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Saakashvili Tested: Is Georgiaís ‘Uniter’ Up To The Task?

For all his embracing of modern Western-style human rights and democracy, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili aspires to be more like a medieval king. He wants, perhaps, to be another King David the Builder, the 12^th century ruler who liberated the towns and countryside from the Seljuk Turks and consolidated Georgian power at the dawn of a golden age that was to last over a century.Considering Georgia’s fractious history, it is a small miracle that the country has survived in any form into the modern day. The plethora of ethnic and linguistic groups, as well as the country’s formidable terrain, have all threatened political unity and stability over the centuries. Owing to its location as a bridge between continents and civilizations, Georgia has also suffered the fate of being an imperial battleground. The Persians, Ottomans, Mongols and Soviets are only some of the empires that have controlled it over the ages. But the Georgians’ tenacious hold on their language, culture and history has allowed them to persevere.

After winning independence from the Soviet Union in 1992, Georgia was led briefly by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a respected 1950’s dissident who became associated with the idea of “Georgia for the Georgians.” This slogan proved more successful in the campaign than in practice, however. An inevitable outcome of nationalist euphoria that usually manifests in small countries after their independence, the “Georgia for the Georgians” rhetoric proved disastrous. Not only did Gamsakhurdia soon ignite tensions among Georgians, his attitude also provoked feelings of vulnerability among minorities in the northwest (Abkhazia, South Ossetia). His rule ended in a mess of coups, expulsions and civil wars in 1993. Georgian internal weaknesses and minority mistreatment were easily exploited by Russia, which looked to maintain its influence over Georgia by covertly backing the breakaway regions’ rebellions.

The legacy of that botched era vexes Georgia still. Considering this context, and also considering the US-educated Saakashvili’s understanding of propaganda, it was no surprise that he sought to make the kingly association explicit at his pre-inauguration ceremony in January, when he took an oath on the tomb of King David in the Gelati Monastery, receiving the blessing of Georgia’s Patriarch, Ilia II.

“…You are entrusted with Georgia with its great hardships and problems,” the patriarch intoned sternly. “Georgia expects reunification from you and we are sure that you will do it with God being your helper.” It’s the kind of task for which one would appreciate divine assistance. But Saakashvili sounded up for the challenge:

“…today Georgia is split and humiliated. We should unite to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity. Georgia has existed and will exist. Georgia will become a united strong country.”

In its short history as a modern independent state, Georgia has failed to escape from Russia’s sphere of influence. Saakashvili, the leader who is receiving arguably the strongest backing from the West in the country’s modern history, has the unfortunate fate of ruling at the same time as Russia’s powerful Vladimir Putin. Both have been accused of autocratic rule, suppressing dissenting voices, and using sometimes ruthless measures to get the job done. Sometimes, these claims have seemed justified.

Aspirations are always limited by determining factors, however. Whereas Putin is the experienced and very clever leader of a world superpower (if not a ‘hyperpower’), Saakashvili is an untested young president in charge of a country that tends to always find itself in turmoil of one sort or another. Whereas the Russians can play with Georgia, as it were, for fun, the latter actually needs Russian natural resources and economic cooperation. Georgian leaders in the past have frequently felt the pain of natural gas and electricity shut-offs owing to Russian displeasure over various incidents.

It’s obvious that Saakashvili is determined, confident in his American backing, to put his country back together again. Yet he may be on the verge of violating the first of the 48 Laws of Power- that is, “never outshine the master.”

Saakashvili may have learned well about political infighting and cunning from his victory over Eduard Shevardnadze, and he no doubt relished bringing down Adzharian leader Aslan Abashidze, who had seemed immovable for so long, running his private fiefdom in the south. That Saakashvili was able to sweep into power and within months end the Adzharian separatist threat (at least for now), reviving at the same time Georgians’ flagging national pride, was quite notable. Yet Ossetia and Abkhazia are quite different commodities, and Saakashvili would do well to avoid a direct confrontation with Putin over these disputes. They represent battles he can’t win and, with the US bogged down in Iraq and distracted by its own internal political strife, it’s unlikely he will receive much eager attention from the most important Georgian ally.

Yet this week’s events seemed to indicate that Saakashvili, fresh from his victory in Adzhara, is bruising for a fight elsewhere. According to the Russia Journal,

“…Saakashvili recently brought Georgia’s renegade Adzhara region back into the fold by forcing out the local leader [Abashidze], and has made clear he has now set his sights on regaining control over South Ossetia and another breakaway region, Abkhazia.”

The Tbilisi government alarmed the Russians by sending troops on Monday to the border between Georgia proper and South Ossetia. According to Georgia, the Russian peacekeepers stationed there were trying to dismantle key anti-smuggling checkpoints. The majority of South Ossetia’s 70,000 people survive on smuggling goods across their mountainous terrain between Russia and Georgia.

After Georgia raised the stakes by sending its army on what would seem to be a matter more suitable for the police, Moscow charged it with making “provocations.” And yesterday, the Russian Duma ominously declared that any Georgian saber-rattling could have “irreversible consequences” for Tbilisi. Surreptitious sponsors of the rebellion that lost Ossetia for the Georgians, Russia does not need to spell out what sort of consequences these might be.

Nevertheless, the government in Tbilisi has taken a feisty tone, charging Russia with interference. According to the Russia Journal, Georgia’s foreign ministry bluntly rejected the charge: “…this affair concerns Georgia’s territory and Georgia is a sovereign state and has the right to take action to uphold the law on its own territory, just like Russia and other sta
tes.”

The war of words became more voluble still. Russia said the troops in question “…were trained by U.S. special forces for anti-terrorism, and objected to their use in South Ossetia.” Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania was somewhat vague regarding the charge: “…we will act in the interests of our compatriots, including using trained units for the armed forces. It’s our business which units we send as part of the peacekeeping contingent in South Ossetia.”

Yet just as diplomats representing the Georgians, Russians, South Ossetians and North Ossetians (in Russia) tried to cool tensions at talks in Tskhinvali, South Ossetia’s main town, sensational media reports about an imminent Georgian tank invasion threatened to heat things up once again.

“Absurd!” retorted Georgian minister for affairs of settlement of conflicts Goga Khaindrava, in reaction to the claim that Georgian tanks were set to rendezvous in the central Georgian town of Gori, just 30 kilometers from Tskhinvali.

Minister Khaindrava explained that while tanks were indeed on the move, they were simply returning to their customary base in Gori following the grand military parade in Tbilisi on May 26, Georgia’s Independence Day. Georgian Defense Minister Gela Bezhuashvili also denied  that extra troops were on the way to Gori, a dusty town best known for being the birthplace of Joseph Stalin.

Like Putin, Saakashvili has also chosen to play the card of martial patriotism. While Georgia’s meager military is infinitely weaker than Russia’s, relatively speaking the former have more reason to be proud right now. With its army bogged down in Chechnya, its navy rusting in the docks, and staff unable to keep up with new developments in military technology, Russia continues to regress. Yet since it cannot get much lower than it has been in recent years, there’s only one way to go for the Georgian military. “Anti-terrorist” training from the Americans that began in 2002, and related improvements in equipment, have given the country something to take pride in. Considering Saakashvili’s strategy, it comes as no surprise that this year’s military parade was the country’s largest to date.

Indeed, despite Wednesday’s reassurances from the government, a certain ambiguity characterizes recent announcements. For example, while Defense Minister Bezhuashvili discredited the blitzkrieg hysteria, he did say that the barracks in Gori “…will be enforced with  additional forces soon.” Exactly why that will be necessary, he did not say.

In any case, Saakashvili appears to have taken one on the chin in South Ossetia. The troop action amounted to a symbolic show, more or less; after enforcing the checkpoints for a few hours, Saakashvili pulled them back from the border area. Wednesday’s hasty meeting of the relevant Georgian, Russian and Ossetian parties- officially known as the Mixed Control Commission for the Georgian-Ossetian Settlement- resulted in the agreement to immediately remove Georgian troops from the administrative border and to dismantle the checkpoints they had created. In a further blow to Saakashvili, the Commission proclaimed that “…it was impermissible to place any uncoordinated posts [checkpoints] there in the future.”

One might wonder what Saakashvili had hoped to achieve in regards to Ossetia. Was he just trying to make a display of force, a show of daring against mighty Russia? Or had he been actually trying to counter a specific threat? Either way, his embarrassing reprimand from the Mixed Control Commission makes it seem that he violated another of the 48 Laws of Power- that is, “always plan through to the end.”

There are signs that the incident was meant as more smoke than fire, occurring shortly after South Ossetian officials refused to travel to Tbilisi for previously planned peace talks. With the agreement on Wednesday, however, other positive developments are being mentioned. Georgian Railways boss David Onoprishvili, and Prime Minister Zhvania discussed restoration of the railway between South Ossetia and Georgia, while the Ossetian authorities have accepted Tbilisi’s proposal to resume distribution of state pensions, according to Goga Khaindrava. This idea shows that Saakashvili knows how to deal in carrots as well as in sticks.

Abkhazia, the breakaway province bordering on the Black Sea and Russia, remains the greatest wound to national pride. Georgians cannot come to grips with the idea that a minority population managed to expel the majority Georgian population- amounting to 300,000 people- while another 10,000 were killed. Anti-Russian feeling in Georgia owes a great deal to Russia’s role in helping to “liberate” the Abkhazians.

While no action similar to the Ossetian one has yet been taken, Abkhaz leader Raul Khajimba has chosen proactive reaction, so to speak. Earlier this week he warned Tbilisi that the “Adzharian scenario” will not succeed in either his “republic” or in South Ossetia. In regard to the latter, Khajimba warned that “…such provocations may result in the resumption of the hostilities that took place in the early 1990s… those conflicts resulted in Georgia’s defeat in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”

Confident of his continued support from Russia, Khajimba threatened that “…if Georgia decides to resume armed conflicts in either Abkhazia or South Ossetia, this will again end badly for Georgia itself.”

Abkhazia bluntly refused Saakashvili’s invitation for reconciliation, made on May 28. “…Abkhazia’s status is final,” stated Khajimba. “The Republic has adopted the constitution of an independent state and the issue of Abkhazia’s status can not be the subject of discussion.” While no country in the world recognizes Abkhazia as an independent state, this has had little effect on curbing Abkhaz leaders’ zeal.

This week’s stand-down in South Ossetia has slowed the momentum Saakashvili gained following the reintegration of Adzharia. As the continued belligerence from Georgia’s estranged provinces shows, for decrees of national unity to take effect, they must be promulgated by a king. For all his successes, Saakashvili is not yet such a ruler. He had best hope that his economic promises made to a beleaguered citizenry prove easier to achieve than his nationalistic ones.