller organizations, depending on their geographic location in the United States, [it can include] all of them.”

If the Pentagon did indeed inadvertently blow the cover of this “semi-legitimate organization” by mistake in the cited letter of 10 September 2002, it would answer a lot of questions – besides helping to put the pieces together in this jigsaw puzzle of intrigue.

So, what do we know for sure from previous information about the specific, unnamed organization(s) accused by her of infiltrating the FBI, compromising American national security and being involved with global organized crime and terrorism? They are:

-located in the Washington, D.C. area;

-very appealing to those with socialite ambitions, boasting as they do influential members from high society, big business and government;

-in cahoots with specific named and unnamed FBI and DOD employees, diplomats and “elected officials;”

-involved in highly lucrative international drugs, arms and money laundering affairs;

-allowed to continue with these activities because stopping them “…would hurt certain foreign relations abroad.”

And, what we know for sure about Sibel Edmonds’ prime suspects, the Dickersons? They:

-had interesting backgrounds- she Turkish-born, he an Air Force man formerly stationed in Turkey and tasked with weapons procurement there for countries including Uzbekistan and Turkey itself;

-asked Sibel Edmonds and her husband to join the specific “semi-legitimate organization,” unsuccessfully;

-disclosed that joining that organization would be very lucrative for the Edmonds’ and in return would require passing over classified FBI information;

-deliberately kept a FBI suspect of Turkish origin safe from investigators by obstructing translations;

-later threatened Sibel Edmonds and her family;

-allegedly influenced the Turkish government to harass Sibel Edmonds’ sister while in Turkey;

-were protected by the system, even after Edmonds’ allegations had been made, and allowed to escape to work for NATO in Belgium;

-have financial assets in Turkey, making “…both of them vulnerable to foreign influence.”

We mention these bits of salient information, deriving from the testimony of Sibel Edmonds and other sources, strictly as matters of public interest. Reader is left to make his own conclusions.

What follows is the previously unpublished document cited above, the letter of 19 Sept. 2002 from Sibel Edmonds’ lawyers to DOD Inspector General Joseph E. Schmitz. The letter is reprinted as received from Sibel Edmonds, including bolded texting, the only changes being the removal of some unfriendly HTML tags and internal linking that caused formatting problems, hence footnotes are listed as endnotes.

September 19, 2002

Via Fax: (703) 604-8567  

Joseph E. Schmitz

Inspector General

U.S. Department of Defense

The Pentagon

Washington, D.C.

Dear Inspector General Schmitz:

We represent Ms. Sibel Edmonds, who filed allegations regarding violations of the DOD Personnel Security Program by letter dated August 7, 2002.   An inquiry into Ms. Edmonds’ allegations was opened under Hotline case number 85069.

By letter dated September 10, 2002, Colonel James N. Worth, Director, Inquiries Directorate, Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Air Force, informed Ms. Edmonds that the matter was being closed as a result of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFSOI) having conducted a complete and thorough review of her concerns.   I am writing to bring to your direct attention our concern that this matter was not thoroughly or completely investigated and that this matter was not properly handled.   In addition, we ask that your office look into this matter further and investigate these very serious matters.

Ms. Edmonds alleged in her letter of August 7th that both Major Douglas Dickerson and his wife, Melek Can Dickerson,(¹) have committed numerous violations of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Personnel Security Program.   Improper contacts with foreign governments, officials or organizations by spouses of military personnel also constitute violations of the DOD Personnel Security Program.   In addition, a security risk may exist when an individual’s family members may be subject to duress or other potential influence by a foreign country.

Notably, in his letter of September 10^th, Col. Worth states that OSI’s investigation focused on “Major Dickerson’s relationship with the American-Turkish Council.”   This statement is very troubling for a number of reasons.   First, Ms. Edmonds never even mentioned the name of this organization in any of her communications with the DOD, DOD IG, Department of the Air Force IG, and AFOSI, concerning this matter.   Second, Ms. Edmonds’ concerns are not limited to whatever contacts Major Dickerson might have with the American-Turkish Council.   Third, this statement by Col. Worth is evidence that the AFOSI and the Air Force IG did not properly review Ms. Edmonds’ concerns in this matter.   Fourth, Col. Worth’s letter characterized Ms. Edmonds’ concerns in the narrowest and most limited way which demonstrates that both the AFOSI and the Air Force IG did not appreciate the gravity and seriousness of Ms. Edmonds’ allegations in this matter.

There is no indication that either the AFOSI or the Air Force IG has investigated the Dickersons’ relationships with other organizations and individuals which would be necessary in order to conduct a complete and thorough investigation of this matter.   In addition, neither Ms. Edmonds nor her counsel was requested by AFOSI or the Air Force IG to provide additional information.   Without obtaining additional information from Ms. Edmonds it would be impossible for the AFOSI or the Air Force IG to obtain the detailed information regarding the identities of the organization(s)/individual(s) and the scope of their relationships to the Dickersons.   In addition, there are a number of other allegations of wrongdoing that have been made (a number of which have already been substantiated) against Mrs. Dickerson, which would constitute additional violations of the DOD Personnel Security Program.   Once again, there is no indication that either the AFOSI or the Air Force IG is even aware of these matters involving Mrs. Dickerson which impact her husband’s clearance, let alone that a complete and thorough review of such allegations has taken place.

We are hereby providing you with additional information so that you may commence an investigation immediately.   These allegations involve extremely serious matters, including but not limited to several leaks of sensitive information by Mrs. Dickerson to a foreign country and direct threats that were made by Mrs. Dickerson against Ms. Edmonds and her family.   These allegations are also considered serious by the Senate Judiciary Committee. See, Letter from Sen. Patrick J. Leahy and Sen. Charles E. Grassley to Hon. John Ashcroft (August 13, 2002), attached hereto.(²) We also incorporate herein all of the allegations contained in the attached August 13^th letter from Senators Leahy and Grassley to Attorney General Ashcroft.

Mrs. Dickerson was a contract monitor at the FBI Washington Field Office translations department and was granted a security clearance by the FBI to work as contract monitor to perform translation services for the FBI commencing in
October or November, 2001.   However, Mrs. Dickerson had past and ongoing associations with one or more subject(s) or target(s) of an ongoing FBI investigation and failed to disclose those associations to the FBI. In June, 2002, the FBI confirmed in an unclassified briefing to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee that Mrs. Dickerson did, in fact, have undisclosed contacts with a foreign official who was the subject or target of an FBI investigation.(³)

Ms. Edmonds believes there is credible evidence that both Mrs. Dickerson and her husband, Major Dickerson, had ongoing improper and undisclosed contacts with one or more foreign officials.   Such improper contacts are not limited to whatever contacts the Dickersons may have with the American-Turkish Council.   Notably, the public record already reflects that the Dickersons maintained frequent associations with foreign nationals (aside from whatever relationship with the American-Turkish Council they may have).   We believe that those associations and the frequency of such associations were not reported by the Dickersons as required by FBI/DOJ and DOD requirements, and that these associations are such that the Dickersons would be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure from a foreign government.

Moreover, the Dickersons made statements to Ms. Edmonds and others that reflect that the Dickersons have a substantial financial interest in a foreign country that makes both of them vulnerable to foreign influence.

In addition, Mrs. Dickerson was assigned to translate information obtained from FBI wire-taps concerning one or more subject(s) or target(s) of an investigation, but she had past and ongoing improper and undisclosed contacts with the subject(s) or target(s).   Mrs. Dickerson is suspected of leaking information to one or more targets of an FBI investigation to which she was assigned to perform translation services.

Mrs. Dickerson also improperly instructed Ms. Edmonds and another employee at the FBI not to listen and translate certain FBI wire-taps because Mrs. Dickerson claimed that she knew the subject(s) and was confident that there would be nothing important to translate concerning those subject(s) or their conversations.

When Ms. Edmonds refused to go along with Mrs. Dickerson’s instruction and, after Ms. Edmonds reported Mrs. Dickerson’s conduct to FBI management, Mrs. Dickerson threatened the lives and safety of Mrs. Edmonds and her family members, who were citizens of, and resided in, a foreign country.   Ms. Edmonds alleges that Mrs. Dickerson made such threats because Ms. Edmonds refused to go along with Mrs. Dickerson’s scheme to obstruct justice and because Ms. Edmonds reported her concerns about Mrs. Dickerson’s wrongdoing to FBI management.

As a result of misconduct by Mrs. Dickerson, numerous translations were not properly conducted, and/or intentionally not conducted, which threatened intelligence and law enforcement investigations related to September 11th and other ongoing counter-terrorist, counter-intelligence and law enforcement investigations.   As a result of Mrs. Dickerson’s misconduct, extremely sensitive and material information was deliberately withheld from FBI translations.

In addition, FBI work order documents concerning translations related to September 11th investigations were falsified and contained forgeries of Ms. Edmonds’ name and/or initials.

By letter dated May 8, 2002, Ms. Edmonds, through counsel, notified Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III, that as a direct result of the FBI’s failure to address or correct the serious misconduct and security breaches that were reported by Ms. Edmonds, the safety and security of Ms. Edmonds and her family has been jeopardized and that a foreign country has targeted Ms. Edmonds’ sister to be interrogated “and taken/arrested by force.”   Ms. Edmonds’ counsel’s letter of May 8, 2002 to the Attorney General and FBI Director also provided them with a copy of the arrest warrant served by the foreign country at the residence of Ms. Edmonds’ sister in the foreign country together with a copy of the English translation of the arrest warrant.(⁴)

We believe that the warrant that was issued to Ms. Edmonds’ sister in the foreign country is the direct result of improper contacts between the Dickersons and a foreign country, and was a result of the threats that were made by Mrs. Dickerson when she threatened the lives and safety of Mrs. Edmonds and her family members, who were citizens of, and resided in, that same foreign country.   In addition, we believe that the threats made by Mrs. Dickerson, and the issuance of the arrest warrant, were the result of improper and undisclosed contacts by Mrs. Dickerson and Major Dickerson with a foreign official.   Such acts taken by Mrs. Dickerson (and other statements made and conduct by both Dickersons) would indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States which would also make Major Dickerson prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States, and such acts reflect a level of personal conduct and outside activities that raise a security concern that may be disqualifying.   Our concern in this regard is heightened by the fact that it is alleged that Mrs. Dickerson has maintained dual citizenship with a foreign country and has continued to possess a foreign passport from that same country as well as by the statements to others by both Major and Mrs. Dickerson that they have financial or business interests in that foreign country.

It is inconceivable how the Department of Defense could tolerate permitting one of its military officers to have access to classified information under such circumstances, especially when that officer’s spouse is alleged to have: (1)   threatened another person employed as a translator for the FBI on counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence cases; (2) committed other misconduct and serious security violations while employed by the FBI (such as having unreported contacts with one or more foreign officials while performing translation services for the FBI regarding conversations involving the same foreign officials); and (3) to make matters worse, carried out those threats by leaking information about the FBI translator to a foreign country (or agents thereof) so retaliation could be carried out against members of the FBI translator’s family who resided in that foreign country.   Moreover, as outlined above, there is more than sufficient information to require a security investigation of Major Dickerson based on foreign influence, foreign preference, personal conduct, security violations, and outside activities.   See, e.g., Adjudicative Desk Reference (ADR), Adjudicative Guidelines, Version 2.2, pp. 3-13 (July, 2001) (Guidelines B, C, E, K, and L).⁵

Additionally, we do not believe that Major Dickerson could be considered an “innocent spouse” and there is ample evidence that he was involved in (and/or had knowledge of and failed to report) many of the activities of his wife that comprise her acts of misconduct.   Moreover, in light of the serious allegations raised against Mrs. Dickerson, and the alleged involvement of Major Dickerson in his wife’s nefarious activities with, or on behalf of, foreign interests, Major Dickerson is vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure from foreign interests.

We do not believe that these matters could have been thoroughly or completely reviewed in the short time that AFOSI and the Air Force IG devoted to reviewing Ms. Edmonds’ letter of August 7^th.   After reviewing this matter further we believe that you will agree that Ms. Edmonds’ allegations of Perso
nnel Security violations are very serious and that they warrant further investigation by your office.   For all of the above reasons we hereby request that you re-open this matter and that the DOD OIG thoroughly investigate these matters.

Please direct all correspondence or communications about these matters to this office.   If you, or anyone at the Department of Defense or Inspector General’s offices, has any questions regarding this matter please feel free to contact me.     Thank you in advance for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

David K. Colapinto

Attorney for Ms. Edmonds

Enclosure

cc:       Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee

              Senator Charles E. Grassley, Senior Member, Senate Judiciary Committee

ENDNOTES

1.) Mrs. Dickerson is believed to be a United States citizen, but maintains dual citizenship with a foreign country and she is believed to possess a passport issued by that same foreign country.   In addition, Mrs. Dickerson and her husband also are believed to have financial interests in that foreign country.

2.) We believe that the “contract monitor” mentioned by Senators Leahy and Grassley in their August 13th letter to Attorney General Ashcroft is Mrs. Dickerson.

3.) A copy of the June 19, 2002 letter from Senators Leahy and Grassley to the DOJ Inspector General, which referenced this FBI confirmation, was attached to Ms. Edmonds’ original letter to DOD OIG of August 6, 2002.

4.) A copy of Ms. Edmonds’ counsel’s letter to the Attorney General dated May 8, 2002 was attached to Ms. Edmonds’ letter of August 7^th.

5.) The Adjudicative Guidelines are the “official U.S. Government policy that guides decisions on an individual’s eligibility for access to classified information.”   See, ADR, p. 1.   The ADR was developed by the Defense Personnel Security Research Center.   Id.

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