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11/4/2003 (Balkanalysis.com)
On Saturday, after a fanfare of media, peace concerts, and even an anti-weapons march that attracted a few hundred stragglers (some governmental) and succeeded mostly in angering Skopje’s idled motorists, the long awaited weapons collections began. After all the controversies, mockery and doubt surrounding this epochal event, the government is just lucky that Charlton Heston hasn’t found about this flagrant breach of the Second Amendment. It’s also a good thing that he’s too old to be swayed by the siren charms of Skopje’s anti-gun girls.”What!” the reader may protest. “Macedonia is ruled neither by foreign pressure groups nor by the constitution of another country!”
Of course, this would be to deny the entire discursive history of the weapons collection itself. The train that started in Ohrid in 2001 is nearing its final destination- right? Peace, stability and all that are soon on the way- right?
At least the West knows how to cover its bases. It happened with the equally symbolic and equally useless operation “Essential Harvest” that helped “decommission” the NLA in 2001, and it’s happening again now- the relativization of victory.
The formula is simple: stipulate that success will be attained when a specific (but arbitrary) number of weapons are collected. In 2001, it was 3,000; today, it is 25,000. Although such figures have neither a connection with reality (i.e., how many weapons actually exist) nor with altering motive (i.e., why someone would want to use such a weapon in the first place), at least they provide a quantifiable goal- like the big red thermometer at a blood drive or some public television fundraiser. Hit it and you win.
Yet even if the magic number is hit, will the operation have proven a success. However, it is extremely unlikely that this will happen, if one looks at the recent example of Kosovo.
Nevertheless, despite its reprisal the golden carrot formula used in Kosovo in September, Macedonia’s disarmament drive is unlikely to be a success- relatively or otherwise.
Whereas the Kosovo administration promised municipal infrastructure aid, Macedonia is offering compliers a chance to win a car, or a sewing machine, or a washer. The great Macedonian lottery of 2003 seems to be rewarding violators and brigands- as such, a logical extension of the Ohrid Accord’s ramifications.
The ludicrousness of this scheme has appeared often in the press. Many have stated that they should go out and buy a gun now just so that they can turn it in for a car or a washing machine. Why not? After all, if more people in Macedonia didn’t have to rely on public transportation or hand-washing, the chances of war breaking out would sag considerably.
The EU and OSCE offered the usual encouragements last week, making the highly interesting comment that success “…lies in the hands of people who have such weapons.” One would have thought that success would lie in the mouths of those who made the press releases.
While the flimsy government coalition has rallied in support of the weapons collection, the fact that it is run by a former NLA commander (Gzim Ostreni) hasn’t built much confidence in the Macedonian population. As in Kosovo, mutual mistrust and an endemic pro-gun Balkan mindset will prove more obstinate than any offers the itinerant “confidence builders” can make.
Aside from that, some parties have been openly opposed to the disarmament scheme. Most notable in this regard is Arben Xhaferi’s DPA, which nevertheless pledged not to obstruct it.
However, new information suggests that DPA has not only disagreed with the arms drive on a policy level. Menduh Thaci and other top leaders have been making the rounds of Albanian villages near Tetovo and Skopje, telling the people to hold onto their guns- cause “it ain’t over yet.”
Whether it is just trying to spread fear, bolster nationalism, or actually has some plan for later destabilization, the DPA is actively working against the weapons collections. It is counting on the failure of the operation to weaken DUI’s credibility in the government, and propel more nationalistic, extremist forces to the fore.
The West gambled that Ostreni’s record would help win over suspicious Albanian villagers. However, now that the DUI is perceived as Skopje “sell-outs” by the rank-and-file, Xhaferi’s bunch hopes to eliminate the DUI’s “moderate” Albanian influence in the government (even if that “moderate” influence comes from people who were once called terrorists.) While the success or failure of the weapons failure is not enough to topple the government (recent ministerial changes have other, internal motivating factors), it is sufficient to present an embarrassment. Mostly, one hopes, to the architects of the Ohrid Agreement who after all created it in the first place as a concession to the Macedonian side.
Of course, as with all the other “concessions,” this is proving to be a largely simulated, ceremonial one that whether it “succeeds” or not will have no effect on Macedonia’s collective confidence or safety.
In terms of large-scale conflict, the number of guns in a country has little part to play in determining risk value. Even were the Albanians in the hills to give up every gun in their possession, the whole arsenal could be replenished several times over the very next day, just by dipping into the limitless funds available from the diaspora and organized crime.
On the other hand, even if they were to clutch tight onto every firearm in their possession, the risk of war would depend only on whether they perceived a need to use them. In the end, the rationale for voluntarily surrendering weapons becomes most effective in one capacity: that it allows less chance for a child to be killed in a household accident. Which is exactly what gun control advocates in the US have been arguing.
That said, the best solution may be to import the American anti-gun lobbyists while simultaneously deporting the militias to America. Everyone would be happy: the former extremists would enjoy an environment where people didn’t call them un-Constitutional, and the latter extremists would get to join Mr. Heston and Co. in celebrating the Second Amendment in a (politically) safe environment. Everyone would win- with the only catch being the retention of hand-washing and public transportation in Macedonia.
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