Georgia and the West, Part II
The US, Russia, and apologists in the Western media have lately been criticizing Georgia for failing to “crack down” on a perceived al Qaeda threat in the Pankisi Gorge. As the first part of this article showed, such a threat may actually be exaggerated, or in fact completely spurious.
Assuming that there is at least a security threat- of whatever provenance- in Pankisi, and that Georgia must act, there are strong reasons to defend Georgian caution. First of all, unlike Russians and Americans, Georgians actually have to live there. Should certain unsavory elements be sufficiently aggravated by the Georgian military response, Georgian citizens themselves may be in danger of violent and misdirected reprisals. This has application to two other overlooked considerations, those of the historical and cultural characteristics of the Caucasus. Neither can be ignored.For many centuries, life in the Caucasus has been characterized by decentralization, informal economy, and the necessity for local allegiances. Only rarely has a unified and autonomous Georgian state managed to control all of the territory it now (however tenuously) administers. In the Caucasus, land of myriad ethnic groups and languages, the rules are radically different in less diverse Western nations. Sometimes the distance separating different groups is quite literally just over the next mountain pass. And this brings us to the associated question of geography.
Although it is easy for outsiders to chide Georgia’s halfhearted military response, such criticisms usually overlook the key relevant factor- geography. In a wild area of enormous mountains and valleys, any military campaign should be just as difficult as in Afghanistan. To be sure, the Georgians know their own terrain better than outsiders do, but the Chechens- on the run and experienced in battle- know it even better. And they are used to fighting for their lives, whereas Georgians are a peaceful bunch who do not willingly go off to start wars. When they do have to fight, as Abkhazia proves, the results are disastrous. Prodding Georgia to start another war, when tensions of varying magnitude lurk in at least three other regions of the country, is asking a lot of a country whose economy and military are admittedly weak.
The “Great Powers” have so far come up with two remedies for this. An impatient Moscow has volunteered to carpet-bomb the Gorge. So far, the Russian campaign- sharply decried by Washington- has only managed to kill one hapless Georgian civilian. For Russians fed up with continued Chechen impunity, the Georgians seem to be at least abetting the terrorists. For Russia, access to the Gorge would be not only a moral victory, not only a declaration of power over Georgia, but also a real chance to terminate the Chechen threat. Unless, of course, the Chechens were merely driven further into Georgia. In which case Moscow would be obliged to follow- and re-occupy the country in the process.
The other alternative, perceived as less painful, is to have the Georgians do it themselves with the backing of US Army trainers. Yet resistance to the GTEP program lingers, and suggested reforms from 2000 have yet to be carried out. There is a real argument going on within the Georgian defense establishment, and existing divisions have been worsened by the increasing pressure from two powerful interventionist forces. Proof of this is the failure to fill the 600 trainee slots, and, more ominously, the July 19 resignation of Col. Nika Djandjgava and about 100 other officers and NCO’s. The colonel, “a leading pro-American advocate of military modernization,” had recently been named acting land forces commander, as well as overseeing the GTEP program. Despite stating that low wages and other related issues had to do with the resignations, Eurasianet.org believes that they derived from a feud between Djandjgava and the pro-Russian Maj. Gen. Koba Kobaladze, commander of the National Guard. The fact that the majority of officers soon returned to work seems to indicate such a publicity stunt. The episode does serve as testimony to the other difficulties- perhaps unanticipated by the Georgians- of the American intervention.
It also can’t be comforting to the Georgians to know that their American mentors have no intention of going into the line of fire- rather, they are huddling next to their chalkboards and in the Tbilisi Sheraton, where they were recently billeted for two months (at a cost of $700,000).
The analyst Stratfor was correct (on 28 August) to blame “endemic corruption” in the Georgian police and military in part for the failed crackdown on terrorists. Yet will this is a compelling reason, it is not a solution: there is little chance for a phenomenon so deeply ingrained to disappear within the timeline the US and Russia have set for action. Nor will forcing the issue make corruption go away any quicker. Advising Georgian authorities may be commendable, but forcing them to do so for the immediate benefit of other and external interests is not. It is merely a bullying tactic, cloaked under the guise of well-meaning advice. And it may backfire, if (as Stratfor admits) powerful Georgian and Chechen mafia figures take their revenge on law enforcers.
Yet Western grumblers have overlooked a crucial consideration. Making someone an official by putting him in a uniform does not simultaneously free him of the operative local conditions. For Georgians living in remote, dangerous areas awash in drugs, foreign and local criminals (like Pankisi), there exists a very different and complex reality of localized, inter-ethnic relationships. In areas overlooked by the rule of law, decentralized authority and its unique system of negotiations, loyalties and deal-making takes effect. The Russian belief in a sweeping solution (bombs and more bombs) and the American naˆšÃªÂ¬Ã¸vetˆšÃªÂ¬Ï€ (that training and downsizing will automatically make the Georgian army spring into action) overlook the intricacies of real life in the Caucasus.
In short, it is easy for analysts and bureaucrats in far-off cities to criticize Georgian efforts. Then again, they don’t have to execute them.