Balkanalysis.com

This text from one year ago, recapping the year 2002, is a fitting introduction to this week’s special series recapping 2003- and finishing with our predictions for 2004 on January 1st.

While not as exciting a year as many had hoped, 2002 in Macedonia was in the end not so boring, either. Some saw it as the year when the impossible happened, and terrorists joined the government. Others saw it as the year when the impossible happened, and freedom fighters joined the government. Still others saw it as a “year of little progress” in which Macedonia, together with its West Balkan neighbors, remained mired in the mud of crime, instability and corruption.

However, even to mention “progress” implies some goal. Indeed, what sort of teleological fulfillment is the country progressing toward?A year ago at this time, war was being predicted for the Spring. Fortunately this did not happen- at least not as predicted. Instead of a return to Albanian-Macedonian violence, we saw hostilities turn inward amongst the Albanian parties. After a largely successful war, with everyone anticipating a larger piece of the pie, Ali Ahmeti broke free of Xhaferi’s influence and, after some shoot-ups in Tetovo, formed his own party. While many expressed disbelief- first that he turned to politics, second that his party won, and third that he finally entered the sanctum of Parliament (just the other day)- this was all part of a natural progression that could have been predicted from the moment his insurrection gained support among the Western media, back in early 2001.

As in “liberated” Kosovo, the biggest threat to peace this year was inter-Albanian fighting. As 2002 draws to a close, it is likely that the feuding will be revived in an even stronger form- Xhaferi and Thaci are desperately trying to recover their lost popularity, and now seem to be taking a very radical stance (regarding the need for a new war to really win “human rights” for the Albanians). Informed sources believe that DUI members have been offered large sums of cash to switch to the DPA, and that some already have- including former friends of Ahmeti who are now willing to work against him.

If the recent bombing in Kumanovo was the work of such agitators- as seems quite possible- then the risk of unpredictable new violence is high. Since this bomb was not meant to scare but to kill, it must be understood as a provocation designed to bring about Macedonian retaliation.

But the major hazard for 2003 will be the realization of the grand myth of 2002: the Ohrid Accord. The new and messy coalition of SDSM and DUI was built on the foundation of Ohrid implementation, as well as the heavily-publicized fight against VMRO-DPA corruption. (DUI was too new a party to have been compromised politically by it; the topic of SDSM corruption was apparently past its sell-by date). Rather naпvely, these twin crusades were seen by Western diplomats and media as Macedonia’s magic solutions: Ohrid would be a band-aid to cover the festering sore of Albanian separatism, and tackling corruption would repair the dilapidated economy.

However, the economy’s problems are far too complex, and destructive attitudes far too ingrained for any overnight solution. The public is already disillusioned, realizing that little has changed since September 15^th. Indeed, Branko’s first hundred days have been characterized almost entirely by power struggles, squabbles over ministerial appointments, and musical chairs with directorates across the country. This was to have been expected.

The Framework Agreement is the most contentious issue of all; since August 2001, it has been the cornerstone of all Western public policy. Stakes are highest here. In 2002, “implementing Ohrid” has been the mantra of all international organizations of note. The Albanian former militants have signed up to it, pledging that it will sufficiently appease their craving for “human rights.” This pledge to behave largely convinced the West to back DUI, though they knew it was an unpopular coalition choice for the majority of the county’s population.

Much of the treaty, however, depends on one magic number- 20 percent. This is the percentage required to win certain of the treaty’s stipulated minority rights. So what if the Albanians do not make up 20 percent of the population in the census, the results of which are to be released on January 15^th? With Ahmeti promising his flock 30 percent, anything under 25 percent will be a defeat. Ahmeti, and his foreign enablers in the media, have set up a situation whereby the census-takers will be charged with deception, should anything less than the expected result be announced. The messenger would be shot by critics who didn’t even count any heads in the first place- and Macedonia be plunged into fresh crisis.

But should the real Albanian head count fall under 20 percent (as some informed sources believe), it is likely that covert manipulation will occur to prevent a political firestorm. And perhaps the same thing will happen if the result is too high. The government will have to be very brave indeed if it plans to release the true figures, as they will no doubt be unpalatable to one of the two sides.

Let’s just assume that everything goes well: the census results are amenable to everyone, Ohrid is implemented, and no more mysterious acts of terror occur. Will this be enough to appease Albanian voters, or will the “human rights” demands prove never-ending, as many fear? And will the country be saved from forced segregation and nationalism?

The answer is probably no. When there are too many interested parties who feel themselves shut out from power and wealth, nothing will proceed as simply as envisioned. But in any case, everything will not go well with the abovementioned: at least one (if not all) is bound to occur, causing an increase of tensions. And then the “pro-Western” government and its foreign handlers will have to face the moment of reckoning: that the present reality was largely constructed on the myth of the Framework Agreement as the guarantor of human rights and the guardian of peace and stability- in short, the treaty to end all treaties.

Since 2001, a huge amount of energy has been expended on making this myth a reality. And probably, some people sincerely believe in it. But most of them, I would imagine, don’t actually live here. Just as the strongest believers in the Albanian and Macedonian national identities tend to live in the diaspora communities, the biggest backers of Ohrid tend to be those living somewhere with functioning infrastructure, economic prosperity, ethnic harmony and good customer service. All of these mythical narratives are complex and have their own self-sustaining internal logic that precludes them from existing outside of the ideal.

In short, the grand myth of Ohrid was not sufficiently challenged in 2002. There seems to have been no contingency plan made for the “what if it doesn’t work” scenario. Since the operative stipulations of the Ohrid Agreement pertain to the results of the census, Macedonia may be headed for a train wreck.

Hopefully, this will not happen. But the possibility is there. Could the Ohrid Agreement suffer the same fate as the equally idealistic League of Nations? And could it actually lead to a catastrophic return to violence?

However it turns out, one thing is for sure: 2003 will be a far more interesting year than the lackluster, ambivalent 2002. We can only hope that it will be characterized by interestingly peaceful developments, rather than by new outbreaks of violence.