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Archive for August, 2002

Georgia and the West, Part II

The US, Russia, and apologists in the Western media have lately been criticizing Georgia for failing to “crack down” on a perceived al Qaeda threat in the Pankisi Gorge. As the first part of this article showed, such a threat may actually be exaggerated, or in fact completely spurious.

Assuming that there is at least a security threat- of whatever provenance- in Pankisi, and that Georgia must act, there are strong reasons to defend Georgian caution. First of all, unlike Russians and Americans, Georgians actually have to live there. Should certain unsavory elements be sufficiently aggravated by the Georgian military response, Georgian citizens themselves may be in danger of violent and misdirected reprisals. This has application to two other overlooked considerations, those of the historical and cultural characteristics of the Caucasus. Neither can be ignored.For many centuries, life in the Caucasus has been characterized by decentralization, informal economy, and the necessity for local allegiances. Only rarely has a unified and autonomous Georgian state managed to control all of the territory it now (however tenuously) administers. In the Caucasus, land of myriad ethnic groups and languages, the rules are radically different in less diverse Western nations. Sometimes the distance separating different groups is quite literally just over the next mountain pass. And this brings us to the associated question of geography.

Although it is easy for outsiders to chide Georgia’s halfhearted military response, such criticisms usually overlook the key relevant factor- geography. In a wild area of enormous mountains and valleys, any military campaign should be just as difficult as in Afghanistan. To be sure, the Georgians know their own terrain better than outsiders do, but the Chechens- on the run and experienced in battle- know it even better. And they are used to fighting for their lives, whereas Georgians are a peaceful bunch who do not willingly go off to start wars. When they do have to fight, as Abkhazia proves, the results are disastrous. Prodding Georgia to start another war, when tensions of varying magnitude lurk in at least three other regions of the country, is asking a lot of a country whose economy and military are admittedly weak.

The “Great Powers” have so far come up with two remedies for this. An impatient Moscow has volunteered to carpet-bomb the Gorge. So far, the Russian campaign- sharply decried by Washington- has only managed to kill one hapless Georgian civilian. For Russians fed up with continued Chechen impunity, the Georgians seem to be at least abetting the terrorists. For Russia, access to the Gorge would be not only a moral victory, not only a declaration of power over Georgia, but also a real chance to terminate the Chechen threat. Unless, of course, the Chechens were merely driven further into Georgia. In which case Moscow would be obliged to follow- and re-occupy the country in the process.

The other alternative, perceived as less painful, is to have the Georgians do it themselves with the backing of US Army trainers. Yet resistance to the GTEP program lingers, and suggested reforms from 2000 have yet to be carried out. There is a real argument going on within the Georgian defense establishment, and existing divisions have been worsened by the increasing pressure from two powerful interventionist forces. Proof of this is the failure to fill the 600 trainee slots, and, more ominously, the July 19 resignation of Col. Nika Djandjgava and about 100 other officers and NCO’s. The colonel, “a leading pro-American advocate of military modernization,” had recently been named acting land forces commander, as well as overseeing the GTEP program. Despite stating that low wages and other related issues had to do with the resignations, Eurasianet.org believes that they derived from a feud between Djandjgava and the pro-Russian Maj. Gen. Koba Kobaladze, commander of the National Guard. The fact that the majority of officers soon returned to work seems to indicate such a publicity stunt. The episode does serve as testimony to the other difficulties- perhaps unanticipated by the Georgians- of the American intervention.

It also can’t be comforting to the Georgians to know that their American mentors have no intention of going into the line of fire- rather, they are huddling next to their chalkboards and in the Tbilisi Sheraton, where they were recently billeted for two months (at a cost of $700,000).

The analyst Stratfor was correct (on 28 August) to blame “endemic corruption” in the Georgian police and military in part for the failed crackdown on terrorists. Yet will this is a compelling reason, it is not a solution: there is little chance for a phenomenon so deeply ingrained to disappear within the timeline the US and Russia have set for action. Nor will forcing the issue make corruption go away any quicker. Advising Georgian authorities may be commendable, but forcing them to do so for the immediate benefit of other and external interests is not. It is merely a bullying tactic, cloaked under the guise of well-meaning advice. And it may backfire, if (as Stratfor admits) powerful Georgian and Chechen mafia figures take their revenge on law enforcers.

Yet Western grumblers have overlooked a crucial consideration. Making someone an official by putting him in a uniform does not simultaneously free him of the operative local conditions. For Georgians living in remote, dangerous areas awash in drugs, foreign and local criminals (like Pankisi), there exists a very different and complex reality of localized, inter-ethnic relationships. In areas overlooked by the rule of law, decentralized authority and its unique system of negotiations, loyalties and deal-making takes effect. The Russian belief in a sweeping solution (bombs and more bombs) and the American naпvetй (that training and downsizing will automatically make the Georgian army spring into action) overlook the intricacies of real life in the Caucasus.

In short, it is easy for analysts and bureaucrats in far-off cities to criticize Georgian efforts. Then again, they don’t have to execute them.

Georgia and the West, Part I

Ever since late February, when Georgia was added to Washington’s exclusive club of terror-afflicted nations, the West has developed a whole new Caucasus curiosity. While not exactly gripped by frenzied adoration, the cream of the Western media has lately come around to pay its respects: the BBC, New York Times, Wall Street Journal and Chicago Tribune, just to name a few. This unprecedented new interest is not without its risks for these organizations’ profit margins. After all, since the US kicked off its Georgia 2002 campaign with such stylish aplomb- by announcing that al Qaida terrorists had penetrated the Pankisi Gorge- the new media interest in Georgia remains predicated on the country’s potential for future excitement. High-altitude shootouts, enriched plutonium gone missing, or even a tense standoff between the Americans and the Russians- these are the kind of stories that the Western media will need, if it is to maintain its newfound interest in Georgia.Unfortunately for them, since no other news has emerged about the “al Qaida” menace, media interest may very well ebb. Unfortunately for Georgia, an unfulfilled media bereft of exciting stories will soon latch on to other themes, for other reasons. But perhaps this was part of the plan all along.

From the first, it has been abundantly clear that the announced deployment of American military trainers has little to do with keeping the world safe from terrorism. Rather, it has to do with safeguarding American interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The first motivation is to protect the Caspian Sea oil reserves; second is to contain Iran and Iraq. Georgia, indeed, is just one part of a larger plan. As Armen Khanbabyan writes, in a recent Counterpunch article entitled “Georgia is only the beginning,”

“not only Central Asia, but also the Transcaucasus should become a zone of complete Western influence. For the resolution of the task, Georgia alone is not sufficient. Very soon Americans and Turks will appear in Azerbaijan, and in quantities much greater than in Georgia, as Washington has already signed an agreement with Baku on the modernization of the local armed forces.”

For all this, the American media has fostered an air of innocence about the whole Georgian adventure. “America to the rescue, again,” was the title of an innocuous Wall Street Journal piece of 10 March. Amazingly, the paper acts as if the US is performing a noble act of sacrifice: “America is again bearing the brunt of Europe’s burdens- this time in Georgia, a country struggling to move from Russia’s orbit into the West’s.” The thesis of grudging American efforts in the face of European inaction is popular among apologists for the US involvement in Yugoslavia. In that case as in this, however, it was only perceived national interest that propelled the intervention.

Despite an awareness of these greater goals, many Georgians are willing to embrace the new American intervention. One young Georgian told me, “we need all the help we can get- from anyone.” Georgia also desires to remove itself from the oppressive Russian yoke. Yet here, we should consider the old adage: better the enemy one knows than the enemy one does not. This may well apply to the current situation, in ways that Georgia may not expect. Indeed, is Georgia ready to fulfill the West’s requirements- and can it even predict what these will be?

Coercive measures, shadowy goals

The last decade has seen the birth of a new word in the English language: “balkanized.” Emerging from the self-same region of south-central Europe, this word connotes all of the popularized images associated with the Yugoslav wars- images of polarization, ethnic discord, nationalistic folly and hopeless poverty. Although used adjectivally, the semantic richness of the word derives from the sense one gets of a process- in this case, a decade-long, debilitating series of civil wars- being fulfilled. The central thesis of the apologists for Western intervention in the Balkans has been that latent ethnic and religious tensions were too strong to be stopped- hence, an unavoidable war. Despite the international community’s best efforts to help, the region’s very self-destructive and discordant nature made war inevitable. Lost in this explanation, of course, is the role played by international sanctions, covert arms sales, and the efforts of hidden forces to prolong the fighting. If the word “balkanized” can describe so effortlessly a whole region’s intrinsic folly, it is mostly owing to the media and other mouthpieces of the West, which informed the content of the definition more than any of the region’s inhabitants ever did.

There is some good news and bad news in this for Georgia. First, the bad news- however terrible the ethnic and religious strife has been in the Balkans, the Caucasus has ten times the potential for a greater war. While the Balkans has only a handful of languages, the Caucasus boasts over a hundred. While the former Yugoslavia was an affluent and well-functioning country before its collapse, Georgia is already poor and worn out by the destructive Abkhazian and Ossetian wars. With help from outside forces, it would take very little to tear Georgia apart- and the rest of the region as well.

The good news, of course, is that none of these dark predictions has yet materialized. Georgia still has a good chance of coming out unscathed from the “war on terror.” In support of this epic battle, the US claims to be helping the country- and if the Georgian military is modernized by the American presence, this might be a welcome step indeed. But on other fronts, signs of more sinister coercion are emerging. It seems that the Western interest has taken the form of an ultimatum. Take the recent report of one very powerful influence on Western policy:

“Human Rights Watch today (13 April) welcomed the U.N. Human Rights Committee’s new recommendations for improving Georgia’s treatment of detainees and prisoners. The Committee cited Georgia’s prisons for having a high death rate, poor and unhealthy living conditions, and widespread police torture and arbitrary detention. It gave the Georgian government an extraordinary twelve-month deadline to report back on measures taken to curb these abuses.

The Committee has provided clear instructions on what Georgia must do to fulfil its international human rights obligations,” said Elizabeth Andersen, executive director of Human Rights Watch’s Europe and Central Asia division. “The government must now move swiftly to reform Georgia’s police, prisons, and criminal procedure code.”

The arrival of Human Rights Watch in any country signifies that economic coercion is right around the corner. By trumpeting the UN “recommendations,” HRW is enthusiastically upholding the West’s ultimatum. Now that the conditions have been set, one of three results will follow. Possibly, Georgia will make the necessary reforms, and temporarily appease the West; more likely, it will not. When conditions are not met, the West can become terribly cranky. Whether by blocking promised economic aid, or even by imposing sanctions, the West can dictate the terms of negotiation and to some extent shape the course of future events. One must not forget the inordinately strong role that non-governmental organizations, advisory bodies, and other foreign lobby groups had on Western policy-making in the Balkans. This influence continues to this day in Macedonia, where a sensationalized HRW report of human-rights violations from last summer has whetted the appetite of the Hague Tribunal. Now that revered arbiter of justice, it is said, plans to indict Macedonia’s popular interior minister, Ljube Boshkovski. There does not currently exist a war crimes court for Georgia. Yet enthusiasm for joining the Western club may well result in such unpleasant violations of the state’s sovereignty.

Cultural insensitivity- or something more?

There is, however, a second and more disturbing aspect the same document:

“During its review of Georgia, on March 18-19, the (UN Human Rights) Committee also expressed “deep concern” about Georgia’s rising intolerance against religious minorities, particularly Jehovah’s Witnesses. Mob attacks by Georgian orthodox militants against religious minorities have escalated throughout the past two and a half years, facilitated by government inaction. The Committee called upon the Georgian government to ensure that those perpetrating abuses against religious minorities are prosecuted, to conduct a public awareness campaign on religious tolerance, and prevent, through education, intolerance and discrimination based on religion or beliefs.”

This rather audacious statement shows that, as in the Balkans, the West intends to force its values and beliefs on Georgia, without seeking to understand it first. As one Macedonian man told me about aid workers in his country, “we get these idealistic, well-educated young Americans… they come here, but never try to learn anything about the history or the culture of Macedonia. Instead, they look for examples that support their preconceived ideas about what they should do to fix our country.”

This HRW and UN decree on “religious minorities,” though it does not seem so, is practically a declaration of war. It is one thing to expect Europeans to tolerate the minority faiths that have taken root in their lands over centuries; it is quite another to expect Georgians to welcome modern proselytizers, such as the Mormons or Jehovah’s Witnesses. Such glassy-eyed missionaries are uninvited representatives of “religions” entirely foreign to Georgia- indeed, entirely foreign to most of the world. Lumping the latter-day American cults in Georgia into the same box as the Balkan Muslims is patently absurd. Since the startling successes of these evangelizers owes to their predatorial nature- typically, they promise salvation to hopeless people in poor countries- it is no wonder why the Georgian church, or the Ukrainian, or Russian, for example, would be angry. Yet for their own safety, Georgians must realize that these concerns for “human rights” are just a vicious game, and one played for very high stakes indeed.

Analysts typically operate under the notion that power coalesces around major military moves and political statements. Yet for the West, this is not entirely true. In the West, non-profit institutions, NGO’s and thinktanks lay the groundwork for full-blown policies that often see their logical conclusion in coercion, meddling, and even war. If Georgia does not want to share the fate of the former Yugoslavia, it must try to understand the way the West thinks, and avoid being manipulated or baited into emotional outbursts of nationalism. For, as is evident from the above documents, the warning shots have been fired. And somewhere, somebody is already thinking excitedly about all the possible unpleasant meanings for the adjective of the future- “georgianized.”

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