VMROÃs Power Struggle, and an Arrest on Ice
May 31, 2004
Balkanalysis.com has learned that the “International Community”- the western embassies, think-tanks and ruling NGOs- is placing enormous pressure on the Macedonian government not to issue an arrest warrant for former PM Ljubco Georgievski and his closest associates, for the time being.The government had allegedly made a secret plan to move on the case between 1-4 June, but is being pressured to delay the action out of Western fears that any arrest would marginalize the position of Georgievski’s replacement at the VMRO-DPMNE party helm, Nikola Gruevski, by making him appear an “American stooge” at a time when he is already under fire from Georgievski loyalists whose actions have recently threatened to cause a schism in the party ranks.
The last thing the West wants to do is to make a martyr out of the former prime minister. But its perhaps sound prudence has also tapped into the frustrations of Georgievski’s many political enemies who were planning to relish in overseeing his demise.
However, while the West is urging them to delay an arrest, it is not telling them to forget abut the idea altogether. Conceivably, such an action could occur within a few weeks, once the embattled Gruevski’s position is deemed unassailable. A former finance minister untainted by charges of corruption, Gruevski is perceived as being the party’s Great White Hope. His one-year tenure has seen VMRO vocally endorse the generic pro-Europe, pro-”civil society” platform required of emerging states, while suppressing the nationalist tendencies that had until then characterized the party.
Several weeks ago, the SDSM-led government agreed on the plan to arrest Georgievski for his alleged approval of the March 2002 “mujahedin” killings. That widely-reported incident saw 7 innocent Pakistani illegal immigrants lose their lives in a staged killing, according to an investigation carried out by the (until recently) Minister of the Interior, Hari Kostov. (Kostov is today being sworn in as prime minister). The long game of musical chairs saw former PM Branko Crvenkovski take over as president, following the February 26th death of Boris Trajkovski in a plane crash in Bosnia. Kostov’s position as top cop has been filled by an experienced veteran, the ministry’s Siljan Avramovski.
According to our sources, Kostov had been the one most eager to bring in Georgievski, but was restrained by his party superior, Branko Crvenkovski. As the wily and experienced Crvenkovski saw it, leaving Georgievski alone was good for their party, as it has wreaked havoc with the opposition’s unity.
This new development seems to support widely-circulated rumors that Ljube Boskovski, the former interior minister accused of directly ordering the immigrant slayings, was allowed to flee Macedonia for Croatia- possibly, in exchange for future testimony against his perceived ally Georgievski. While such somewhat conspiratorial logic may never receive ultimate confirmation, we should keep in mind that this is the Balkans and stranger things happen all the time.
This would also help answer one of the oddest questions of all: the timing of the Boskovski accusations. Why did Paki-Gate emerge only 2 days after Crvenkovski’s election- an election which was by all accounts plagued by irregularities and ballot-stuffing executed on his behalf by young toughs provided by the Albanian DUI coalition partners? If revealing the scandal was really motivated by the government’s concern for championing human rights- as virtually all foreign media accounts affirmed- then why was it not done a long time ago? After all, we now know that the government, guided by strong pressure from the Americans, has been on the case since 2002.
By putting the case on ice until now, the government has been able to maximize its usefulness. It has waited until the moment when both it and the opposition have sunk to their lowest levels of strength. Almost two years since the parliamentary elections that brought SDSM and DUI to the fore, Macedonia’s economy continues to sputter. Promises to bring the country new prosperity have so far remained unfulfilled. Meanwhile, Trajkovski’s untimely death allowed the SDSM to quickly assume total power, with Crvenkovski’s election as president; but it remains an open question as to whether the party will again dominate the next parliamentary election.
Therefore, calling early elections would be a wise strategic decision for retaining the SDSM-DUI lead. If done quickly enough, they could take advantage of the opposition’s present disarray. Thawing out the Boskovski-Georgievski cases right now has inevitably increased the turmoil in the ranks of the VMRO, threatening to divide the party at a time when it should have been able to capitalize on the government’s failures.
It is an open secret that Georgievski’s many enemies have been gunning for him for a long time. During the war of 2001, his tough-talking stance alienated Albanian citizens and the West as well. And average Macedonians who had supported the prime minister for his perceived nationalism later grew dismayed when his government ended up losing the war, signing away huge concessions to the Albanian militants.
Furthermore, the then-opposition SDSM and Western monitors alike accused the prime minister of massive corruption, claiming to have whole dossiers full of evidence for his indiscretions. From the interventionist ranks were imported fixers and political assassins. The media, both local and foreign, were simultaneously full of corruption and other allegations against the prime minister.
The present government believes the strongest and most important case it has against Georgievski involves such scandals. However, as we understand it they are afraid to raise such issues, as then their own previous corruption scandals from the 1990’s would then be brought up. The Pakistani murders therefore will likely be used, insofar as they represent a “neutral” case. So much for being motivated by a fundamental desire to champion human rights.
Nevertheless, whatever the government decides to do will likely have little effect, except for a symbolic one. Georgievski has fled the country, apparently tipped off to the plans being made against him in advance. Many believe that he is taking refuge in Russia. However, from wherever he is, rumor has it that Georgievski still partially hinders VMRO because he managed to take sole control over the party’s finances before being forced out of the party headship last May. He also no doubt can fall back on financial tentacles spread out across several European and near-Eastern states.
Recent History of the Inter-VMRO Feud
Prime Minister from 1998-2002, Ljubco Georgievski had headed Macedonia’s most historic party from its inception (or re-inception) 13 years ago, right up until last May, when he stepped down to let the younger Gruevski take his place. After VMRO’s humiliating defeat in the 2002 parliamentary elections, it was decided that the party needed new blood and a change of pace. To add weight to this argument were fears that the much-maligned Georgievski could be arrested at any time for numerous allegations of corruption regarding the privatization of the OKTA oil refinery and other deals. In short, he had become a liability. But many believed he still continued to serve a role as the
hidden hand behind the party, even in “retirement.”
While long-standing and contentious, the inter-party power struggle only became really ferocious this month, finally involving threats, name calling, as well as a little hooliganism and intimidation too. The saga ended- for the moment- with Georgievski’s open letter to Gruevski last week. In it, he formally gave up his title of honorary party president, thus severing his last official tie with the party.
According to ‘Vreme,’ the old divisions “…came out in the open when Georgievski ’suggested’ that members abstain from voting [on April 28]. Post-election analyses conducted after Georgievski had left the country blamed him [and his suggestion] for the election’s result [i.e., the defeat of VMRO’s candidate, Sasko Kedev].”
On Saturday, May 29, A-1 TV quoted party sources as saying that while passions have for the moment cooled, “..very soon new issues” may arise. Yet “nobody wants to make prognoses.” According to the article,
“…the people who know the situation in VMRO best said that is incredible to believe that Georgievski will give up so easily. His move to tender his resignation as honorary president may be just a move designed to try and inflame passions between the [party] members, and to prove that Gruevski doesn’t have support from the party’s base.”
This motive had been mentioned a day earlier, when the station reported that Gruevski had met with Georgievski and asked the latter not to resign but to help the party in the coming local elections this fall. Such a motive could also be seen from the covert heckling expressed in Georgievski’s letter:
“…it’s very said that Nikola Gruevski spent almost all year on a political fight with Ljubco Georgievski, and not with Branko Crvenkovski… honestly I hope that from today, Nikola Gruevski can start by proving to Communistic (?) journalists and certain diplomats that he is not an instrument in Ljubco Georgievski’s hands, but an independent and free-thinking politician.”
Comments like these had led Gruevski to complain earlier this month that he’d been the victim of back-stabbing from his former ally and mentor. Tensions reached their peak mid-month when an organized crowd of aggressive young Georgievski supporters staged a protest outside Skopje’s Panorama Hotel, where the VMRO Central Committee was holding a closed meeting on 14 May. The meeting was delayed almost an hour by the arrival of the rabble-rousers, who chanted “Ljubco! Ljubco!” in support of Georgievski and broke a few windows. According to A-1 on 15 May, the atmosphere was “electrified to the max.”
A couple of days later, Gruevski complained about the hooliganism, declaring that “300 criminals with guns” had tried to disrupt the party gathering. At the meeting, the indecisive Gruevski- more a technocrat than a leader- had tried to proffer his own resignation, but this was rejected even by the Committee members who generally oppose him.
Georgievski’s (apparently) final power play was made last week. On May 26, before absolving himself of relations with VMRO, he declared that Gruevski faced a choice between sacking party second-in-command Ganka Samoilovska-Cvetanova, or else holding an emergency party congress where entirely new leadership would be elected. Gruevski was indignant, and once again brought together his Central Committee, most of whom proceeded to ignore the ultimatum. In the end, he did manage to get approval for expanding the Council by six (supportive) members- his primary goal. After the marathon 9-hour meeting, furthermore, the eight “disgruntled” Council members who had previously supported Georgievski resigned.
However, while the storm seems to have passed, ‘Vreme’ relates that
“‘…it is still not clear how the [VMRO] leadership will cooperate with a parliamentary group in which from out of 28 people 21 supported Georgievski’s call for Gruevski’s resignation. The coordinator of the parliamentary group Koce Trajanovski yesterday said that ‘…the group still hadn’t decided as to what outlook the party’s management would take.’”
The wild card in all of this is the current government. Will they decide to take action against Georgievski- one that would have unpredictable results? Will Western caution be heeded?
If so, it would seem to be a boon for the “reformed” VMRO. They could be rid of the old guard once and for all, while not appearing to be guilty for doing the ridding.
By pushing for a postponement of the government’s arrest announcement, the West seems to have taken pity on the former political outcasts. After all, while the Internationals like to get smooth cooperation such as they’ve been getting from the current SDSM-DUI bunch, their interests are not served by any one party or coalition become a permanent fixture. In such a case, peddling influence becomes more difficult, even in a small and easily exploitable country such as Macedonia.
Get it while it’s hot! The latest riveting text on Macedonia, Confessions of a Macedonian Bandit: a Californian in the Balkan Wars.