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The Georgian Gamble: Will Tbilisi Win too, in the “War on Terror?”

Last week, America announced that Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge has become a safe haven for Al Qaeda terrorists. This accusation, which Tbilisi denied, was followed swiftly by the arrival of US Special Forces troops into the country. In retrospect, we should have seen it coming- the American ambassador’s pronouncement was merely made to prepare the public for a move that had been decided and planned long before. Yet the sudden deployment seems to have caught many by surprise. The American public is not surprised, however, chiefly because the majority of the population has never heard of Georgia. It is simply another far-off, unkempt place, where exist the evildoers whose extirpation, we are told, is vital to American national security.

Indeed, whatever the US may do in Georgia in the future is not likely to cause much dissent at home. Bush’s approval ratings are sufficiently high as to prevent much grumbling- especially because the “war on terror� has thus far brought close to zero combat deaths. In contrast, the “bodybag syndrome� has been more pronounced among unarmed journalists than among their warrior peers.

The only people who may object to expanding the war on terror are those who oppose US military intervention in general. These critics cite the inordinate costs of sending and maintaining overseas forces, which result in a parallel decrease of domestic spending. Such dissenters also point to what the Pentagon calls “collateral damage�- the needless loss of human life resulting from military mistakes and blunders.

US tactics: the dead, the bad and the ugly

The war in Afghanistan has thus far witnessed several occasions where US forces bombed friendly Afghan contingents by accident. The most high-profile case was the liquidation of a convoy of tribal elders, on their way to Kabul for the inauguration of Hamid Karzai. Another recent gaffe was the targeted bombing of a group of Afghan peasants on a mountainside (San Francisco Chronicle, 17 February 2002). Since one of them was tall, and they appeared to be gathered in a “conspiratorial� group, the CIA surmised that this merry band was none other than bin Laden and his crew. Unsurprisingly, the men turned out merely to be poor villagers, who had trekked for days with their donkeys, just to cart off some scrap metal to resell for 60 cents a pound. They were all killed on the spot by a US missile. Whoops.

Given the infinitely difficult job that the US has had of separating good intelligence from bad in Afghanistan, one must wonder how they will handle the similarly chaotic Pankisi Gorge region. As in Afghanistan, will local warlords and criminals deceive the US into bombing their own local enemies? Will the Americans even be able to separate the “good� guys from the “bad�?

Even trying to imagine how it will all transpire is enough to give one a headache. If the US is right, and dangerous Afghan Al Qaeda fighters are intermingled with renegade Chechens in the Gorge, then what would be the best means of apprehending them? Should the US simply barge in and open fire, innocent people- Georgians and Chechen refugees alike- will certainly be killed. Indiscriminate bombing may also increase the risk of a real Islamic jihad being declared against Georgia- something which has not happened so far.

Gunboat diplomacy, and more intimate embarrassments

Besides these potential dangers to Georgia, we must consider exactly how the US will handle the messy “human element.� As has become clear from the Afghan war, America is strong on ammo, but weak on diplomacy and the interpreting of intelligence. The “shoot now, ask questions later� approach has unfortunately prevailed. Yet in the lawless, smuggler’s lair of the Pankisi Gorge especially, the US will have few trustworthy friends- even if it tries to “manufacture� them with money. One wonders if the Chechens will be recruited; the US could promise them safety if they were to hand over Al Qaeda members. Or, on the other hand, the Americans could instead try to eradicate the Chechen threat along with the Al Qaeda mercenaries. Either way, some lurid compromises will have to be made.

If the first, the US will find itself in another unseemly partnership with dubious company. As with NATO’s support for Albanian gangsterism in Kosovo, becoming friends with the Chechens (who control the central link in the heroin chain that remarkably enough ends in Kosovo) may have some unpleasant side effects. Chief of all may be angering Russia- which is certainly not defenseless, as a weak Serbia was in 1999. If America steals Russia’s war only in order to win it for the Chechens, the outlook is not good for world peace.

Most doubt, however, that Bush and Co. are capable of such a daring and self-destructive feat. What is more likely is that America is seeking to wound the Russian bear where it hurts most- the sense of pride. If the US, after years of denouncing Russian brutality in Chechnya, should steal Russia’s war only in order to fight it itself, the humiliation and shock will cause big problems for Putin. Certainly the Russian generals who advocate a strong Caucasus presence will be smarting when they see American forces occupying Vaziani base. The Russians didn’t leave Vaziani all that long ago; it hasn’t even had a chance to get dusty yet. They had also not been expecting Shevardnadze to play the American card in forcing Russia’s withdrawal from Georgia. Moscow thought it could perpetuate a stalemate by threatening Georgia with the Abkhaz insurgents, since Georgia had nothing to fight back with- save Pankisi.

Confusion abounds: determining the goals of Shevardnadze and the US

On the surface, inviting the Americans in would seem a masterstroke for Shevardnadze. In an instant, he has set the clock ticking for Russia’s complete military withdrawal (something which will pacify Georgian nationalists). He has also pleased the United States, and will most certainly win much-needed cash and military training for the Georgian armed forces. Further, he has guaranteed the safety of his country as a pipeline route, should the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline ever be built.

In short, should everything go according to plan, and Shevardnadze win out on the nationalist front, as well as the economic front, he will consolidate his grip on power- now, an especially important concern. Even before the controversial attempt to close Rustavi 2 TV in November 2001, opposition to his rule was on the rise. America has intervened in the past to help Shevardnadze win dubious victories in elections lamely deemed “fair and free� by the OSCE. In many ways, his current invite is just a means of paying the US back.

Yet the benefits for Georgia are minor compared to what the stronger power- the US- will get. And apparently, the risks mentioned above are worth it for the Americans. As an insightful recent report in World Net Daily states (�Stealing Russia’s War,� 22 February 2002), the US will close the circle in its military ring around Russia- as well as gain access to the oil-rich Caspian region. Third, and most important in the short-term, is the access Georgia provides to expediting the new and improved “war on terror.� The report states:

“…if, for example, Washington chooses to unleash its firepower against Baghdad, Georgia could provide an extra base for the U.S. Air Force to attack Iraq from the north. If Turkey, which has expressed opposition to such a war, should balk at allowing U.S. forces to use its territory to launch strikes, Shevardnadze would be more than willing to serve Washington in this and any other actions. And if U.S. relations with Russia turn confrontational again, American forces in Georgia - backed by U.S. forces in neighboring Turkey and the Turkish army - would seriously threaten the Russian army and major Russian strategic centers in the southern part of European Russia.�

Regardless of what happens, future historians will inevitably link such a strategic interest with the eccentric Bush administration: what I call the “reign of the dinosaurs.� Doddering war hawks like Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney- the most powerful vice-president in US history- are old men brought up on the Cold War’s doctrines. For someone like Rumsfeld, who is now reprising the role of Defense Secretary he first played back in the prehistoric Ford administration of the 1970’s, “containing Russia� is a mantra in American foreign policy. This current persisted right through the conservative regime of Ronald Reagan (ending 1988). Only since then has America slowly begun to realize that Russia is no longer the enemy. As we’ve seen in the recent Winter Olympics, Russia is now reduced to pouting over athletic defeats. But if the Bush administration (which is tilting at windmills, confronting an enemy that no longer exists) pushes its advantage too far, it may goad Russia into asserting its still formidable strength. And that would be a tragedy- for Russia, the US, and Georgia alike.

Endgame: how will the gamble play out?

In the end, Georgia’s diplomatic “victory� might prove deceptive. Two adages come to mind- “beware of Greeks bearing gifts,� and “better the enemy one knows, than the enemy one doesn’t.�

As for the first, we can say that inviting America into Georgia will lead to the political patronization of the Georgians. If future US intervention follows the logical, unblinking course it has in other parts of the world, Georgia will soon become a mountain of papers- of protocols, administrative diktats, the directives of foreign-controlled corporations, and endless legal red tape, all of which will keep Georgia bound in a nightmarishly bland illusion of freedom. Agriculture giant Monsanto already has an office in Tbilisi. When Monsanto wishes to sell genetically-modified seeds, will the independent-minded Georgian farmers of the mountains be consulted? Probably not.

This is not to say that Georgia should be paranoid, or refuse any foreign help whatsoever. To be sure, much reform is needed at the level of management and infrastructure to ameliorate Georgia’s standard of living and economy. Increasing foreign investment and tourism are important parts of this renovation. Yet in the end, will Georgia become America’s “partner,� or its “apprentice?� Accepting patronage means accepting an obligation. The Georgian government, by inviting the American military into the country, has gambled that fulfilling an as-yet unknown obligation won’t be too harsh. It remains to be seen how events play out, and whether the rich and ancient Georgian culture will survive the “war on terror.�