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Macedonia year in review part 3: security and defense

Introduction

The year began with now-perennial worries over a “spring offensive” from Albanian paramilitaries. While this did not in fact occur, numerous low-intensity attacks and terrorist bombings did go on throughout the year. As most of these were Kosovo-related, it seemed that, yet again, the unresolved situation there was the biggest threat to Macedonia’s security. Growing dissent in the UN-administered province led to an upsurge in violence, against Serbs but also against UNMIK and KFOR personnel. Terrorist attacks carried out by the same “Albanian Liberation Army” active in Macedonia proved that the organization was at least partially staffed by the KPC- Kosovo’s allegedly legitimate police force, composed of old KLA members. Reports from Kosovo Albanian media indicated a close intelligence cooperation between the SHIK (Kosovo Intelligence) and its counterpart in Tirana. Later comments from AKSH representative Idajet Beqiri also attested to connections for the group in Albania itself.

In general terms, 2003 saw a continuing process of Westernization and cooperation with NATO and the US. Macedonian security officials attended conferences and training seminars in far-flung European cities. Cooperation on anti-terrorist training was increased as the reshaping of the military got underway.Western reforms and re-orientation; weaknesses and strengths

Defense Minister Buchkovski’s stated goal- eventual NATO accession- involved adherence to the larger goals of the NATO alliance and US defense planners in Europe- a lighter, faster and more dynamic defense force capable of countering urban terrorism, that is, “asymmetrical threats.” This philosophy was behind the projected sale of Macedonia’s few Sukhoi jet fighters in favor of acquiring more helicopters.

Another tactic for appeasing the West was sending troops to Iraq. Since they all returned safe, one might say all’s well that ends well. In Iraq, these crack troops no doubt picked up valuable experience in a truly “hot” zone, and seemed to be outfitted with much better, American style gear upon their return. And they won America’s undying love, too.

America was not Macedonia’s only military partner, however. In October, PM Branko Crvenkovski met with his Russian counterpart, Mikhail Kasyanov in Moscow, and signed a pact on military cooperation (mostly, however in the area of repairing existing Russian made equipment). Still, this was a good sign in an improved year for bilateral relations with Moscow.

Additionally, Macedonian police, defense and intelligence forces expanded cooperation with neighboring countries on matters ranging from Albanian militants to customs checks to weapons smuggling. While the little country is still finding its place in Europe, Macedonia’s geography meant that it continued to be of interest to security forces of many countries, even if a war was not taking place.

In 2003, Macedonia’s strength continued to be direct, human intelligence, while open-source intelligence and high-tech remained under-used. Since Kosovo remained the country’s number one concern, one would have expected that cooperation with Serbia would have been solid. However, this issue was ambivalent as informed sources on both sides argued for or against the quality of cooperation. Serbia’s armed forces proceeded along the same lines of NATO reform, though its leadership was afflicted additionally by never-ending Hague indictments.

On the level of personnel, Macedonia’s greatest problem continued to be the suspect allegiances of ranking members of the police, intelligence and defense ministries. All of these ministerial slots had been given to Macedonians, meaning that (for reasons of political correctness) the ministers’ immediate subordinates had to be from the Albanian DUI party. This meant, essentially, that the same people who had participated in terrorist attacks against the state in 2001 would have access to the most classified information available- and, conceivably, shares it with paramilitaries. This thorny problem is not likely to be solved, though it did not present overt and publicized dangers to the fragile coalition in 2003.

Terrorism and militant attacks: imagined and real

While Islamic extremism received plenty of coverage, in 2003 Macedonia fortunately escaped the wrath of the jihadis. There had been fears that the country’s support for Iraq would make it a target. Yet Macedonia likely did not seem a juicy enough target for al Qaeda to waste its time on. However, if we are to believe recent Bulgarian reports, a small amount of Albanian “students” from Macedonia sent for religious education in Jordan and the Gulf were being indoctrinated, and either sent to Afghanistan, or sent home to seek new converts. Macedonian authorities continued their scrutiny of specific figures in the Islamic religious community, and even became interested in a few more.

As usual, the biggest threat to life and limb came from the ostensibly secular Albanian extremists based in Kosovo, Skopska Crna Gora and Lipkovo. Yet save for a few needless deaths, they were unable to do much. The overnight sensation “Commander Chakala,” blustering his demands and deadlines from the hills, only provoked a limited police action, checkpoints, and jokes from Macedonians. The Interior Ministry claimed that Chakala only had 20-30 followers, all “criminals.” These opinions were publicly backed by the US, EU and OSCE.

A provocation of unquestionably criminal nature occurred after the escape and re-capture of Dilaver Bojku, or “Leka,” a famous prostitution boss from Struga. He had escaped in a suspiciously easy way, leading critics to wonder whether his friends in high places were helping him. After a vociferous outcry from the internationals, Leku was recaptured. He subsequent bombing of a courthouse in Struga was meant as a warning to the authorities. Still, the intimidated locals were glad to see him go.

The deaths of two Polish NATO soldiers who drove over an Albanian-planted landmine on March 4 internationalized the issue. The mine had been meant for a Macedonian army patrol. Waning support for the Albanian cause dropped to nil in the immediate aftermath of the murders.

May was a trying month for Macedonian security officials. First was the embarrassing Vejce incident, which proved that no force on earth, not even the US Ambassador, is capable of persuading stubborn Albanian peasants to give way. A planned and pre-announced ceremony, for family members to lay flowers on the place where a massacre of soldiers had taken place in 2001, was stymied by Albanian villagers in Vejce. Their refusal to stop blocking the road made Minister Kostov threaten to quit, and even angered US Ambassador Butler. The government’s inability to deal decisively with the villagers showed the continuing political fragility of the “Albanian question” in Macedonia. A similar affirmation of this was seen just over the border in Kosovo, where an internationally sanctioned, UN-implemented border crossing plan was scrapped at the last minute due to the bellyaching of Albanian villagers.

In late May, following the arrest of an Albanian over the 2 NATO deaths, the village of Sopot (near south Serbia, north of Kumanovo) made its own threats. Villagers gave the Macedonian police an ultimatum of 48 hours to release the suspect, Sulejman Sulejmani. This member of the “Albanian National Army” was viewed as a hero by the locals, who interestingly enough made it clear that the EU-led Concordia mission was not welcome, either. This Albanian turning against the West, increasingly noted in Kosovo, was one of the year’s most ominous signs for the future.

Some foreign journalists were tipped off that a new conflict would began in early September, perhaps meant to coincide with the arrival of the English football team on the 5th. A small disturbance did occur, near the village of Brest on Skopska Crne Gora, when the police and army (supported by helicopters) took on about 5 Albanian militants led by a so-called “Commander Brechta.” Two Albanians were killed in the fighting, one wounded and two escaped. The “international community” cautiously voiced support for the government’s action, which had occurred as a result of typical Albanian provocations (the kidnapping of police officers in Aracinovo and a bombing in Skopje).

As temperatures dipped, the guns cooled off too, and verbal provocations took the place of military ones. Safe in their diaspora lairs, Albanian extremist leaders plotted and raised funds for whatever adventures are to come next. However, a growing international disdain for the movement and better intelligence have helped the Macedonians to suppress this threat.

Weapons collection theatrics

An operation that provoked great Western unease was the weapons collection of November and December. One of the Ohrid Accord’s key stipulations, this ill-fated plan was meant to disarm those citizens (in villages, mostly) who distrusted the state and who might wage war again. A massive advertising campaign before the month-long event failed to change anyone’s  minds. As expected, not even the prospect of prizes such as washing machines and cars could inspire many people to turn over the goods; in the end, only about 5,000 guns were turned in, most of them too old or rusty to use. As with NATO’s disarmament of the NLA in 2001, this was merely a simulated show of good will and progress. That very few people handed in their guns indicated their belief in a potential future war.

While the weapons collection was mainly a political stunt and thus to be discussed in that context, we can say that for the security forces, the mission was successful. That is to say, no one was killed or injured and tensions were kept to a minimum. The West had feared the worst and begged the Macedonians to defer the collections ’til spring. However, their fears proved unfounded- just as was their optimism for a rich “harvest.”

Conclusions

For Macedonian security and defense, 2003 was a year characterized by three themes: NATO cooperation and modernization programs; keeping the Kosovo and Kosovo-directed threats under control; and restoring Western trust through executing cool-headed security actions and a peaceful weapons collection program.

The first was by and large a success. Defense Minister Buchkovski recently stated that Macedonia is on track to join NATO in 2006. Almost as a reward, the EU military mission was ended in December in favor of Proxima- an unarmed 200-strong battalion designed to fight crime. For its part, NATO decided against removing its entire staff, even though its official mission had concluded- because they may as well stay to help oversee the modernization and accession process.

A late-breaking incident that may get ugly saw the US slap sanctions on a Macedonian businessman, Blagoja Samakoski, and his company, Mikrosam on 24 December. The US placed a two-year contract ban on Mikrosam, claiming that the company’s “missile proliferation technology violated the US Arms Export Control Act. As this story continues to unfold, more interesting details are likely to emerge.

As for the Kosovo situation, results here were more ambivalent. Attacks on border posts and forts continued, and land mines and bombings took the lives of Macedonian soldiers, civilians and foreign troops as well. The growing despair of the UNMIK administration over the lack of a happy exit strategy was readily apparent. For this reason, perhaps, 2003 saw an increased international resolve against Albanian extremists, as international troops and civilian officials started to come under fire too. For the first time since very early 2001, Macedonian actions against rogue elements were tolerated and even respected. International cooperation resulted in the arrests of several important figures, including AKSH leader Gaiffur Adili in Albania and Idajet Beqiri in Germany. However, the former was released, and the similar release of Agim Ceku- detained by Slovenia on a Serbian Interpol warrant- showed the extent to which the situation is still being dictated by the men with guns, men who still have designs on Macedonia. We’re not out of the woods yet.

How will Macedonia handle its political upheavals, economic challenges and hostile threats to its security in 2004? Find out tomorrow, when Balkanalysis.com offers its predictions for the New Year.