US and Russia Play a Dangerous Game in the Caucasus
The terrorism in New York may have particularly dangerous effects for Russia, as it struggles to contain Chechen terrorism and control its Caspian territories. Russia is trying to equate the Chechen terrorism with the similar actions the US accuses bin Laden of having perpetrated in New York. However, it remains to be seen whether the US will enthusiastically back up Russia in the Caucasus, because there are far greater implications than merely the question of whether Chechnya is indicative of terrorism or ethnic rights. The US and the humanitarian organizations which it basically controls have been scathing in their criticisms of Russia’s operations in Chechnya. One would assume, therefore, that the fact that both the Chechens and Bin Laden are radical Islamic terror organizations would be enough to unite Washington and Moscow. But America-s verbal support for the Chechens has more to do with issues like oil and NATO expansion than it does with human rights.
According to a Stratfor intelligence report of August 29, the bomb that ripped open the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline in the city of Achisu, on the Caspian Sea, has all the makings of further trouble for Russia: “the implications of a new Chechen strategy could be far-reaching. The Chechen capital of Grozny once housed the fourth-largest refinery network in the former Soviet Union; the Chechens know exactly where to hit oil infrastructure to maximize damage. That infrastructure is directly responsible for the petroleum revenues that fund more than half the Russian budget.”
It is obvious that Chechen separatists, and the rebels they have placed in neighboring Dagestan (where Achisu is located), have an eye on the oil revenues that come from the Caspian. If they could block Russia-s access to the coast, they could block not only whatever Russia claims in the Caspian itself, but effectively control the pipelines- and profit themselves.
While the many international oil companies involved also stand to be hurt by the same terrorism that affects Russia, there is a further reason that the US has not been particularly supportive of the Russian position. This has to do with the proposed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which has not been built yet, but is being pushed by the US as a means to bypass Russia. Leading analysts, such as Alec Rasizade (Contemporary Review, July, 2001) reveal that there have been criticisms raised about the feasiblity of this pipeline, from the very people who would fund it. “The problem has long been that few in the oil industry believed that that the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline was commerically viable. They have repeatedly pointed out that if this pipeline was commerically viable, then it would have already been built.” According to Rasizade, the backers of the pipeline have made their case based on some “questionable assumptions,” including a possible over-estimate of the Caspian-s oil potential, the need to isolate Russia, and the ability of Turkey-s economy to stabilize. In reality, the Turkish economy has been steadily weakening and some key members of the “sponsor group” (Exxon-Mobil, Russia-s Lukoil, and Pennzoil), have backed out. These companies had a 23% share in the consortium, and their bailing out has “adversely affected investment confidence, especially for international credit agencies that are skittish about Caspian oil reserves and the throughput sufficiency of the project. The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline needs a daily throughput of 1 million barrels to be economically justified.”
We can see, therefore, how any terrorism that affects Russia-s ability to transfer oil would directly benefit those who support a plan such as Baku-Ceyhan, which would only be seen by oil companies as the best of a bad situation, were an easier and cheaper Russian alternative not available. This is part of what’s at stake if the US were to abandon its stance on Chechnya.
Another alternative is Iran, which also has potential pipeline routes cheaper than the Baku-Ceyhan route. Traditional bad relations with the US had taken any Iranian plan out of consideration, but, Rasizade affirms, this might change under the current administration, because Vice President Cheney “has been an outspoken advocate of ending economic sanctions against IranˆšÂ¢Â¬Ã®Â¬Ã² as chief executive of Halliburton, a giant oil-services company, he believed that the Clinton strategy was wrong.” One suspects that an Iranian pipeline will be looked at more favorably by the US, when we also consider that Iran has announced its support for US attacks against Afghanistan. This is another possibility for an American “reward” at the detriment of Russia.
Among the many supporters of American military intervention, we also must consider the case of Georgia, where Schevernadze recently announced that Georgia would be prepared to help the US in any way against the terrorists. NATO conducted exercises in Georgia in June, and was hailed by the Georgian defense minister as “the first NATO/Partner full-scale field exercises in the South Caucasus.” Now it has been announced by Azerbaijan that NATO exercises will soon be held, in November 2001, in that country. There is no doubt that NATO seeks to expand eastward at the expense of Russia, and perhaps may try to impose itself as the arbitrator of regional disputes, as it did in the Balkans. With Georgia blaming Russia for supporting Abkhazian separatists, and Russia blaming Georgia for not cracking down on Chechen terrorists in the Pankisi Gorge, an uneasy status quo is maintained. Will NATO eventually seek to disarm both rebels, to put both pipeline routes- Dagestan and Baku- under its jurisdiction?