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Problems of Consociationalism from the Netherlands to Macedonia

By Darko Angelov

How to make two peoples live together within one state boundary when both, or at least one of them has no ’sincere’ intention for co-existence, and does not uphold the necessary commitment to the state’s general prosperity? The answer is, many would argue, to force them to remain together and to cohabitate at any price, as contemporary international relations seldom support changing of internationally established and recognized boundaries. And here in the cases of divided societies, the oft-prescribed recipe is the enforcement of a consociational democracy.The key feature of consociationalism is that it is a power sharing arrangement encompassing a set of institutional devices (proportionality, grand coalition, mutual veto etc.) as well as related cooperative attitudes of political elites in segmented societies, leading them to transcend the borders of their own groups, to be receptive to the claims of others and to accommodate the divergent interests and claims of the segments (Lijphart 1969: 216).
History knows of positive experiences of consociational power sharing. One such example is the Netherlands, with its consociational democracy up until the 1960s. Another is neighboring Belgium, over the last couple of decades relatively successful in the implementation of consociational power sharing between the country’s two main entities. Aside from these positive examples of consociational democracy in practice, an example of complete failure was the short-lived attempt to implement consociational power-sharing mechanisms in Cyprus in the 1960s.

The following will refer to the three above-mentioned cases, and relate them to Europe’s latest experiment consociational democracy- the case of Macedonia, following the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the 2001 conflict.

The Netherlands

The birthplace of consociationalism is the Netherlands, where Arend Lijphart first hammered out the theory. And it was the Netherlands that provided one of the earliest, if not the earliest, and surely one of the most successful consociational arrangements in practice. The Netherlands is a relatively ethnically homogeneous society with a small minority of Friesians in the northwest of the country. But what made it fruitful soil for consociationalism to take root was its religious and hence cultural heterogeneity, reflected in relatively deep societal cleavages witnessed up until the late 1960’s. (It had been in the 1950s when consociational concepts of governance were introduced).

However, this occurred in a society renowned for its welfare system and overall economic prosperity. Thus, the dilemma of the Netherlands’ success in the utilization of consociationalism may be tied to the very fact that it was in a society not divided on profoundly deep, ethnic lines and that it was not a society (also) burdened by social cleavages lining up to the religious division. As the following examples will show, the more societal cleavages have to do with ethnic antagonisms and division, the less the consociational model is effective and the less it can offer a state sustainable viability.

In the Netherlands today, the Protestant, Catholic, and secular societal groups have lost most of their significance. This modern Western country is now culturally homogeneous. When this homogenization really occurred (throughout the 1970s and 1980s as a follow-up to the successful implementation and practice of consociationalism) there was no need to continue practicing consociationalism as a scheme for creating government coalitions or for safeguarding the well-being of state and society. It was precisely when consociationalism became part of the political mentality and culture that it also became unnecessary to continue rigidly and instrumentally enforcing it. After a successful decade of enforcing consociational democracy (in the 1950s), it was no longer necessary for the leaders to practice consociationalism in order to hold the Dutch subcultures together. Simply, the decline of consociational democracy in the Netherlands since the 1960s was an indicator of its success, not its failure. Societal cleavages became relativised as the consensus-based, cohabitation approach to practicing politics became a core characteristic of the ‘Dutch way’ of doing politics and running a state.

Belgium

Moving to a society divided not on religious, but on linguistic grounds, Belgium presents a case where consociational democracy was and is harder to implement and maintain. Nevertheless, it seemed the only answer for providing greater self-government. It had been the Walloon, French speaking community of the country (a minority vis-а-vis the majority Flemish, Dutch-speaking community) that pressured for a greater autonomy.

It is here, in the example of Belgium that we witnessed the most troublesome aspect of Lijphard’s recipe for consociationalism: the stipulation that a minority veto must exist, allowing elites of each group to challenge decisions unfavorable to their particular groups. According to Lijphard, this consociational method aims to protect minorities from a tyrannical majority by providing their representatives setting out a mechanism of checks and balances. In Belgium, the 1970 constitutional reforms introduced a minority veto on non-constitutional matters for the purpose of protecting the Waloon minority against the Flemish majority. Since the two communities were in most cases territorially divided, in Belgium the consociational model was deemed less effective than in Holland. Indeed, whereas in the Netherlands territorial segmentation (Catholics living in the south and Protestants in the north of the country) existed, the two religious community shared a common language and sense of belonging to a common state.

In Belgium, on the other hand, the state was younger, with a short legacy of statehood, and inhabited by two major communities speaking distinct languages and strong identifying with separate regions (the French-speaking Belgians with Wallonia and the Dutch-speaking ones with Flanders). Thus, Belgian consociationalism was much more turbulent, with political constraints and deadlocks becoming a usual occurrence. Unlike the Dutch experience where consociationalism eventually produced a much greater societal cohesion, in Belgium it brought an increased alienation of the two entities vis-а-vis the common state, and a lessened identification of the two communities with Belgian nationhood.

Cyprus

Cyprus symbolized the most extreme case of consociationalism’s complete failure as the remedy for a thoroughly divided society. The Cypriot consociational experiment begun with the 1960 constitution introduced a very rigid formula for achieving a delicate balance between the two groups’ desires: the majority Greek Cypriot preference for a unitary state and the minority Turkish Cypriot demands for recognition as a separate political entity. Although making up only 20% of the population, the Turkish inhabitants of Cyprus were given prime status as one of the state’s two communities.

However, the fundamental differences between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots (starting from the numerical imbalance between the two, the long legacy of violent conflict between their kin nations and states, and the clear distinction in terms of religion, culture, language and national awareness) proved insurmountable. Soon it became obvious that the Cypriot experiment was doomed to fail. The state collapsed and violence took center stage. What followed in the Cypriot case is yet another example of violence replacing dialogue, affirming the incapability of current international political theory to provide replicable, durable solutions with universal applicability.

Macedonia

Macedonia is the latest, but surely not the last example of a divided society striving to preserve its integrity as an indivisible entity. It is a newly independent state with a short and unstable legacy of statehood. It is a society deeply divided along ethnic, religious, social and political/ideological lines, a country both internally and externally contested and challenged.

Macedonia gained its full independence in 1991 out of a federal arrangement having many consociational features. It was first of all Yugoslavia’s collapse, following a decade of dysfunctional power sharing between its six constituent republics that set the context for the fledgling state’s arrival. Thus, the larger picture out of which independent Macedonia emerged hardly provided reason for optimism. From the beginning (1991), it seemed hardly plausible that the consociational model would work. The country was faced by conflict between the majority ethnic Macedonians and the largest minority, the Albanians. Their perceptions of not only the country but also the whole process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia diverged sharply. While the Macedonians saw it conceivable to have the country proclaim independence within the boundaries and with the structure inherited from Yugoslavia, the Albanians in Macedonia (and Kosovo), saw the collapse of Yugoslavia as an opportunity for secession. Almost parallel to Macedonia’s independence referendum of 1991, the Albanians of the country ran their very own plebiscite for the establishment of a territorial Albanian autonomy in the western parts of the country, where the bulk of that population lived. Thus, the very start of Macedonia’s road to statehood was marked by a clear conflict of interest between the country’s Macedonians and Albanians.

Throughout the whole course of the 1990s, because of both geopolitical circumstances and the continued democratization within the state itself, Macedonia remained relatively peaceful, without any significant violent inter-ethnic conflicts. However, on the political level there was much turmoil and constant bargaining between the political elites of the Macedonians and Albanians. It was the continued zero-sum game of give-and-take between the political representatives of the two communities that produced a de-facto consociational system of governance. This model was introduced by the first government in 1990. Proportionality, grand government coalitions, and minority veto power as key instruments of the consociational model were all gradually introduced into the formal and informal order of the country. Legislative and practical developments were based on the consociational concept of governance. Nevertheless, even this did not prevent yet another outbreak of Balkan violence.

Many argue that the 2001 conflict in Macedonia was merely a spillover of the earlier 1999 crisis in Kosovo, and see a geopolitical rationale of the follow-up events. However, some would also explain it as the failure to transform Macedonia into a complete whole where ethnic differences could be reconciled with the idea of a common state.

For their part, the Macedonians saw their independence as too fresh and too problematized by external factors to support an outright consociational model where the Albanians of the country would be the one of the two constituent nations. The Albanians, on the other hand, had a wider, regional national cause in Kosovo; they had lesser interest in participating in a Macedonian state. With this dichotomy in perception between the two communities vis-а-vis the state of Macedonia, the dilemma has been whether consociationalism, or any other societal model, can be a viable solution, when there is little interest between the Macedonians and Albanians for having a common state.

Macedonia’s experience with consociationalism has confirmed the shortcomings of this societal model- that the veto power exploited by minorities causes deadlocks in government deliberations. Thus, the effectiveness of government, one of the fundamental principles of democracy, has decreased. Consequently, Macedonia throughout the whole course of the 1990s suffered constant strain. Invariably the so-called “Albanian issue” was pushed to the very top of the political agenda. Little space was left for other segments of societal reform to be enforced.

Another aspect of the consociational democracy theory is the principle of proportionality, which aims at a fair distribution of power. In theory, it ought to provide for the equal representation and participation of all segmental groups. In Macedonia, as in many other divided societies, proportional representation guaranteed minorities an opportunity to shape policies at both the national and subnational levels. More specifically, this principle suggests that proportionality must be the standard principle for political representation, civil service employment, and the allocation of public funds. However, though this may be regarded as being genuinely democratic, there are problems, because proportionality, quota-based allocations and duplications across the civil service and in public funding only serve to intensify segregation along ethnic lines. In Macedonia’s case, this proved to be the case. With the introduction of affirmative action, Macedonian society became even more ‘ethnicized’ and polarized along ethnic lines.

One may ask whether Macedonia’s direction towards an even deeper and more formalized consociationalism after the 2001 conflict was the right road to take. The consociationalist approach institutionalizes ethnic segmentation in the state itself, and this presents a problem when introduced into societies with a profound level of segregation, as with Macedonia. It is the pluralist approach that denies the state and state institutions to be defined in ethnic terms. The pluralist or civic approach is oriented towards openness and participation. Consociational approaches are at best elitist, and at worst anti-democratic in character. The 2001 conflict in Macedonia proved this; initially the conflict was an intra-Albanian one, wherein the then-incumbent Albanian political elite severely criticized the rebels, who represented an emerging, wannabe Albanian political structure, coming from the Diaspora and externally supported from Kosovo.

Conclusion

Consociational democracy is not a modus operandi to be taken for granted. It rests on the assumption that the political elites of the communities in multi-ethnic states want to develop such a democratic model of the state and even more crucially, that they sincerely strive for a common state. As I have tried to show with the foregoing examples of countries that uphold (or have upheld) consociationalism, this model for power sharing has no universal and ultimate utilization in different environments. The pattern visible from these examples is that the more a society is divided along ethnic lines, the less the consociational mode has a durable positive effect. Therefore, each country should first and foremost consider, when making political and societal arrangements, the unique characteristics of the state in question. Any implementation that merely replicates another country’s successful experience with a certain model cannot be guaranteed to meet with similar success.

Darko Angelov is a Macedonian graduate student studying international relations at the Central European University in Budapest. Primarily interested in Macedonian politics and public relations, Darko has previous experience working with the Macedonian government, the International Crisis Group, and the World Macedonian Youth Congress.

Readers may be interested by another, earlier criticism of consociationalism from Antiwar.com’s Justin Raimondo.

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